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THE ELEMENTS OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 









H 



THE ELEMENTS OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 



BY 
EDWARD L. THORNDIKE 

Professor of Educational Psychology in Teachers College 
Columbia University 

(SECOND EDITION) 



New York 
A. G. SELLER 

1907 






€ 



UBSARY of CONGRESS 
Twe Ooples Received 

FEB 28 ?.90r 

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Crtyright,. 1905, 190? 
By Edward L. Thorndike 



The MASON-HENRY Press 

SYRACUSE, NEW YORK 



INTRODUCTION 

I have been invited to -contribute a preface to this 
book, though when I ask myself, why any/book from 
Professor Thorndike's pen should need an introduction 
to the public by another hand, I find no answer. Both 
as an experimental investigator, as a critic of other in- 
vestigators, and as an expounder of results, he stands in 
the very forefront of American psychologists, and his 
references to my works in the text that follows will, I 
am sure, introduce me to more readers than I can intro- 
duce him to by my preface. 

In addition to the monographs which have been pour- 
ing from the press for twenty years past, we have by this 
time, both in English and in German, a very large num- 
ber of general text-books, some larger and some smaller, 
but all covering the ground in ways which, so far as stu- 
dents go, are practical equivalents for each other. The 
main subdivisions, principles, and features of descriptive 
psychology are at present well made out, and writers are 
agreed about them. If one has read earlier books, one 
need not read the very newest one in order to catch up 
with the progress of the science. The differences in 
them are largely of order and emphasis, or of fondness 
on the authors' parts for certain phrases, or for their 
own modes of approach to particular questions. It is one 
and the same body of facts with which they all make us 
acquainted. 

Some of these treatises indeed give much more promi- 
nence to the details of experimentation than others — 



vi Introduction 

artificial experimentation, I mean, with physical instru- 
ments, and measurements. A rapid glance at Professor 
Thorndike's table of contents might lead one to set him 
down as not belonging to the experimental class of psy- 
chologists. He ignores the various methods of proving 
Fechner's psycho-physic law, and makes no reference to 
chronoscopes, or to acoustical or optical technics. Yet 
in another and psychologically in a more vital sense his 
book is a laboratory manual of the most energetic and 
continuous kind. 

When I first looked at the proofs and saw each sec- 
tion followed by a set of neatly numbered exercises, 
problems, and questions in fine print, I confess that I 
shuddered for a moment. Can it be, I thought, that the 
author's long connection with the Teachers College is 
making even of him a high-priest of the American "text- 
book" Moloch, in whose belly living children's minds are 
turned to ashes, and whose ritual lies in text-books in 
which the science is pre-digested for the teacher by every 
expository artifice and for the pupil comminuted into 
small print and large print, and paragraph-headings, and 
cross-references and examination questions, and every 
other up-to-date device for frustrating the natural move- 
ment of the mind when reading, and preventing that irre- 
sponsible rumination of the material in one's own way 
which is the soul of culture? Can it be, I said, that 
Thorndike himself is sacrificing to machinery and dis- 
continuity ? 

But I had not read many of the galleys before I got 
the opposite impression. There are, it, is true, discon- 
tinuities in the book which might slightly disconcert a 
critic with a French turn of taste, but that is because of 
the intense concreteness with which the author feels his 
subject and wishes to make his reader feel it. The prob- 



Introduction vii 

lems and questions are uniquely to that end. They are 
laboratory work of the most continuous description, and 
the text is like unto them for concreteness. Professor 
Thorndike has more horror of vagueness, of scholastic 
phrases, of scientific humbug than any psychologist with 
whom I am acquainted. I defy any teacher or student to 
go through this book as it is written, and not to carry 
away an absolutely first-hand acquaintance with the work- 
ings of the human mind, and with the realities as distin- 
guished from the pedantries and artificialities of psy- 
chology. The author's superabounding fertility in famil- 
iar illustrations of what he is describing amounts to 
genius. I might enter into an exposition of some of the 
other peculiarities of his treatise, but this quality of ex- 
ceeding realism seems to cap the others and to give it 
eminence among the long list of psychology-books which 
readers now-a-days have to choose from. 

It is not a work for lazy readers, however; and lazy 
reading also has a sacred place in the universe of educa- 
tion. But I seem to foresee for it a powerful anti- 
pedantic influence, and I augur for it a very great suc- 
cess indeed in class-rooms. So, with no more pref- 
atory words, I heartily recommend it to all those who are 
interested in spreading the knowledge of our science. 

William James. 
Harvard University. 



PREFACE 

The aim of this book is to help students to learn the 
general principles of psychology. Those facts which 
can most profitably be made the subject matter of a 
course in general psychology are presented with an 
abundance of concrete illustrations, experiments, exer- 
cises and questions, by which the student may secure real 
rather than verbal conceptions and may test, apply and 
make permanent his knowledge. 

A good method of studying the book is probably ( I ) 
to read a section through quickly, then (2) to read it with 
care, jotting down in a note book every question that 
seems to be answered by the text. Next (3) without the 
book try to answer those questions; hunting out the 
answers when unable to give them from memory. (4) 
Do the printed exercises, writing down each answer or, 
if it is too long, its main point. (5) Do any experiments 
in connection with the section. (6) When the several 
sections of a chapter have all been thus studied, write 
down the general questions which the whole chapter has 
answered, and after an interval of several days try to 
give clear and reasonably adequate answers to these 
questions in writing. 

The references for further reading noted at the end 
of each chapter may best be read only after the text itself 
is mastered. The references marked A are for students 
in general, those marked B are for students especially 
desirous of increasing their knowledge of psychology and 
capable of studying difficult treatises. Additional read- 



Preface \x 

ings on special topics will be found at the end of the 
book. In the references Roman numerals refer to the 
chapters. § i, § 2, § 3, etc., refer to sections. Arabic 
numerals alone refer to pages. Titchener, Outline' re- 
fers to the third edition, that of 1899; 'Wundt, Physiolo- 
gische Psychologie/ refers to the fifth edition. 

The references to Wundt through Chapter VI are 
available in the English translation by Professor Titchener 
(Principles of Physiological Psychology, Vol. 1). Fur- 
ther volumes of this English version will appear in the 
near future. 

Through the great kindness of Professor L. F. 
Barker of Chicago University, Professor Dr. L. Edinger 
of Frankfurt-a.M., Professor A. von Kolliker of Wiirz- 
burg, Professor M. v. Lenhossek of Budapest, Professor 
M. Allen Starr, Dr. E. Learning and Dr. O. S. Strong of 
Columbia University, and Professor A. Van Gehuchten 
of Louvain, I am able to reproduce photographs and 
drawings of the finer structure of the nervous system 
such as are rarely seen in elementary books on either 
psychology or physiology. 

To Professor William James I owe the common debt 
of all psychologists due for the genius which has been 
our inspiration and the scholarship which has been our 
guide. The obligation is patent in every chapter. In- 
deed, the best service I wish for this book is that it may 
introduce its readers to that masterpiece of thought and 
expression, the Principles of Psychology. I owe also 
a personal debt for unfailing kindness and encourage- 
ment which can only be acknowledged, never repaid. 



PREFACE FOR TEACHERS 

This book is designed to serve as a text-book for stu- 
dents who have had no previous training in psychology, 
who will not in nine cases out of ten take any consider- 
able amount of advanced work in psychology, and who 
need psychological knowledge and insight to fit them to 
study, not the special theories of philosophy, but the gen- 
eral facts of human nature. For such students training 
in methods and technique alone is almost futile : they are 
not to be expert psychologists, but intelligent men and 
women. Training in the analysis of the process of 
thought is equally inadequate : they need more than an 
introduction to logic and philosophy. A course which re- 
duces psychology to a mass of technical words and defi- 
nitions is criminal : it hides realities from the student and 
either encourages him in verbal quibbling or destroys all 
interest in the study of mental facts. It is' the right and 
the duty of the psychologist as a thinker to specialize, 
to be an experimentalist, or analyst, or comparative psy- 
chologist. But it is the right of the student in a general 
course on psychology to demand a fair representation of 
the science as a whole. This book is therefore eclectic in 
subject matter and in method. Description, definition, 
analysis, experimentation, comparative and genetic 
studies— no one of these can wisely be omitted. 

This book represents no particular kind of psychology 
peculiar to the author, nor any radical departures from 
the general usage of modern text-books on psychology. 
Some of its features do, however, vary from those of the 
elementary text-books and so deserve comment. 



Preface for Teachers xi 

The description of the brain and sense organs 
follows the recent views instead of those current in the 
early eighties. By thus discarding the unprofitable 
geography of 'convolutions/ 'centers' and 'tracts' and 
utilizing the real facts of the constitution of the nervous 
system, we not only give the student knowledge of a 
truly explanatory sort which he can apply to psychologi- 
cal facts, but also supplant an incoherent mass of detail 
by a simple and clear hypothesis'. The length in pages 
of Part II is due to the photographs and drawings and 
represents a shortening rather than a lengthening of the 
student's time and effort. 

The descriptive or structural psychology has been 
sharply separated from the dynamic psychology. For 
instance, instead of taking up in one chapter both the 
nature of percepts and the laws of mental action in- 
volved in perception and illusion, I have put the latter in 
Part III along with such topics as instinct, habit and the 
association of ideas. The older custom is a relic of the 
'faculty psychology' and inevitably disposes the student 
to believe that perception, memory, reasoning and the 
like are subtle dynamic forces acting on mental proces- 
ses. By the separation the real value of the terms, sensa- 
tions, percepts, images, memories, judgments, emotions 
and the like, — namely, thei|*\ value as terms describing 
qualitative differences, — is preserved. Needless to say, 
the newer arrangement is not only truer to the facts, but 
also more teachable. 

Dynamic psychology is given a place in this book 
more in accord with the^ place it holds in present psy- 
chological thought than is customary in elementary books. 
It is surely wise to give adequate space to the facts and 
laws of instinct, capacity, habit, discrimination, analysis, 
assimilation, pre-perception, the association of ideas, 



xii Preface for Teachers 

selective thinking, ideo-motor action and choice. They 
are the least technical but at the same time the best 
organized and most instructive topics in psychology. 

In one particular the author abandons the accepted 
doctrine of the psychology books. That images of the 
resident or remote sensations produced by a movement 
should be the usual excitant to the movement, he cannot 
believe and has never taught. In the view presented in 
the text he has the support of the opinions reached by 
Kirkpatrick, Woodworth and Bair in the course of actual 
investigations of voluntary action. The text states 
frankly that the majority of psychologists believe other- 
wise. 

The exercises and experiments are intended to serve 
the purpose, not of interesting puzzles or theses to be 
argued, but rather that served by the problems of the 
algebra or physics book, by the sentence-writing of a 
text-book in Latin or French, and by the experiments 
and demonstrations of a course in chemistry. They are 
to give the student some very definite thing to do, which 
he can do, and which can be definitely corrected or ap- 
proved by the instructor. It is difficult to get such defi- 
nite material for study and practice in the mental sciences 
other than logic, but it is a prime necessity for successful 
teaching, especially in large classes. 

The sharp division of' the book into descriptive psy- 
chology, physiological psychology and dynamic psychol- 
ogy makes some difficulty in the selection of reference 
readings. Strictly parallel readings are impossible in the 
case of many chapters. It is on the whole best to follow 
Professor Titchener's advice and have the class first mas- 
ter one coherent account of the subject and then read 
one or more other elementary text-books and later still, 
if there is time, parts of some general treatise. A list of 



Preface for Teachers xiii 

references for individual study of special topics is given 
at the end of the book. 

Teachers College, Columbia University, January, 1905. 



PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION 

The changes from the first edition consist of altera- 
tions of form, especially in the case of the exercises, which 
the experience of teachers who have used the book recom- 
mends. The content remains practically identical with 
that of the first edition. The reference lists are improved 
by the utilization of the psychological literature of the 
past two years. Since an excellent English version of 
the fifth edition of Wundt's Physiologische Psychologie 
is now progressing toward completion, the references to 
it have been changed to fit the fifth, instead of the fourth, 
edition. 

Teachers College, Columbia University, December, 1906. 



CONTENTS 



INTRODUCTION 

CHAPTER I 
The Subject Matter and Problems of Psychology 

§ I. Mental Facts I 

§ 2. A General View of Mental States 3 

§ 3. A General View of Human Action 10 

§ 4. A General View of the Connections of Mental Facts. . 12 

PART I 

Descriptive Psychology 

CHAPTER II 

Feelings of Things and Qualities as Present : 

Sensations and Percepts 

§ 5. The Nature of Sensations 19 

§ 6. The Classification of Sensations 24 

§ 7. Sensation and Stimulus ^8 

§ 8. Percepts 35 

CHAPTER III 
Feelings of Things as Absent: Images and Memories 

§ 9. Mental Images 43 

§ 10. Memories 50 

CHAPTER IV 

Feelings of Facts : Feelings of Relationships, 

Meanings and Judgments 

§ 1 1. Feelings of Relationship 58 

§ 12. Feelings of Meaning 65 

§ 13. Judgments 71 



xvi # Contents 

CHAPTER V 
Feelings of Personal Conditions: Emotions 

§ 14. The Nature of the Emotions 74 

§ 15. The Classification of the Emotions 75 

§ 16. The Attributes of Emotions 81 

CHAPTER VI 

Mental States Concerned in the Direction of 

Conduct: Feelings of Willing 

§ 17. Definitions and Descriptions 85 

CHAPTER VII 
General Characteristics of Mental States 

§ 18. Qualities Common to all Mental States 92 

§ 19. Attention 98 

§ 20. A New Classification of Mental States 108 

CHAPTER VIII 
The Functions of Mental States 

§ 21. The Function of Mental Life as a Whole in 

§ 22. The Functions of Different Groups of Mental States. . 114 



PART II 

The Physiological Basis of Mental Life: 
Physiological Psychology 

CHAPTER IX 
The Constitution of the Nervous System 

§ 23. Gross Structure 120 

§ 24. Finer Structure 125 

CHAPTER X 
The Action of the Nervous System 

§25. The Functions of the Neurones 144 

§26. The Arrangement of the Neurones 147 

§ 27. The Laws of Brain Action 162 



Contents xvii 

CHAPTER XI 
The Nervous System and Mental States 

§ 28. In General 169 

§ 29. The Physiological Correlates of Particular Groups of 

Mental States 170 



PART III 

Dynamic Psychology 

§ 30. Introduction 184 

CHAPTER XII 
Original Tendencies to Connections 

§ 31. Instincts 187 

§ 32. Capacities 191 

§33. Further Attributes of Original Tendencies 193 

CHAPTER XIII 
The Law of Association 

§ 34. The Growth of Instincts into Habits.*. 199 

§ 35- The Formation of Connections in General 203 

§ 36. The Control of the Formation of Connections 209 

§37. Response by Analogy 211 

CHAPTER XIV 
The Law of Dissociation or Analysis 

§ 38. The Process of Analysis 215 

§ 39. The Influence of the Law of Analysis 217 

§ 40. The Control of the Process of Analysis 220 

§41. Physiological Conditions of Human Nature 222 

CHAPTER XV 
The Connections Between Sense Stimuli and Mental 
States: Connections of Impression 
§ 42. Inborn and Acquired Connections of Impression. .. . 224 
§ 43. The Law of Association in the Case of Connections of 

Impression 227 

§ 44. The Control of Connections of Impression 230 



xviii Contents 

CHAPTER XVI 

The Connections Between One Mental State and 

Another 

§ 45. Associations of Ideas 238 

§ 46. Memory 255 

§47. The Control of Purely Mental Connections 260 



CHAPTER XVII 

The Connections Between One Mental State and 

Another (Continued) 

48. Purposive Thinking 264 

49. Reasoning 267 



CHAPTER XVIII 

The Connections Between Mental States and Acts : 

Connections of Expression 

§ 50. The General Laws of Human Action 274 

§51. The Will: Spontaneous and Purposive Action 276 

§ 52. The Nature of the Mental States Which Precede Move- 
ments 281 

§ 53- Suggestion and Imitation 286 

§ 54. Individual Differences in the Life of Action 290 

§ 55- The Control of the Life of Action 293 



CHAPTER XIX 
Movements 

§ 56. Acts of Skill 298 

§ 57. The Connections between Sense Stimuli and Move- 
ments 302 

§ 58. Movements as Antecedents 306 

CHAPTER XX 

Selective Processes 

§ 59. Attention and Neglect 309 

§ 60. Satisfaction and Discomfort 314 

§ 61. Conclusion of Part III 316 



Contents xix 

CONCLUSION 

CHAPTER XXI 

The Relations of Psychology 

§ 62. The Science of Psychology as a Whole 319 

§ 63. The Relations of Psychology to Other Sciences 322 

§64. The Relations of Psychology to the Arts 324 

§ 65. The Relations of Psychology to the Personal Conduct 

of Life 327 

Topics for Special Study 336 

Index of Illustrations 343 

Index of Experiments 344 

Index of Names and Subjects 345 



The Elements of Psychology 



CHAPTER I 

The Subject Matter and Problems of Psychology 
§ i. Mental Facts 

The world is made up of physical and mental facts. 
On the one hand there are solids, liquids and gases, plants, 
trees and the bodies of animals, the stars and planets and 
their movements, the winds and clouds, and so on through 
the list of physical things and their movements. On the 
other hand are the thoughts and feelings of men and of 
other animals; ideas, opinions, memories, hopes, fears, 
pleasures, pains, smells, tastes, and so on through the 
list of states of mind. Physics, chemistry, astronomy, 
botany, zoology, geology and the other physical sciences 
deal with the former group of facts. Psychology, the 
science of mental facts or of mind, deals with the latter. 
Human psychology deals with the thoughts and feelings 
of human beings and ^eeks to explain the facts of intellect, 
character and personal life. How do you remember 
where you were a year ago? Why do we attend to 
certain sights and sounds and neglect others? What 
is the difference between an intelligent pupil and an 
idiot? What decides how large one shall judge an ob- 
ject to be? What happens when a student reasons out 
a problem in geometry? Such are the questions which 
the science of psychology tries to answer. 

These questions center about four leading topics : 
(i) The nature of the different kinds of thoughts and 
feelings. 



2 Introduction 

(2) The purposes which they serve in life. 

(3) The ways in which they are related to the action of 

the brain or nervous system. 

(4) The laws which govern their behavior and that of 

the bodily states and acts connected with them. 
E.g., psychology , should ' give information about : — 

(1) Just what attention is. 

(2) In what way fear or pain is useful in the conduct 

of life. 

(3) How softening of the brain produces idiocy or how 

fever produces mental confusion. 

(4) Why thinking of one thing' makes one think of a 

certain other thing,*or why practice makes perfect. 

Its task thus concerns the description of mental states 

or processes, their function in nature, their relation to the 

nervous system and the general explanation of the part 

played by the mind in human life. 

Exercises 

1. Which of the following words refer to mental facts? 
Which refer to physical facts ? Which refer sometimes to mental 
and sometimes to physical facts? 

Gas, tree, sympathy, money, desire, wish, dog, stone, dreams, 
headache, inventiveness, inch, pound, taste, intelligence, heavy, 
sour, oxygen, electricity, fatigue, pleasure, loud, observe, remem- 
ber, image, teeth. 

2. Under which topic, of (1), (2), (3) and (4) above, dees 
each of the following questions belong? 

a. Is the fact that a thing gives pleasure a sign that it is 
good for us? 

b. What good does dreaming do? 

- c. What is the difference between anger and hate? 

d. Why are certain people bad spellers in spite of much study? 

e. Why is it so much easier to say the alphabet forward 
than backward? 

1 f. Why does great sorrow make one unconscious of what 
goes on about him? 



The Subject Matter of Psychology 3 

g. What are the causes of exceptional musical ability? 
h. What are the causes of insanity? 
i. What feelings guide us to self-preservation? 
j. What feelings guide us to help other people to keep alive? 
k. In what respects are imagining and remembering alike? 
3. Which of the four aspects of psychology does each of the 
definitions of psychology given below emphasize? 

a. "Psychology is the Science of Mental Life, both of its 
phenomena and their conditions." (W. James). 

b. . . . "We note their resemblances, differences and 
other relations [the author is speaking of thoughts and feelings] 
and can thus coordinate them, place under one head those that 
are alike, and give them a name by which to speak of them." 
(J. McCosh). 

j c. "What these phenomena [thoughts and feelings] actually 
are, as conscious states and how they come to exist and follow 
each other in the order which they in fact assume, forms the 
primary subject of the investigations of psychology." (G. T. 
Ladd). 

j d. The science of psychology attempts "(1) to analyze con- 
crete (actual) mental experience into its simplest components, 
(2) to discover how these elements combine, what are the laws 
which govern their combination, and (3) to bring them into con- 
nection with their physiological [bodily] conditions." (E. B. 
Titchener). 

e. "The business of psychology is to furnish a systematic 
and coherent account of the flow of psychical process in its 
various forms, phases, and stages, and of the conditions on 
which it depends." (G. F. Stout). 

r ; I 

% 2. A General View of Mental States 

The Classification of Mental States.— A list of all 
the different kinds of thoughts and feelings that human 
beings have would exceed in length a list of the hundreds 
of thousands of animals and plants. For convenience 
psychology divides this total group of mental conditions 
into a few great classes. 

For instance, the feelings of joy, grief, anger, fear, 



4 Introduction 

sympathy and merriment, are alike among themselves in 
that each is a feeling, not of something in the outside 
world, but of some personal attitude or condition. All 
these and similar feelings are grouped together for study, 
the name used by psychologists in referring to the group 
being emotions. When you close your eyes and call up 
in imagination your father's face, or your room at home, 
when you call up the voice of a friend or the melody of 
a familiar song, you feel in each case some thing or con- 
dition, but as not present. All such feelings of things, 
qualities and conditions as not present are grouped to- 
gether for study under the name mental images. To take 
another instance, the sound of a bell that you hear in a 
dream, the faces which the fever-patient sees in his delir- 
ium, the ghosts which still exist for the mind's eye, may 
all be classed together since they are all feelings of 
things as present when really nothing of the sort is 
actually present. Such feelings are called hallucinations. 
Some of the chief groups into which thoughts and 
feelings are classified are : — 

1. Sensations. 

2. Percepts. 

3. Mental Images, 
•4. Memories. 

5. Feelings of Meaning. 

a. concepts or general notions. 

b. individual notions. 

c. abstractions. 

6. Feelings of Relationships. 

7. Judgments. 

8. Emotions. 

9. Feelings concerned in the direction of 

conduct ; states of will. 
Definitions of These Groups. — The exact nature of 



The Subject Matter of Psychology 5 

these groups will be made clear in later sections. For 
the present it will be sufficient to get a rough general idea 
of them. This can be done easily by making actual 
observations as follows: — 

1. Sit near a hot stove. 
Touch yourself with a pencil. 
Bend your finger. 

Prick yourself with a pin. 

Listen to the tap of a stick on the floor. 

Hold a book at arm's length for one minute. 
The feelings of warmth, touch, movement, pain, 
sound, strain or fatigue and others like them are called 
Sensations. Sensations are feelings of qualities or con- 
ditions either of things or of one's own body. 

2. Look at a picture. 

Listen to a chord or melody. 
Take hold of a key. 
You feel in each case some 'thing' that is present. 
Such feelings of things present are called Percepts. 

3. Imagine to yourself the tune of Yankee Doodle. 
Imagine the feeling of velvet. 

Imagine the sight of the moon. 
Imagine that your arm is swinging back and 
forth. 
The feelings you have of the sound, the velvet, the 
moon and the arm-motion are called Mental Images. A 
mental image is the feeling of a thing or quality or condi- 
tion when it is really not there and is felt not to be there. 
4. Think what you were doing yesterday at one 
o'clock. Think of what you ate for dinner day before 
yesterday. Recall the feeling you have when you meet 
some one whom at first you do not remember but finally 
remember as having been with you at a certain place. 
These feelings are called Memories. 



6 Introduction 

The term memories is also at times used to include 
mental images. Thus if any one calls to mind the way 
his father looks, he may be said either to have a mental 
image of his father or to remember his father. The 
words memory and remember and forget are also used 
for habits or matters of skill that are permanent. Thus 
we say that we remember how to dance, swim or play the 
piano. A better name here would be 'the permanence of 
habits.' 

5. If you have such thoughts as, 

'Eggs are nutritious.' 

'Girls are better than boys/ 

'Electricity is not a fluid/ 

'All teachers should be paid/ 

'Shakspere was a genius/ 

'Virtue is its own reward/ 

'Honesty is the best policy/ 
there may be images of sight or sound in connection with 
the thought but they vary with different people and are 
not the important thing in the thought. The important 
thing is the feeling of your Meaning. Thus, in the fourth 
thought, you feel that you mean all teachers, though you 
may have an image of some one teacher, or of the sound 
of the word 'teacher/ or of something different. These 
feelings of Meaning are very important in all higher sorts 
of thinking. When the feeling is that we mean every 
one of a class of things (e. g., 'all teachers', or 'girls') 
the feeling is called a general notion or concept. When 
we feel that we mean one particular thing (e. g., when we 
think 'Shakspere' or 'Napoleon' or 'this apple') the feel- 
ing is called an individual notion. When the feeling is 
that we mean some element or quality or characteristic 
apart from the thing or person possessing it, the feeling 
is called an abstract idea or abstraction. 



The Subject Matter of Psychology 7 

6. We feel not only qualities, conditions, objects and 
meanings, but also the relations between them. E. g., 
look at two books, one of which is bigger than the other. 
You feel not only the books, but also their relation of in- 
equality. When you feel 'cats and dogs' you have not 
only two general notions, but also the feeling that the 
things they mean are to be taken together. 'Cats without 
dogs' would be felt to mean something quite different. 
Very important among such Feelings of Relationships 
are those of likeness and difference and of cause and 
effect. Try to observe in yourself the feelings you have 
when you think of or, nevertheless, above, below, like, 
unlike, equal, unequal, the same as, 

7. The entire feelings which you had in thinking the 
sentences given to show feelings of meaning, would be 
called Judgments. They are feelings that such and such 
a state of affairs exists, feelings that may be expressed in 
declarative sentences. 

8. The nature of the Emotions was briefly described 
in the second paragraph of § 2. The following list of 
sample emotions may serve further to define the group : — 
Admiration, amusement, anger, annoyance, anxiety, awe, 
envy, fear, gratitude, hatred, joy, love, pity, regret, relief, 
remorse, restraint, revenge, self-complacency, shame, shy- 
ness, sorrow, surprise, suspense, suspicion, sympathy, 
wonder. 

9. Notice your feelings of desire, choice, decision, 
effort, conflict, impulses and intentions. These feelings 
and others concerned with action are commonly called 
States of Will; or Volitional States. 

A long list could be made of kinds of feelings 
which fall more or less outside of these chief groups. 
E.g., there are feelings of attention, inattention, ennui, 
interest, belief, uncertainty, inference, etc., etc. 



8 Introduction 

Complex Mental States. — No absolute and sharp 
classification can be made. It is not necessary or even 
wise to make a cut-and-dried classification of all thoughts 
and feelings, since in the ordinary course of mental life 
mixtures of different kinds of mental states are the com- 
mon occurrences. E.g., one thinks of a man and at the 
same time has feelings of attention to the mental image 
and of aversion toward the man, and perhaps a judgment 
that he is dishonest. Memory image, attentiveness, emo- 
tion and judgment thus combine. Nearly all mental 
states are pervaded by a feeling of selfhood, by sensations 
of one's own bodily condition and by a general feeling- 
tone of well-being or ill-being. It is, however, profitable 
in studying human nature to analyze complex states of 
mind into their component parts, to study separately the 
simpler aspects or parts of the total thought or feeling. 

Intermediate Mental States. — It is also true that 
in the richness of an actual human mind's life there exist 
very many mental states which do not fall readily into 
one class rather than another. E. g., is the sound of a 
bell ringing a sensation or a percept, a feeling of a quality 
or of a thing? Is the feeling of impatience an emotion 
or a state of will? Shall the feeling of effort or strain 
that one has as one holds the mind to a disagreeable task 
be called a sensation or an emotion? Just as there are 
some things which may be called either animals or plants, 
just as there are some streams which are equally well 
classified as brooks or as rivers, — so there are in mental 
life intermediate, halfway stages between sensation and 
perception, perception and image, sensation and state of 
will, etc. It would be misleading to suppose that a man's 
mind was by nature divided up into a number of neat 
bundles, one of sensations, one of percepts, and the like, 
and that each bundle was quite distinct and separate from 



The Subject Matter of Psychology 9 

all the rest. The division is not absolute, but is like that 
made when a city is divided into a Chinese quarter, Italian 
quarter, Jewish quarter, and the like. The divisions 
grade into each other imperceptibly. 

Exercises 

i. In studying which of the following studies does one 
make the most use of (a) the emotions, (b) feelings of meaning, 
(c) percepts, (d) states of will? — Botany, Music, Grammar, 
Literature? 

2. What kind of a mental fact is referred to by each sentence, 
except (h), in the following passages? — 

(a) "An unaccountable dread seized him. (b) He heard 
only the rustle of the wind in the trees, (c) Before his mind's 
eye came a vision of the man whom he had been compelled to 
forsake, (d) Halting between the choice from two apparently 
equal evils, he could make up his mind neither to go forward 
nor to return, (e) 'I shall lose in any case,' he mused." - 

(f) "In utter amazement, Silas fell on his knees and bent 
his head low to examine the marvel : (g) it was a sleeping child 
— a round, fair thing, with soft yellow rings all over its head. 
(h) Could this be his little sister come back to him in a dream — 
his little sister whom he had carried about in his arms for a year 
before she died, when he was a small boy without shoes or 
stockings? (i) But along with that question, and almost 
thrusting it away, there was a vision of the old home and the old 
streets leading to Lantern Yard — and within that vision another, 
of the thoughts which had been present with him in those far- 
off scenes." (Silas Marner.) 

3. Which sort of mental fact is usually expressed by a 
proper noun? By an interjection? By a preposition? 

4. What varieties of mental states may verbs express? 
Give an illustration in each case. 

5. Give illustrations of a noun expressing a percept, as 
when a baby says 'Man, Man'; of a noun expressing a general 
notion, as when one says, 'Men are mortal' ; of a noun expressing 
an emotion, as when one says, 'Man alive!' 



io Introduction 

§ 3. A General View of Human Action 

Since the majority of human actions are directly con- 
nected with thoughts or feelings, psychology deals with 
not only the mental states, but also the acts or conduct 
of men. 

Conduct Equals Movements and Their Connec- 
tions.— All acts are reducible to movements of the body 
brought about by the contraction and relaxation of mus- 
cles. The common notion of an act, however, includes, 
besides the mere act itself, the thoughts and feelings 
leading to it and the circumstances under which it occurs. 
Thus we commonly regard Caesar's crossing the Rubicon 
as an act of unique importance, although the act itself 
was really only a series of alternate muscular contractions 
identical with the act of going to breakfast. The mere 
act of saying 'Yes' is the same whether it be a slice of 
bread or a husband that is accepted. The million things 
a man does from birth to death are at bottom only some 
thousands of muscular contractions. A comparatively 
small number of movements make up the infinite variety 
of human conduct by being combined in different ways, 
caused by different feelings and employed in different 
circumstances. Thus the movements of speech are only 
varied enough to produce some hundreds of sounds, 
degrees of loudness and qualities of pitch and timbre, but 
these few elementary movements combine to produce 
hundreds of languages, each with thousands of words, 
capable of making millions of statements and questions, 
each of which may be an act of many differing meanings 
according to the intentions and circumstances of its utter- 
ance. Human conduct is then made up of (1) acts 
proper, or movements, and (2) the connections between 
these movements and the various circumstances of life. 



The Subject Matter of Psychology 1 1 

The Classification of Movements. — The common 
classifications of acts, as right and wrong, conscious and 
unconscious, normal and abnormal, and the like, are 
classifications not of acts proper, but of the circumstances 
under which they occur. The same movement — e. g., 
winking, — may of course be now right, now wrong, now 
conscious, now unconscious. 

Acts proper or movements may be classified in three 
ways: — (i) according to their composition, (2) accord- 
ing to their location, and (3) according to their function 
or use. The last is the classification of importance to 
psychology. 

1. Movements are simple or complex. A complex 

movement is one that is made up of simpler 
movements. A simple movement is one that 
is not. 

2. Movements are hand-movements, ^-movements, 

c/2 ^-movements, etc. 

3. Movements are physiological, expressive and effec- 

tive. Movements of physiological function, such 
as those involved in swallowing, in the contrac- 
tion of the heart, in the peristalis of the intes- 
tines, or in the expansion of the lungs, have as 
their chief direct function to keep the body alive. 

Movements of expression, such as those in- 
volved in laughing, crying, staring and groan- 
ing, have as their chief direct function to reveal 
inner conditions, — states of mind. 

Movements of effect, such as those involved 
in running, striking, grasping and dropping, 
have as their chief direct function to bring 
about results in things or persons. 



12 Introduction 

Exercises 

1. Describe cases in which the same movement results from 
several different mental cases. 

2. Describe cases in which the same mental state results in 
several different movements. 

3. Describe cases in which four or five movements result in 
ten or twelve different actions (in the common meaning of the 
word) according to the ways in which the movements are con- 
nected. 

4. Classify the following acts into acts of physiological func- 
tion, acts of expression and acts of effect: (a) wrinkling the 
forehead, (b) lifting the arm, (c) curling the fingers in, (d) 
sneezing, (e) coughing, (f) walking, (g) pushing, (h) raising 
the eye-brows. 

5. Into which of the three classes mentioned in the fourth 
question would (a) movements of the arms generally fall? 
(b) Movements caused by facial muscles? (c) Movements of the 
stomach ? 

§ 4. A General 'View of the Connections of Mental Facts 

The Classification of Mental Connections.— -The 

stuff out of which a human life is made is mental states 
and movements. What sort of a life it shall be depends 
upon : first, what mental states* and movements compose 
it, and second, how these are connected. To understand 
a man's intellect we must know not only what thoughts 
and feelings he has, but also in what circumstances, that is, 
in what connections, he has them : to understand his char- 
acter we must know not only what are his acts, but also in 
what connection he performs them. All men feel love : 
the question is what they love. All men drink : the differ- 
ence between the total abstainer and the drunkard lies in 
the stimulus that provokes the act of drinking. Psy- 
chology, to study human life fully, must study not only 
mental states and bodily acts, but also their connections. 
And since both thoughts and movements are aroused by 



The Subject Matter of Psychology 13 

events in the physical world 1 which stimulate the organs 
of sense, psychology must study also the connections 
between (1) processes in the sense organs and (2) men- 
tal states or movements. 

The connections to be studied are then: — 

(1) Connections between processes in the sense organs 

and a thought or feeling, 
(ia) Connections between processes in the sense or- 
gans and a movement. 

(2) Connections between one thought or feeling and 

another. 

(3) Connections between a thought or feeling and a 

movement. 

E- g., feeling hot when one goes near the fire is a case 
of (1) : for it is a connection between the outside event, 
rapid molecular motion, and our sensation of heat. The 
contractions of the stomach when it contains food illus- 
trate (ia). Thinking of C when one thinks of A B is a 
case of (2). Going to get food when one becomes hun- 
gry is a case of (3). 

Connections between Movements and Mental 
States. — One might expect to study also connections 
between a movement and a mental state and between one 
movement and another, but as a matter of fact, movements 
do not arouse mental states or other movements directly, 
but only by first connecting with some happening in a 
sense organ. The (ia) group of connections (between 
a stimulation of a sense organ and a movement) are more 
properly a part of physiology- than of psychology, since 
they do not involve any mental fact. I shall therefore 
not discuss them further. 

1 Thus pressure on the body makes one feel pain ; rapid molec- 
ular motion makes one feel warm ; certain chemical conditions in 
the body make one feel hungry. 



14 Introduction 

Unlearned and Learned Connections. — Each of 

these three divisions may be subdivided into: — 

A. Unlearned or original or native connections. 

B. Learned or acquired connections. 

The former are called instincts; the latter, habits. 
The connection between a blow and a pain is already 
made in us apart from experience or training (iA), while 
the connection between the presence of the letters dog on 
a page and the thought of the familiar domestic animal 
has to be acquired by experience, has to be learned (iB). 
So also for the connections between a sweet taste and 
the act of sucking (3A), and the thought T have only 
two minutes to catch the train' and the act of running 
(3B). The second group of connections are in nearly 
all, if not in all, cases acquired. That between the 
thought of the discovery of America and the thought of 
Columbus is a sample. 

Classes (1), (2), and (3) may be called connections 
of Impression, Association and Expression respectively. 
There are then : — 

(iA) Native or unlearned connections of impression. 
(iB) Acquired or learned connections of impression. 
(?) (2 A) Native or unlearned connections of association. 
(2B) Acquired or learned connections of association. 
(3A) Native or unlearned connections of expression. 
(3B) Acquired or learned connections of expression. 
Each of the six classes so far made could be subdivided 
again to almost any extent according -to the kind of out- 
side events, mental states and bodily movements involved. 
Thus (2B), acquired habits of association, could be 
divided into associations between sensations and concepts, 
images and emotions, images and images, emotions and 
impulses, judgments and judgments, etc. 



The Subject Matter of Psychology 15 

In the case of class (3) it is useful to subdivide also 
according to the extent to which the connection of the 
bodily act with the feeling is modified and controllable. 
Some connections (e. g., the contraction of the pupil of 
the eye in response to the brightness of the light) cannot 
be altered. Others, forming the great majority, can 
(e- g., grasping certain objects in response to seeing 
them). 

Further Classification. — The following names used 
in psychology books for certain kinds of connections need 
explanation either because they are technical terms or are 
common words used with a special meaning: — Reflexes, 
Instincts, Habits, Powers, Capacities, Associations of 
Ideas, Inferences, Reasonings. 
\\ Reflexes include those connections of events in the 
body, — sometimes felt in sensation, sometimes not, — with 
movements, in which the act follows the impression auto- 
matically, without either intention or control on our part 
(e. g. } turning in the toes when the sole of the foot is 
tickled, the contraction of the pupil of the eye in response 
to light, or sneezing when the membrane of the nose is 
irritated). 

Instincts, as now commonly defined, include reflexes 
and all other connections or tendencies to connections 
amongst thoughts, feelings and acts which are unlearned, 
— are in us apart from training or experience. Anything 
that we do without having to learn to do it, in brief, is an 
instinct. Thus, crying when pain is felt, starting at a sud- 
den noise, feeling fear at large, strange, moving objects 
seen in the dark, feeling anger when food is snatched 
away from one and laughing when tickled, are instincts 
of babyhood ; to feel jealousy when rivalled by one of the 
same sex and to act conspicuously when attracted by one 
of the opposite sex, are instincts of youth. The common 



16 Introduction 

usage of the words instinct and instinctive differs from 
the psychologist's usage. People commonly say that they 
do or feel certain things instinctively when they act or 
feel without deliberation or forethought or clear con- 
sciousness of what or why ; e. g., "He instinctively lifted 
the glass to his lips."/ "By instinct I realized that the 
only way of escape " was directly through the fire." 
Neither of these cases would be called instinctive by the 
psychologist. For to him an instinct means an act that 
is the result of mere inner growth, not of training or 
experience. 

Habits. — Tendencies to respond which are created in 
whole or in part by experience, practice or training are 
called Habits. The instinctive tendencies become habits 
as soon as experience alters them. Practically all of 
human behavior is a series of illustrations of habits. In 
common talk the word is used only of tendencies to re- 
spond which have become very frequent and very habitual, 
such as eating three meals a day, taking off our clothes 
when we go to bed, bowing to acquaintances, thinking 
four when we see 2+2, and the like. But the essential 
nature of the behavior is the same whether the habit is 
partially formed and rarely used or fully formed and 
always used. Indeed, for psychology every tendency for 
anything to go with anything else is either a case of a 
pure instinct or of habit. 

Powers. — Habits not in action and possibilities of 
forming habits are called Powers. For instance, that 
man has the power to avoid theft who would be habitually 
honest, though tempted, or who will habitually, when 
tempted, not thieve. 

Capacities. — The inborn qualities which are the partial 
basis for the development of mental powers might be 
called instincts of possibility rather than of fact, they 



The Subject Matter of Psychology ly 

being qualities which will result in the presence of the 
powers or habits corresponding to them when the proper 
circumstances arise. The common word for these in- 
stincts of possibility is Capacities. Thus the capacity for 
composing music means the qualities which, though them- 
selves unknown, will, when the proper opportunity comes, 
blossom out into the power to compose music and the 
habit of doing so. 

Associations of Ideas. — Those habits of thought by 
which any one state of mind tends to call up another state 
of mind are called Associations of Ideas. Thus we 
should say that the thought of AB calling up the thought 
of C, or the thought of 90 degrees calling up the thought 
of heat or of a right angle, were cases of the association 
of ideas, or, more clearly, of habits in the realm of ideas. 

Inferences. — When one thought or judgment calls up 
another leading on to some related conclusion the process 
is called an Inference. Thus, whereas we would call the 
sequence, 'J onn is- sick. I like John/ a mere association 
of ideas, we should regard as an inference the sequence, 
'John has the measles. ^ Fred has been playing with him. 
Fred will probably have the measles.' A series of such 
directed thoughts or inferences is called Reasoning or 
Rational Thinking. 

In general the term Situation is used for any total set 
of circumstances in the outside world and in one's body 
by which the mind is influenced ; Stimidus is used for any 
particular part of a situation ; Reaction and Response are 
used for the act, and sometimes for the mental state, that 
occurs as a result of the stimulus. 

Exercises 

1. Classify the following cases of connection as (iA), (iB), 
(2A), (2B), (3A) or (3B), or at least as (1), (2) or (3). 
2 



18 Introduction 

a. Shutting the eyes when a bright light is flashed into 

them. 

b. Bowing to an acquaintance seen. 

c. Hearing ten times eight and thinking eighty. 

d. Seeing a pin and picking it up. . 

e. Feeling pain at a severe blow. , \,„ 

f. Thinking of an engagement at a distance and taking 

one's hat and coat and starting. iS 

g. Thinking of 'I cannot tell a lie' and then of George 

Washington. 

h. Feeling disbelief at seeing, "England has voted to 
do away with the King and the House of Lords." 

I. Seeing red when light waves of 460 billion vibrations 
per second strike the retina of the eye, and violet 
when the waves have a vibration rate of 790 bil- 
lions per second, j 

j. Thinking of 8 after thinking 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 

2. Which of the cases above are reflexes? Which are 
associations of ideas? 

3. Why might ideo-motor connections or ideo-motor ac- 
tions be a suitable name for d and f ? 

4. Name two connections between a mental state and a bod^ 
ily act which are acquired. Two that are unlearned or native. 

5. What are some common connections between thoughts 
that are acquired in the study of arithmetic? In the study of 
Latin? Of what sort are the connections formed in learning to 
play the piano? 

6. Give cases illustrating the difference between mere as- 
sociation of ideas and inference. 

7. Name two or three beneficial instincts. Two or three 
undesirable ones. 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, I., XXIII. 
Stout, Manual, 1-14, 56-70. 
Titchener, Outline, §§ 1-4, 61. 

B. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, §§ 1/2, 3, 12. 
James, Principles, I., XXIII. 

Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, Einleitung (or, 
Principles of Physiological Psychology, Introduction). 



PARTI 

DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY 

CHAPTER II 

Feelings of Qualities and Things as Present: 
Sensations and Percepts 

The topic of this and of the next five chapters will be 
the nature of the different groups of mental states. These 
six chapters may be grouped together under the general 
title, Descriptive Psychology. 

§ 5. The Nature of Sensations 

Definitions. — The word ^Sensations is used by writ- 
ers of psychology with several different meanings. 
Sometimes they include under this term only feelings of 
brightness, color, size, pitch, loudness, timbre or tone- 
quality, taste, smell, touch, pressure, resistance, move- 
ment, heat, cold, pain, position, rotation, hunger, thirst 
and other feelings of definite qualities of things and well 
known conditions of the body. But often they include 
also the feelings of fatigue of different sorts, of effort or 
strain, of suspense or expectancy, of shock, shuddering, 
trembling, well-being, malaise, dizziness and other feel- 
ings of vague and little understood bodily conditions. 

Ordinarily they include only the simple, bare, uncom- 
bined feelings under the term sensation and treat the 
actual complex feelings (e.g., of the taste of a mouthful 

19 



20 Dynamic Psychology 

of acid, the smell of the woods or the touch of a pin, as 
mixtures or combinations of simpler elementary feelings. 
But they also use the word more vaguely for all direct 
feelings of the qualities of things or of conditions of the 
body which are not the definite feelings of things classed 
as percepts or the rich combinations of feelings classed as 
emotions. This being the usage, the complex sound of a 
city street, the taste of coffee or the shock of a cold plunge 
would be called a sensation. Sensations are sometimes 
defined as the primitive, bare elements of mental life, the 
first things in consciousness. From this point of view 
only the original appearance of any feeling may be called 
sensation; after that the mental state equals sensation 
plus association or experience. 

The fact of importance that appears from these va- 
rious definitions, is that they and all others are arbitrary, 
that in fact we cannot draw clear lines of distinction 
between sensations of qualities of things and sensations 
of bodily conditions, — between sensations from special, 
well-known stimuli like sounds and from vague, jll- 
known stimuli like the condition of the blood or the 
gnawings of dyspepsia, — between atomic, indivisible bits 
or brightness or pain or bitter and complex masses of 
color, toothache or tones, — between the first sensation of 
any sort and the subsequent ones modified by it. Nor 
can we draw a clear line around sensations (taken in 
the broad sense shown by the group of samples above) so 
as to infallibly separate sensations from percepts or from 
emotions or from certain feelings of relationships. It is 
indeed as important to know that these mental states 
shade off the one into the other as to know the general 
features of difference which lead us to separate them into 
groups. 

Realizing then that definitions must be rough, one 



Feelings of Things as Present 21 

may say that sensations are direct feelings of qualities of 
things or of conditions of the body. Pure sensations are 
such feelings when uninfluenced by previous experiences. 
Elementary sensations are such feelings so simple or 
minute as to be unanalysable into simpler ones. 

Pure Sensations. — Except in the first experiences of 
early infancy, pure sensations are not found. The ways 
in which the outside world and our own bodily states are 
felt are the result of original tendencies combined with 
practice. Thus artists who wish to get back to the bare, 
immediate sizes and colors of things, apart from the 
influence of our habitual interpretations of them, have to 
undergo special training to free themselves from the, for 
their purposes, disadvantageous tendencies of experience. 
Although in actual mental life pure sensations are not 
found, it is possible in thought to regard any sensation as 
a pure sensation plus the modifications in it dfte to experi- 
ence, and to argue about the pure sensation's factor or 
share or aspect by itself. 

Elementary Sensations. — Elementary sensations 
are not real fragments of our mental states, but abstrac- 
tions invented to aid our understanding of mental life. 
They exist in the sense that lines without breadth or thick- 
ness exist. Just as an actual boundary wall is not a sum 
of such lines, so the sensations we have are not sums or 
collections of tiny atomic sensations. An intense salt 
taste is not the sum of a thousand slightly salt tastes, any 
more than the thought of a chair is the thought of c plus 
the thought of h plus the thought of a and so on. Our 
feelings of the outside world can in thought be analyzed 
into elements of colors, sounds, pressures and the like, but 
in actual experience they are felt as complex total feelings. 
Nor does the mind in its sense life grow from a start- 
ing-point of elementary sensations by the addition of more 



22 Descriptive Psychology 

and more of them and by building them into complex 
wholes. On the contrary, the first sensations are ex- 
tremely vague, rich, complicated feelings of comfort, 
discomfort, bodily disturbances and such appearances of 
external things as are well characterized by Professor 
James' phrase 'a big, blooming, buzzing confusion.* The 
progress of the mind is by the differentiation of vague 
feelings into more and more definite and detailed feelings. 
The clean-cut reds and blues, A flats and C sharps, sweets 
and sours, hards and softs which we call elementary sen- 
sations are the result of slow growth. The world of 
sense comes not as a building constructed of small pieces 
of bricks and mortar and glass, but as a landscape grad- 
ually clearing up from the obscurity of a fog. The child 
comes to feel hot, cold, red and green as we come to dis- 
tinguish the constituents of a salad-dressing, the sounds 
of the different instruments in an orchestra, or the char- 
acteristic odors of a slum. 

It is nevertheless desirable to try to analyze any actual 
sensation into, or replace it in thought by such fictitious 
elements^ Fictitious in the sense of being elements of 
mental states which when put together give the sensation, 
they are real in the sense of corresponding to elementary 
processes in the brain which, when happening together, 
do produce in mental life the sensation. The sensation 
produced in the mind when one plunges the hand into 
cold water is not the equivalent of a thousand feelings of 
little cold spots plus a thousand feelings of little slipper- 
inesses and elasticities, but the brain process which 
produces the feeling of a cold and wet hand is the equiva- 
lent of thousands of component processes. 

The Attributes of Sensations. — Every sensation, and 
indeed every mental state of any sort, is in time, lasts 
so long, possesses Duration as an attribute. 



Feelings of Things as Present 23 

Every sensation possesses Intensity, by which we mean 
that there is a certain amount of it which can be con- 
ceived to have possibly been more or less. 

That every sensation is felt as possessing Bigness or 
Extensity is held to be true by some psychologists. 
Others would limit the attribute of spatial quality more 
narrowly; e.g., to sensations from the eyes and skin and 
joints. Others even deny it to all sensations, arguing 
that by itself a sensation is felt as nowhere and of no size, 
that only in the connection of many sensations with one 
another does the feeling of 'thereness' and Voluminous- 
ness' appear. Those announcing this third view pre- 
sumably refer only to elementary sensations. 

Every sensation possesses Quality, which can be de- 
fined provisionally by examples : color, pitch and sweet- 
ness are qualities of sensations. 

If anyone examines his own sensations, he will find 
that they may differ from one another in these four ways : 
One may last a longer or shorter time than another ; may 
be more or less vigorous or intense; may be bigger or 
smaller; i.e., may fill more or less space; may be different 
in mental stuff, in its very nature. In all but the last case 
sensations may be ranged in a series according to the 
amount of some attribute they possess; they may be 
ranked by the quantity of time, or energy, or extent 
belonging to them. The fourth case of differences can- 
not be expressed as differences of quantity, but only as 
of the kind or quality of the feelings. When the differ- 
ences between sensations fail to resolve themselves into a 
series of amounts of any one thing they are therefore 
called differences of Quality; Thus with red and green, 
the touch of velvet and that of soft soap, the feeling of 
nausea and that of a toothache. The quality of a sensa- 



24 Descriptive Psychology 

tion is thus the attribute of it which distinguishes it from 
any other sensation. 

§ 6. The Classification of Sensations 

By Their Quality. — Sensations may be classified 
according to their degrees of difference in quality. All 
colors are more like each other in quality than they are 
like tastes. All reds are more like each other than they 
are like blues, but are more like blues than they are like 
tastes. Touches are more like pressures than they are 
like smells. We thus classify sensations according to the 
sense to which they belong. 

Within each sense we have further classification ; for 
instance, of sensations of vision into the different colors 
or of sensations of hearing into noises and tones. Al- 
though in the spectrum red shades off into orange, orange 
into yellow and yellow into green and so on, we feel the 
change to be more abrupt at certain places than at others 
and so group color-sensations into reds, oranges, yellows, 
greens and the like. So also sounds are grouped into 
noises and tones, though a tone that lasts but a very short 
time is indistinguishable from a noise and certain com- 
binations of noises, such as the sound of certain machines 
heard at a distance, take on the likeness of tones. 

By the Sense Organs Causing Them. — Sensations 
are also classified according to the sense organ the activity 
of which arouses them. Every educated person knows 
that his feelings of color are due to the influence of light 
rays upon the visual sense organ, the eye ; that his sensa- 
tions of sound are due to the influence of air vibrations 
upon the auditory sense organ, the ear. It is equally true 
that tastes, smells, heat, cold, pressures and other varieties 
of sensation correspond each to the activity of one kind 



Feelings of Things as Present 25 

of sense organ or combination of sense organs. Some of 
these sense organs,— e.g., the eyes, ears, and nose, — are 
influenced by stimuli exterior to the body, such as ether 
vibrations and air vibrations. Some are influenced by 
stimuli within the body, such as the rubbing of the sur- 
faces of the joints, changes in the blood supply, inflam- 
mation of the tissues and the like. 

The large groups resulting from a classification on the 
basis of the sense organs concerned are: — 

A. Sensations from the periphery of the body : External 

Sensations. 

Sensations from the eyes. 

" " ears. 

" " nose. 

" " mouth. 

" " skin. 

B. Sensations from the internal organs of the body: 

Internal Sensations. 

Sensations from the semicircular canals in the inter- 
nal ear. 
Sensations from the muscles. 
" " tendons. 
" " surfaces of the joints. 
" " alimentary canal. 
" " circulatory system. 
" " lungs. 

" brain and nerves themselves. 
" " sex-organs. 
Within each of these groups a finer grouping can 
often be made out. The skin or cutaneous sensations, 
e.g., are apparently due to different sorts of nerve endings 
in the skin and may accordingly be divided into feelings 
of pressure, heat, cold, pain, and perhaps of traction (due 
to pulling the skin or hairs outward) touch, tickling and 



26 Descriptive Psychology 

others. The mouth is perhaps furnished with four differ- 
ent sorts of nerve-endings, each the source of a special 
variety of taste (sweet, sour, salt and bitter). 

Finally each variety of sense organ may be capable of 
arousing many different sensations, according to the dif- 
ferent ways in which it may behave, — the differences in 
action of which it is capable. Thus in the retina of the 
eye the so-called 'rods' and 'cones/ which are the nerve- 
endings concerned in vision, are apparently each capable 
of arousing hundreds of different shades of color and 
degrees of brightness. 

In a classification resulting from perfect knowledge, 
the main classes will correspond to the kind of sense 
organ involved, the sub-classes to the kinds of activity 
of each kind of sense organ. 

The Two Types of Classification Compared.— With 
respect to the more obvious and more important groups of 
sensations the classification on the basis of felt resem- 
blances parallels that on the basis of the sense organ con- 
cerned. The differences between the two classifications 
are due first to the fact that common-sense judgments of 
qualities often put compound sensations into a single 
group although they involve very different sense organs. 
Thus when what common sense calls tastes are found to 
be due largely to stimulation, not of the gustatory nerve- 
endings in the mouth, but of the olfactory nerve-endings 
in the nose, 1 psychology changes popular usage and 
reserves the word tastes for the bare sweets, sours, salts, 
bitters (and possibly alkaline and metallic tastes) and 
classifies the rich savors of foods as smell sensations. 

1 Hence the loss of 'taste' when one has a cold in the head. 
One can gain experimental evidence of the share of the nose in 
taste by testing some friend, who with eyes shut and nose carefully 
plugged, tries to distinguish raw potato from apple, maple syrup 
from molasses, soup from salt water. 



Feelings of Things as Present 27 

Even expert analysis sees no difference between the sen- 
sations from the rods in the retina and those from the 
cones and has always made a single class, — visual sensa- 
tions. Yet it is perhaps true that the rods act only when 
the light is dim, and give no sensations at all for green. 
On the basis of the sense organ involved a classification 
into sensations in a dim light and sensations in a bright 
light would be, perhaps, more scientific and fundamental 
than one into colors and brightness. 

Classifications by felt quality and by known sense 
organ differ in the second place because clear and impor- 
tant differences can often be felt where no corresponding 
difference in the nerve-endings involved has been dis- 
covered. For example, sweets and sours and bitters 
deserve separate classes from their felt unlikeness, but no 
proof of different nerve-endings for each class has yet 
been offered. 

Two general cautions are necessary in connection with 
the classification of sensations. First, in trying to pick 
out the different kinds of sensations one should not forget 
that the actual stream of mental life rarely offers a single 
kind of sensation at a time. Our feelings of the outside 
world are feelings of complex things involving many 
different sensations, or of numerous qualities at the same 
time. The feeling of a lifted weight, for example, is a 
complex due to the action of sense organs in the skin, on 
the surfaces of the joints and in the muscles themselves. 
Second, the fact that only the more definite and frequent 
sensations, such as sights, sounds and tastes, are easily 
classified should not blind one to the existence and impor- 
tance of the vaguer sensations, such as fatigues, aches, 
hunger and the like. The condition of the body as a 
whole, the state of its muscular tension, circulation, 
digestion, and other obscurer activities, influences the 



28 Descriptive Psychology 

little known internal sense organs, and so causes those 
mental states which verge from sensations toward emo- 
tions. These must not be neglected. 

§ 7. Sensation and Stimulus 

Sensations correspond to and are due to physical 
causes and happenings without and within the body, 
which cause activity in the sense-organs. Such a physi- 
cal cause of activity in a sense-organ is called the; 
Stimulus to the sensation. 

The Threshold of sensibility for any variety of sensa- 
tion is the least possible stimulus that will cause it, i.e., the 
softest sound, the weakest light, the slightest touch. 

The Range of sensibility in any sense is the range of 
physical stimuli below and above which the stimulus 
causes no sensation. For instance, the range of pitch is 
from about 16 vibrations of the air per second to about 
30,000 vibrations per second; 1 the range of color vision 
is from about 450 billion 2 to about 790 billion vibrations 
of the ether per second ; 3 i.e., from the extreme of red to 
the extreme of violet. 

It would be possible, though not in the present con- 
dition of knowledge especially useful, to classify sensa- 
tions by the physical facts which cause them, by the 
nature of their stimuli. We should then have as the two 
chief groups: 

A. Feelings caused by the qualities of outside objects. 

B. Feelings caused by qualities of the body itself. 

1 These figures vary among different individuals, and different 
values have been assigned to them by different investigators. The 
low limit is almost certainly between 8 and "30. 

2 A billion means here, following the European usage, a million 
millions. 

3 Under favorable circumstances a red of only 412 billion vibra- 
tions can be distinguished and a color beyond the violet end of the 
spectrum of 912 billion vibrations. The range varies with indi- 
viduals as in the case of sound. 



Feelings of Things as Present 29 

Under A we should have : 

A I. Feelings caused by light, i.e., by ether vibra- 
tions. 
A II. Feelings caused by molecular motions. 

A II 1. By tones, i.e., periodic wave motions. 
A II 2. By noises, 'i.e., non-periodic motions, 
A II 3. By temperature, i.e., inner molecular 
motions. 
A III. Feelings caused by gross mechanical forces. 
A III 1. By weight. 
A III 2. By elasticity. 
Etc. 
A VI. Feelings caused by chemical forces. 

A IV 1. In gaseous form (causing sensations 

of smell). 
A IV 2. In liquid form (causing sensations of 
of taste). 
Under B (feelings caused by qualities of the body 
itself) the movements of the ether and of sound waves 
would play a small if not a zero role while electrical forces 
might perhaps be found to influence feelings as they do 
not when acting through outside objects. To such clas- 
sifications on the basis of the nature of the physical 
stimulus are due the terms : the chemical senses, for taste 
and smell; the mechanical senses, for touch, pressure, 
etc. ; the distant senses, for vision and hearing. 

The richness of the contribution of sensations to men- 
tal life hardly requires comment. The number of quali- 
ties of things felt in vision or hearing or touch alone or 
the multitude of bodily conditions of which the organic 
senses, including pain, warn us, is certainly astounding. 
The loss of a single sense deprives a human life of a 
whole kingdom of facts. It is more necessary to call 
attention to the fact that although the number of the dif- 



30 Descriptive Psychology 

ferent sensations that a human being feels seems almost 
infinite, they represent the influence on us of only a part 
of the world's forces. Sensations are aroused only by a 
selected few of the events about us and in our bodies. 
Sounds are due to air waves, but waves above thirty or 
forty thousand vibrations per second cause no sensations 
of sound in man, though they apparently do in some in- 
sects. The x-rays and the emanations from radio-active 
bodies cause no sensations directly. All about us there 
may be forces in nature to which our senses are not 
susceptible. What we feel are the comparatively few 
series of stimuli to which our senses are, so to speak, 
tuned. The growth of tissues, the action of certain 
glands, and the destruction of dangerous substances by 
the white blood corpuscles are samples of important 
events within the body which leave us unfeeling. To 
only a few of the multitudinous events of our bodily lives 
are we sensitive. Our sensations warn us of only a frac- 
tion of the happenings of the universe within and without. 

Exercises 

1. Of the feelings referred to in the list of words, phrases 
or sentences given below which are most like emotions? 

2. Which are most like feelings of relationships? 

3. Which would be called sensations without any hesitation? 

4. Which might possibly be called elementary sensations? 

5. Which might possibly be called pure sensations? 

6. Which are internal sensations? 

7. Which are compounds caused by at least two different 
senses ? 

a. The child's feeling when it first burns itself. 

b. Hunger. 

c. The sound of a tuning fork. 

d. The general feeling of being well or ill. 

e. The faintest possible taste of bitter. 

f. Feelings of weight. 



Feelings of Things as Present 31 

g. Nausea. 

h. Feelings of distance. 

i. The taste of coffee. 

j. An unrecognized smell. 

k. The ringing in the ears that results from a large 

dose of quinine. 
1. Sleepiness. 

m. Hearing a note sung crescendo. 
n. Lassitude, 
o. Restlessness, 
p. The sight of a light by a four-weeks-old baby. 

8. Show now the author of the following passage classifies 
sensations partly on the basis of felt likeness and partly on the 
basis of the sense organs concerned : 

"Different Classes of Sensation. — Passing now to the 
enumeration and comparison of the different classes of sensation 
we may begin with the following provisional list: Sensations of 
sight, of hearing, of contact and pressure ; those due to the vary- 
ing states of muscles, joints, and tendons as dependent on the po- 
sition and movement of the limbs; sensations of smell, of taste, 
of temperature, and finally organic sensations. The last head 
requires some explanation. Under the term 'organic sensation' 
are included sensations due to the state of the internal organs of 
the body, such as headache, thirst, muscular cramp, or fatigue, 
nausea, etc." (G. F. Stout, Groundwork of Psychology, p. 42.) 

9. Which groups in this classification most need further sub- 
division. 

10. What criticism may be made of a description of a group 
of feelings as "those due to the varying states of the muscles, 
joints and tendons as dependent on the position and movement 
of the limbs"? 

11. Criticise the following classification: 

"Sensation. There are two classes of sensations, — General 
and Special. 

General Sensations include all those which do not belong to 
the "five senses," — those which constitute our bodily comfort or 
discomfort; they may be classed as follows: 

Muscular Sensations of injury, fatigue, and repose. 

Nervous Sensations arising from the state of the nervous 
system, as when we feel the exhilaration of perfect health or are 
weakened by care or suffering. 



32 



Descriptive Psychology 



Vital Sensations, depending on the condition of the vital 
organs, as those of hunger and thirst and their opposites, the pain 
of indigestion, the feeling of suffocation when breathing impure 
air. 

Special Sensations are of five kinds, namely, those of Touch 
(including those of the "Muscular Sense"), of Sight, of Hearing, 
of Taste, and of Smell." 

12. No one has found a classification of smells that is either 
simple or comprehensive or scientific. It is interesting to try to 
classify the odors of the objects named below and compare the 
groups one makes with those made by others: 



alcohol 

apples 

bananas 

benzine 

cabbage (cooked) 

camphor 

canteloupes 

cheese 

chloroform 

cinnamon 



orange peel 

pine woods 

roast beef 

roses 

rubber 

sour milk 

strawberries 

sulphur (burning) 

sulphuretted hydrogen 

violets 



coffee 

ether 

fir balsam 

fish (cooked) 

fish (raw) 

Kay 

kerosene 

lemons 

maple sugar 

onions 

13. Give the names of two things which seem to you to have 
somewhat the same kind of a smell that the thing named has, in 
the case of each of the following : ■ 

chloroform coffee tobacco 

camphor rancid butter decaying meat 

cinnamon roses new mown hay 

alcohol apples cheese 

benzine onions bananas 

14. Make a list of senses which it is conceivable that human 
beings might have, though they do not. 

15. Which one of the senses provides the greatest variety of 
different qualities? 

16. Which sensations are aroused by distant objects? 

17. Which sensations are least delusive, most reliable? 
Experiment 1. Pressure Spots. — On the back of the hand, 

say between the base of the thumb and the base of the forefinger, 
mark off an area about an inch long and a half inch wide. Have 
ready: (1) a pyramid of cork about a quarter inch square at the 
base, about one quarter inch high and cut to a point, with a long 
needle or a tooth pick stuck into its base for a handle; (2) two 



Feelings of Things as Present 33 

small metal rods, such as knitting needles, or pieces of wire with 
rounded ends, or better two hollow metal cylinders drawn to a 
closed point at one end. 

Go over the surface of the skin with the point of the cork, 
touching each square millimeter lightly. Note the location of any 
spots where the touch of the cork arouses a much more pro- 
nounced feeling of pressure (of what is commonly called touch) 
than it does in general. Does the touch of the cork in some spots 
arouse a feeling of coolness? If so, locate these. 

Experiment 2. Cold Spots. — Go over the surface of the skin 
with one of the rods cooled to say 50 Fahrenheit (if the hollow 
rods are used, they need only to be filled with cold water) and 
note the location of any spots where the touch arouses a much 
more pronounced feeling of coolness than it does in general. 
Touch these spots with the cork. What sensation results? Touch 
them with the second rod warmed slightly above the temperature 
of the room. What sensation results? 

As an aid to remembering the location of the pressure spots 
and cold spots, it will be useful to draw on paper an enlarged 
outline of the area marked off on the hand, or to mark the hand 
itself with a tiny spot of ink or paint. 

Experiment 3. The Threshold for Pressure. — Make 5 cylin- 
ders of wood about 4 millimeters in diameter and 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 
millimeters in height. Have each one smooth at top and bottom. 
Fasten to the center of the top of each by a bit of glue, a fine, 
flexible thread of silk. Tie the thread to one end of a small stick 
(tooth picks will serve), letting the length from the cylinder to 
the stick be about two inches. Holding the stick at the end 
removed from the thread, lower the cylinder gradually till it rests 
on some smooth surface, as a table-top. Each cylinder should, 
when thus lowered, have the plane of its bottom surface parallel 
with the table-top. 

Let a friend be seated with eyes closed, fore-arm resting on a 
table, and the palm of the hand upward. Say to him: "I shall 
give as a signal the word ready. Then at the end of two seconds 
I shall either put a very light weight on your hand or I shall do 
nothing. If you feel a weight, say 'Yes,' if you do not feel any, 
say nothing." Then say, 'Ready/ and lower a cylinder gently till 
it rests on the center of the palm. Note the answer given, and 
remove the cylinder slowly. Record the answer. Repeat with 
another and so on through the following series: the 16mm. cyl- 

3 



34 Descriptive Psychology 

inder, the 8, o (that is, none at all), 16, o, 2, 4, 2, 16, 0, 1, 8, 8, 2, 1, 
4, 16, 1, 8, 1, 8, 1, 16, 2, 0, 1, 2, 0, o, 2, 0, 16, 1, 1, 8, 0, 16, 16, 8, 2, 0, 
o, 4, 4, 16, 0, 8, 8, o, 16, 0, 4, o, 2, 16, o, 1, 1, 16, 1, 4, 2, 2, 8, 4, 0, 16, 
4, 4, 4, 16, 16, 0, 0, 16. 

Record the answers by drawing a line under the figure denot- 
ing the cylinder used if the subject answers yes, and a line 
through it if he says nothing. This method of scoring serves also 
to keep track of which cylinder is the next to be used. 

Which weights are below the threshold? (Unless a cylinder 
was felt in eight cases out of ten it was probably not really sensed 
at all, for mere guessing would of course give fifty per cent, of 
correct answers.) 

Try the same experiment placing the weights on the back of 
the wrist or fore-arm. Which weights are below the threshold 
here? 

Experiment 4. The Mixture of Taste and Smell. — Arrange 
for a friend to give you a half hour of his time. Prepare 4 
pieces (cubes about one quarter of an inch long) of each of the 
following: raw apple, raw onion, raw celery, cooked chicken, 
cooked beef, cooked lamb; and have ready a half spoonful each 
of honey, maple syrup, molasses, cinnamon, clove and nutmeg, a 
medicine dropper (a plain glass rod will do) and a salt spoon or 
a visiting card cut lengthwise into six or seven strips. 

Let the subject of the experiment be seated, with eyes closed 
and nose carefully plugged with cotton. Say to him, "I shall put 
something in your mouth ; taste it and tell me what it is before 
you swallow it." Require the subject to answer at once before 
the odor can penetrate to the nose through the passage at the 
back of the mouth cavity. Then place a piece or drop or pinch 
of the food, say a pinch of cinnamon, on his tongue and record 
his answer. Give the different substances in a mixed-up order, 
using each two times, and recording the substance and the 
answer in each case. 

After these 24 trials have been made, remove the filling from 
the subject's nose and repeat the 24 trials. 

Compare the number of errors in the two cases. Why would 
it be desirable to repeat the experiment on another person, test- 
ing him first with nose open and later with nose plugged? 



Feelings of Things as Present 35 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, II. (9-16), III., IV., V., VI. 

Stout, Manual, 117-124, 141-198. 
Titchener, Outline, §§ 7-26. 
Angell, Psychology, V. 

B. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, §§ 13-36. 
James, Principles, XVII. (1-9). 

Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, VII., VIII., X. 

§ 8. Percepts 

The Nature and Attributes of Percepts. — Our con- 
sciousness of the world is commonly not of confused 
blurs and masses of colors, sounds, tastes, and the like, 
but of unified wholes which we call 'things.' We can in 
thought analyze our feelings of the outside world into 
elements of colors, sounds, pressures, etc., but in reality 
they appear as complex total feelings. The feeling of a 
'thing' as actually present is called a Percept if the thing 
is actually present ; an Illusion if it is not present but 
something else is which gives us the feeling; an Hal- 
lucination if nothing is actually present to cause the feel- 
ing. Thus my feelings of the page I see, the pen I 
hold, the chords being played on the piano or the puffing 
of an engine are percepts. My feelings, as I lie dozing, 
of a page seen, when really only a dirty blotter is seen, 
and of the puffing of an engine, when really only my own 
breathing is heard, are illusions. My feeling of music 
heard in a dream, when really no sound at all is audible, 
is an hallucination. 

Feelings of things are most commonly based on sight 
and touch, less commonly on hearing, still less commonly 
on taste, smell or pain, and almost never on the feelings 
of nausea, dizziness, muscle-strain and other inner bodily 
conditions. We rarely say or think, T have a sourness/ 
or 'There are four dizzinesses in this room.' 



36 Descriptive Psychology 

Percept and Stimulus. — The same outside thing may 
arouse different percepts, different feelings of it, in dif- 
ferent people according to the amount and nature of 
their previous experiences of it. To the man without 
musical training the song sung by a chorus is a vague 
total of sounds, but to the trained musician it is a 
balanced harmony in which all the different parts are 
clearly felt. To the five year old a page of print is an in- 
definite smear of black specks on a white ground; to his 
teacher it is a definite series of letters and words ; to the 
printer it is not only that, but also 10 point type. To 
the baby all our 'things' are as yet a misty, chaotic mud- 
dle of feeling. 

We learn our feelings of the commonest things as 
truly as we learn the multiplication table or the Latin 
language. The differences are that we learn the former 
mainly in the earliest years of life, that the constant pres- 
ence of things and the need of getting on with them 
makes the acquaintance with them almost universal and 
brings to pass far greater similarities amongst men in 
their percepts than in the more elaborated connections 
between ideas. These similarities should not, however, 
blind us to the differences which do, as has been pointed 
out, exist, or to the fact that even by the age of entrance 
to school the feelings of things which adults have long 
taken for granted may be absent or only partially de- 
veloped. 

One of the results of experience is that less and less 
of the outside thing is required to arouse the feeling of it. 
Our eyes really see and our ears hear only a part of what 
we feel as visual and auditory percepts. In all prob- 
ability a number of readers of this book did not actually 
see the of in the first line of this paragraph or the the in 
the second line or the last e of outside. If the reader 



Feelings of Things as Present 37 

will read very rapidly the passage printed on page 38 and 
then re-read it very slowly, looking at each word, he will 
probably discover that in the first reading his senses must 
have taken in only partial glimpses of the words and that 
his mind supplied their customary accompaniments out 
of whole cloth. In listening to a foreign language one 
is surprised at the small number of articulate sounds that 
he hears : the rest seem a mere jangle. Of conver- 
sation in our own language our ears really hear only a 
few sounds clearly, but these serve as a sufficient basis 
for a total series of clear percepts. Repeat to a group of 
people the lines below and you may be surprised to find 
the changes unnoticed. 

Mary had a little lamb, 

Its fleece was white is snow ; 

And every pair that Mary went, 
The lamb was sure to go. 

Percepts and Sensations Compared. — Between sen- 
sations and percepts, between feelings of the qualities 
of things and feelings of the things themselves, no sharp 
line can be drawn. E.g., is my feeling of the sound of 
the watch ticking to be called a sensation of the sound, a 
quality of the watch, or a percept of a thing, a ticking 
sound ? If by sensations are meant what were called pure 
sensations, the clear distinction can be drawn that every 
percept involves experience, that 'every perception is an 
acquired perception/ But since pure sensations exist 
only in the dawn of mental life, this distinction is as use- 
less as it is clear. Again between elementary sensations 
and percepts the clear distinction can be drawn that every 
percept is caused by a number of sensory stimulations, 
requires the co-operation of many brain processes, is 
divisible in analysis into parts. But since elementary 



38 Descriptive Psychology 



We, the people of the United States, in order to form 
a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic 
tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the 
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to 
ourselves aud our posterity, do ordain and establish this 
Constitntion for the United Stales of America. 

All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested 
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist 
of a Senate and House of Representatives. 

The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
members chosen every second year by the people of the 
several States, and the electors in each State shall have 
the qualifications requisite for electors of tho most nu- 
merous branch of the State legislature. 

No person shall be a Representative who shall not 
have attained the age of twenty-five years, ard been seven 
years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, 
when elected, be an inhahitant of that State in which he 
shall be chosen. 

Representatives and direct taxes shalt be apportioned 
among the several States which may be included within 
this Union, according to their respoctive numbers, which 
shall be determimed by adding to the whole number of 
free persons, including those bound to service for a term 
of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of 
all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made 
within three years after the first meeting of the Congress 
of the United States, and within every subsequent term 
of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. 



Feelings of Things as Present 39 

sensations do not have real existence, it may be objected 
that there is no great advantage in distinguishing any- 
thing from them. 

The facts are that sensations and percepts are words 
that divide between them the work of naming our feelings 
of the outside world as present ; that in their general use 
the former refers to our feelings when they emphasize 
simple qualities such as of color, pitch, heat, cold, and the 
like, while the latter refers to our feelings when they 
emphasize things or groups of qualities that go together. 

The Classification of Percepts. — There is literally 
no end to the variety of the feelings of things possible to 
a human mind. In an hour's walk in a city one may have 
five thousand different percepts, each of a human face. 
In an evening at the opera one may add thousands of 
percepts of tones. A classification in any detail of the 
perceptual life of a mind would thus be. a long labor. 
There may be as many and as different percepts in the 
mind as there are things in the world, indeed more. For 
the same thing may arouse different feelings according 
as it is seen near or at a distance, in the light or in the 
dark, from one side or from the other, and so on through 
many possible changes. 

For purposes of study a classification according to 
which sense furnishes the main features of the percept is 
useful. Thus we have visual percepts, auditory percepts, 
etc. The word main must be emphasized in our thought, 
for in many percepts different senses combine. 

Another classification useful for purposes of study 
would be into extensive, temporal and merely qualitative. 
For many of our feelings are of things as in space, as so 
big, of such a shape, at such a distance, and the spatial 
or form-size character of things is highly important in 
the sciences and arts. So also the precepts of language 



40 Descriptive Psychology 

and music in which elements successive in time become 
joined into unitary feelings of words or melodies well 
deserve separate study. The group left over — the feel- 
ing of things through taste, smell, pressure and the rest 
— is, however, a very mixed and unwieldy group. 

In discussions of the development of our knowledge 
of things or of the education of the senses, percepts may 
best be grouped according to their clearness, detail and 
number of connections with images and other percepts. 
Thus the vague, coarse and isolated percept of its 
mother's face which an infant has would be put in one 
group ; the percept of the same face which the child will 
feel in a year or two would be put in a second group; 
while the exact definition and complete detail of the per- 
cept of the same face felt by a friend who was painting 
the mother's portrait would be put in a third class. 

Percepts might also be classified as single or col- 
lective. The sight of a pencil or the sound of a tone are 
examples of the former ; the sight of a forest or an army 
or the sound of a melody or of a pattering of rain are 
examples of the latter. 

The Constitution of Percepts. — Elementary sensa- 
tions are said to combine to form percepts. When the 
combination is by the juxtaposition in space of the ele- 
ments, as when different bits of blue make a blue surface 
or different bits of pressure give the feeling of a hand 
pressed against the brow, the combination is called 
colligation. When the elements do not each exclude the 
other from occupying the same space, as when different 
tones combine to form a chord, or when tastes and smells 
and touch combine to form the total 'taste' of celery, the 
combination is called fusion. This combination is really 
a combination, not of feelings, but of the processes in 
the brain upon which they depend. 



Feelings of Things as Present 



4i 



Exercises 

1. Give illustrations of illusions and of hallucinations from 
your own and from your friends' experiences. 

2. a. Which senses provide percepts of the form of objects? 

b. Which senses provide percepts of the texture of 

objects? 

c. Which senses provide percepts of the weight of ob- 

jects? 

3. What terms in grammar refer respectively to single and 
collective percepts? 

4. Give three illustrations of the influence of training in 
replacing vague and coarse percepts by definite and detailed per- 
cepts. 




Fig. 1 



B 



5. What paragraphs in the text bring out the facts stated in 
these qooTationiF For a. see § 6; for b. and c. see § 8. 

a. "Consciousness is never composed of a single sensa- 

tion." ( Titchener ) . 

b. "The consciousness of particular material things pres- 

ent to sense is nowadays called perception." 
(James). 

c. "Every perception is an acquired perception." 

(James). 
Experiment 5. Sensations and Percepts. — a. Look at Fig. 
1 A. Find the two frogs. Notice the change from a vague blur 
of lines to a definite picture as the frogs spring into view. 

b. Look at a landscape with the head turned upside down ; 
then with the head in its usual position. 

c. Look through the pages of an illustrated magazine, held 



42 Descriptive Psychology 

upside down or turned through an angle of 135 degrees from its 
usual position. When a picture appears as a mere chaos of 
sensations, turn the magazine to its usual position and note the 
difference in the picture's definiteness and 'thingness.' 

Experiment 6. ' Percept and Stimulus. — Look at Fig. 1 B. 
What is it? Continue looking until you find another animal 
shown. Show the figure to six or eight people, letting each one 
tell at once what it is. What sentence in the text (page 36) do 
the results illustrate? 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, XX. (312-315). 
Stout, Manual,- 312-391. 

Titchener, Outline, §§ 43-51. 
Angell, Psychology, VI., VII. 

B. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, §§ 37-41. 
James, Principles, XIX. (76-82). 

Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, XII.-XV. 

*I am indebted to the publishers of St. Nicholas for permission 
to use Fig. i A, 



CHAPTER III 

♦ 
Feelings of Things as Absent: Images and Memories 

§ 9. Mental Images 

Definition and Classification. — The term Imagery 
or Images is often restricted to feelings of things as not 
present. A more useful meaning and one that prevails 
in recent books on psychology, is feelings of things, quali- 
ties and conditions of all sorts as not present. In this 
sense of the word there may be an image to correspond 
to every sensation, percept, impulse or emotion. There 
may be images of fatigue, fear, lonesomeness and tickling, 
as well as of faces or tunes. The most frequent images 
are however of sights, sounds and movements. 

Images are naturally classified according to the kind 
of sensation or percept or impulse or emotion to which 
they correspond. The most important groups are : 

Images of sights: — Visual Images. 

Images of sounds: — Auditory or Audile Images. 

Images of feelings of movement: — Motor or Mo- 
tile Images. 

Images of touches : — Tactile Images. 

Images of tastes : — Gustatory Images. 

Images of smells : — Olfactory Images. 
The readers may be unable to get images of all these 
different kinds. Images of tastes and of smells are com- 
paratively rare and some individuals can be found who 
apparently lack visual and auditory images. 

43 



44 Descriptive Psychology 

A group of images which is of much practical impor- 
tance is formed by images of words. More of human 
thinking, especially of that of educated men and women, 
is done by imaged words than by imaged objects. It 
should be noted that whereas for images of objects the 
order of frequency is visual, auditory, motor, the order 
of frequency for images of words is probably motor 
auditory, visual. Possibly auditory, motor, visual is the 
order, but common opinion often mistakes a motor for an 
auditory image. The more one observes his images of 
words, the more he will find motor factors and approach 
agreement with the following statement by Bain: 

'When we recall the impression of a word or sentence, 
if we do not speak it out, we feel the twitter of the organs 
just about to come to that point. The articulating parts 
— the larynx, the tongue, the lips — are all sensibly 
excited ; a suppressed articulation is in fact the material 
of our recollection, the intellectual manifestation, the 
idea of speech.' 1 

Generic Images. — In certain cases the conditions 
are especially favorable for the production of vague, 
hazy, incomplete images ; namely, when many things 
alike in certain features and unlike in others have been 
experienced. For instance, the many different percepts 
that have been associated with the word dog result in a 
tendency of the process of reproduction toward an image 
of a dog of indefinite and fleeting size, color and shape. 
In such cases the different percepts contribute elements 
which in some cases agree enough to reinforce each other, 
in others are so contradictory as to annihilate each other, 
and in all cases tend somewhat to give way in succession 
to each other. We may compare the process to that of 
making composite photographs in which each of a hun- 

1 Quoted by James, Principles of Psychology, vol. II., p. 64. 



Feelings of Things as Not Present 45 

dred or so faces has its share. Or the process may be 
likened to the clamor of a thousand men saying some- 
thing alike in part and different in other parts. Out of 
it all comes to the listener a vague feeling of the general 
thought of the assembly. A mental image which pos- 
sesses clearly only the commonest features of a class of 
objects, being incomplete and hazy and changing in all 
minor details, is called a Generic Image. 

"In dreams, one sees houses, trees and other objects, 
which are perfectly recognisable as such, but which re- 
mind one of the actual objects as seen 'out of the corner 
of the eye,' or of the pictures thrown by a badly-focused 
magic lantern. A man addresses us who is like a figure 
seen by twilight; or we travel through countries where 
every feature of the scenery is vague ; the outlines of the 
hills are ill-marked, and the rivers have no defined banks. 
They are, in short, generic ideas of many past impres- 
sions of men, hills, and rivers. An anatomist who oc- 
cupies himself intently with the examination of several 
specimens of some new kind of animal, in course of time 
acquires so vivid a conception of its form and structure, 
that the idea may take visible shape and become a sort of 
waking dream. But the figure which thus presents itself 
is generic, not specific. It is no copy of any one speci- 
men, but, more or less, a mean of the series. " 1 

Variation in Images. — Images differ greatly in 
clearness, in fidelity and in susceptibility to control. One 
may have a perfect distinct image of his father's face, 
one which accurately corresponds detail for detail with 
the real percept and which can be gotten at any time and 
retained before the mind's eye at will; but his image of 
a certain house or of a regular polygon of twenty sides 
may be vague, rough and fleeting. Between individuals 
the difference is even more marked. One may be able at 
will to feel 'before his mind's nose' the odor of roast 

1 Huxley's 'Hume/ p. 113. 



46 Descriptive Psychology 

beef as a clear exact correspondent of the real sensa- 
tion. Another may be utterly unable to feel it at all 
unless it is there. The following cases illustrate extreme 
cases of imagery of various sorts : — 

(1) "This morning's breakfast-table is both dim and 
bright; it is dim if I try to think of it when my eyes are 
open upon any object; it is perfectly clear and bright if I 

think of it with my eyes closed All the objects are 

clear at once, yet when I confine my attention to any one 

object it becomes far more distinct I have more 

power to recall color than any other one thing; if, for 
example, I were to recall a plate decorated with flowers, 
I could reproduce in a drawing the exact tone, etc. The 
color of anything that was on the table was perfectly 
vivid. — There is very little limitation to the extent of my 
images: I can see all four sides of a room, I can see all 
four sides of two, three, four, even more rooms with such 
distinctness that if you should ask me what was in any 
particular place in any one, or ask me to count the chairs, 
etc., I could do it without the least hesitation. — The 
more I learn by heart, the more clearly do I see images of 
my pages. Even before I can recite the lines, I can see 
them so that I could give them very slowly word for 
word, but my mind is so occupied in looking at my print- 
ed image that I have no idea of what I am saying, of the 
sense of it, etc. When I first found myself doing this, I 
used to think it was merely because I knew the lines im- 
perfectly ; but I have quite convinced myself that I really 
do see an image. The strongest proof that such is really 
the fact is I think, the following : 

"I can look down the mentally seen page and see the 
words that commence all the lines, and from any one of 
these words I can continue the line. I find this much 
easier to do if the words begin in a straight line than if 
there are breaks." 1 

(2) "I am unable to form in my mind's eye any 
visual likeness of the table whatever. After many trials 
I can only get a hazy surface, with nothing on it or about 

1 James, Principles of Psychology, vol. II., p. 56. 



Feelings of Things as Not Present 47 

it. I can see no variety in color, and no positive limita- 
tions in extent, while I cannot see what I see well enough 
to determine its position in respect to my eye, or to en- 
dow it with any quality of size. I am in the same posi- 
tion as to the word dog. I cannot see it in my mind's 
eye at all; and so cannot tell whether I should have to 
run my eye along it, if I did see it." 1 

(3) "Imagination also takes the auditory form. 
'When I write a scene/ said Legouve to Scribe, 'I hear; 
but you see. In each phrase which I write, the voice of 
the personage strikes my ear. Vous, qui etes le theatre 
meme, your actors walk, gesticulate before your eyes ; 

I am a listener, you a spectator' 'Nothing more 

true/ said Scribe. 'Do you know where I am when I 
write a piece? In the middle of the parterre/ 1 

(4) "If I wish to imagine that I am walking, I have 
to combine feelings in the parts of the body concerned in 
walking. This feeling is in my case most vivid in the 
upper part of the thigh. For every step, which I wish 
to imagine, I have to revive expressly such a feeling in 
the upper part of the thigh, just as if I wished to really 
move it forward, to make a real step/' 

"If I try to call up in memory the walking move- 
ment of another person, say of a soldier marching, and 
in such wise as to imagine him first in one position (for 
instance with both legs on the ground and then as lifting 
his leg at the order March and putting it forward so as 
to take a step), I notice that I am thinking of the upper 
part of one of my own thighs. 

"If I wish to imagine him lifting his left leg, I am 
aware of something in the upper part of my left thigh; 
if I seek to imagine him as lifting his right leg, the feel- 
ing passes back to my right thigh/' 

"My memories of the movements of all inanimate 
objects are for the most part connected with feelings in 
the eye muscles. If I wish to represent to myself the 
motion of the clouds, I have to add the feeling of my 
eyes following the clouds. If I try to suppress this feel- 

1 James, Principles of Psychology, vol. II., pp. 57-60. 



48 Descriptive Psychology 

ing, the image of the movement is at once inhibited, the 
clouds seem unable to move. The case is the same with 
my images of the flight of a bird, of smoke rising, of a 
wagon passing by. 

"I cannot imagine the sound b without feelings in 
my lips. No more can I call up the feeling in my lips 
of b without thinking of the sound." 1 

(5) ' 'Auditory Mental Imagery. I find the audi- 
tory mental imagery in my case to be almost as import- 
ant a factor in my mental life as is the visual, being a 
mental reproduction of the sounds I have heard — musi- 
cal or otherwise. They are comparable with real 
sounds, not so much in intensity, but perfectly in timbre, 
pitch and duration. I can estimate a minute with much 
greater exactness mentally if I listen to the auditory 
mental imagery of a piece of music which takes about 
a minute to perform. 

"The auditory mental imagery, I would say, includes 
all the actual word thinking that I do, which is almost 
always done by means of writing. . 

"Olfactory Mental Imagery. These are in my own 
case extremely numerous, probably because to me so 

many things have a smell, often a distinctive smell 

These mental images have to me, like those of the other 
senses, quite distinctive qualities. The mental image of 
the smell of new-mown hay is totally unlike, even as a 
purely mental occurrence, that of the aroma of forest leaf- 
mold. And the words 'tea' and 'coffee' are represented 
in my mind by two mental images, totally unlike." 2 

Types of Imagination. — Individuals may often be 
classified under types according to the kind of imagery 
which predominates in their streams of thought. Thus 
Dr. Strieker, the author of the fourth quotation given 
above, would be put under the motor type, while the 
author of the first quotation would be called a visualizer. 

1 S. Strieker, Bewegungsvorstellungen, pp. 12-14, an d Sprach- 
vorstellungen, pp. 9-10. 

a Wilfrid Lay, Mental Imagery, pp. 36-37. 



Feelings of Things as Not Present 49 

So would Dr. Lay, who found that 2,500 recorded mental 
images of his own were distributed as follows: 

Per Cent. Per Cent Per Cent. 

Visual 574 Gustatory ... .6 Organic .... 1. 1 

Auditory 28.8 Thermal 2.0 Motor 3 

Olfactory .... 5.9 Tactile 3.8 Emotional ....I 

The majority of individuals do not, however, show so 
emphatic a predominance of one kind of imagery as to 
be put surely in any one class. They are mixed types. 
For instance the reader will probably find that he or she 
has visual images most frequently, auditory next and 
motor next, as do the majority ; that in his class or among 
his friends cases of the almost exclusive use of any one 
kind of imagery are rare. 

Image and Percept. — The image, as defined, is 
never the exact duplicate of the sensation or percept to 
which it corresponds. If it were, one would feel the 
thing as present and act as if it were. Indeed the most 
useful characteristic of an image is that it does not du- 
plicate the sensation or percept. Otherwise we should 
all be like sleep-walkers and madmen, confusing fact 
with fancy in the most absurd and dangerous ways. 

Images, like percepts, are the result of a process of 
acquisition. At the start of life we have neither, and for 
some time the two are confused, — at least in memory, as 
is witnessed by the innocent lies of three year olds who 
tell of lions running down the street and of dogs as big 
as houses or as small as mice. 

Productive Imagination. — So far only those images 
have been described which at least roughly correspond 
to real things and conditions. There also occur images 
which correspond to nothing real, but are new combina- 
tions. One can picture a beast with an elephant's head, 

4 



50 Descriptive Psychology* 

a lion's body and a giraffe's legs. There is in these cases 
a correspondence not of the total image with some real 
thing, but only of parts of the image with parts or ele- 
ments of real things. In our fancies and dreams we 
thus make the most extraordinary and elaborate com- 
binations of the old familiar elements. The names (i) 
Reproductive Imagination and (2) Productive Imagina- 
tion are used for ( 1 ) the capacity of getting images that 
repeat whole things experienced and (2) the capacity of 
getting images of things never experienced on a basis of 
old elements and parts. 

The capacity to thus create a new world from the 
ruins of past experiences is one of the primary sources 
of human achievement. When directed by wise insight 
it becomes a part of the creative genius of poets, in- 
ventors and men of science. On the basis of the same 
experiences one man imagines the steam engine, another 
man nothing; out of the same stuff one man creates a 
tawdry play of revenge, another a Hamlet. 

§ 10. Memories 

Definitions. — In the common usage of language the 
words memory and to remember refer to four distinct 
things : — 

( 1 ) The presence of mental images ; e.g., 'Can you 
remember his face?' usually means, 'Can you call up a 
visual image of his face?' 

(2) The feeling of a thing as having been experi- 
enced ; e.g., T remember your face but I cannot place it.' 
Recognition is a better name for this sort of feeling. 

(3) The feeling of a thing or event as belonging to 
some definite experience of one's own in the past, or, in 
the words of Professor James, ''Knowledge of an event, 
or fact, of which meantime we have not been thinking, 



Feelings of Things as Not Present 51 

with the additional consciousness that we have thought 
or experienced it before;" e.g., 'Do you remember how 
you fell from your horse here last summer?' means, 'Can 
you call to mind the event, and feel that you experienced 
it?' 

(4) The continued existence of connections that 
have been formed between ideas or feelings and acts 
or acts and acts; e.g., 'Do you remember your Latin?', 
'Do you remember how to write shorthand?', and 'Do 
you remember how to throw an out curve?' refer to the 
presence not of feelings of things past but of connections 
made in the past. Permanence of connections or as- 
sociations is a better name for these facts. 

Memory Proper. — The word memory, or rather 
memories, may best be kept rather strictly for the feelings 
of class (3) of the above. Such feelings are evidently 
complex. They involve far more than the mere repe- 
tition of a feeling. Like images they are feelings of a 
thing or event as not present. They also involve the 
perception of time, since they are feelings of things or 
events as having been present in the past The conscious- 
ness of self enters, also, since they are feelings of a 
thing or event as having been in one's own past ex- 
perience. Like judgments they imply an affirmation 
that such a state of affairs is (here was) the case. It 
would indeed not be unfair to define memories (mean- 
ing by the word class (3) above) as judgments con- 
cerning one's own past experience. 

The facts about the permanence of connections will 
be presented in Part III, since they are explainable by 
the laws of the mind's action, — belong, that is, to dy- 
namic psychology. Why different individuals possess 
different degrees of ability in retaining connections once 
formed, what decides whether one shall be able to call 



52 Descriptive Psychology 

up a given fact or not, how connections may most 
readily be made permanent, — are samples of the ques- 
tions that will arise. 

Exercises 

1. Study carefully the picture your mind calls up of your 
breakfast-table of this morning as Galton directs in his 'Questions 
on Visualizing' and then write down your answers to the first 
three questions of his list. Where would you class yourself in 
visual imagery and in color representation, using Galton's scale 
(printed on page 55 f.) ? 

2. Make the observations and answer the questions as 
directed by Galton, so far as you have time. What kinds of 
images do you lack entirely? What kinds are little developed? 
What kinds are most prominent? Compare your answers with 
those of three or four of your friends. 

In answering the questions one must beware of : — 

(1) Confusing the image of the name of a thing with the 
image of the thing itself. That I can call up the word bitter does 
not mean that I can have an image of a bitter taste. 

(2) Confusing the fact that one can act as if a feeling were 
present in his mind with the fact of the real presence of the feel- 
ing. The same act may have various antecedents. That I can 
draw my finger around an oblong space in the air does not imply 
that I can have a visual image of an oblong. That I shiver when 
someone is hurt does not imply that I feel an image of pain. 

(3) Confusing the knowledge that something happened 
with an image of its happening. That I can now feel that I was 
angry does not mean that I feel a mental image of the emotion, 
anger. 

(4) Confusing the process of arousing certain conditions 
and so having a certain real feeling, with the process of arousing 
an image of that feeling. That I can, by thinking of certain 
events, get a feeling of anger, does not mean that I can get an 
image of the feeling of anger. That by calling up thoughts of the 
country I can arouse a feeling of desire does not mean that I can 
feel an image of the feeling of desire. 



Feelings of Things as Not Present 53 

Galton's 'Questions on Visualizing and Other Allied 
Faculties' 

*The object of these Questions is to elicit the degree in which 
different persons possess the power of seeing images in their 
mind's eye, and of reviving past sensations. 

From inquiries I have already made, it appears that remark- 
able variations exist both in the strength and in the quality of these 
faculties, and it is highly probable that a statistical inquiry into 
them will throw light upon more than one psychological problem. 

Before addressing yourself to any of the Questions .... 
think of some definite object — suppose it is your breakfast-table 
as you sat down to it this morning — and consider carefully the 
picture that rises before your mind's eye. 

1. Illumination. — Is the image dim or fairly clear? Is its 
brightness comparable to that of the actual scene? 

2. Definition. — Are all the objects pretty well defined at the 
same time, or is the place of sharpest definition at any one moment 
more contracted than it is in a real scene? 

3. Colouring. — Are the colours of the china, of the toast, 
bread crust, mustard, meat, parsley, or whatever may have been 
on the table, quite distinct and natural? 

4. Extent of field of view. — Call up the image of some pano- 
ramic view (the walls of your room might suffice). Can you 
force yourself to see mentally a wider range of it than could be 
taken in by any single glance of the eyes? Can you mentally 
see more than three faces of a die, or more than one hemisphere 
of a globe at the same instant of time? 

5. Distance of images. — Where do mental images appear to 
be situated? Within the head, within the eye-tall, just in front 
of the eyes, or at a distance corresponding to reality? Can you 
project an image upon a piece of paper? 

6. Command over images. — Can you retain a mental picture 
steadily before the eyes ? When you do so, does it grow brighter 
or dimmer ? When the act of retaining it becomes wearisome, in 
what part of the head or eye-ball is the fatigue felt? 

7. Persons. — Can you recall with distinctness the features of 
all near relations and many other persons? Can you at will 
cause your mental image of any or most of them to sit, stand, or 
turn slowly round? Can you deliberately seat the image of a 
well-known person in a chair and see it with enough distinctness 



54 Descriptive Psychology 

to enable you to sketch it leisurely (supposing yourself able to 
draw) ? 

8. Scenery. — Do you preserve the recollection of scenery 
with much precision of detail, and do you find pleasure in dwell- 
ing on it? Can you easily form mental pictures from the 
descriptions of scenery that are so frequently met with in novels 
and books of travel? 

9. Comparison with reality. — What difference do you per- 
ceive between a very vivid mental picture called up in the dark, 
and a real scene? Have you ever mistaken a mental image for 
a reality when in health and wide awake? 

10. Numerals and dates. — Are these invariably associated in 
your mind with any peculiar mental imagery, whether of written 
or printed figures, diagrams, or colours? If so, explain fully, 
and say if you can account for the association. 

11. Specialties. — If you happen to have special aptitudes for 
mechanics, mathematics (either geometry of three dimensions or 
pure analysis), mental arithmetic, or chess-playing blindfold, 
please explain fully how far your processes depend on the use 
of visual images, and how far otherwise? 

12. Call up before your imagination the objects specified in 
the six following paragraphs, numbered A to F, and consider 
carefully whether your mental representation of them generally, 
is in each group very faint, faint, fair, good, or vivid and com- 
parable to the actual sensation : — 

A. Light and colour. — An evenly clouded sky (omitting all 
landscape), first bright, then gloomy. A thick surrounding haze, 
first white, then successively blue, yellow, green, and red. 

B. Sound. — The beat of rain against the window panes, the 
crack of a whip, a church bell, the hum of bees, the whistle of a 
railway, the clinking of tea-spoons and saucers, the slam of a 
door. 

C. Smells. — Tar, roses, an oil-lamp blown out, hay, violets, 
a fur coat, gas, tobacco. 

D. Tastes. — Salt, sugar, lemon juice, raisins, chocolate, cur- 
rant jelly. 

E. Touch. — Velvet, silk, soap, gum, sand, dough, a crisp 
dead leaf, the prick of a pin. 

F. Other sensations. — Heat, hunger, cold, thirst, fatigue, 
fever, drowsiness, a bad cold. 



Feelings of Things as Not Present 55 

13. Music. — 'Have you any aptitude for mentally recalling 
music, or for imagining it? 

14. At different ages. — Do you recollect what your powers 
of visualizing, etc., were in childhood? Have they varied much 
within your recollection?" (F. Galton, Inquiries Into Human 
Faculty, pp. 378-380.) 

Galton's Scale of Vividness and Fidelity 

in Visual Imagery 

"Highest. — Brilliant, distinct, never blotchy. 

First Suboctile. — The image once seen is perfectly clear and 
bright. 

First Octile.— I can see my breakfast-table or any equally 
familiar thing with my mind's eye quite as well in all particulars 
as I can do if the reality is before me. 

First Quartile. — Fairly clear; illumination of actual scene is 
fairly represented. Well denned. Parts do not cbtrude them- 
selves, but attention has to be directed to different points in suc- 
cession to call up the whole. 

Middlemost. — Fairly clear. Brightness probably at least from 
one-half to two-thirds of the original. Definition varies very 
much, one or two objects being much more distinct than the 
others, but the latter come out clearly if attention be paid to them. 

Last Quartile. — Dim, certainly not comparable to the actual 
scene. I have to think separately of the several things on the 
table to bring them clearly before the mind's eye, and when I 
think of some things the others fade away in confusion. 

Last Octile. — Dim and not comparable in brightness to the 
real scene. Badly defined with blotches of light; very incom- 
plete; very little of one object is seen at one time. 

Last Suboctile. — I am very rarely able to recall any object 
whatever with any sort of distinctness. Very occasionally an 
object or image will recall itself, but even then it is more like a 
generalised image than an individual one. I seem to be almost 
destitute of visualising power as under control. 

Lowest. — My powers are zero. To my consciousness there 
is almost no association of memory with objective visual impres- 
sions. I recollect the table, but do not see it. 



56 Descriptive Psychology 

IN COLOUR REPRESENTATION 

Highest.— Perfectly distinct, bright and natural. 

First Suboctile. — White cloth, blue china, argand coffee-pot, 
buff stand with sienna drawing, toast — all clear. 

First Octile. — All details seen perfectly. 

First Quartile. — Colours distinct and natural till I begin to 
puzzle over them. 

Middlemost. — Fairly distinct, though not certain that they are 
accurately recalled. 

Last Quartile. — Natural, but very indistinct. 

Last Octile. — Faint; can only recall colours by a special 
effort for each. 

Last Suboctile. — Power is nil. 

Lowest. — Power is nil." (Inquiries Into Human Faculty, pp. 
93-94.) 

First suboctile means the ability exceeded by one sixteenth 
of people; first octile means the ability exceeded by one eighth; 
first quartile means the ability exceeded by one fourth; last quar- 
tile means the ability exceeded by three fourths ; last octile means 
the ability exceeded by seven eighths, last suboctile means the 
ability exceeded by fifteen sixteenths. 

3. Compare the imagery of the author of the following 
statement with that of the individuals quoted in § 9. 

"When I seek to represent a row of soldiers marching, all 
I catch is a view of stationary legs first in one phase of move- 
ment and then in another, and these views are extremely im- 
perfect and momentary. Occasionally (especially when I try to 
stimulate my imagination as by repeating Victor Hugo's lines 
about the regiment, 

'Leur pas est si correct, sans tarder ni courir, 

Qu'on croit voir des ciseaux se fermer et s'ouvrir,') 
I seem to get an instantaneous glimpse of an actual movement, 
but it is to the last degree dim and uncertain. All these images 
seem at first to be purely retinal. I think, however, that rapid 
eye-movements accompany them, though these latter give rise to 
such slight feelings that they are almost impossible of detection. 
Absolutely no leg-movements of my own are there; in fact, to 
call such up arrests my imagination of the soldiers. My optical 
images are in general very dim, dark, fugitive and contracted. 
It would be utterly impossible to draw from them, and yet I 



Feelings of Things as Not Present 57 

perfectly well distinguish one from the other. My auditory 
images are excessively inadequate reproductions of their origi- 
nals. I have no images of taste or smell. Touch-imagination is 
fairly distinct, but comes very little into play with most objects 
thought of. Neither is all my thought verbalized; for I have 
shadowy schemes of relation, as apt to terminate in a nod of the 
head or an expulsion of the breath as in a definite word. On 
the whole, vague images or sensations of movement inside of 
my head towards the various parts of space in which the terms 
I am thinking of either lie or are momentarily symbolized to lie 
together with movements of the breath through my pharynx and 
nostrils, form a by no means inconsiderable part of my thought- 
stuff." (James, Principles of Psychology, vol. II., p. 65.) 

Experiment 7. After Images and Recalled Images. — Cut out 
of a sheet of black paper, say 10 inches square, a cross with arms 
each an inch wide and two inches long. Fasten the sheet against 
the glass of a window so that a bright light comes through the 
cross shaped opening. Sitting at a distance of six or eight feet, 
look steadily at the center of the cross for a minute and a half or 
longer. Then look at a white screen (for instance a sheet or 
towel hung against the wall). A duplicate of the cross, but dark 
with a light background will be seen. How does this so-called 
after image differ from the visual image you call up in memory 
of a dark cross on a light background : — (a) in persistence, (b) 
in seeming a real object, (c) in location, (d) in modification by 
your will, (e) in intensity? 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, XVIII. (287-288), XIX. 
Stout, Manual, 393-417, 435-446. 

Titchener, Outline, §§ 70-80. 
Angell, Psychology, VIII, IX. 

B. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, §§ 48-50. 

James, Principles, XVI. (643-652), XVIII. 
Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, XVIII. (§ 3), XIX. 
(§6). 



CHAPTER IV 

Feelings of Facts: Feelings of Relationships, 
Meanings and Judgments 

§ ii. Feelings of Relationships 

Contrasted with Feelings of Things and Quali- 
ties. — As you look at this page you are conscious not 
only of the words, 'Feelings of Relationships/ but also 
of the fact that these words are at the top of this page ; 
you feel, that is, the 'abovenestf of these words. As 
you think of this chapter you are aware also that it is 
a part of the whole book; you feel, that is, its relation- 
ship to the whole. You feel, too, the unlikeness of the 
black letters to the white page. As you read in the 
first sentence the not only, you feel the incompleteness 
of the idea immediately to come; and as you read the 
but also, you feel the belonging-together-ness or to-be- 
added-to-ness of the next coming idea with the idea, 
'percepts of words/ 

We may thus feel things and qualities and conditions, 
not as mere bare existences, but as related in space and 
time, — as more than, less than, equal to, part of, whole 
containing, like, unlike, opposite to, derived from/super- 
ior to or inferior to some other fact. Amongst parts of 
speech, prepositions and conjunctions express feelings, 
not of things or qualities, but of relationships. There 
are feelings of in-ness, beside-ness, beyond-ness, with- 
ness, if-ness, but-ness and although-ness as truly as of 
the sun or moon, of black or white, of fatigue or pleasure. 

58 



Feelings of Facts 59 

These feelings are among the commonest features of 
mental life. Witness how much disappears from any 
statement, — e.g., the preamble to the United States Con- 
stitution, — when words expressing feelings of relation- 
ship are omitted from the text. 

"We the people the States form perfect, establish 
justice, insure domestic tranquillity, the defense, the wel- 
fare, the blessings liberty ourselves posterity do ordain 
establish this Constitution States America." 1 

Their Attributes. — It is hard to describe feelings of 
relationships. Anyone knows that when he thinks, 'He 
is sick : nevertheless/ he feels a different expectation 
toward the coming thought than if he heard or thought, 
'He is sick, therefore.' But it would be impossible to 
describe the feeling to one who had not felt it himself 
and it would take rather long statement to describe it 
to oneself. Two characteristics feelings of relation- 
ships almost invariably possess. In the first place they 
are fleeting, evanescent, intangible mental states. No 
sooner does one try to examine them than they are 
gone. One can keep the same percept in mind for some 
time; can hold the same image constant for at least a 
number of seconds. But one rarely thinks nevertheless- 
ness or but-ness or above-ness for any appreciable time. 
Feelings of relationship are among those transitory 
states of mind which Professor James calls the fringes 
of thought; they are the almost unseen web of con- 
nections in which are set the obvious percepts and 
images and the somewhat less obvious feelings of mean- 
ing. In the second place they almost invariably occur, 
not by themselves alone but in a context either as ele- 

1 Some of the words retained are relational if we consider their 
real meaning. Form and establish, ordain and secure may thus be 
held to express a feeling of causing; domestic and posterity to ex- 
press feelings of unlikeness. 



60 Descriptive Psychology 

ments of complex mental states, — 'fringes' or 'tenden- 
cies' of percepts and images, or as transitive, inter- 
mediate feelings, joining two mental states. We feel, 
not more alone but more than some given thing; not 
merely and but John and James. We feel things as 
relative or as related rather than things and relations. 1 
To supplement this account of the nature of these 
elusive feelings, I quote from Professor William James, 
who first emphasized their importance. - 

"If there be such things as feelings at all, then so 
surely as relations between objects exist in rerum natura, 
so surely, and more surely, do feelings exist to which 
these relations are known. There is not a conjunction 
or a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syn- 
tactic form, or inflection of voice, in human speech, that 
does not express some shading or other of relation which 
we at some moment actually feel to exist between the 
larger objects of our thought 

We ought to say a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a 
feeling of but and a feeling of by, quite as readily as we 
say a feeling of blue or a feeling of cold." 

"When we read such phrases as 'naught but,' 'either 
one or the other,' 'a is b,' 'but,' 'although it is, neverthe- 
less,' 'it is an excluded middle, there is no tertium quid/ 
and a host of other verbal skeletons of logical relation, is 
it true that there is nothing more in our minds than the 
words themselves as they pass ? What then is the mean- 
ing of the words which we think we understand as we 
read ? What makes that meaning different in one phrase 
from what it is in the other ? 'Who ?' 'When ?' 'Where ?' 
Is the difference of felt meaning in these interrogatives 
nothing more than their difference of sound? And is it 

Occasionally perhaps the pure feeling of a relationship holds 
the field by itself. The mere feeling of unity or of difference 
seems to enthrall us without our being able to say what is thus 
unified or similar. The following sentence, e. g., seems to repre- 
sent nothing more than jumbled feelings of relationship. "There 
are no differences but differences of degree between different de- 
grees of difference and no difference." 



Feelings of Facts 61 

not (just like the difference of a sound itself) known 
and understood in an affection of consciousness correla- 
tive to it, though so impalpable to direct examination? 
Is not the same true of such negatives as 'no,' 'never/ 
'not yet?' 

The truth is that large tracts of human speech are 
nothing but signs of direction in thought, of which direc- 
tion we nevertheless have an acutely discriminative sense, 
though no definite sensorial image plays any part in it 
whatsoever. Sensorial images are stable psychic facts; 
we can hold them still and look at them as long as we 
like. These bare images of logical movement, on the 
contrary, are psychic transitions, always on the wing, so 
to speak, and not to be glimpsed except in flight. Their 
function is to lead from one set of images to another. 
As they pass, we feel both the waxing and the waning 
images in a way altogether peculiar and a way quite 
different from the way of their full presence.' , 

"Every definite image in the mind is steeped and 
dyed in the free water that flows around it. With it 
goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying 
echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of 
whither it is to lead. The significance, the value, of the 
image is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and 
escorts it, — or rather that is fused into one with it and 
has become bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh; leav- 
ing it, it is true, an image of the same thing it was be- 
fore, but making it an image of that thing newly taken 
and freshly understood." 1 

Classification. — The more important feelings of 
relationship may be classified as follows : — 
Feelings of Objective Relationships — 
Of Relationships of Space. 
" Time. 

" Substance and Quality. 
Feelings of Logical or Intellectual or Subjective Re- 
lationships — 

1 James, Principles of Psychology, vol. I., pp. 245-255 passim. 



62 Descriptive Psychology 

Of Relationships of Identity. 

" Equality. 

" Likeness. 

" Unlikeness. 

" Opposition. 

B Part and Whole. 

" Cause and Effect. 

" Condition and Result. 

" Concession. 
Feelings of Relationships and Logical Thought. — 
Feelings of Relationships are essential features of logi- 
cal thinking. Especially important for it are feelings 
of the intellectual relationships, such as likeness and 
difference, and cause and effect. Compare, for instance, 
the paragraph A, which requires no thought and which 
leads mainly to a series of images in a scholar's mind, 
with the paragraph B, which involves thought and leads 
to real comprehension. Count the number of words 
standing for relationships in each. 



.The Nile overflows annually. The land in Egypt is 
fertile. The soil of the hills to the south is rich. The 
river deposits the soil. The land produces great crops of 
wheat. The river plains of China produce large crops of 
rice. Egypt used to be called the granary of Rome, 
Tlje method of cultivation in Egypt is by hand labor. 
The people are uninventive. The people are uneducated. 

B. 

Because of the annual overflow of the Nile the land in 
Egypt is fertilized by a deposit of rich soil brought down 
from the hills to the south. The lanxl thus produces 
great crops of wheat for the same reason that the river 
plains of China produce large crops of rice. Hence 
Egypt used to be called the granary of Rome. The in- 
ferior methods of cultivation, largely by hard labor, are 



Feelings of Facts 63 

'due to the lack of inventiveness and of education among 
the population who sow by hand. 

The dependence of logical thinking or reasoning upon 
feelings of relationships is shown also by a comparison 
of studies like grammar or geometry, which are conspic- 
uously rational, with one like spelling, ability in which is 
consistent with almost all degrees of reasoning power. 
Grammar bristles with relationships of subject, object, 
modifier and modified, dependent and independent, actor 
and acted upon, condition, concession and the like. 
Geometry is practically a series of propositions based on 
the relationships of identity, equality, greater than and 
less than. Spelling, however, is chiefly a matter of clear, 
accurate percepts of words and permanent associations 
of their images with the sounds and meanings of the 
words. Only occasionally are there words whose spell- 
ing is to be inferred from their likeness to others or 
from their being wholes, the parts of which are known. 

The Development of Feelings of Relationships. — 
Feelings of relationships develop later in childhood than 
feelings of things and qualities ; e.g., conjunctions are 
among the latest words learned, and complex sentences 
involving the expression, in clauses, of feelings of condi- 
tion, cause, opposition, and the like, appear much later 
than simple sentences. Children asked to give the word 
meaning the opposite of a given word, to give the word 
meaning just what the given word does not mean, will 
answer correctly and quickly in the case of words like 
day, work, rich, empty, or to hate, at an age when they 
would answer only partially and slowly in the case of 
with, different, more or part, and would in most cases 
fail utterly with and, because or if. The feelings of 
space- and time-relationships are felt much earlier than 



64 Descriptive Psychology 

the so-called logical relationships such as cause, condi- 
tion or concession. 

The ease with which feelings of relationships, espe- 
cially of relationships other than those of space and time, 
are acquired and the extent to which they are used by any 
individual, is in direct ratio to his intellectual capacity. 
The brighter the child, the more they will be in evidence. 
Very weak minded children never come to feel them. 

Exercises 

1. Make a list of ten or more words expressing feelings of 
relationships other than those of time and space. 

2. Give instances of other parts of speech than conjunctions 
and prepositions which may express feelings of relationships. 

3. Of the following, which depends the more on feelings 
of relationship : (a) ability in computation or (b) ability in doing 
arithmetical problems ? 

4. Answer the same question in the case of (a) knowledge 
of syntax and (b) knowledge of vocabularies. 

5. Name parts of speech that never express feelings of re- 
lationships. 

6. Pick out the words or phrases expressing feelings of 
relationship contained in the two quotations below. Which quo- 
tation has the more words expressing intellectual relationships? 

"At the helm 

A seeming mermaid steers : the silken tackle 
Swell with the touches of those flower-soft hands, 
That yarely frame the office. From the barge 
A strange invisible perfume hits the sense 
Of the adjacent wharfs. The city cast 
Her people out upon her; and Antony, 
Enthroned i' the market-place, did sit alone, 
Whistling to the air; which, but for vacancy, 
Had gone to gaze on Cleopatra too. 
And made a gap in nature." 

Antony and Cleopatra; Act II, Scene II. 
"What is the task which philosophers set themselves to per- 
form ; and why do they philosophize at all ? Almost every one will 
immediately reply: They desire to attain a conception of the 



Feelings of Facts 65 

frame of things which shall on the whole be more rational than 
that somewhat chaotic view which every one by nature carries 
about with him under his hat. But suppose this rational concep- 
tion attained, how is the philosopher to recognize it for what it 
is, and not let it slip through ignorance? The only answer can 
be that he will recognize its rationality as he recognizes every- 
thing else, by certain subjective marks with which it affects him. 
When he gets the marks, he may know that he has got the 
rationality." (W. James, The Will to Believe, p. 63.) 

7. Copy the first page of this text book omitting all words 
that express and arouse feelings of relationships. Observe the 
result. 

8. Make up intelligible sentences which, like the example 
below, shall be composed in the main of words expressing feel- 
ings of neither things nor emotions nor sensible qualities nor 

feelings meaning such, but only of relationships. "Although 

is not a product and cannot be equal to a derivative still 

the addition on the one hand and the subtraction on the other of 
necessity counteract each other. The total result therefore may 
be just the same as it was in the previous process." The only 
words here which in order to make sense need be the names of 
things are the two to be supplied in the blank spaces. 

9. Try to express the law of gravitation or any theorem in 
geometry, or to explain the change of the seasons, without using 
words that express and arouse feelings of relationships. Try to 
express, subject to the same limitation, the experiences of an 
hour in a storm. Why is the second task easy of accomplishment 
and the first so hard? 

§ 12. Feelings of Meaning 

Their Nature and Attributes. — Sensations, percepts, 
images and emotions are direct feelings of things, qualities 
and conditions. The feeling appears to be the thing. 
But we can feel that we mean or refer to a thing without 
directly feeling it. Thus one can think of or mean or 
refer in thought to his father without at the time seeing 
him or having a mental image of his appearance. That 
this power of meaning objects, in addition to and apart 

5 



66 Descriptive Psychology 

from feeling them as present or as absent, exists, can be 
proved by examining one's thoughts and also by the fact 
that we can mean or refer to objects, perceptions or 
images of which are impossible. For instance you can 
think of, though you cannot see or imagine, ten million 
pine trees growing in one row, or a line one millionth of 
an inch long, or a thousand angels all standing on one pin 
head, or Romulus and Remus, or King Alfred of Eng- 
land, or a flying machine without wings or balloons. 
Furthermore a dozen men may each have a similar feel- 
ing of meaning although the sensed and imaged parts of 
their thoughts are to the last degree dissimilar. Thus 
though one man hears 'Cinq et cinq font dix,' another 
'Fiinf und fiinf sind zehn,' and a third, 'Five and five are 
ten;' though the first man has a visual image of 5+5=10, 
the second a motor image of the incipient movements of 
saying 'Fiinf und fiinf sind zehn,' and the third no image 
at all, yet the feeling of the meaning may be the same in 
each case. 

The bulk of our thinking is in fact not concerned 
with direct feelings of things, but with mere references to 
them. We can do hundreds of examples about dollars 
and cents and hours, about feet of carpet and pounds of 
sugar, with never a percept of real money or carpets and 
with few or no mental pictures of the sight of coins or the 
taste of sugar. We can argue about the climate of a 
country with few or no mental pictures of black skies, 
drenched skins, or muddy soil. It is sufficient for our 
purposes if we feel that the words or other symbols in 
which we think stand for or represent or refer to the real 
things. 

The sound or sight or articulation, felt or imagined, 
of a word, — i.e., the percept or image of it, — is the least 
important thing about it. The word or symbol need not 



Feelings of Facts 6j 

be in the least like the real thing. What it refers to or 
stands for is the essential. Eleven dollars has a smoother, 
pleasanter sound than sixty-six buckets of gold shekels; 
the word victuals is as a word more painful than the word 
pain ; H, S0 4 is a rather bland and agreeable sound. 
Any symbol will do for any real thing. In fact the whole 
body of language and of scientific and mathematical sym- 
bols has for one of its chief ends to furnish us a way to 
mean and think of things (and also of qualities, condi- 
tions, emotions and relationships) without directly feeling 
or imagining them. The chief office of percepts and 
images of words is to be carriers of meanings. 

So far I have described only feelings meaning things, 
but we can mean qualities, conditions, emotions, impulses 
or relationships as well. The reader can think, 'Red is a 
bright color/ without any red in his actual field of vision. 
He can think, 'Great fatigue overcame the mind of the 
general,' or, Tn his anger he smote him to the ground,' 
without feeling in the least tired or angry in fact or fancy. 
He can think, 'A strong impulse to sneeze nearly betrayed 
the servant's presence,' without himself being tempted to 
sneeze. He can think, 'The relation of condition con- 
trary to the fact is expressed in Latin by the subjunctive,' 
without feeling any unfulfilled condition. Anything that 
we have ever felt in fact or fancy can later be meant or 
referred to. We can not only have or, one might say, 
be our feelings, but can at our convenience think of them 
through symbols devised for the purpose. 

Classification. — Chief among our feelings of mean- 
ing are: — 

I. Feelings that mean single facts or feelings of 
individual reference. Such feelings we call Individual 
Notions. Examples are our feelings of the meanings of 
the italicized words in the following: — 



68 Descriptive Psychology 

Julius Caesar is dead. 

His anger was terrible to witness. 

My dog is lost. 

2. Feelings that mean groups or classes of facts or 
any one or some part of a group or class of facts. They 
are called General Notions, Class Ideas, Concepts or 
feelings of general reference. Examples are: — 

A. Meaning a group or class. 

Men are mortal. 
Hospitals are useful. 
Sponges are animals. 
Teachers should possess tact. 

B. Meaning anyone of a group or class. 

Any man is sure to die. 

A hospital benefits the community. 

A sponge is not a plant. 

A teacher needs tact. 

C. Meaning some part of a group or class. 

Many men die before they are forty years old. 
Some hospitals are better managed than others. 
Certain varieties of sponges are commercially 
valuable. 

3. Feelings that mean some part or quality or aspect 
independently of the thing of which it is a part or quality 
or aspect. Such feelings are called Abstract Ideas or 
Abstractions, or feelings of reference to a quality or at- 
tribute. Examples are: — 

All bodies possess weight. 

The heat is intolerable. 

All is lost save honor. 
Feelings of Meaning and Images. — An individual 
notion may be and often is accompanied by an image 
more or less exact of the fact for which it stands, but in 



Feelings of Facts 69 

the nature of the case there can be no exact image of the 
fact referred to by an abstract or general notion. Of 
courage that is no particular act of courage, but is mere 
courage ; of velocity which is neither fast nor slow, 
neither of a cannon-ball nor of a feather falling, but is 
mere velocity ; of men that are not old or young, sick or 
well, white or black, with legs or without, intelligent or 
idiotic, but all are men ; of animals that include a hundred 
thousand different species, — no image can be formed. 
Often a vague, hazy, mixed and changing image of some 
of the facts meant, — that is to say, a generic image, — 
accompanies a feeling of absolute or general meaning, but 
still oftener the image is not of the fact meant at all. 
[ The commonest image present is that of the word that is 
'* used for the fact, not of anything like the fact. 

Feelings of Meaning and Reasoning. — It is largely 
by means of these feelings of meaning or reference that 
the life of real thought is carried on. Individual notions 
allow one to think of a fact conveniently without waiting 
for a percept or image of it and to keep in mind the same- 
ness of a thing in spite of its changes. General notions 
present in a sort of short-hand the results of many ex- 
periences and refer to thousands of possible percepts, 
images and individual actions in a single word. By ab- 
stract ideas a man can break up the endless complexities 
of the world's objects into a comparatively small number 
of elements and can think the one quality which is the 
important subject of thought at the time without being 
bothered by its concrete accompaniments — can argue 
about courage, or industry, or subtraction, or velocity 
without having the mind clouded by hundreds of images 
of brave deeds or sums from arithmetic books, or the like. 
From a comparison of individual facts he can derive a 
general notion. From finding that an individual fact 



jo Descriptive Psychology 

belongs to a general class about which something is true, 
he can assert that that thing is true of the individual fact. 
Man thus comes to work over the world of actual 
experiences into a world of objects and relations, thought 
of, classified and broken up into elements. And through 
this world of thought he acquires new knowledge of, and 
enlarged control over, the world of experience. In this 
world of thought are the highest activities of mental life ; 
by it are won the greatest triumphs of man over his 
environment. 

Exercises 

1. Classify the feelings of meaning aroused by reading the 
italicized words in the following sentences into individual notions, 
general notions and abstractions: — 

O, what a rogue and peasant slave am /. 
He would drown the stage with tears 
And cleave the general ear with horrid speech, 
Make mad the guilty and appall the free. 

For who would bear the whips and scorns of time, 
The oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely, 
The pangs of despised love, the law's delay, 
The insolence of office and the spurns, 
That patient merit of the unworthy takes. 

Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice 
And could of men distinguish, her election 
Hath sealed thee for herself. 

2. Of the following studies, which two are most concerned 
with individual notions? Which two are- most concerned with 
abstractions? Latin Grammar, History, Manual Training, 
Algebra, Chemistry. 

3. Name two studies which do not deal with individual 
notions at all. 



Feelings of Facts yi 

§ 13. Judgments 

Definition. — In an early chapter it was stated that 
thoughts were rarely strings of isolated sensations, per- 
cepts, images or feelings of meaning; in the present 
chapter the relating, transitional, connecting feelings 
which help to make the complex whole thoughts of real 
life have been described. One important group of these 
complex whole thoughts comprises those which are called 
Judgments, They are feelings that a certain state of 
affairs is or is not the case, that a certain relationship does 
or does not exist between certain things. They are feel- 
ings that affirm or deny something about something, — 
such feelings as are ordinarily expressed in declarative 
sentences. 1 According to many logic books the judgment 
feeling is always one that relates two terms, and such 
statements as, The dog runs,' and 'The snow falls,' really 
mean, 'The dog is a running thing,' and 'The snow is a 
falling object.' This explanation may do no harm in 
logic, but it is psychologically false. One may have a 
judgment feeling with one term as well as with two, on 
the basis of a percept as well as of a comparison. The 
thought, 'The snow falls,' is a judgment, not that the 
snow is in the class a falling object, but that a certain 
state of affairs, 'snow falling,' is the case. 

Judgments and Thought. — It is as combined in 
judgments that our feelings of things, conditions, quali- 
ties and relations are most influential in the intellectual 
life. Conversation is largely the expression of judg- 
ments. Still more so is the reading-matter of newspapers, 

1 Interrogative sentences also may express judgments plus an 
attitude of inquiry concerning their correspondence with reality. 
Thus 'Is John a tall man?' equals 'John a tall man. Is it so?' 
The interrogative state of mind in turn is often expressed as an 
outright judgment plus a query, as in the German, ( Er ist ein 
grosser Mann. Nicht wahr?' 



*J2 Descriptive Psychology 

magazines and books. Every scientific formula, every 
mathematical equation, every philosophical principle — 
each is an expressed judgment. In childhood intellec- 
tual progress is marked by the transformation of mere 
percepts and images and vaguely felt relationships into 
judgments. Throughout life the thoughtful, as opposed 
to the sensuous or dreamy or scatter-brained, man or 
woman, is one whose mental states consist largely of 
well-defined judgments. 

Classification. — Judgments may be Individual or 
General or Abstract according as they affirm or deny 
something about a thing or about a group of things or 
about an abstract quality. Judgments are called Analytic 
when they affirm or deny something about an object 
which was implicit in the thought of the object; e.g., 
The light is bright :' 'His breathing is regular ;' 'A is A.' 
They are called Synthetic when they affirm or deny some- 
thing about an object which is a new contribution to the 
thought of the object; e.g., 'The square root of 2 is 
1.41421356;' 'Malaria is caused by the bite of a mosquito;' 
'The most frequent age of graduation from American 
colleges is about 22 years and 10 months.' It should be 
noted that what is an analytic judgment in one case may be 
synthetic in another. Thus for someone who had noticed 
merely breathing but had not noticed varieties of breath- 
ing, 'His breathing is regular' would be a synthetic judg- 
ment. Such a person could have thought of the breath- 
ing without having its regularity implicit in the thought. 
'A is A' might be a synthetic judgment in the case of a 
very young child. 

Further classifications may be found in text books on 
logic. The student unacquainted with the elements of 
logic will do well to read Chapters I, III, VI and VIII 



Feelings of Facts 73 

of Aikins' Principles of Logic, or equivalent chapters in 
some similar book. 

No more time need be spent with the descriptive 
psychology of judgments. In Part III the conditions 
of their development and action will concern us for many 
pages. 

Exercises 

1. Give illustrations of: — 

(a) Individual judgments. 

(b) General judgments. 

(c) Abstract judgments. 

2. State also, in the case of each illustration given, whether 
it is an analytic or a synthetic judgment. 

3. What kind of sentence does not express judgments? 

4. Which arouses the more judgments, a story read or music 
heard? 

5. With which are judgments most associated, learning a 
science like physics or learning an art like painting? 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, XI. (160-167), XIV. 

Stout, Manual, 447-489. 
Titchener, Outline, §§ 82-83. 
Angell, Psychology, X. 

B. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, §§ 42-43. 
James, Principles, IX. (245-259), XII. 



CHAPTER V 

Feelings of Personal Conditions: Emotions 

§ 14. The Nature of the Emotions 

Emotions Contrasted with Thoughts. — Sensations, 
percepts and images, and feelings of meaning, relation- 
ship and judgment agree in being connected with what 
in common usage is called the life of thought. They 
would all be put by psychologists under the head of 
intellection or cognition. 

The emotions form in a sense a radically different 
group of mental facts. Love, hate, fear, jealousy, anger, 
joy, sorrow and the like, are feelings, not of or about 
things or bodily conditions recognized as such, but of one's 
own conditions, unreferred to bodily facts. They have, 
that is, a subjective or personal as opposed to an objective, 
reference. The emotional state of mind, in which one's 
own mental condition is paramount, is opposed to the 
intellectual state of mind, in which some object of thought 
is paramount. Besides possessing this subjective quality, 
the emotions are less subject to elaboration and manip- 
ulation than are sensations, percepts and images. They 
do not connect with one another so as to form any system 
or order as do the feelings of things, meanings and rela- 
tionships. They are essentially isolated and incoherent. 
In the third place, we do not master them and use them 
at will for intellectual and practical ends as we do our 
ideas and judgments; rather they master us. For the 
time being one is the emotion. 

74 



Feelings of Personal Condition 75 

Emotions and Sensations. — It is however true that 
between certain emotions and certain sensations no clear 
line of distinction can be drawn. The distinctions just 
made approach a vanishing point in the case of such 
sensations as dizziness, fatigue or nausea, and such emo- 
tions as ennui, interest, zeal, stage-fright, and the animal 
types of jealousy and love. Stage-fright is a feeling of 
as definite a thing as nausea. One can master zeal and 
use it to intellectual advantage rather better than nausea. 

The emotions are in fact closely allied to, and perhaps 
are one division of, the internal sensations. Whether we 
shall say that the feeling of well-being is a sensation or an 
emotion depends upon whether we do or do not recognize 
it as a feeling of bodily condition, refer it to the body as 
we do hunger or leave it as an unref erred subjective feel- 
ing as we do ambition. One person will feel it in the one 
way, another in another ; one person will feel it at. one 
time as an unreferred feeling, but at another time, say 
after taking a medical course, will refer it definitely to 
his body. Indeed one theory of the nature of the emo- 
tions is that they are made up of the same stuff as sensa- 
tions plus greater or less amounts of the feelings of 
pleasantness or unpleasantness. 

§ 15. The Classification of the Emotions 

Classifications are Arbitrary. — In our present igno- 
rance of the differences in physiological basis of the 
different emotions, any method of classifying them 
must be largely arbitrary. Different students of the 
subjects consequently have widely different opinions, and 
in no classification can the groups be sharply separated 
from one another. 

A classification does however serve the useful purpose 
of displaying the variety of the emotional life. If the 



j6 Descriptive Psychology 

physiological basis for each kind of emotional feeling 
were known we might have a more satisfactory classifica- 
tion, comparable in definiteness to the classification of 
sensations. I shall not try to present the best possible 
classification, but will present the essentials of four differ- 
ent classifications, each arranged by an eminent psycholo- 
gist. The first to be given is that of Professor Baldwin. 
A description of the different classes may be found in his 
Elements of Psychology, pp. 241-298. 

Baldwin's Classification. — 

The Common Emotions 

A. Interest. 

B. Reality Feeling and Unreality Feeling. 

C. Belief. 

D. Doubt. 

The Special Emotions 

A. Of Activity. 

I. Of Adjustment. Distraction or confusion, ab- 
straction or clearness, contraction or effort, 
expansion or ease. 
II. Of Function. 

1. Of Exaltation. Freshness, triumph, eager- 

ness, alertness, hope, courage, aspiration, 
elation. 

2. Of Depression. Hesitation, indecision, anx- 

iety, timidity, melancholy, irritation, fear. 

B. Of Content. 

I. Presentative. 

1. Self- Emotions. 

a. Emotions of Pride. 

b. Emotions of Humility. 

2. Objective Emotions, 
a. Expressive. 



Feelings of Personal Condition JJ 

A. Of Attraction. 1 

Admiration, veneration, awe, attachment, 
affection, confidence, patience, security, etc. 

B. Of Repulsion. 1 

Unattractiveness, objectionableness, disdain, 

distrust, distaste, scorn, rebellion, hatred, 

abhorrence, contempt, disgust, etc. 

b. Sympathetic. Congratulation, fellow-suffering, 

pity, jealousy, sensitiveness, and many others. 

II. Relational. 

i. Logical. Feelings of reasonableness and un- 
reasonableness, anticipation, distance, co-ex- 
istence, quality, identity, fitness, objective 
power, etc. 
2. Conceptional. 

a. For System in Mental Construction. 

b. Ethical Feelings. Moral sympathy, moral 
obligation, remorse, etc. 

c. Aesthetic Feelings. 

(a) Lower or sensuous. 

(b) Higher or representative. 
Wundt's Classification. — It is possible also to clas- 
sify emotions according to the prominence in them of 
pleasantness or unpleasantness, of excitement or depres- 
sion (sthenic and asthenic emotions), and of tension or 
relief. We can, that is, rate an emotion according to 
these three scales and group together those which have 
similar ratings. By excitement and depression are meant 
the qualities that stimulate or lower general bodily activi- 
ties. By tension is meant the quality that stimulates the 
voluntary muscles to over-action and constrained action, 
by relief the quality that predisposes to free and relaxed 

1 With reference to future and past we have under B2 a A, hope 
and joy, and under B2 a B, dread and sorrow. 



78 Descriptive Psychology 

action. Glee would be distinguished from joy as being 
more exciting though not necessarily more pleasant. 
Both joy and glee would be mediocre with respect to the 
tension-relief quality. Horror would imply much un- 
pleasantness and tension and some depression. Grief 
would imply more depression but less tension. 

The quality of relief is per se pleasant and is ordi- 
narily associated with still more pleasantness. The 
reverse holds of tension. Both excitement and depres- 
sion may be accompanied by pleasantness or by un- 
pleasantness. Joy is exciting and pleasant. Anger is 
exciting, but often unpleasant. Melancholy (in the 
poet's sense) is depressing but pleasant. Of depressing 
and painful mental states the number is of course legion. 

Royce's Classification. — Another grouping (that of 
Professor Royce) is according to the pleasantness or un- 
pleasantness and the restlessness or quiescence of the 
feeling. This latter scale is perhaps a composite of the 
excitement-depression and tension-relief scales. 

Titchener's Classification. — Finally, a still different 
view is given in the following quotation (for a fuller 
account see, An Outline of Psychology, by E. B. 
Titchener, pp. 224-234) : 

"The Forms of Emotion. — Just as there are two kinds 
or classes of feelings, so there are two of emotion ; the 
pleasurable and the unpleasurable. Within each kind or 
class there are a large number of special emotive forms, 
as there are a large number of special 'feelings.' Can we 
name these forms, and so classify emotions, as we classi- 
fied sensations and ideas ? Or must- we be content with 
the general distinction of the two classes, as we were 

compelled to be in the case of feeling? All emotions 

are coloured by the organic sensations set up during the 
adjustment of the physical organism to the situation. If, 



Feelings of Personal Condition 79 

then, we could find typical groups of organic sensations — 
lung, heart, bladder sensations — appearing in the various 
emotions, we could, again, determine the fundamental 
emotive forms. Our 'physical' would be supplemented 
by a truly psychological classification. 

Although there is no reason to suppose that the 
problem is insoluble, it has not yet been solved.'' 

Emotions Concerned with the Manner of Think- 
ing. — The feelings which Professor Baldwin describes 
under the heading, Relational, are worthy of special at- 
tention. It may be a question whether such feelings of 
the tendency, direction and attitude of thought should 
be called emotions, but at all events they exist. We 
feel in our thinking, not only objects and their relation- 
ships and meanings, but also feelings of their comings 
and goings, of their fitness to our purposes, and of our 
attitudes toward them. Like the feelings of relation- 
ships described in § 11, these feelings of tendency and 
intellectual attitude are commonly transitive, evanes- 
cent, intangible feelings that color rather than compose 
our mental life. Examine, for instance, the feelings of 
expectancy, of a mental gap to be filled, and of 
familiarity. 

"Suppose three successive persons say to us : 'Wait !' 
'Hark !' 'Look !' Our consciousness is thrown into three 
quite different attitudes of expectancy, although no defi- 
nite object is before it in any one of the three cases. 

Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state 
of our consciousness is peculiar. There is a gap there- 
in ; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensely active. 
A sort of wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a % 
given direction, making us at moments tingle with the 
sense of our closeness, and then letting us sink back 
without the longed-for term. If wrong names are pro- 



80 Descriptive Psychology 

posed to us, this singularly definite gap acts immediately 
so as to negate them. They do not fit into its mould. 

Again, what is the strange difference between an ex- 
perience tasted for the first time and the same experi- 
ence recognized as familiar, as having been enjoyed 
before, though we cannot name it or say where or when? 
A tune, an odor, a flavor, sometimes carry this inarticu- 
late feeling of their familiarity so deep into our con- 
sciousness that we are fairly shaken by its mysterious 
emotional power." 1 

The Aesthetic Emotions. — The so-called aesthetic 
emotions also deserve additional comment. The common 
classification of them is merely into feelings of the beau- 
tiful, of the sublime and of the comic. It is obvious 
that without great straining these three types of feeling 
fail to include the feelings one has say in seeing an 
ordinary play or reading an ordinary story. The plays, 
Sherlock Holmes and Uncle Tom's Cabin, are hardly 
beautiful, are certainly not sublime and are comic only 
in spots if at all. Robinson Crusoe is certainly neither 
beautiful nor sublime nor comic. A more exact divi- 
sion of the aesthetic emotions is evidently needed. 

The two main classes of feelings which are meant 
by the term aesthetic emotions, as it is used in critical 
studies of art and literature and music, are Sen- 
sory Pleasures and certain Pseudo-Emotions. These 
sensory pleasures are distinguished from the non- 
aesthetic, first in that they are unselfish, not proprietary, 
do not imply the possession of, or exclusion of others 
from, the object causing the pleasure but only its 
presence; and second, in that they arise from intrinsic 
qualities of the object, not from its derived values. The 
pleasures of taste are thus not called aesthetic because 
one cannot eat his cake and leave it for others to eat too. 

1 W. James, Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pp. 250-252. 



Feelings of Personal Condition 81 

The pleasure one has in seeing a coin because of its form 
and chasing is called aesthetic, while the pleasure in its 
money value is not. 

The pseudo-emotions 1 are distinguished from their 
real correspondents in that they do not arouse the same 
bodily reactions and impulses and are free from excessive 
pain or pleasure. Thus the sorrow felt for the suffering 
hero in the story is unlike real sorrow (i) in that one 
does not rush around wringing his hands and seeking to 
offer help nor feel like doing so, and (2) in that, whereas 
real sorrow is very uncomfortable, the pseudo-sorrow of 
the reader of the story is more or less enjoyable. In 
place of both the violent pangs and delights of real 
jealousy and affection, the reader of a novel has only a 
rather mild excitement, which is commonly pleasant 
regardless of the quality of the corresponding real 
emotion. 

§ 16. The Attributes of Emotions 

Their Bodily Expression. — Omitting from con- 
sideration the feelings of tendency and the aesthetic feel- 
ings, one finds that emotions as a class are characterized 
by emphatic bodily expression; e.g., fear expresses itself 
far more than does a feeling of seventeen. It is usually 
not difficult to tell whether a person is frightened, happy, 
angry or eager by his facial expression and bodily move- 
ments, whereas it is impossible to tell whether he is 
thinking of seventeen or of seventy, of a cat or of a mat. 
Other mental states do, of course, influence the bodily 
organs, the facial muscles especially, but not to such an 
extent as do the emotions. Doing arithmetic does raise 

1 It is conceivable, and has, I believe, been by some literary- 
critics suggested, that these pseudo-emotions occupy the same po- 
sition with respect to real emotions that mental images do with 
respect to percepts. They are on the whole rather a mystery. 

6 



8a Descriptive Psychology 

the pulse, but it cannot make the heart go pit-a-pat as 
fear does. Attention leads to a frown, but not to the 
tremendous wrinkles of the man in a rage. 

Their Impulsive Power. — Emotions, especially the 
coarser ones, cause not only these expressive movements, 
but also further movements of effect They tend to 
arouse some emphatic acts, running, jumping, seizing, 
biting or the like. Our ideas and judgments more often 
guide and restrain, while the emotions more often arouse, 
action. The more intellectual feelings also, in so far as 
they do arouse action, lead to the more orderly and re- 
strained movements of face, eyes and throat; while 
the emotional states impel to more gross and violent 
movements. 

Their Early Development. — The emotions are older 
in the individual and in the race than images, feelings of 
meaning and relationships, or judgments. They come 
along with vague sensations, as early steps in the growth 
of the infant's mind. During the first year anger, joy, 
impatience and other emotions are evident. They appear 
in animals below man in the scale of development. Birds 
and mammals that give few signs of the possession of 
images and almost certainly lack feelings of meaning, 
relationships or judgments, manifest many of the coarser 
emotions of the human mind. It is when we are absorbed 
in emotional feelings that we act more or less as the lower 
animals do. In general the progress of development 
involves a weakening of the coarser animal-like emotions 
and their transformation into sentiments by the mixture 
of ideas with them. 

The Infrequency of Reproduced Emotions. — Emo- 
tions are less often and less easily imaged than are 
percepts. One can easily remember that he did feel 
angry; but he then has not a real image of the anger 



Feelings of Personal Condition 83 

feeling, but only a judgment that at such and such a time 
he was angry. Occasionally individuals do have, or at 
least report that they have, a feeling of anger as not 
present comparable to the image of a sight or a sound. 
But such cases are surely rare and may really be cases 
where the individual by recalling certain circumstances 
gets a real but lesser emotion of anger, not a true image 
of it. It may be, as was hinted in the note on page 81, 
that the revival of an emotion in imagination takes the 
form of the pseudo or aesthetic emotions. 

Exercises 

1. Name one or two emotions characterized by much ex- 
citement. 

2. Name one or two emotions characterized by much de- 
pression. 

3. Name one or two emotions characterized by much tension. 

4. Name one or two emotions characterized by much relief. 

5. Name one or two emotions characterized by much rest- 
lessness. 

6. Name one or two emotions characterized by much definite 
bodily feeling. 

7. Name one or two emotions characterized by little definite 
bodily feeling. 

8. Name one or two emotions characterized by much out- 
ward expression. 

9. Name one or two emotions characterized by little out- 
ward expression. 

10. Name one or two emotions which are common to man 
and the lower animals. 

n. Name one or two emotions which are primarily individ- 
ual, that is concern chiefly oneself. 

12. Name one or two emotions which are primarily social, 
that is concern chiefly others. 

13. What is the bodily expression of rage? 

14. " " " " " " fear? 

15. " " " " " " grief? 

16. " " * " " " joy? 



84 Descriptive Psychology 

17. (a) What part of speech almost invariably expresses an 

emotional state ? 
(b) What parts of speech almost never do? 

18. What kind of sentence almost always expresses an emo- 
tion? 

19. Which can animals express to us most clearly, their 
sensations or their emotions? Why? 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, XXIV. 
Stout, Manual, 276-311, 562-580. 
Titchener, Outline, §§ 31-34, 56-60, 86-91. 
Angell, Psychology, XVIII. 

B. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, §§ 51-54. 
James, Principles, XXV. 

Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, XVI. 



CHAPTER VI 

Mental States Concerned in the Direction of Con- 
duct: Feelings of Willing 

§ 17. Definitions and Descriptions 

In General. — Books on psychology commonly an- 
nounce three divisions of mental life, cognition, emotion 
and volition, or, in the older phraseology, the intellect, 
the feelings and the will, but give nine-tenths or more of 
their space to cognition and the emotions. In so far as 
psychology attempts merely to describe states of con- 
sciousness, this subordination is not unfair. For, al- 
though the will in a broad sense deserves as much study 
as the intellect, states of volitional consciousness, that 
is to say, feelings of willing, do not require lengthy 
explanation. For their description this one section will 
suffice. The will, in the broad sense of the entire basis 
of human action, will receive due attention in Part III. 

The important mental states concerned primarily in 
the direction of conduct are usually stated to be feelings 
of impulse, wishing or desire, deliberation, motiv.es, de- 
cision and choice, will, effort, consent, and of the so- 
called c Hat! It is, of course, true that mental states 
of all sorts may appear in intimate connection with the 
life of action. But it will be best to follow the custom 
that singles out for treatment under one head the men- 
tal states named. 

Impulses. — One is tempted to desire a special name 
85 



86 Descriptive Psychology 

for the class of feelings which in the round-about phrases 
of common thought and speech are called 'an impulse to 
sneeze/ 'an impulse to laugh,' 'an impulse to run/ and the 
like. Many mental states are so intimately connected 
with acts that the only names for them are names of the 
acts to which they lead. E.g., the feelings that lead us 
to yawn and to cough appear almost never save as im- 
pulses to these acts ; are not felt by themselves ; do not 
reappear as images ; and play but a slight part in the 
development of the fabric of ideas and judgments as a 
whole. Yet strictly speaking these two feelings are sen- 
sations, are feelings of bodily condition comparable to 
the sensations of tickling, heat, cold, pain, and the like. 
And in a strict classification there need be no separate 
heading for impulses. The feelings that are commonly 
called impulses are those sensations and emotions which 
are vague, obscure and little emphasized in the mind in 
comparison with the acts to which they lead. 

It is further true that any mental state whatever may 
be an impulse, — may take on the aspect of impeller to an 
act. Feelings of relationships and feelings of meaning 
do so but infrequently and slightly ; images and memories 
do so somewhat more; percepts, sensations and emotions 
do so most of all. Those among the last that do so pre- 
eminently are commonly called impulses. 

Although we must abandon the notion of impulses as 
a group of feelings distinct from all others, we might 
have a right to speak of an impulse-quality which could 
add itself to any feeling, but was itself a new kind of 
mental stuff. But the psychologists of to-day deny that 
one has that right. By the impulsive quality of a mental 
state is meant, they say, not any peculiar aspect of it as 
felt, but only its quality of being connected directly with 
an act. The description of this impulse quality comes 



Feelings of Willing 87 

then under the description of the connections between 
mental states and bodily acts. 

Desires and Wishes. — Desire and wishing are emo- 
tions, and have been so classified in the previous chapter. 
When we feel, 'I wish I had that picture/ the feeling 
includes the thought of the object and an emotional atti- 
tude toward it. The particular sort of emotion is, it is 
true, somewhat more frequently and emphatically con- 
nected with conduct than are emotions of other sorts, but 
the difference is only one of degree. The 'I wish' repre- 
sents a state of mind not in general character different 
from T hate' or 'I pity' or T fear.' It represents a special 
activity of the mind no more and no less than do they. 

Deliberation. — The word deliberation is used in 
ordinary speech to mean any state of mind in which some 
topic is considered attentively. It then means little more 
than a state of attention. In the more restricted use of 
the word to describe a state of will, psychologists mean 
by it the consideration of a topic calling for mental choice 
or bodily action. In such cases the state of mind is likely 
to include different and more or less opposed motives. 
We think over the alternatives, have ideas favoring this, 
that or the other, and swing suspended between them. 
The presence of percepts, images and feelings of meaning 
plus an emotion of doubt or uncertainty describes delib- 
eration from the inside. From the outside, it is a state 
of hesitation before action. 

Decision and Choice. — The termination of this hesi- 
tation, suspension or conflict of ideas is sometimes marked 
by a feeling of decision or choice. We must not confuse 
here the fact of decision with the feeling of decision. 
The fact of decision or choice, which means simply that 
one motive has conquered, — that one idea or act has pre- 
vailed in the mind, — may have much or little or no feeling 



88 Descriptive Psychology 

of choice accompanying it. Thus, in writing the last 
sentence, I thought first of writing 'little or nothing' and 
then of writing 'little or no.' The latter was chosen, but 
there was no feeling of choice or decision, — no conscious- 
ness of anything but the two phrases and the grammati- 
cal superiority of the second. On the other hand we 
often have an intense feeling of acceptance of the one 
course and of rejection of the other, a feeling of 'yes to 
this, and no to that.' Such feelings are akin to, if not 
identical with, the feelings of belief and disbelief and of 
attraction and repulsion and belong properly among 
the emotions. 

The Fiat. — The term, the fiat of will, is applied to 
a feeling which may perhaps be analyzed ont in some 
cases from the feeling of acceptance, a feeling of 'Go 
ahead,' 'Let the act occur/ 'Let the consequences of my 
decision become real.' 

Willing. — The verb to will is used as a general term 
to express the fact of decision in favor of or consent 
to any course of action which has been the topic of 
thought. The word is used especially of cases where the 
decision is accompanied by a feeling of effort, where we 
decide against natural tendencies. We do not say that 
we willed to breathe because no decision was involved. 
We do not say that we willed to eat our breakfast this 
morning because the action was not the topic of thought. 
We do not often say that we willed to stay in bed this 
morning because, though the issue may have been the 
topic of thought and a decision may have been involved, 
the action accepted was easy and natural, We do say, 
'I got up this morning by sheer will/ because thought, 
decision and effort were markedly present. In all this 
there is no description of any special feeling of willing or 
volition, but only of a general experience involving cer- 



Feelings of Willing 89 

tain feelings and tendencies to action. The feelings 
present when, one wills to do or think something are in 
fact those already described. 

The Will. — The phrase the will is used most often 
to mean the source of all purposive action. In this sense 
it equals the general fact of connections between mental 
states and acts. Thus we say, To educate the will is 
more important than to educate the intellect.' It is used 
at times to mean the power to inhibit attractive in favor 
of less attractive ideas and acts. Thus we say, Tt re- 
quired will to do that.' It is used at times by psycholo- 
gists as a class name for all those feelings which are 
closely associated with acts. Thus we say that mental 
states comprise states of thought, states of feeling and 
states of will, or are divided among cognition, emotion 
and volition or will. 

The terms effort and motive have been used without 
description. The feeling of effort needs no description, 
for anyone who has ever attended to an uninteresting 
piece of mental or bodily work, or chosen the disagreeable, 
repulsive duty, or willed to do and done the painful task, 
has had direct experience of the feeling. The term mo- 
tive is used for any sensation, percept, image, feeling of 
meaning, judgment or emotion which shares in swaying 
one's decisions. In so far as it influences our willing, 
any idea is called a motive. 

On the whole the feelings concerned in the life of 
conduct are in the main, perhaps entirely, made up of in- 
tellectual and emotional stuff. Action itself is not 
thought nor emotion, but it is felt in and guided by 
thought and emotion. The special psychology of the 
will is chiefly not a descriptive account of the feelings 
connected with conduct, but an account of capacities for 
and habits of action and of the connections between 
thoughts and acts. This will be found in Part III. 



90 Descriptive Psychology 

Exercises 

Notice your feelings as you follow the directions given in 
this paragraph. Follow them without question, a. Choose a 
certain number between ioo and 200. b. Will to turn to that 
page (i. e., the page of the chosen number) or not to do so. c. 
It is left to you whether you will take the trouble to write to the 
author 1 of this book a description of how you feel (a) when you 
decide to go to church rather than to stay at home, and (b) 
when you will to continue studying, though bored and sleepy. 
The information is seriously and earnestly requested by him. 
Decide whether you promise to do so or not. 

1. Did you or did you not in choosing the number have any 
feeling of decision or of indecision? 

2. In case you willed to turn to that page, what was your 
feeling of willing to do so? (*. e., describe the feeling). 

3. In case you willed not to turn to the page, what was your 
feeling of willing not to do so? (i e., describe the feeling). 

4. In case you decided to promise to write to the author, 
describe your feeling of deciding to. 

5. In case you decided not to do so, describe your feeling of 
deciding not to. 

As before, follow the directions, noticing your feelings. 

d. Take a pencil and write your name. 

e. Make up your mind to buy ten cents worth of stamps 
to-morrow. 

6. Did you, before taking the pencil and writing your name, 
(I) feel nothing but the words read; or did you (II) have an 
image of the movements to be made; or did you (III) have a 
visual image of the name as written? 

If you had any other feelings as components of the 'willing,' 
what were they? 

7. Did you, in resolving to buy the stamps, (I) feel nothing 
but acquiescence to the words read; or did you (II) feel 'All 
right,' or 'Yes,' or T will'; or did you (III) feel also an image of 
yourself handling out money; or did you (IV) feel also yourself 
going to the purchasing place, taking out money and handing it 
over to the clerk ; or did you (V) feel, in place of III and IV or 

1 The author will indeed be very glad if some of the students 
of this book are willing to send him descriptions of their feelings 
of willing. He has already many such records. 



Feelings of Willing 91 

in addition to III and IV, an image of the stamps as in your 
possession? 

8. In view of your answers to questions 1-7, would you 
agree with the theory that an anticipatory image of the move- 
ment to be made or of the result of the movement was a neces- 
sary^ feature of willing? Would you, for instance, say that the 
following account was true of all people? 

"My volition to sign a letter is either an image of my hand 
moving the pen or an image of my signature already written, and 
my volition to purchase something is an image of myself in the 
act of handing out money or an image of my completed purchase 
— golf stick or Barbedienne bronze." M. W. Calkins, Introduc- 
tion to Psychology, p. 299. 

References 

A. Titchener, Outline, §§ 36-37. 
Angell, Psychology, XVII. 

B. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, § 55. 

Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, XVII. 



CHAPTER VII 

General Characteristics of Mental States 
§ i 8. Qualities Common to all Mental States 

Complexity. — The fact that one's mental state at 
any moment is usually a complex mixture has already 
been emphasized. As the reader sees this page, he feels 
the temperature of the room and the well or ill-being of 
his body, thinks of the meanings of the words in this 
paragraph, has flitting images of this or that called up by 
them and is mildly interested or bored or satisfied or 
disgusted with it all. Even if we take but a momentary 
bit of his mental state it may contain many of these dif- 
ferent elements. Although, to study the body of thought 
and feeling of a human life, we dissect it out into this, 
that and the other specially named kinds of mental facts, 
we must not forget that in reality a mental life is a series 
of confused mixtures of thought-stuff, a rich blending 
of various elements, and that often all the names so far 
given to denote different sorts of mental facts would be 
needed to describe the mental state of a man for a single 
minute. Mental life is not like a series of solos, now sen- 
sations, now memories, now decisions ; but is like the 
performance of an orchestra in which many sounds fuse 
into a total. One instrument may predominate for a 
while, but only very rarely is it active alone. 

Personal Feeling. — Again, although for convenience 
we study images, concepts and all mental facts as if one 

92 



General Characteristics of Mental States 93 

image of a tiger was like another of the same tiger, one 
feeling of eight like another feeling of eight, it must be 
borne in mind that what we call the same thought or feel- 
ing in two men is, after all, never the same. John in 
imagining a tiger feels it as a tiger not present and so does 
James, but John feels the feeling as Ms, as belonging with 
the rest of his inner life, as a part of his stream of 
thought. James could feel the feeling just as John does 
only by being John. If a hundred scholars are asked 
to add four and four, the hundred thoughts of eight are 
never absolutely alike. Each eight is felt with a fringe 
or halo of personal possession, — as someone's own ob- 
ject of thought, — with a tag which says, 'This is my 
thought or my emotion.' To quote Professor James : 

"In this room. . . .there are a multitude of thoughts, 
yours and mine, some of which cohere mutually, and 
some not 

"They are as little each-for-itself and reciprocally 
independent as they are all-belonging-together. They 
are neither : no one of them is separate, but each belongs 
with certain others and with none beside. My thought 
belongs with my other thoughts, and your thought with 
your other thoughts. Whether anywhere in the room 
there be a mere thought, which is nobody's thought, we 
have no means of ascertaining, for we have no experience 
of its like. The only states of consciousness that we 
naturally deal with are found in personal consciousnesses, 
minds, selves, concrete particular I's and you's." 1 

This personal element varies in amount in the same 
individual at different times and amongst individuals. 
When one is playing with interest a game of skill or 
absorbed in the effort of landing a fish or stalking a 
deer the personal element is almost absent. It is far less 
in young children than in developed minds. There is 

1 W. James, Principles of Psychology, vol. I, p. 225 f. 



94 Descriptive Psychology 

less and less evidence of it as we progress down through 
the animal kingdom to the lower forms. 

Social Implications. — That in human beings gen- 
erally thoughts and feelings are always some one's own 
should not be taken to mean that one man's thought is 
incomparable with and uninfluenced by those of other 
men. The likeness of the hundred feelings of eight is 
far greater than the difference. The isolation of my 
stream of thought from others is only such that I can- 
not be them, not such that I cannot be incessantly and to 
the utmost extent influenced by them. 'Individual' 
would be a very unfit adjective to apply to human 
thoughts and feelings if it were to mean more than 'felt 
always by someone as his own.' So far they are indi- 
vidual, but they are also in an important sense social. 

If we leave out any solitary from birth whom chance 
or miracle may have preserved, the thoughts and feel- 
ings of any man at any time are in part the result of the 
thoughts and feelings of others. What we feel, how we 
think, what we enjoy, depend on the existence and action 
upon us of the thoughts and feelings of other people. 
When the attempt is made to explain the actual mental 
life of men so as to show how they come to be what 
they are, the social aspect of mental facts, — the impor- 
tance of the fact that anyone's thoughts and feelings are 
members of a great community of mental states, — is 
abundantly evident. 

Mental States are Parts of a Continuum. — Any 
mental state is felt as a part of a total stream of feeling, 
as in a context, as with what has been and is to be. The 
first thought of the morning is thus bound to the life of 
yesterday, feels at home with the memories of the past 
and already half-acquainted with the life of the future. 

Are, More or Less, Focal. — Thoughts and feelings 



General Characteristics of Mental States 95 

may be ranked in a scale according to the degree to which 
they are absorbing, exclusive of others, impressive charac- 
ters in one's mental history. A thought may be so promi- 
nent, so in the focus that for the time being it practically 
is the mental life, or it may be just a shadowy, almost 
unnoticed hoverer in the background of the mind. 

Within any mental state also some parts are more 
emphatic, more in relief, gain greater possession of us, 
count more, are attended to more than others. Psycholo- 
gists make use of the fitting epithets focal and marginal 
to express this unevenness in the emphasis of different 
parts of a mental state. In the reader's mind the thought, 
'more emphatic, more in relief, gain greater possession of 
us, count more,' should just now have been the chief, focal, 
absorbing part of his total state of mind ; the sight of the 
rest of the page and the feeling of the book in his fingers 
less so ; while the feelings or noises about him, of the time 
of day or of the floor beneath his feet should be out in 
the margin of thought, a shadowy background, half lost 
in the darkness of the border-land between consciousness 
and unconsciousness. 

If a mental state is pictured as an elevation above the 
level of unconsciousness, it must be pictured not as a cube 
or cylinder but as a mountain, the peak representing the 
focal or attended to part of the thought, the slopes the 
marginal part merging gradually into the flat plain of 
unconsciousness. If we picture it as an illuminated area 
in darkness, the light should be unequally diffused, strong 
at one point but melting off gradually into darkness. 

This general characteristic of thinking by which one 
thought prevails over others or some one element of a 
total thought outweighs all the rest is of tremendous 
practical importance. Not what we think but what is 
focal in our thoughts, becomes thus the matter of conse- 



g6 Descriptive Psychology 

quaice in mental life. This focalizing of thought, com- 
monly referred to by the word attention, will be the 
subject of a special section. 

Other Qualities. — (i) Thoughts and feelings may 
also usually be ranked in a scale of intensity. Some 
have an extreme amount of a striking, incisive, piercing 
quality; others are mild, flat, weak, lukewarm. (2) It 
may perhaps be possible to rank all thoughts and feelings 
on a scale of desirability and intolerability ranging from 
the feeling one most shrinks from to the feeling one most 
welcomes. This scale, desirability to intolerability, is not 
identical with pleasure to pain. Certain pleasures may 
be intolerable and certain pains welcomed. (3) No one 
could build a pile of feelings over which one could not 
jump, or fill a bucket with ideas; they do not occupy 
space. (4) They do take time ; as quick as thought is no 
truer than as slow as thought. 

So much for the general inner qualities of mental 
.facts. They have also two general outside relationships. 
They are intimately connected with conditions of the 
brain which precede, accompany and, in the common 
sense use of the word, cause them! They are also inti- 
mately connected with acts of the body which, in the 
common sense use of the word, are caused by them. 

These two general facts that all mental life is con- 
nected with the activity of the brain and always expresses 
itself in bodily action will be discussed in Parts II. and III. 

Exercises 

Experiment 8. The Duration of Mental Processes. — With 
the proper apparatus for making delicate measurements of time 
and for eliminating the influence of other processes than those 
which we wish to measure, the time required to notice a difference, 
or to call up an image, the time that an idea or an emotion lasts, 
and the like, may be measured. 



General Characteristics of Mental States 97 

Even with the crudest means the differences in duration of 
the following processes may be at least roughly measured: — 
To feel a stimulus and make a movement in response to it. 
To feel a stimulus, distinguish it from other possible ones, 

and make a movement in response to it. 
To feel a stimulus, feel its meaning, call up an idea in 
response to it and make a movement in response 
to this idea. 
Arrange for ten or more individuals to act as subjects: have 
ready a stop watch measuring fifths of a second. Let the subjects 
be seated in a circle, the observer among them. 

A. Say, "We are to measure roughly the time it takes to 
hear a sound and make a sound in response. I shall say, 'Be' and 
as soon as I say it, the person at my right will reply by making 
the same sound 'Be'; as soon as he says it, the person on his 
right will make the same sound, and so on around the circle as 
fast as we can until I say 'Stop'. Be careful not to say 'Be' un- 
til you hear the person just at your left say it." Give one round 
of practice. Then say 'Attention', and then say 'Be', starting the 
watch simultaneously. After the word has been passed around 
the circle three times, that is, when you hear 'Be' the fourth time, 
stop the watch instead of saying 'Be' a fourth time, and then say 
'Stop'. If there are ten people the total time taken divided by 30 
will be the average time taken to hear the sound and to make the 
sound and for the sound wave to pass from one person's mouth 
to the next person's ear. 

B. Say, "We will now measure the time it takes to hear a 
sound, distinguish it from others and make a sound in response 
to it. I shall start counting, say, with two ; as soon as I say two, 
the person on my right will say three; as soon as he says three, 
the person on his right will say four; as soon as he says four, 
the person on his right will say one, and so on, one calling for 
two as its reply, two for three, three for four, and four for one. 
Continue until I say stop." Give one round of practice. Then 
say 'Attention', and say 'Two' or 'Three', starting the watch sim- 
ultaneously. Stop after three rounds of the circle as before. 
Compute the average time as before. It will be well to have 
some one outside the circle watch for erroneous responses. 

C. Say, "We will now measure the time it takes to hear a 
word, distinguish it, think what thing it means, think of some 
thing connected with this and respond. I, the first person, will 

7 



98 Descriptive Psychology 

say the name of something; the person at my right will reply by 
saying the first word called to his mind by the word I say, the 
person at his right will reply by saying the first word called to 
his mind by the word the second person said, and so on. Be 
careful to listen only for the word spoken by the person at your 
left and to reply with the word it calls up." Give one or two 
rounds of practice and then after the 'Attention' say 'House' and 
start the watch simultaneously. Stop after three rounds of the 
circle as before. Compute the average time as before. 

Experiments A, B, and C may be repeated as many times as 
is convenient. 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, XI. 
Stout, Manual, 71-76. 
Titchener, Outline, §§ 92-98. 

B. James, Principles, IX. 



§ 19. Attention 

The Fact of Attention and the Feelings of Atten- 
tion. — The words and phrases 'attend,' 'attentive,' 'ab- 
sorbed in,' 'give one's mind to,' and their synonyms, like 
most common words, have many shades of meaning. 
They refer at times to what I shall call the fact of atten- 
tion and at other times to what I shall call the feelings of 
attention. In the first case they mean (1) the fact that 
some part of one's state of mind is focal, prominent, pre- 
potent over the rest or (2) that some one possible idea is 
noticed and felt to the exclusion of others. Thus (1) 
'He attended chiefly to the color of the rose he was 
observing,' and (2) 'He attended to the rose, not noticing 
what was said or how awkward he appeared.' In the 
second case they mean (3) the feeling of effort which so 
often accompanies the prevalence of one part over other 
parts of a feeling or of one feeling over others if the 



General Characteristics of Mental States 99 

natural impulse is to attend otherwise, or (4) the feeling 
of interest which so often accompanies such prevalence 
if it is in accord with natural impulse or (5) the feeling 
of activity, — of oneself being a helper in making the part 
or idea prevail. Thus (3) 'He resolutely attended,' The 
power of attention;' (4) 'He was absorbed in play,' 'It 
attracted my attention,' 'I could not help feeling atten- 
tive;' (5) 'I was thinking hard. Every sense in me was 
on the qui vive.' 

Separate words should be used for each of these five 
meanings if we are to be clear, at least in all cases where 
the context does not show in which sense the word atten- 
tion is used. Let us use Focalness of Mental States for 
the fact that each mental state is not throughout equally 
prominent, but that parts are in greater relief than others, 
and S elect edness of Mental States for the fact that out of 
many feelings felt by no means all are noticed, dwelt 
upon, allowed to play leading part:. For the three chief 
feelings that accompany such focal and selective thinking, 
let us use the terms : The Feeling of Effort or Strain, 
the Feeling of Interest or Attraction, and the Feeling of 
Activity or of Mental Life. 

(1) and (2) are the most alike. They represent the 
results of the same mental law acting (A) within one 
mental state and (B) among a number of mental states. 
Together they represent the fact of attention as opposed 
to the feelings going with it. When in this or later chap- 
ters the word attention is used alone it will mean this fact 
of attention. 

Cases of attention may be classified : — 

(A) According to the kind of feeling accompanying 
them, into voluntary and involuntary. 

(B) According to the reason why the chief thought 

LOFC. 



ioo Descriptive Psychology 

or feeling is chief, into native and acquired, and also 
into immediate and derived. 

(C) According to the nature of the chief or pre- 
potent or 'attended to' object, into intellectual and sen- 
sorial. 

Voluntary and Involuntary Attention. — In certain 
cases the special emphasis on some part of our total 
thought or possible thought is accompanied by a feeling 
of effort or strain, a feeling of holding ourselves down to 
that part and resisting other temptations. If in the mind 
of a schoolboy, in spite of tired eyes and a strong desire 
to be outdoors, the xs and ys of the algebra book before 
him hold the field against the shouts and laughter of play- 
mates outside and impulses to look at the clock, to leave 
the examples till next day and the like, the case is pre- 
sumably one of voluntary attention. The boy probably 
has a feeling of effort. Such cases of attention with a 
feeling of effort are called Voluntary Attention, The 
name is perhaps ill chosen ; for in a sense these are just 
the cases where we do not attend willingly. The word 
voluntary is used by psychologists to show that in these 
cases of attention with a feeling of effort there is a willful 
ruling out of other tempting ideas and an adherence to 
the point attended to. 

In other cases an idea is in the focus, — is selected, — 
v/ithout being accompanied by any feeling of effort. On 
the contrary the object seems to attract us, is more tempt- 
ing than any others, and is usually accompanied by a 
feeling of attraction. Such cases are called cases of 
Involuntary Attention. To say that a thing attracts us 
is simply another way of saying that it wins a place over 
other thoughts without any feeling of effort on our part. 
When the percepts of an exciting game hold the field in 
the school-boy's mind and keep down and out the thoughts 



General Characteristics of Mental States 101 

of xs and ys, nouns and verbs, sitting still and looking at 
books, it is presumably a case of involuntary attention. 
He probably feels little effort in the process. 

The feeling of effort of voluntary attention is a feeling 
arising not so much from thinking of the one thing to 
which we feel we must attend as from checking or, in 
technical terms, inhibiting the tendencies to think of other 
things. The real task of the boy in school who with 
effort keeps the example uppermost in his mind is to keep 
down and out ideas of how long it is before school ends, 
of the base ball match in the afternoon, of how thirsty he 
is, and the like. Thinking and action are of themselves 
desirable, natural and involuntary; the effort is not to 
think the more attractive thought, not to do the more 
enjoyable acts. It is what we do not do that is hard. 
The fatigue which is in school the so common result of 
work demanding attention is due largely to the strain of 
suppressing attractive tendencies. In proportion as the 
work itself is attractive and absorbing, fatigue diminishes. 

Although voluntary and involuntary attention are 
diametrically opposite, the same object may at one time 
arouse voluntary attention and at another involuntary. 
The boy who in the primary school attended to the letters 
in a book only with effort comes later to read without 
effort. The song which a few months ago won our invol- 
untary attention has by repetition lost its attractiveness 
and we listen to it only with a decided feeling of strain. 
What interests one ceases to do so if no profit or pleasure 
to him results. What originally implied a feeling of 
effort becomes freed from it in porportion as profit or 
pleasure to the mind concerned results. 

Other names for Voluntary and Involuntary Attention 
are Forced and Free. 

Native and Acquired Attention. — Certain thoughts 



102 Descriptive Psychology 

and feelings take a prominent place in the stream of 
thought apart from any experience on our part of their 
pleasurableness or utility. The inborn constitution of 
human beings is such that in young children a clear, 
bright light wins a place in the focus of the mind over 
filmy shadows, — that the sight of a puppy running about 
excludes the feelings of the clouds or trees. The fact 
of attention in such cases is called Native or Inborn 
Attention because it is caused by inborn qualities. 

In the majority of cases of attention in adult life, 
however, the tendency for the uppermost idea to be upper- 
most has been caused by our experiences of the different 
ideas concerned and of their consequences. The black 
and white of printed pages gains attention because of the 
pleasures that have come from reading, the utility of the 
information gained and the like. The dollars and cents, 
clothes and furniture, concerts and plays, the spoken and 
written words, which figure so largely among the promi- 
nent, focal, attended to ideas of civilized human beings 
do not owe their prominence to the inborn constitution of 
man, but to the circumstances of his life and training. 

Cases of native attention are always involuntary. 
There is no feeling of effort in doing what one's inborn 
make-up leads him to do. Cases of acquired attention 
may be voluntary or involuntary. 

Immediate and Derived Attention. — A less useful 
division is into Immediate and Derived Attention, imme- 
diate attention meaning those cases where the prominence 
of the object is due to some intrinsic quality of its own, 
and derived attention meaning those cases where it is due 
to some thing not in the object but indirectly associated 
with it. The attitudes of a baby and of an adult toward 
a twenty dollar gold-piece are cases in point. The first 
is immediate attention due to the glitter of the form itself ; 



General Characteristics of Mental States 103 

the second is largely derived attention, due to the ideas 
connected with twenty dollars. The reason why this 
division into immediate or intrinsic and derived or ex- 
trinsic is less useful is that it is in many cases extremely 
hard to decide which occurs. For example, does the 
miser attend to the gold for itself or for its indirect 
properties? Certainly the attention was originally de- 
rived, but certainly it feels to him now immediate. 

Sensorial and Intellectual Attention. — Cases where 
the object that is prominent is a thing of sense are called 
cases of Sensorial Attention. Cases where it is an image, 
meaning, concept, or the like, are called cases of Intel- 
lectual Attention. Thus 'His mind was absorbed by the 
face before him/ gives an instance of the former, and 
'His thoughts were firmly fixed on the idea of self sacri- 
fice/ gives an instance of the latter. Many other divisions 
could be made, according to the nature of the object of 
attention, into attention to thoughts and attention to acts, 
attention to feelings of external things and attention to 
feelings of the body, etc. 

In common use the word attention refers to physical 
facts as well as to mental facts. 'I attended to the lec- 
tures' means in common speech not only 'Percepts of the 
words spoken were predominant among my feelings and 
excluded other feelings,' but also, 'My eyes were directed 
toward the lecturer and followed his movements. They 
focussed upon him, not upon something in front of or 
behind him. My ears were held tense as in listening/ 
The connection between the mental fact attention, which 
this chapter has dealt with, and its physical or bodily 
expression, to which the word attention so often refers, 
will be discussed later in its proper place. 

Attributes of Attention. — Much has been written 
about the extent to which one idea in the focus of thought 



104 Descriptive Psychology 

may shut out others. Even the most intense stimuli may- 
fail to influence one who is thus absorbed. Stock illus- 
trations are the soldier who, absorbed in the excitement of 
the battle, fights on unconscious of severe wounds, the 
child absorbed in his story book who fails to reply to the 
loudest call, and the preacher who, although so afflicted 
with weakness as to have to be carried to his pulpit, yet 
in the course of his discourse rose from the chair in which 
he had been seated and soon was speaking with full voice 
and vigorous gestures. Though such extreme cases of 
the victory of a possessing idea are rare, the same thing 
occurs to a less degree with everyone in every day's work. 
We can and do 'put things out of our mind' by attending 
to something else. 

Whether it ever happens that all parts of a state of 
mind are equally focal, equally attended to, is a doubtful 
question. At times, for instance when he lies idly dozing 
in a hammock, a person seems to feel one thing as much 
and no more than another, to be equally open to all parts 
of an impression, to care no more for one element of a 
thought than for another. But in such cases attention 
may not be really dispersed equally over the field, but may 
have run from one thing to another very rapidly. Each 
element may have been attended to in its turn somewhat 
exclusively. The question is not of much importance, 
since such cases are certainly rare in mental life. As an 
almost, if not quite, universal rule mental life is focalized. 
What common usage calls inattention is then very, 
very rarely real inattention, attention to nothing, but only 
attention to something else. We call him inattentive who 
does not attend to what we wish or expect him to. The 
reason is to be sought not in the non-focal quality of his 
mental life, but in the fact that it is focussed on some- 
thing else. The inattentive boy of the school is commonly 



General Characteristics of Mental States 105 

extremely attentive to the bent pin he is preparing for his 
neighbor's sleep or to the dreams of out-of-school life 
which fill his mind. 

Analysis. — Closely allied to the fact of focalness of 
thinking is the fact of analysis, 1 the fact of breaking up a 
total fact into its elements, parts or aspects. It is only as 
a result of such a process of breaking up total facts into 
their qualities that the elements of color, size, shape, 
weight, pressure and the like are felt in place of a 'big, 
blooming, buzzing, confusion.' It is only as a result of 
such a process that many feelings of meanings and of in- 
tellectual relationships arise at all. In the fact of focal- 
ness of thinking lies the possibility of feeling one part or 
element of a fact and neglecting the rest. As now the 
color, now the size and now the shape, of, say, a plate is 
made focal in the infant's mind, he is able with aid from a 
law to be described in Chapter XIV to think of the color 
of the plate, the size of the plate and the shape of the plate 
each by itself, and to think of the total fact, the plate, as 
possessing or constituted by these elements. 



Exercises 

1. Classify each of the following cases of attention as vol- 
untary or involuntary, as native or acquired and as intellectual 
or sensorial : — 

a. The baby's fixed glance at the bright light. 

b. The miser's absorption in contemplating his hoard of 

gold. 

c. The poet's attention to the composition of a poem. 

d. The school boy's attention to it in learning it by 

heart for to-morrow's lesson. 

1 The word discrimination is used sometimes with this same 
meaning of coming to feel parts of facts, but as it is more often 
used to mean feeling differences between facts, the word analysis 
is preferable. 



io6 Descriptive Psychology 

e. The compositor's attention to the copy of it in setting 

it up in type. 

f. The child's attention to the piece of candy held be- 

fore him. 

g. His attention to the organ-grinder's monkey. 

h. His attention to the letters in the primer from which 
he puzzles out the words. 

i. The sailor's attention to the sail he can barely dis- 
cern in the distance. 

j. The young girl's attention to the memories of last 
night's party. 

2. Illustrate from your own experience the power of inat- 
tention to temporarily banish pain and fatigue. 

3. What are some of the things and qualities to which at- 
tention is naturally given as a result of inborn constitution re- 
gardless of our experience of their effects? 

Experiment 9. TT\e Fluctuations of Attention. — Paint a very 
light gray circle about a half inch in diameter on a square of 
white cardboard or heavy paper, the color of the circle to be 
barely distinguishable from white (about 2 drops of black writ- 
ing ink to a teaspoonful of water will do if painted in a thin coat). 
Place the square of cardboard far enough away so that the gray 
circle can just be made out. Look steadily and attentively at it 
for six or eight minutes. What happens to the gray circle? 

Experiment 10. The Relative Time of Focal and Marginal 
Thinking. — Read passage A not thinking of the words at all at- 
tentively: read it, that is, as one skims over an unimportant pas- 
sage or a perfunctory letter. Keep a record of the number of 
seconds which elapse. It will be convenient to start when 
th: second hand is at 60. Read passage B attentively, as one 
would read an interesting book or a notice of importance. Score 
the time as before. Compare the times. 

A. 

Passing down the street you come first to a tall, brick build- 
ing, then to the Presbyterian church, and next to the store of 
William Gunnison. Above the door hangs the sign, "Antiques 
Bought and Sold." If you go in you will see tables, chairs, bed- 
steads, and desks of mahogany, mirrors in gilded frames which 
Mr. Gunnison will assure you are genuine Chippendale, and an 
almost endless row of grandfather's clocks. The walls are 
covered with shelves and racks and hooks on which rest or to 



General Characteristics of Mental States 107 

which are hung thousands of pieces of crockery of all sizes and 
shapes imagined and unimagined. Blue, brown and lavender 
figured plates jostle pewter, china and earthen tea-pots. 

B. 

Just across the river is situated a prosperous-looking farm- 
house with a red barn and a little beyond it a grove of pine trees. 
Near the gate stands a man with sword and pistol. In the house 
he has stored knives, guns, cutlasses and Indian tomahawks, and 
ninety Italian stilettos, each of which, he informs visitors, has 
killed a man. In spite of the murderous nature of Mr. Talbot's 
mania, he is kind to his horses, cattle and dogs. He simply en- 
joys collecting weapons as other people enjoy collecting more 
peaceful objects. He gathers straight, curved and pointed swords 
and daggers as you might gather pictures, books or oriental rugs. 

Experiment 11. The Influence of Attention on Memory. — 
Write what you remember of both passages, A and B. Compare 
the results. 

Experiment 12. The Aid of Attention in Analysis. — (a) 
Sound or, better still, have some one sound for you on a piano, a 
chord made up of the middle C and the note C, an octave above 
it. Do you hear the two components or is the sound apparently 
only one note? If the latter is the case, sound several times the 
~C until you have it clearly in mind. Have the chord played 
again. Do you now hear the C as a component? If the chord 
was felt as a result of two component tones notes from, the start, 
experiment as follows : 

(b) Strike the middle C alone. Do you hear any com- 
ponent notes? Strike softly the C until you have it clearly in 
mind and then listen for it as you again strike the middle C. Do 
you hear the C now? The middle C does contain the C as one 
of its overtones and with enough practice and close attention it 
can be detected. 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, XIII. 
Stout, Manual, 611-614. 
Titchener, Outline, §§ 38-42. 
Angell, Psychology, IV., 64-82. 

B. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, §§ 56-59. 
James, Principles, XL 

Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, XVIII. § I. 



io8 Descriptive Psychology 

§ 20. A New Classification of Mental States 

The thoughtful and ingenious student may have 
observed already that human thoughts and feelings may 
be ranged in a scale according to the directness of their 
relationships to their 'objects/ that is the things which 
they stand for. 

Feelings Which are What They Stand For .—There 
are firstly feelings, such as of blue, length, suffocation, 
sleepiness, terror and rage, which simply are what they 
stand for. These may be called feelings of the first 
intention. They give us the stuff, the content, the ma- 
terial out of which the mind's world is shaped. They 
mean or refer to or know nothing unlike or beyond them- 
selves. The suffocation, as a feeling of the first inten- 
tion, stands for just the suffocation; the blue means just 
the blue. In adult life one rarely has feelings of the first 
intention pure and simple. Even the suffocation is felt 
as, T am strangling,' or 'What an intolerable atmosphere/ 
more frequently than in its bare, intrinsic self. To get 
adequate illustrations of them one must turn to such feel- 
ings as one has when, in close touch with nature, without 
thought of 'things' or 'self/ he feels impressions directly. 
Think for instance, of how one feels when half dozing in 
the summer sunshine or when swimming lazily, or when 
in the agony of whooping-cough or asthma, or when 
beside oneself with rage, or when absorbed in the smell of 
the woods. One is then swallowed up in the sensation, 
is lost in the feeling, for the time being is it. One does 
not 'think' or have 'ideas' or notice 'things.' One simply 
feels the warmth, the water and the sky and one's bodily 
movements, the pain, the rage, the odorous air. 

Feelings Which are Like What They Stand For.— 
There are, secondly, feelings such as percepts and images 



General Characteristics of Mental States 109 

(and the pseudo-emotions), which have objects, more or 
less, but always somewhat, like themselves. The feeling 
of the blue which we call a feeling of 'the sky/ the feeling 
of a white rectangle which we call a percept of a sheet of 
paper, the image of the line an inch long — each of these 
refers to something which it is not exactly but only in 
part. They may be called feelings of the second intention. 
Feelings Which are Unlike What They Stand For. 
—There are in the third place feelings which may be 
utterly unlike the facts to which they refer. These feel- 
ings of the third intention or symbolic feelings include 
the feelings of intellectual relationships, of meanings, of 
judgments and the like. A single illustration will suffice. 
(a 2 — b 2 ) = (a-\-b) (a — b) is, in so far as it is a feeling 
merely of the straight and curved lines seen, a feeling of 
the first intention ; in so far as it is a feeling of letters and 
signs, that is, of certain things or images which the 
straight and curved lines call to mind, it is a feeling of the 
second intention : while, in so far as it is a feeling that one 
means, 'Any a squared minus any b squared equals the 
sum of these quantities times their difference/ it is a feel- 
ing of the third intention. It is in the third intention that 
feelings become the rational or strictly human kind of 
thinking. They can have as objects, things that are not, 
have not been and cannot be felt in the first or second 
intention. Millions of lengths that could be so felt only 
in the course of a lifetime can be felt in the third inten- 
tion as easily as can a single inch. Differences that are 
indistinguishable and elements that are indissoluble by 
direct feeling can be thought. What the eye has not seen 
nor the ear heard can thus enter the mind of man. Far 
and near, past and future can be joined in thought. Feel- 
ings of the third intention do thus in a sense transcend 
the limits of space and time and place thought sub specie 



no Descriptive Psychology 

aeternitatis. The universe can be and is destroyed and 
recreated in the mind. 

The Attributes of Each of These Classes. — Feelings 
of the first intention are common to many, if not all, of 
the members of the animal kingdom. Feelings of the 
second intention may appear here and there in a few of 
the higher vertebrates, but in general are lacking in the 
lower animals. Feelings of the third intention are the 
exclusive property of man, and fail to appear in the less 
developed minds of idiots. In the growth of any in- 
dividual's mind the second class appears only after some 
months of life, and the third only in proportion as the 
second becomes established. 

Feelings of the first intention are strongly impulsive 
to bodily acts. As a bone is to a dog's mind literally a 
'to seize and gnaw ;' as a sunny dust pile is to the chick's 
intellect literally a 'to scuffle and squat in ;' so, to man as 
well, a feeling of cold is in its first intention a 'to shiver, 
crouch or get away from.' Whereas feelings of the first 
intention thus impel to immediate bodily action, those of 
the second are especially provocative of delayed action, 
of action only indirectly and after a time. Their direct 
consequence is more often another idea. The printed a, 
which in the chick arouses only an act, viz., 'to peck/ 
because the chick feels only the first intention, will in a 
man arouse the image of the sound of a or the ideas of b, 
c and d. Feelings of the third intention impel to imme- 
diate action still more rarely and arouse judgments rather 
than images. In the long run, however, they influence 
action more than do the others, for through them we can 
react once for all to a whole group of objects or to some 
quality in all the thousands of cases where it is found. 
In fact the less our thoughts resemble their objects the 
better they seem to serve us; the less their immediate 
expression, the greater their eventual influence. 



CHAPTER VIII 

The Functions of Mental States 

§ 21. The Function of Mental Life as a Whole 

Thoughts and Feelings Influence Action. — The 
function of thoughts and feelings, — i.e., the work they do, 
the service they perform, their share in the business of 
life, — is to influence actions. In some wider, freer world 
than that of this present life, mental states may count of 
themselves directly. But as things are here, we help or 
harm our fellow men only by what we do. Only when a 
man's ideas and emotions issue in effects on his deeds, 
words, gestures, facial expression or other bodily acts, do 
they make any difference to anyone else. And in truth, 
though it would be a long task to explain why, it is only 
when they influence such acts of body or at least of brain, 
that they make any permanent difference to him. Unless 
mental states resulted in acts that altered the physical 
world of the bodies and minds of men they would be of 
no service, and would as well not be. In § 2J it will be 
shown that sooner or later, directly or indirectly, every 
mental state is expressed or worked off in causing or 
inhibiting bodily movements or brain changes. That we 
now see to be their reason for being. We feel the outside 
w6r\d in order that we may react to it. We remember 
/ and learn and reason in order that we may modify our 
reactions to it. The great majority or our feelings have 
as their function to change our behavior. 

in 



H2 Descriptive Psychology 

The great majority of our actions are done in response 
to and under the guidance of mental states. Getting up, 
dressing, eating breakfast, the work of business or study, 
the play of games and social life, what we say, where we 
go, — the entire course of a day's doings minus the merely 
physiological activities of digestion, circulation and the 
like, — represent the stimulation to and control of conduct 
by thought. The history of a man's life of action as a 
whole is the history of the changes in his natural make-up 
which have been wrought by his mental life. The steel 
which always reacts uniformly to the magnet by approach, 
— the acid and metal which always react by combining 
to form hydrogen and a salt, — these give no sign that they 
possess feelings ; but in the animal kingdom in proportion 
as we find the power to change the individual's responses 
to conditions, to adapt behavior to circumstances, in the 
same proportion we find evidences of conscious life. 

Knowledge Is Not the Sole or Ultimate Purpose of 
Thought. — It is a common mistake to speak of mental 
states as a means to knowledge as if that were their final 
goal. Mental states are not in all cases means to knowl- 
edge. Many of our emotions and impulses furnish us 
only with tendencies to act. For instance, love and envy 
do not enlighten our minds with respect to their objects 
but only change our dispositions toward them. When 
mental states are means to knowledge the knowledge 
itself is really valuable chiefly as a means to action. It 
would be of little advantage to have sensations of cold or 
knowledge of the physiological effects of low temperature 
if one never was moved thereby to' put on a coat or build 
a fire. The reasoning of the mathematician is well nigh 
profitless until it is expressed in words or diagrams or 
some other form of expression so as to influence the 
world's behavior. We learn so as to do. Thought aims 



Functions of Mental States 113 

at knowledge, but with the final aim of using the knowl- 
edge to guide action. 

Adaptation. — Intelligent behavior, — that is, reacting 
to the situations of life so as to adapt oneself to them, — 
involves three factors: (1) being sensitive, (2) acting or 
making movements, and (3) connecting with each of the 
different situations certain particular movements. We 
might give these three factors names as follows : — 

(1) Sensitiveness or Power of Impression or Re- 
ception. 

(2) Movement or Power of Expression or Action. 

(3) Connection or Power of Association or Ela- 
boration. 

We could then say that the function of mental life was 
to be impressed by the environment and to associate suita- 
ble acts with all impressions. The work of education is 
to make the impressions, acts and connections between 
them suitable not only in the sense of suiting the actual 
world but also in the higher sense of suiting the ideal de- 
mands which are to transform the imperfect world that is 
into some better world of the future. 

That mental life in general serves to adapt conduct to 
'environment in useful ways does not imply that in each 
and every case it does so. Feet are useful in general but 
they sometimes trip us up ; the blood is useful in general 
but it serves at times as the medium for disease. So 
thought, though useful in general, at times leads men into 
blunders. That we can swallow food implies that we can 
also swallow poison, and that we can think wisely implies 
also that we can make mistakes. Moreover, just as the 
evolution of the body does not keep pace with the changes 
in the environment and manifests useless organs such as 
the vermiform appendix, so also the mind shows useless 

8 



114 Descriptive Psychology 

sensations such as those coming from tickling, useless 
emotions such as hysterical fear or joy. 

I shall not waste the reader's time in the following 
account of the special functions of different classes of 
feelings and connections between them by rehearsing 
under each head the cases of useless functioning. The 
reader should once for all understand that such excep- 
tions occur. In the text only the more general facts will 
be presented. 

§ 22. The Functions of Different Groups of Mental States 

The Function of Sensations and Percepts. — The 

function of sensations and percepts is to serve as signals 
to warn us of the presence of some thing or quality or 
condition and so to arouse the appropriate thought or act 
or emotion. Sensations and percepts may be likened to 
the signals of an army or the steam-gauge of an engine. 
They report what occurs within and in the neighborhood 
of our bodies, that is they report more or less of the 
environment, and thus are the first step in our adapta- 
tions to it. This does not mean that a sensation or 
percept necessarily resembles or duplicates or mirrors 
the thing it stands for. The feeling of sweet no more 
needs to be like sugar than does the position of the indi- 
cator on a steam-gauge to be like an explosion. A tooth- 
ache is no more like a decayed tooth than it is like a green 
light; a sound is no more like air- vibrations than like 
ether-vibrations. The function of the sensations is not 
to give us a picture of the outside world but to lead us to 
act properly toward it. It is indeed literally true that we 
in any case sense not so much what is present, as what it 
is useful for us to feel. 

The different sensations give, of course, warnings of 



Functions of Mental States 115 

the existence of different qualities or features of physical 
things or bodily conditions. Sights and sounds are 
specialized signals of distant objects; pains, of conditions 
dangerous to life and health ; and so on through the list. 
In general, sensations are warnings that emphasize the 
presence of qualities and conditions, while percepts are 
warnings of the presence of things themselves. 

The Functions of Images and Memory. — The func- 
tion of images is to permit us to prepare for future re- 
actions to things not at the time present. They allow us, 
so to speak, to anticipate the future, to prepare for war 
in time of peace. By thinking of the frosty Caucasus we 
can take measures in thought or action against the time 
when we shall actually confront it. It is by virtue of 
images that man thinks before and after and so modifies 
his behavior apart from the stress of immediate contact 
with things. He can thus spend days in preparation for 
a situation which in actual presence would allow of hardly 
a minute's thought. Instead of having to wait for the 
convenience of nature, he can suit nature to his thought. 

The function of the permanence of mental changes in 
conscious memory and in unconscious habits of thought 
and action is, of course, to permit experiences to extend 
their influence into the future. Man and other animals 
as well would quickly succumb to the environment if the 
lessons it taught them in one hour were all lost during the 
next. It would be useless and indeed meaningless to 
learn if we learned only immediately to forget. 

The Function of Feelings of Relationships. — To ex- 
plain in detail the service rendered by feelings of relation- 
ships would require too intricate an analysis of their 
influence on human conduct. In general they enable man 
to adapt his reactions to the world as a related whole. 
Since things are alike and different, are causes and effects, 



n6 Descriptive Psychology 

are before and after, are above and below, awareness of 
these relations guides our reactions to the things. And 
since the relations often equal or outweigh the things in 
practical importance, awareness of relations will often be 
of as great service as awareness of things. 

The Function of Feelings of Meaning. — The func- 
tion of an individual notion is to provide a constant men- 
tal sign for one particular thing, regardless of the 
variations in its appearances in percepts and images. 
Thus we can mean or think 'J°lm Smith' no matter 
whether his face or voice or the sound of his name is 
perceived or imaged. The provision of a constant mental 
sign to stand for 'Jorm Smith' anywhere and always 
implies the provision for similar reaction to 'John Smith' 
anywhere and always. The individual notion then enables 
anyone to economize by having one reaction to one thing 
instead of many reactions to its varied appearances. 

The function of a general notion or concept is to pro- 
vide a constant mental sign for any one of the members of 
a group. As before, this implies the power to react 
similarly to any member of the group by reacting to the 
sign that stands for any one of them. Since seven means 
any seven and five means any five, any seven and any five 
make twelve. Since acid means any acid and base means 
any base we can once for all form habits of knowledge 
and action respecting the union of any acid and any base. 
General notions are the short-hand of thought. 

The function of an abstract notion or abstraction is to 
provide a mental sign for and hence means of reaction to 
some element or aspect or quality or relationship regard- 
less of the particular thing or things in which it appears. 
Thus we react to intentions regardless of results ; to 
lengths without either breadth or thickness ; to times apart 
from anything happening in them; to shapes regardless 



Functions of Mental States 117 

of what they are shapes of. In a sense we recreate the 
world to suit us by analyzing it in thought into elements 
more manageable and by reacting, not to the total situa- 
tion with which we are confronted, but to some element 
in it which offers a vital point of attack. 

The Function of Emotions. — Emotions serve to 
emphasize certain things and conditions and to lead to 
action in more specific and intense ways than do sensa- 
tions and percepts. They commonly go with those things 
and conditions which nature has taught us to emphatically 
seek or avoid. The teachings of nature in this respect 
are however of much less value in the conditions of mod- 
ern civilized life than they would be if man were still lead- 
ing an animal life in the woods. Jealousy and rage, for 
instance, could be omitted from human life with little loss. 

It is often stated that the emotions furnish the energy 
for action, while the intellectual states only guide and 
enlighten; that without the emotions man would never 
act vigorously. This is false. Men of vigorous action 
seem to be moved by strong emotions because acting 
vigorously itself tends to produce strong emotions, but 
really clear insight and prompt decision do as much to 
favor action as do soul-stirring fervor and intense pas- 
sion. It would be truer to say that strong emotions 
represent a partial waste of the energy that should be 
used in action. The waste is only partial ; for the emotion 
does, as was said in the previous paragraph, emphasize 
the situation and so intensifies action somewhat. 

The Functions of Connecting, Selecting and Ana- 
lyzing Agencies. — It is perhaps needless to call atten- 
tion to the function of habits, the associations of ideas, 
and judgments. They are all names for connections; 
the first a general name, the second a name for con- 
nections amongst ideas only and the third for connections 



n8 Descriptive Psychology 

commonly between concepts, abstractions and individual 
notions, connections that also usually involve a felt rela- 
tionship. The function of connections as a class was 
made clear in the first few paragraphs of this chapter. 
Instincts, though also connections having in general the 
function of all connections, have as their special function 
that of providing for the essentials of preservation and of 
serving as the material out of which the edifice of habits 
is reared. 

Analysis, in the sense of noting parts, does the actual 
work of breaking the direct concrete experiences of things 
up into elements, and so of producing the abstractions 
the function of which we found to be so important. In 
fact the power to 'see into things,' to 'pick out the essen- 
tial factor in a situation/ is as important practically as the 
power to 'put two and two together;' so that analysis is 
as useful as association. 

The function of attention, is, first, to economize time 
and effort. The selective activity for which attention 
stands concentrates mental life upon the things, qualities, 
and conditions of moment to us and allows the rest of 
the universe to slip by without taking our time. It 
allows us to proportion the prominence any thing shall 
have in the mind to the importance it possesses for our 
welfare. In the second place, attention is one main step 
toward analysis. 

Only this brief statement of the functions of the 
means of connection, selection and analysis is given here, 
because the same topic will be dealt with more fully in 
Part III. 

Exercises 

The function or part played by different features of mental 
life can be concretely imagined by thinking what would be lost 
from life by the loss of any one of them. 



Functions of Mental States 119 

Thus suppose a man to be: — 

1. Without any concepts or abstractions. 

2. Without any permanence to his ideas. 

3. Without any images. 

4. Without any established connections amongst his ideas. 

5. Without any established connections between ideas and 
acts. 

6. Without any restriction of thought to special features of 
the situations encountered. 

7. Without any sensations. 

8. What are some of the difficulties that would be caused if 
the feelings of things in memory or anticipation were indistin- 
guishable from the feelings of things present to perception? 



PART II 

THE PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF 
MENTAL LIFE 

CHAPTER IX 

The Constitution of the Nervous System 

§ 23. Gross Structure 

Human thought and conduct are intimately connected 
with the working of the nervous system, by which is 
meant the brain and spinal cord, the nerves from these to 
the organs of sense and to the muscles, the nervous tissue 
in the organs of sense, and the sympathetic system and 
local ganglia. Injuries to or diseases of the nervous sys- 
tem cause marked changes in thinking and action. Brain 
tumors may result in disordered thinking ; diseases of cer- 
tain nerves cause inability to move the corresponding 
muscles; disease of the optic nerve causes blindness. 
Drugs which affect the nervous system, such as chloro- 
form, alcohol and hashish, produce mental symptoms. 
The development of the nervous system in child life 
parallels the growth of bodily control, intellect and char- 
acter. From a vast amount of such evidence as this it is 
abundantly shown that the thoughts and feelings and 
behavior of men are in direct relations with the activities 
of the nervous system. 

The appearance to the naked eye of the human nerv- 
ous system, as in Figs. 2, 3 and 4, offers little instruction 

120 



The Constitution of the Nervous System 121 

to the student of mental life. The surgeon or physician 
must know its shape, the names of its parts, and the out- 
lining walls of its ventricles, because he has to operate 
upon it. Its more detailed inner structure, as shown by 
the microscope and by modern histological methods, is of 
chief concern to the student of psychology. It is not the 
gross appearance but the composition of the nervous sys- 
tem that throws light upon human learning and conduct. 
The reader should, however, in order to understand 
later descriptions, recall from his studies of physiology 1 
that the nervous system as a whole is divided into (1) 
the central nervous system, (2) the nerves passing from 
it to different parts of the body, (3) the sympathetic 
system and its isolated ganglia in different parts of the 
body and (4) the nervous apparatus of the end-organs 
(eyes, ears, etc.). The central nervous system is further 
divided into the brain and spinal cord. The brain is 
further divided into the cerebrum, cerebellum, medulla 
oblongata and other parts. The cortex of the cerebrum 
is the gray matter composing its outside layer. 

In the descriptions of the figures, the name refers to the 
source from which the figure was copied. Barker refers to L. 
F. Barker's 'The Nervous System and Its Constituent Neurones;' 
Edinger to L. Edinger's, 'Nervose Centralorganej 5 Auflage; 
Kolliker to A Kolliker's, 'Handbuch der Gewebelehre des Men- 
schen' Zweiter Band, 6 Auflage ; Lenhossek to M. v. Lenhossek's, 
'Der Feinere Bau des Nervensystems,' 2 Auflage ; Starr refers to 
the reproductions of M. Allen Starr's series of photographs of the 
brain's finer structure in his 'Atlas of Nerve Cells'; Van 
Gehuchten refers to A. Van Gehuchten's 'Anatomie du Systeme 
Nerveux de 1'Homme.' Roman numerals refer to the volume, 
the first arabic numeral to the page, and the second arabic num- 
eral to the number of the figure in the original. 

1 The student who has never studied human anatomy and physi- 
ology should read the chapters on the nervous system in some stan- 
dard text book of human physiology. 



122 



Physiological Psychology 




A. b. 

Fig. 2. A. The brain and spinal cord, viewed from the side, in then- 
relation to the general structure of the body. One-seventh natural 
size. B. The brain and spinal cord, viewed from the front. Three- 
seventeenths natural length After Van Gehuchten, I, 2, 1 and 2. 



The Constitution of the Nervous System 



123 





Fig. 3. A (above). The cerebrum, viewed from the top. Two-fifths 
natural length. After Van Gehuchten, I, 80, 60. 

Fig. 3. B (below). The cerebrum, viewed from the left side. Two-fifths 
natural length. After Van Gehuchten, I, 87, 69. 



124 



Physiological Psychology 




Fig 4. A section through the cerebrum, showing the appearance to the 
naked eye of the white and gray matter and the relation of the cortex 
to the inner substance of the cerebrum. After Edinger, 254, 173. 



The Constitution of the Nervous System 



125 



§ 24. Finer Structure 

The Nervous System Equals the Sum of its Neu- 
rones. — The nervous system proper (exclusive, that is, 
of the blood vessels and lymph which permeate it and the 
tissues which act as connective and supporting structures) 
is composed of units of structure called neurones or nerve 
cells. For instance, the optic nerve is essentially a bundle 
of very fine thread-like bodies of protoplasm placed side 







L> 



V 






Fig. 5. Rough sketches of six neurones. Thickness is overestimated rela- 
tively to length. 




126 Physiological Psychology 

by side like the wires running from pole to pole along a 
telegraph line. Each of these neurones or nerve cells 
of the optic nerve has one end in the retina of the eye and 
the other in the brain (in the parts called the geniculate 
bodies). Again, if we could see exactly the structure of 
the brain itself, we should find it to consist of millions of 
similar neurones each resembling a bit of string frayed 
out at both ends and here and there along its course. So 
also the nerves going out to the muscles are simply bun- 
dles of such neurones, each of which by itself is a thread- 
like connection between the cells of the spinal cord or 
brain and some muscle. The nervous system is simply 
the sum total of all these neurones, which form an almost 
infinitely complex system of connections between the 
sense organs and the muscles. 

Fig. 5 gives a general idea of the essential features 
of a neurone, or nerve cell, by giving simplified drawings 
of several types of neurones. 1 Figs. 6-16 may help to 
make real the idea that the brain and other components of 
the nervous system are essentially a vast assemblage of 
these string-like neurones. Figs. 6- 11 are reproductions 
of drawings made with all possible fidelity to the actual 
facts; Figs. 12-16 reproduce actual photographs of very 
thin sections from the central nervous system, so stained 
as to show its composition. In examining them one must 
bear in mind that such sections will rarely if ever show 
the whole of any one neurone, but only cross views of 
parts of some, lengthwise views of parts of others, here a 
main string, there a frayed-out end. It is also the case 

1 The student will of course bear in mind that the fraying out is 
not simply in one plane, that the neurone is not flat. Moreover, in 
the drawings the thickness of the string and its branches is over- 
estimated relatively to their length. To get a true idea of these rel- 
ative proportions in the longest neurones one would need to have a 
page many yards long or on a page of this size to represent the main 
string of the neurone as less than a thousandth of an inch thick. 



The Constitution of the Nervous System 127 

that the method of staining used is such that not all of the 
neurones are stained. If they were, the whole picture 
would be a dense-black mass, so closely are the string- 
like nerve units packed together. The top of Fig. 15 
gives some idea of this closeness of interweaving. 

If the reader will think of a slice through the brain, 
such as appears to the naked eye as in Fig. 17 or Fig. 4, 
as being really of the appearance which a combination of 
hundreds of such drawings and photographs as Figs. 6-16 
would make, he will have a true though crude conception 
of the general characteristics of the brain's structure. It 
is absolutely essential that the picture of it as a custard- 
like mass of gray and white stuff be replaced in the 
reader's mind by a picture of it as an aggregation of 
millions of thread-like neurones, each a perfectly definite 
unit by itself. 

The drawings, I repeat, are in no sense unreal or 
simply general diagrams, but are actual reproductions of 
the things seen under the microscope. The photographs 
are of course absolute copies of actual cells as found in 
sections cut from the brain and stained. It is unfor- 
tunate that a picture of an entire neurone cannot be gotten 
by the camera, and that one sees therefore only a scrap 
of one neurone here and a scrap of another there. Fig- 
ures drawn as well as photographs taken give a false idea 
of the length of the neurone. The longer ones do not 
appear for the very good reason that at the magnification 
of say 190 diameters, a drawing of one of the longer 
neurones would have to be a tenth of a mile long. 



128 



Physiological Psychology 




After Kdinger, 221, 152. 



The Constitution of the Nervous System 129 




Fig. 7. A section through the brain cortex. Greatly magnified. After 
Kolliker, 652, 732. 

9-a 



13° 



Physiological Psychology 





Fig 8. 



Fig. 9- 



Fig. 8. A section through t e brain cortex (a) (at the left) so stained as 
to show the thickened portions of the neurones and short pieces of their 
string-like processes, and (b) (at the right) so stained as to show 
only parts of the string-like processes. Imagine the left and right 
halves to fill the same space and the result will fairly represent the 
real condition. Much magnified. After Edinger, 220, 151. 

Fig. 9. A section of the part of the brain in a very early stage of its 
development. Much magnified. After Kolliker, 802, 814. 



Fig. 10 (above) and Fig. 11 (below). Sections through the medulla ob- 
longata or myelencephalon (the enlargement of the spinal cord where it 
joins the brain). These sections are from the brain of a young 
mouse, but the idea they give of the general structure of the brain is 
perfectly applicable to the human brain. After Van Gehuchten, II, 
386, 597 and II, 392, 603. Both figures are due originally to Ramon y 
Cajal. ** 




Figs, io and ii. 



132 



Physiological Psychology 




Fig. 17. A section through the cerebrum, as it appears to the naked eye. 
Nearly actual size. After Edinger, 243, 165. 



The Structure of Neurones. — Different names are 
given to the different parts of a neurone or nerve cell. 
The thickened part containing the nucleus is called the 
cell-body. The process that diminishes in size slowly in 
its course and commonly goes a considerable distance 
from the cell-body and gives off branches rather infre- 
quently until it frays out at its end, is called the axis- 
cylinder process or neuraxon or axone. The one or more 
processes that diminish rapidly in size, that commonly 






- N4 \ - 




:.i \ 



r v'v 



Fig. 12. A photograph of a section of the spinal cord in an early stage 
of the development of the nervous system. After Starr, 20, Plate 2. 
X27 Diameters. 




Fig. 13. A photograph of a section through the cortex of the cerebrum, 
showing segments of very many neurones. After Starr, 68, Plate 41. 
X150 Diameters. 




Fig. 14. A photograph of a section through the cortex of the cerebrum in 
an early stage of development of the nervous system, showing segments 
of a number of neurones, including the thickened part. — the so-called 
cell-body of the neurone. After Starr, Plate 42 X150 Diameters. 




j 



M 



§ 



Fig. 15. A photograph of a section through a convolution of the cere- 
brum in an early stage of development of the nervous system. The 
black mat at the top of the photograph represents a dense aggregation 
of the frayed-out ends of many neurones; in the rest of the photograph 
are seen clearly segments of many separate neurones, with the thickened 
parts of about thirty in a nearly horizontal line. After Starr, 62, Plate 
33. X20 Diameters. 




Fig. 16. A photograph of a section through the cortex of the cerebrum, 
showing short segments of a number of neurones, including in many 
cases the thickened part, — the so-called cell-body of the neurone. After 



The Constitution of the Nervous System 133 



go only a slight distance from the cell-body and branch 
again and again like a tree are called the dendritic pro- 
cesses or dendrites. 1 The fine branches given off from 




Fig. 18. A neurone from the cerebral cortex. The axis-cylinder process, 
dendrites and collaterals are marked A, D and C respectively. The 
neuraxon is shown in the drawing only for a short distance. If its 
entire length were pictured it would run for yards below the bottom of 
the page. Very greatly magnified. After Van Gehuchten, I, 201, 145. 

the neuraxon are called collaterals. The branching out 
at the end of a process is often called (by Latin words 

1 An absolutely comprehensive and exact distinction between 
neuraxon and dendrite cannot be made that will agree with the dif- 
ferent usages. 



134 Physiological Psychology 

meaning the same thing) the terminal arborisation. (See 
Fig. 18.) These different parts of the neurone are 
clearly shown in Figs. 19-23 which represent neurones or 
parts of neurones. They may also be observed in the 
actual photographs of neurones reproduced in Figs. 26-29. 

The part of a neurone called the axis-cylinder process 
or neuraxon or axone is throughout a part of its course 
covered with a surrounding substance or sheath, called 
the medullary sheath. When a part of a neurone is called 
a fibre, the part of it thus ensheathed is called a medullated 
fibre. Xeuraxons in that part of their course outside the 
central nervous system have a second sheath outside the 
medullary sheath, called the sheath of Schwann. Figs. 24 
and 25 (p. 137), show the arrangement of these sheaths. 

It is clear from the description so far given and from 
the figures that the word cell which is used for the unit 
of structure in any living thing does not describe the unit 
of structure of the nervous system at all well. The great 
majority of structural units are at least somewhat like a 
cell or box or bag or lump in shape, but the 'cells' of the 
nervous system are especially unlike all other cells of the 
body and utterly unlike the cell of common language. 
These may be thousands of times as long as they are wide 
or thick, are extremely irregular in their shape, and would 
be far better described by the term, nerve-string or fibre 
or tangle. The unfitness of the term is one reason why 
the nerve cell is commonly described as a cell-body plus 
cell-processes. It has also been the cause of a most mis- 
leading habit : namely, the use of the word cell for the 
cell-body alone and the word fibre or process for the 
string-like parts of the cell. The student should remem- 
ber always that the process or fibre is always a part of a 
neurone or cell, and as important a part as the cell-body. 
It would be a sad mistake to think of the thickened part 



The Constitution of the Nervous System 135 




Fig. 21. 



Fig. 19. A neurone from the optic lobe. Very greatly magnified. After 

Kolliker, 419, 5718. 

Fig. 20. A segment of a neurone from the optic lobe. Only the frayed 

end or terminal arborization is shown. Very greatly magnified. After 

Kolliker, 583, 693. 

Fig. 21. A segment of a neurone from the spinal cord, showing a collateral. 

Very greatly magnified. After v. Lenhossek, 255, 36, 



136 



Physiological Psychology 




Fig. 22, Segments of three neurones from the optic nerve's termination, 
showing their frayed ends or terminal arborization. Very greatly mag- 
nified. After Kolliker, 416, 575. 




Fig. 23. Segments of neurones from the spinal cord, showing also col- 
laterals (d). Very greatly magnified. After v. Lenhossek, 287, 45. 




* V 






Fig. 26. A photograph of a cell-body of a motor neurone in the spinal 
cord with numerous dendritic processes and the beginning of the neu- 
raxon. The latter passes from the cell-body at the left hand side 
and runs almost horizontally to the edge of the figure. After Starr, 21, 
Plate 3. X120 Diameters. 

Fig. 27. A photograph of segments of several neurones from a spinal 
ganglion of an embryo chick. The cell-body and the extensions of the 
neurone from it are very clear in five of the neurones. After Starr, 21, 
Plate 11. X 120 Diameters. 




\t- 


( 




f 

J 
* 


\m 




) L 




V ^I 




Jl 


\ 

V 


" 7 T 


\ 

9 


i / i 




1 /jf* 


4 

i 



Fig. 28. 



Fig. 29. 



Fig. 28. A photograph showing at the right a segment of a neurone includ- 
ing the cell-body, the neuraxon running downward and a long den- 
dritic process running upward to form, by branching, a part of the 
black mat at tne top of the figure. After Starr, Plate 44. X120 Di- 
ameters. 

Fig. 29. A photograph of a neurone of the third layer of the cerebral 
cortex, showing the cell-body, dendritic processes and the neuraxon; 
the latter runs upward, and divides into two branches which later divide 
again. After Starr, Plate 46. X330 Diameters. 



The Constitution of the Nervous System 



137 



where the nucleus lies as the essential, and of the proc- 
esses or thinner parts as minor features. 

The thickened part is not the main thing even in bulk. 
The process or fibre part is almost always larger, in some 
cases nearly if not quite two hundred times as large. 




B ,C 



Fig. 24. Schematic sketch of a longitudinal section of a medullated 

neurone. 

1 is the neurone itself (that is, a segment of the neuraxon). 

2 is the medullary sheath. 

3 is the sheath of Schwann. 

Fig. 25. Drawings of (A) a section of a segment of a medullated neuraxon, 
and of (B, C, and D) the appearance of a medullated neuraxon, show- 
ing the structure and arrangement of the medullary sheath. After 
Kolliker, pages 10, 13 and 14, Figs. 331, 334 and 335. 



And in the service performed by a neurone, although the 
whole cell is needed, the frayed-out ends and the fibres 
play the leading role. 



10 



138 



Physiological Psychology 



Varieties of Neurones. — The cells that compose the 
nervous system vary tremendously in size and shape. 
They range from less than a twentieth of an inch to three 
feet or more in length. Some are very simple threads 




Fig. 30. A pyramidal neurone, showing only the beginning of the neuraxon. 

Greatly magnified. After Kolliker, 46, 367. 

Fig 31. Segments of neurones with long neuraxons. Greatly magnified. 

After Van Gehuchten, II, 497, 676. 



with a few frayings and side branches ; others are at their 
two ends as complicated as the branches and roots of a 
tree. Some end in simple fibrils, others in discs or plates. 
These special forms are probably each adapted to the work 
the neurone has to do. With all these differences there 



The Constitution of the Nervous System 139 

remains the general likeness to a thread-like body frayed 
out at the ends, and along its course. Figs. 30-40, wiih 
those already given, show some of the chief types of 
neurone structure. They will serve also to emphasize 
the fact that the nervous system is made up of definite 
units. 




Fig. 32. A Purkinje ceil, a type of neurone found in the cerebellum, 

characterized by very elaborate branching of the dendritic processes. 

Only a part of the neuraxon is shown. Greatly magnified. After 
Kolliker, 44, 363. 



The Connections Between Neurones. — No neurone 
is in complete isolation. Every neurone stands in a spe- 
cial relation to one or more other neurones ; namely, that 
some part of it is in close proximity or contact with some 
part of the other neurone or neurones. Probably it is 
between (i) the terminal arborization of the neuraxon 
or of one of its collaterals of one neurone and (2) the 
dendritic process or cell-body of the other that this close 
proximity obtains. I shall use the word connection to 



140 



Physiological Psychology 




Fig. 33. A basket cell, a type of neurone found in the cerebellum. The 
neuraxon gives off a number of branches, each ending in a basket- 
shaped arborization. Greatly magnified. After Kolliker, 352, 535. 
Fig. 34. A commissural cell, a type of neurone with a short neuraxon. 

Greatly magnified. After v. Lenhossek, 333, 50. 
Fig. 35. A Golgi cell, a type of neurone with a short and much branch- 
ing neuraxon. Greatly magnified. After v. Lenhossek, 371, 57. 
Fig 36. A Cajal cell, a type of neurone with several neuraxons. Greatly 
magnified. After v. Lenhossek, 53, 8. 







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Fig. 38. A photograph of a Purkinje cell. After Starr. 35, Plate 15. 

X125 Diameters. 
Fig. 39. A photograph of a Cajal cell. After Starr. 65, Plate 37. X125 

Diameters. 

Fig. 40. A photograph of a large polygonal neurone from the spinal cord. 

After Starr, 26. Plate 8. X125 Diameters. 



The Constitution of the Nervous System 141 

denote this relationship of close proximity or contact, 
though it should be understood that there may be, and 
commonly is, no connection in the sense of one neurone 
growing into the other, fusing with it, making a struc- 
tural connection. Every neurone, then, is in connection 1 




Fig. 2,7- Association cells (a, b and c). Greatly magnified. After Ed- 
inger. 28, 9. 



with some other or others. Fig. 41 shows the general 
plan of such connections. Figs. 42 and 43 are drawings 
of the actual connections in two cases where they can be 
clearly inferred from what the microscope reveals. 

1 The word synapsis, meaning a clasping together, has been sug- 
gested as a useful descriptive term for the peculiar connections that 
exist between neurone and neurone. 



142 



Physiological Psychology 



St 



A 



W 



^ 



^ 



■^1 



/*" 



$<• 



Fig- 41. A schematic sketch showing methods of connection between neu- 
rones. 



The Constitution of the Nervous System 143 





Fig. 42. 



Fig. 43- 



Fig. 42. A sketch showing the connection between the terminal arboriza- 
tions between the axis-cylinder processes of the neurones of the optic 
nerve and the dendritic processes of neurones in the optic lobes, f 
obt. =the axis-cylinder processes of the neurones of the optic nerve; 
ram. t. - their terminal arborizations in contact with the dendritic pro- 
cesses of the neurones below. After Van Gehuchten, I, 245, 159. 

Fig. 43. A sketch showing the connection between the terminal arboriza- 
tions of the bipolar neurones of the sense organ of smell and the 
dendritic processes of the so-called mitral cells. The two terminal 
arborizations intertwine in a globular mass called the glomerulus (gl). 
After Van Gehuchten, II, 369, 581. 



CHAPTER X 

The Action of the Nervous System 

§ 25. The Functions of the Neurones 

The neurone or " nerve cell, besides possessing the 
powers of absorption, growth, etc., common to all the 
cells of the body, has three special duties or functions : — 

(1) It is especially sensitive to or influenced by what 
happens to it or to parts of it. 

(2) It conducts or transmits; i.e., it so acts that a 
stimulation or disturbance or activity at one end of it 
results in a stimulation or disturbance or activity at the 
other. 

(3) It is especially modifiable; i.e., its action at any 
time depends upon its previous actions. In the human 
nervous system this third function is probably restricted 
in the main to the cells in certain parts of the central 
nervous system. 

Sensitivity. — The first function, sensitivity or im- 
pressibility, needs no explanation. All matter is influenced 
by what happens to it; all living matter is especially so; 
and the nerve cells are the parts of living animals which 
carry this trait to the extreme. If we compare a man's 
body to a building, calling the steel frame-work his skele- 
ton and the furnaces and power-station his digestive 
organs and lungs, the nervous system would include with 
other things the thermometers, heat regulators, electric 
buttons, door bells, valve openers, — the parts of the build- 

144 



The Action of the Nerz } oiis System 145 

ing in short which are specially designed to respond to 
influences of the environment. 

Conductivity. — Just how the nerve cell conducts or 
transmits is not known. But the fact itself is sure. As 
a copper wire at one end of which an electric current is 
excited is so influenced that the current appears at the 
other end; as the air so acts that a vibration in any part 
spreads to other parts, — so the neurone when stimulated 
at one end acts so as to produce a corresponding activity 
at the other end ; and so as to produce, under certain con- 
ditions, activity in the neurones in connection or synapsis 
with it. 

The activity or disturbance which is transmitted is 
called the nervous impulse. When such an impulse is 
started in a nerve cell we say that the nerve cell is stim- 
ulated and call the agency by which the impulse is begot- 
ten the stimulus. Also when the nerve cell transmits the 
impulse to some body cells or other nerve cells we say 
that it stimulates them. Just as an electric current might 
pass along one wire, thence to another and along it to a 
third, so the nervous impulse passes from neurone to 
neurone when these are in functional connection. 

The conduction or transmission is commonly over a 
series of nerve cells. For instance when the stimulus of 
pain at the finger's end makes us rub the injured spot, the 
impulse does not go from the skin to the muscles via a 
single cell (or set of cells), but traverses at least three, 
one set running from the skin to the spinal cord, one from 
the spinal cord to the muscles and one or more sets in the 
spinal cord connecting these. The transmission is, in 
any given neurone, usually, if not always, in the same 
direction ; namely, toward the extremities of the neuraxon. 
A cell carrying impulses from the brain to a muscle does 
not, so to speak, carry return messages. For that another 



146 Physiological Psychology 

wire is used. A nerve cell may receive impulses from 
several nerve cells. It may and commonly does transmit 
its impulses to many nerve cells. 

As might be expected, the two functions of sensitivity 
and conductivity are aided by such an arrangement of the 
nerve cells that stimuli are received at important points 
in the body and conducted to appropriate muscles. The 
constituents of the nervous system are not arranged at 
random. They are not like the chance tangle of a billion 
little threads which would receive stimuli hit or miss and 
conduct them nowhere in particular, but are, like the 
wires of the telephone system of a city or the railroads of 
a country, definitely placed lines of transmission between 
important points, and are so arranged at central offices 
as to permit a great number of useful connections. For 
instance, the neurones receiving the stimuli of light in the 
retina have definite connections with the neurones that 
carry impulses to the muscles that open and close the eyes, 
also to the muscles that move the eyes in turning to and 
converging upon and focussing for objects, also to the 
muscles that move the head. 

Modifiability. — The analogy with a telephone sys- 
tem fails when we come to the third function, characteris- 
tic of many of the nerve cells 1 of the human brain, their 
power of modification by use. Unlike any system of 
wires or machines, the human nervous system possesses 
the power, at least in many of its parts, to be so altered 
by whatever happens to it as to enable the body on the 
next occasion to meet the situation more successfully. 
The nervous system which causes at a child's early sight 
of the fire the reaction of reaching for it, becomes a 

1 This paragraph refers only to the cells of the so-called 'higher' 
parts of the nervous system. Of the cells in the spinal cord and 
peripheral system it is almost surely not true. Of just what 
groups of cells it is true is not known. 



The Action of the Nervous System 147 

nervous system that causes in later trials the reaction of 
avoidance. The connection between the impression and 
the one motor discharge has been weakened and an 
opposite one formed. The neurones learn, so to speak, 
to form, break and modify their inter-connections. If a 
telephone system possessed within itself the power by 
which the connections between the wires to certain 
houses would, with successful use, become more and more 
easily made while other connections would become in- 
creasingly more difficult, the analogy would be complete. 
But of course no mere machine has such a power to 
modify its workings, to make or break connections in ac- 
cordance with the frequency of their use and the desira- 
bility or discomfort of the results to which they lead. 
This function of the neurones will be more fully described 
after the facts concerning the arrangement of the 
neurones in a system have been presented. 

§ 26. The Arrangement of the Neurones 

The Three Chief Groups. — The cells of the nervous 
system as a whole may best be divided into three classes. 
There are first, neurones which are stimulated by heat, 
light and other physical or chemical forces and discharge 
into other neurones ; second, neurones which are stimu- 
lated by other neurones and themselves stimulate muscles ; 
third, neurones which are stimulated by and themselves 
stimulate other neurones. In other words, there are cells 
directly sensitive to the environment, cells directly active 
in causing muscular contraction and cells acting as inter- 
mediaries between the former and the latter. The first 
are called Afferent or Centripetal neurones because they 
bring stimuli toward the brain and spinal cord (ad-fero=r 
bring to) ; the second are called Efferent or Centrifugal 



148 Physiological Psychology 

neurones because they carry stimuli away from the brain 
and spinal cord toward the muscles. The third are called 
Associative or Connecting neurones. 

Cells of class 1 are also called Sensory neurones or 
cells ; cells of class 2, Motor neurones or cells. The term 
motor cell is also used to include cells which, though 
themselves not directly connected with muscles, lead out 
from the brain and connect in the spinal cord with cells 
which are so connected. Afferent, centripetal and sen- 
sory are used of nerves when the cells composing the 
nerve bring stimuli from the different parts of the body 
to the brain and spinal cord ; efferent, centrifugal or 
motor nerves meaning of course nerves of an opposite 
function. 

Sensory Neurones. — From almost every part of the 
body there originate afferent neurones to transmit stimuli 
arising there to the brain and spinal cord. Not only in 
the eyes, ears, nose, mouth and skin, but also in the 
muscles, articular surfaces, connective tissues, along the 
digestive tract, and throughout the sensitive areas of the 
body, there are neurone-endings capable of being set in 
action by the proper stimuli at the point where they are 
located. 

Motor Neurones. — To all the muscles, — to the 
muscles which control the peristalsis of the intestine and 
the contraction of the blood vessels, as well as to those 
that more obviously move our limbs, — run efferent neu- 
rones, stimuli from which influence the amount and dura- 
tion of muscular action. 

The nervous system thus furnishes a most elaborate 
mechanism for receiving stimuli at almost all points in 
the body, — and, in the case of light, heat and smell, of 
stimuli from distant objects, — and for controlling the 
action of the body in the most minute details. If we 



The Action of the Nervous System 149 

liken the body to an army and the neurones to its signal- 
ling corps, we may say that signals may be sent from 
every point in the army to headquarters and from head- 
quarters to every company or battery that can act. 

Associative Neurones. — Still more elaborate is the 
mechanism for securing the proper connections between 
stimulus to and action of the body, for enabling the body 
to react advantageously with the movement fitted to the 
particular stimuli felt, for causing what happens to it to 
result in its doing what is necessary. This mechanism is 
of course the system of neurones connecting sensory with 
motor cells. It is almost literally true that any set of 
afferent cells may indirectly make connection with any 
set of motor cells and so influence any bodily act. The 
cell connections provide for a range of performances, 
extending from simple cases, such as that of the trans- 
mission of the stimulus of cells in the eye due to a bright 
light to the cells influencing the muscles of the eves so as 
to result in the act of winking, to such a complex linkage 
as occurs when the sight of the word 'dollar' leads a man 
to put his hand in his pocket, grasp a coin and pull it out 
with a sigh. 

The greater part of the bulk of the human brain is 
given up to such connecting cells. And the more im- 
portant part of the work of the nervous system is the 
work, not of receiving stimuli from sensitive parts of the 
body, nor of discharging stimuli to the muscles, but of 
turning stimulus into discharge, connecting outgo prop- 
erly with income, suiting expression to impression, action 
to circumstances. 

The Grouping and Chaining Together of the Neu- 
rones. — It would be hopeless to try to portray in a 
diagram the arrangement of this practical infinitude of 
neurones to be affected by happenings inside and outside 



i5o 



Physiological Psychology 





Fig. 44A. 



A possible scheme of arrangement of neurones to form an ex- 
ceedingly simple nervous system. 




J 1 



f I 




Fig. 44B. A scheme of arrangements of neurones of varying degrees of 
complexity. Each line represents one neurone or neurone group. 



The Action of the Nervous System 151 

of the body and to transmit the stimuli here and there so 
as to make final connections with neurones going out to 
the muscles. Even if we knew the exact arrangement 
of each neurone in a man's brain it would take a model as 
large as St. Paul's Cathedral to make them visible to the 
naked eye, a model with whose details only years of study 
would familiarize us. Consider that counting at the rate 
of 50 a minute it would take a man working 12 hours a 
day over 200 years, probably over 700 years, to merely 
count the nerve-cells of one man. 

It is possible, however, to picture the general features 
of the arrangement. We can imagine an animal with a 
nervous system with only two neurones to receive stimuli, 
only three neurones to discharge into muscles and only 
two connecting neurones. Fig. 44A may serve as its 
picture. Nervous action in general may be diagrammed as 
in Fig. 44B, which shows various degrees of complexity 
of connections. Even the most complicated nervous sys- 
tems are variations of this general arrangement of a 
shorter or longer series of neurones making a circuit 
from sensitive surfaces to organs of response. Such a 
simple circuit is called a Reflex arc or Reflex arch. What 
would be seen if a perfect model of all the nerve cells 
were available would be simply a multitude of such arches 
or circuits of conduction from sensitive parts of the body 
to muscles and a multitude of circuits cross-connecting 
these. 

It is possible also to get a more definite conception of 
these circuits of conduction by studying one or two sam- 
ples or types of them. Figs. 45, 46 and 47 give in this 
way a general view of the grouping and chaining together 
of the neurones which conduct certain stimuli to the brain 
cortex or conduct stimuli from the cortex to certain 
groups of muscles. 



152 



Physiological Psychology 




Fig. 45. Fig. 46. 

Fig. 45. A scheme of the arrangement of the neurones conducting 1 
stimuli from the olfactory sense organ. 1 — the first neurones passing 
to the glomeruli (gl). 2 — the second neurones passing from the glom- 
eruli to the hippocampus. 3 — the third neurones passing from the 
hippocampus to the cornu ammonis. 4 — the fourth neurones passing 
from the cornu ammonis to make further connections. After Van 
Gehuchten, II, 294, 539. 

Fig. 46. A scheme of the arrangement of the neurones conducting 
stimuli from the sense organs in the skin. After Van Gehuchten, II, 
412, 624. 



The Action of the Nervous System 153 




Fig. 47 Scheme of the arrangement of the motor neurones conducting 
stimuli toward the muscles. After Van Gehuchten, II, 512, 688. 



II 



154 



Physiological Psychology 



Sense Organs. — One end (the peripheral end) of an 
afferent neurone is stimulated by physical or chemical 
forces. • It may be more or less specialized to suit it to 
this work. It may be connected with bodily structures 
specially fitted to cause the physical or chemical force to 
influence it. The peripheral end of an afferent neurone, 
or a group of peripheral ends of afferent neurones which 




Fig. 48. A. Sensory neurones ending around the base of hairs (in the 
mouse). B. Cross-section of the same tissue as in A. C. Sensory 
neurones ending in epithelial cells. D. Sensory neurones ending 
around pigment cells. A, B, C and D are after Edinger, 42, 17. C is 
taken by Edinger from Bethe, D from Eberth and Bunge. E. Sen- 
sory nerve fibrils in the lining of the oesophagus, n — the neurone. 
After Barker, 362. 211; after Retzius. F. A sensory neurone's end- 
ing in a tactile corpuscle. After Barker, 386, 242; after Smirnow. 

act as a unit, together with such bodily structures, is 
called a Sense Organ. A sense organ may be so simple 
an affair as the mere terminal arborization of a neurone 
ending freely in the outer or inner surface of the body. 
Such are shown in Fig. 48. It may be so complex as the 
eye, a sense organ which includes not only the endings 
of thousands of neurones in the retina, but also a lens to 



The Action of the Nervous System 155 




Fig. 49. Terminal corpuscle of Ruffini with the sensory neurone's ending 
therein. After Barker, 389, 246; after Ruffini. 

Fig. 50. Tendon with nerve-plaque made up of the ending of sensory- 
neurones seen entering from above; rfnc, ultimate arborization of the 
neurones. After Barker, 408, 266; after Ciaccio. 




51. Terminal plaque in a muscle spindle. The neurone entering at 
the left subdivides to form the elaborate net work shown. After 
Barker, 416, 273; after Ruffini 



i56 



Physiological Psychology 



focus light rays upon them, an arrangement to alter the 
shape of the lens so as to focus the light from objects 
at different distances, an arrangement to regulate the 
amount of light admitted, an arrangement to shut out 
light altogether and an arrangement to move the eyes so 
that light will come from any one of many directions. 
The endings of the neurones of a sense organ may have a 






54 



±Mrkki 





55 



Fig. 52. Taste buds (from the tongue) and the endings of sensory gusta- 
tory neurones: s — a supporting cell; t — taste cells; n — fibrils of neu- 
rones passing upon and between the taste buds. After Barker, 527, 
348; after v. Lenhossek. 

53. The ending of a sensory neurone in the ear (in the macula 
acustica sacculi). After Barker, 502, 333; after v. Lenhossek. 

54. Sensory neurones in the nose (in the olfactory mucous mem- 
brane). After Van Gehuchten, I, 244, 156. 

55. The principal nervous elements of the retina: r — rods; c — cones; 
s — a supporting cell; b — a bipolar nerve cell; g — ganglion nerve cell 
After Van Gehuchten, I, 244, 157. 



Fig. 
Fig. 
Fig. 



The Action of the Nervous System 



157 



structure not notably different 
from the general type (see Figs. 
4.8, 52 and 53) or may be so 
altered as to be hardly recog- 
nizable (see Figs. 51, 54 and 55). 

An adequate idea of the rich 
provision made in the nervous 
system for the reception of stim- 
uli from without and within the 
body can be obtained only by 
study of such a full account of 
the peripheral neurones as may 
be found, say in Barker's 'Nerv- 
ous System,' but Figs. 48-55 will 
give some conception of the fact 
and may serve to illustrate the 
statement previously made that 
"not only in the eyes, ears, nose, 
mouth and skin, but also in the 
muscles, articular surfaces, con- 
nective tissues, along the diges- 
tive tract, and throughout the 
sensitive areas of the body, there 
are neurone-endings capable of 
being set in action." . 

Motor Organs. — The ending 
of an efferent neurone in a mus- 
cle is specialized to suit its work 
of transmitting the nervous 
stimulus in some way to the tis- 
sue of the muscle so as to make 
the latter contract. As this pro- 
cess is almost, if not exactly, the 
same in all cases, there is not 




Fig. 56. The ending of a motor 
neurone in a muscle. At the 
bottom are shown two mus- 
cle plates (p) on muscle 
fibres (m). After Van Ge- 
huchten, 242, 154. 



15& Physiological Psychology 

the variety or complexity in motor organs which is found 
in sense organs. Fig. 56 shows the ending of a motor 
neurone forming the so-called muscle-plates. 

The Localization of Brain Functions. — It is evident 
that each particular cell has its special work to do and 
that the circuits found at any particular spot in the brain 
have each their special work to do. If a man's spinal 
cord is injured in the lumbar region (the lower part of 
the back) it will not directly influence his feelings from 
or movements of his arms, since the cells that go to and 
from the arms and their connecting cells are not directly 
influenced. An injury to the frontal lobe does not 
directly alter the power of vision, for the circuit from the 
eyes to the cortical cells, action of which is accompanied 
by sensations of sight, is not impaired. But the section 
of the cord mentioned above would injure feelings from 
and movements of the legs. An injury at a certain spot 
in the occipital lobe would abolish sensations of sight. 
Injuries to the inferior frontal convolution result in dis- 
orders of speech. Injuries to the parietal region result 
in disordered sensations of bodily condition and second- 
arily in altered feelings of personality. Figs. 57 and 58 
show the probable location in the human cortex of the 
neurones most intimately concerned with sensations of 
various sorts, and Figs. 59 and 60 show the location of 
the neurones most intimately concerned with the control 
of the movements of various muscles, in the case of the 
monkey. 

This view of localization is quite different from 
phrenology, which regards the brain as divided sharply 
into parts each of which corresponds to some complex 
mental trait such as observation, ingenuity, kindness, 
intellect, attentiveness and the like. Such a complex 
trait as anv one of these would involve verv manv differ- 



The Action of the Nervous System 159 




Fig. 58. 
Figs. 57 and 58. The areas of the cerebral cortex to which sensory neu- 
rones lead, and the areas occupied chiefly by associative neurones. 
Fig. 57 is a view of the outer half of the right cerebral hemisphere, 
Fig. 58 of its inner or mesial half. After Van Gehuchten, II, 308, 
548; after Flechsig. I — Tactile area; II — Visual area; III — Auditory 
area; IV — Olfactory area. 1 — Anterior area for association; 2 — Pos- 
terior area for association. 



i6o 



Physiological Psychology 




Fig. 59. 




Fig. 60. 



Figs. 59 and 60. The areas of the cerebral cortex from 
rones stimulating certain movements lead (in the 
Barker, 998 and 999, 634 



,hich motor neu- 
monkey). After 
after Horsley and Schaefer. 



The Action of the Nervous System 161 

ent groups of neurones in many different parts of the 
brain. There is a place in the brain where the cells are 
specially connected with vision, but only the action of 
cells in many places would correspond to observation. 
Moreover 'place in the brain' means the entire course of 
a conducting group of neurones, or some important part 
of that course, not a compartment or special creative 
center. 

The student should, therefore, not harbor any fanciful 
guesses, such as that each neurone corresponds to some 
one idea, or that one kind of a neurone goes with thought, 
another with emotions, or that the neurones hold thoughts 
and feelings in them or tied to them. The neurone is not 
a feeling, nor does it hold it, nor does the fact that the 
action of certain neurones is accompanied by, say sensa- 
tions of smell, imply that the feeling of smell is in them. 

The proper way to realize the nature of the human 
nervous system, the way its infinite multitude of nerve 
strings are arranged, the currents or stimuli which they 
transmit and the way these are aroused by happenings 
in the sense organs and in turn arouse movements of the 
body, — to realize in short the part played in human life 
by the nervous system — is to spend a year or more in the 
study of the histology and physiology of the brain. It is 
difficult from a few pages of words and diagrams to get 
even a general idea of what nerve cells are and what they 
do. If, however, the reader will practice himself in 
thinking at every sense impression, "Now a sense organ 
has been excited to action and has set up a commotion in 
some nerve cells. This commotion has been transmitted 
to other cells in the brain ;" — if he will recall, whenever 
he makes a movement, that the movement is due to the 
contraction of certain muscles because of a stimulus 



1 62 Physiological Psychology 

transmitted to them by nerve cells running from the brain 
and spinal cord and ending in the muscle itself; — if he 
will, as he lives and thinks, keep before him an image of 
countless nerve cells running from this place to that in his 
brain and conducting impulses hither and yon, and think 
of this activity as the condition and parallel of his mental 
life ; — if in short the reader will relate the facts so far 
given to his life of to-day and to-morrow, and think of 
human conduct in terms of the conduction of stimuli by 
nerve cells — he will come to realize and use the truth that 
the nervous system is the sum total of nerve cells, that 
these act by conducting impulses, that they link parts of 
the body that can be influenced to parts of the body that 
can act and link themselves to each other, that in the 
infinite number of their possible ways of conduction there 
is the basis and parallel of the infinite variety of a man's 
thoughts and deeds. 

He will then no longer think of the nervous system as 
a vague name, but as an almost infinitely complex mechan- 
ism for receiving impressions from the body and its 
surroundings, for arousing and controlling bodily acts, 
for connecting the latter in appropriate ways with, the 
various situations represented by the former, and for 
modifying their connections to meet the needs of life. 
He will realize the nature of the mechanism which enables 
us to respond to the events of our lives, and by its power 
of modification affords the physiological basis for changes 
of intellect and character, for learning, for education in 
the broadest sense. 

§ 27. The Lazvs of Brain Action 

The Law of Expression. — In accordance with the 
general doctrine of the conservation of energy we must 
believe that every stimulus that is started in sensory nerves 



The Action of the Nervous System 163 

by what happens at their peripheral ends must have some 
result. These stimuli cannot come to nothing. Their 
energy must either be transmitted on to other cells and 
eventually out through the efferent cells to the muscles, 
or else cause modifications, — do work, — in the cells of the 
central system. Just as in a storage battery electric 
charges coming in must sooner or later be discharged out 
or modify the battery itself, so the stimuli coming in to the 
brain must transform it or be conducted out and cause 
the muscles to contract. Every stimulus has its result 
somehow and somewhere. The function of mental life 
we saw was to influence our movements, — to cause what 
happened to us to result in actions that preserved our 
lives and happiness. The nervous system we now see to 
be a transformer of stimuli coming in, which are due to 
our surroundings, into stimuli going out which cause our 
actions, or into modifications of the nervous system itself. 
Inhibitory Action. — That action in the nervous sys- 
tem discharges eventually into the muscles does not mean 
that it necessarily arouses movement. It may result in 
the cessation of a movement. Suppose that the forearm 
is being lowered by the contraction of the triceps and that 
a stimulus somewhere among the neurones works itself 
out into a stimulus to the biceps muscle. This stimulus 
tends to raise the forearm and, by counteracting or bal- 
ancing the effect of the contraction of the triceps, may 
hold the arm still. Very many performances of skill re- 
quire such a counteraction. Two sets of opposite muscles 
may both be stimulated, and but little movement be made. 
Twice as many neurones may be active as if the arm was 
swung energetically. Stimulation may regulate or de- 
crease or check movement as well as initiate it. What we 
do not do as well as what we do, is often a result of stim- 
ulation. Every nervous impulse tends to work itself out 



164 Physiological Psychology 

in action, but action means restraint, the opposition of one 
contraction to others, not doing, as well as mere move- 
ment. 

In the mental world as well, we may suppose that the 
action of the nervous system may be to check as well as to 
arouse a sensation or idea. Nervous action may make 
one not think of a certain thing, not feel a certain emotion. 

When the result of nervous action is thus apparently 
negative, — when it checks or restrains or lessens, — the 
state of affairs is called Inhibition and the stimulus is said 
to inhibit the checked process. Such inhibitory action is of 
the utmost importance. We die when the vagus nerve to 
the heart is cut, not because the heart stops beating, but 
because it beats too fast ; i.e., over-acts. We are men and 
not brutes because the neurones concerned in the idea- 
tional and moral life keep in subjection and counteract the 
direct impulses to action of the neurones concerned in 
the instincts of greed, lust, cruelty and hatred. We 
reason, and do not merely day-dream, because we can 
check foolish, irrelevant fancies, — can inhibit all ideas 
that do not lead on to the desired goal. 

The Law of Least Resistance. — When any neurone 
acts, i.e., when it is stimulated and transmits, it will trans- 
mit the stimulus along the line of least resistance, or in 
other words along the line of strongest connection. Just 
as a copper wire through which an electric current is 
passing will, if its end is one millimeter from wire B and 
20 millimeters from wire C, transmit the current to wire 
B, so a neurone will transmit its stimulus along the easiest 
path. 

The line of least resistance or of strongest connection 
for any neurone or set of neurones will be, other things 
being equal, to the neurones which by the inborn arrange- 
ment of the nervous svstem are in closest connection with 



The Action of the Nervous System 165 

it. When the neurone endings of the retina are stimu- 
lated by bright light, nothing need happen in the leg 
muscles, because there is no ready made connection in the 
brain between the optic neurones and the neurones pass- 
ing from the spinal cord to the leg muscles. But there 
will be a contraction of the muscles that lessen the 
pupillary opening, for there is a definite connection be- 
tween the optic neurones and those to the iris muscle. 

The Law of Inborn Connections. — The first law 
that decides what neurones any given neurone will arouse 
to action, — what the line of least resistance or strongest 
connection will be, — is then that, other things being equal, 
any neurone group will discharge into the neurone group 
with which it is by the inner growth of the nervous sys- 
tem connected. This we may call the Law of Natural or 
Inborn Connections. 

The Law of Acquired Connections. — These natural 
lines of connection are in the course of life added to and 
subtracted from. The neurones are not by nature so 
arranged as to make a man say, "How dazzling," when 
the neurones of the retina are stimulated by a bright 
light. And the natural tendency of infants to turn the 
head toward a light is in later life largely overcome. The 
'other things' are not always equal. We have in fact as 
a general law of behavior of, at least, the neurone groups 
of the so-called 'higher' centers or parts of the brain, the 
law that when any neurone or neurone group is stimulated 
and transmits to or discharges into or connects with a 
second neurone or neurone group, it will, zvhen later 
stimulated again in the same way, hai'e an increased ten- 
dency to transmit to the same second neurone group as 
before, provided the act that resulted in the first instance 
brought a pleasant or at least indifferent mental state. 
If, on the contrary, the result in the first case was dis- 



1 66 Physiological Psychology 

comfort, the tendency to such transmission will be les- 
sened. 

In other words, any conduction of a stimulus from 
nerve cell to nerve cell tends increasingly to take the 
direction it has taken unless the result is discomfort. In 
that case the original tendency decreases. 

Stating the law in terms of connections made between 
cells, we would say: Connections betzveen neurones are 
strengthened every time they are used with indifferent or 
pleasurable results and weakened every time they are 
used with resulting discomfort. 

This law includes the action of two factors, frequency 
and pleasurable result. It might be stated in a com- 
pound form as follows, (i) The line of least resistance 
is, other things being equal, that resulting in the greatest 
satisfaction to the animal; and (2) the line of least resist- 
ance is, other things being equal, that oftenest traversed 
by the nervous impulse. We may call (1) the Law of 
Effect, and (2) the Law of Habit. 

The line of least resistance will also, other things 
being equal, be that most recently traversed. Suppose 
a neurone group, A, to have made connection ten times 
with neurone group B and ten times with neurone group 
C with equally pleasurable results ; suppose the stimulus 
to have been transmitted from A to B ten years ago and 
from A to C during the past week. All that we know of 
living matter teaches us to expect that time will weaken 
the effect of any influence upon it. The strongest con- 
nection will then be from neurone group A to neurone 
group C. We may call this law the Law of Recency. 

The line of least resistance will also be that which has 
been traversed by strong stimuli rather than weak, or by 
stimuli acting for a long time rather than by stimuli acting 
for a short time. Just as a large flow of water will cut 



The Action of the Nervous System 167 

a deeper channel than a small flow, or a flow lasting an 
hour a deeper channel than a flow lasting but a minute ; 
so energetic or continued nervous transmission in a cer- 
tain direction will make future transmission in that direc- 
tion the more likely. We may call these the laws of 
Intensity and Duration. 1 

The line of least resistance will also be toward the 
most easily arousable, most sensitive neurone group, the 
group most ready to act. 

All these different laws may be combined in the fol- 
lowing general Lazv of Acquired Brain Connections or 
Law of Association: When any neurone group, A, is 
stimulated, the nervous impulse will be transmitted to the 
neurone group which is most closely connected with 
group A, which has been aroused by A most frequently, 
with most satisfaction to the individual, most recently, 
most energetically and for the longest time, and which is 
the most sensitive at the time. 

Finally a neurone group may be, and commonly is, 
tremendously complex, and the connection formed may 
be, and often is, not with a few neurones, but with a few 
neurones chiefly plus a host of others acting less vigor- 
ously. The condition of a whole system of neurones at 
any one time determines their condition later. The action 
of any neurone group depends upon the 'set' or condition 
of the total system of which the group is a part. 

The way in which a brain acts at any time is, then, 
the result of what connections it possesses as features of 
its inborn organization, plus what has happened to it in 
the past and what actions it has previously manifested. 

a There is an important exception to the laws of frequency, re- 
cency, intensity and duration. If a connection is made too often, 
too energetically and too long without rest, the neurones may be- 
come fatigued and lose the power to transmit. Neurones, however, 
apparently fatigue very slowly. 



1 68 Physiological Psychology 

From hour to hour and day to day it is becoming a new 
thing. From month to month it takes on new habits. 
Everything that is manifested as knowledge, power, self- 
control, habits of thought and action, attitudes and capaci- 
ties of mind, skill and training may be paralleled within 
by alterations which the neurones have undergone. If 
we had perfect knowledge of the entire history of a man's 
brain, if we could from second to second see just what 
was going on in it, we should find in its actions and con- 
sequent changes the parallel of his life of thought and 
action. 

Let no one object that it is incredible that the mental 
history of a man involving millions of ideas and acts 
should be paralleled by any bodily organ. A human 
nervous system is estimated to comprise over ten thou- 
sand millions of neurones. Each of these is itself a com- 
plex organ, and is often capable of many connections. 
Since it would take ten lifetimes to merely count the 
neurones and probably the lifetimes of ten Methuselahs 
to count their connections, it is evident that the brain 
is complicated enough to register the richest and most 
active human experience. 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, VIII., IX. 
Stout, Manual, 34-46. 

Angell, Psychology, II. 

B. Ebbinghaus, Grundsiige, §§ 7-1 1. 
James, Principles, II., III. 

Wnndt, Physiologische Psychologic, IT. -VI., or Princv 

pies of Physiological Psychology, II. -VI. 
Barker, L. F., The Nervous System. 



CHAPTER XI 
The Nervous System and Mental States 

§ 28. In General 

Brain Action Without Consciousness. — Not all the 

happenings in all the neurones are accompanied by men- 
tal states. Stnmuli are incessantly coming in from the 
body which need not be felt ; e.g., many stimuli from the 
lungs or digestive tract in waking hours; many stimuli 
from all quarters during sleep; many stimuli of slight 
amount. Stimuli are incessantly going out to the muscles 
which some psychologists think are never felt and which 
certainly in many cases and at many times are not; e.g., 
the stimuli which regulate the nourishment of parts of the 
body and control the reflexes such as winking or the con- 
traction of the pupil of the eye. 

Brain Action With Consciousness. — What sort of 
action in the neurones is accompanied by consciousness 
and even whether there is any special sort that is, science 
has not yet discovered. Which neurones are concerned 
in the conscious life is known only imperfectly. Appar- 
ently in man those in certain parts of the cortex are and 
those in the sensory and motor nerves, spinal cord, 
medulla, cerebellum and base of the brain are not. It is 
thought by many that consciousness appears only when 
the nervous system is undergoing modification, — becom- 
ing adjusted to some new condition. 

The action in the nervous system which is connected 

12 169 



170 Physiological Psychology 

with any mental state is called the physiological or neural 
or nervous basis or correlate of that mental state. 

Although it is easy to prove that mental life in general 
is connected with the activity of nerve-cells it is hard to 
ascertain what is the particular physiological basis of 
each special variety of mental state. For instance, just 
what happens in the nervous system when one feels bored 
or thinks 'nevertheless,' no one could say. So also what 
difference there is between the neural correlate of the 
mental image of a dog and the neural correlate of a gen- 
eral notion of a dog is a matter for hypothesis, not for 
proof. 

There are undoubtedly differences in the activities of 
the nervous system corresponding to the differences 
between feelings. For sensations there is brain action A, 
for percepts, brain action B, for images, brain action C, 
for emotions, brain action D, and so on through the list. 
With the advance of knowledge these correspondences 
will become better and better known. In some cases 
there is already enough evidence to warrant a working 
belief. In others there are more or less interesting 
hypotheses. These beliefs and hypotheses are stated 
briefly in § 29. 

§ 29. The Physiological Correlates of Particular Groups 
of Mental States 

Of Sensations. — The physiological basis of a sen- 
sation is action of certain neurones stimulated at the 
time by sensory neurones. The locality in the brain of 
the neurones concerned in many special kinds of sensa- 
tions, e.g., sounds, is known. In Figs. 57 and 58 were 
shown the localities in the brain where the neurones con- 
cerned with certain sensations are found. It is not 



The Nervous System and Mental States 



171 



action of sensory neurones themselves, of the cells mak- 
ing up the afferent nerves, that parallels sensations. It 
is apparently only when the afferent cells have stimulated 
other cells than themselves, cells in the cortex of the 
brain, that any sensation is felt. 

Of Percepts. — The physiological basis of a percept 
is the same except that modifications of the action of the 
neurone group due to previous experiences play a larger 
part. It is apparently when the actions of neurones 
stimulated by sensory neurones result together in some 
unitary muscular response that we feel, not a confusion 
of sensations, but a definite 'thing.' 

Of Illusions and Hallucinations.-^The physiological 
basis of an illusion is the same as for the corresponding 
percept except that the sensory neurones that give the 
stimulus are not those which commonly do. The physio- 
logical basis of an hallucination is the same as for the 




N P F B 



Fig. 61. Let N P F B be the neural process corresponding to the feel- 
ing of the sound of a bell. Let S B be the action in sensory neurones 
which usually arouses the neural process corresponding to the feeling 
of the sound of a bell. Let S H be the action in sensory neurones 
which usually arouses the neural process corresponding to the feeling of 
the sound of a hammer on an anvil. Let I I be the neural process cor- 
responding to the feeling of certain ideas and images. When S B 
arouses N P F B, the mental state corresponding is called perception. 
When S H arouses N P F B, the mental state corresponding is 
called illusion. When I I arouses N P F B, the mental state corres- 
ponding is called hallucination. 



172 Physiological Psychology 

corresponding percept except that the cells are aroused 
to action without any stimulus from sensory cells. Fig. 
61 illustrates the different neural processes which parallel 
respectively the percept, illusion and hallucination of an 
object. 

Of the Emotions. — With respect to the coarser or 
bodily emotions such as jealousy, rage or fear, the best 
working hypothesis is the theory 1 that their physiological 
basis is, like that of sensations, the action of neurones 
stimulated at the time by afferent neurones. In the case 
of the emotions, however, these afferent neurones come, 
not from eyes or nose or ears, but from the lungs, heart, 
blood vessels and other internal organs. 

That is, just as when, light rays having excited the 
peripheral ends of the visual sensory neurones, the excita- 
tion is transmitted to the sensory neurones concerned in 
vision, sensations of color and brightness are felt ; so 
when the excitation caused in the peripheral ends of the 
sensory neurones in the internal organs of the body by 
palpitating heart, tense muscles, the contraction of the 
small arteries of the skin, etc., is transmitted to the neu- 
rones in the cortex, fear is felt. The bodily disturbances 
which are commonly called the expression of the emo- 
tional feeling would then be really its cause. The tre- 
mendous equipment of sensory neurone endings in the 
inner parts of the body appears to be not so much for the 
sake of the few sensations such as hunger, thirst, nausea, 
pains and the like which are recognized as dependent upon 
afferent neurones from inside the body, as for the sake of 
the rich life of passion, jealousy, fear, anger, grief, joy 
and the like. 

1 The James-Lange theory of the emotions, named after the two 
psychologists, William James and C. Lange, who announced the 
theory independently at about the same time. 



The Nervous System and Mental States 



173 



According to the other theory of the emotions, the 
physiological basis of the emotions would be the action 
of associative neurones aroused by the neurones the action 
of which parallels percepts and ideas. By this theory 
the order of events is ( 1 ) some sensation, percept or idea, 
(2) some emotion resulting from it, (3) disturbances of 
bodily organs resulting from the emotion. The behavior 
of a child frightened by, say, a horse would be described 
by the two theories as follows : — 



Older Theory 
Percept of horse running. 
Feeling of fear. 

Acts of altered heart beat, 
pallor, trembling, etc. 



James-Lange Theory 
Percept of horse running. 
Acts of altered heart beat, 

pallor, trembling, etc. 

Feeling of fear. 



The two theories might be stated in terms of 
neurone action as follows : — 



Older Theory 
Sense organs stimulated. 
Afferent neurones. 
Central neurones concerned 

with percepts. 
Central neurones connected 

therewith (giving the 

emotion). 
Motor neurones. 

Bodily disturbances in heart, 
lungs, etc. 



James-Lange Theory 
Same 
Same. 
Same. 

Motor neurones. 

Bodily disturbances in 
heart, lungs, etc. 

Afferent neurones coming 
from heart, lungs, etc. 

Central neurones con- 
nected with these (giv- 
ing the emotion). 



It is a matter of dispute how far other than the coarser 
of emotions follow the James-Lange theory. It appears 



174 Physiological Psychology 

probable that the bulk of our emotional life is thus due 
to stimuli from the heart, lungs, vaso-motor system, 
digestive tract and other internal organs ; that in large 
measure the emotions are caused in the same way as 
sensations and percepts, — are 'peripherally initiated' 
mental states. There still might be and probably are 
not only such sensory emotions but also imaged emo- 
tions, 'centrally initiated.' Their neural correlates would 
correspond to those for images of things, to be described 
on the next page. 

Of Effort. — The physiological basis for the feeling 
of strain or effort, as in voluntary attention, also cor- 
responds probably to- that for sensations, being action 
of certain neurones stimulated at the time by sensory 
neurones with peripheral ends in or on the muscles, joints 
and tendons. 

Of External Relationships. — Feelings of external 
relationships, such as of above, below, beyond and the like, 
may be really sensational ; e.g., the feeling of the above- 
ness of this line to the next may be simply the feeling of 
the eye's movement in looking from -one to the other. 
The neural correlate of feelings of relationship of this 
sort would be the same as of sensations. 

It may perhaps be assumed that all the feelings which 
were grouped under the heading, feelings of the first 
intention, have as their neural correlate action in neurones 
stimulated at the time by afferent neurones. 

Leaving now the field of sensations and their like, all 
statements about neural correlates of mental states must 
be regarded as hypotheses and should properly be pre- 
faced by a perhaps. 

Of Images. — The neural basis of feelings of the sec- 
ond intention is evidentlv action of cells not stimulated 



The Nervous System and Mental States 175 

at the time by sensory cells. Much more cannot be said 
except as guess work. The physiological basis of an 
image is perhaps action similar to that in the correspond- 
ing percept but weaker, or (and to the author's mind far 
more probably) the action of only a portion of the cells 
involved in the corresponding percept, the cells asso- 
ciated in the action being different in the two cases. In 
actual perception the brain action giving, say, the mere 
sight of the thing would be accompanied by brain action 
corresponding to the thing being in a certain place, being 
touched as well as seen, being felt as possessed of ten- 
dencies to be or do this or that. The neural correlate 
of a percept, say of a dog, would thus be a complex total. 
The mental image of the dog might well have as its neural 
correlate a weakened revival and of only a part of this 
total. 

Still more hypothetical are all notions about the neural 
correlates of feelings of the third intention. 

Of General Notions. — The physiological basis of a 
general notion is perhaps the neural correlate of some 
percept or image or sensation, commonly of a word, plus 
the half-aroused activities of the numerous associated sets 
of cells, each set of which would, if fully active, give the 
feeling of one of the particular things included in the 
class meant by the word. For instance, the concept 'a 
dog' would have as its physiological basis the cell action 
going with the image of the word 'dog' plus the half- 
aroused action of the cells which if fully active would 
give images of different particular dogs. 

Of Individual Notions. — The physiological basis of 
an individual notion is probably the neural correlate of 
some percept or image or sensation, commonly of a word, 
plus action in other cells which would, if allowed to dis- 



176 Physiological Psychology 

charge on into their associated cells, lead to the image or 
percept of the thing or person referred to by the individual 
notion. Thus the thought of 'Napoleon' may have as its 
physiological basis the cell action going with the word 
'Napoleon' plus the half-aroused action of the cells which 
if fully 'active would give images of Napoleon or of his 
various acts and characteristics. 

Of Feelings of Relationships. — Feelings of logical 
relationships may have as their basis the states of transi- 
tion in the brain from the activity of one set of neurones 
to that of others. For instance, the feeling of unlikeness 
may have as its parallel the simultaneous waning of one 
brain process and the waxing of one different. Some 
feelings of relationship may be semi-emotional feelings, 
and due to the same type of neural action as parallels emo- 
tions. Thus the feeling of the relation of cause and 
effect may be a feeling of justified expectancy. 

Other hypotheses about the neural basis of mental 
states are that the greater or less intensity of a mental 
state is due to a greater or less violence of the conducted 
stimulus ; that the personal feeling which characterizes 
mental states is related to the constantly acting cells 
stimulated by ever present bodily conditions ; that the 
broad qualities of mental life which we call temperament 
or disposition are related to cell action due to the con- 
dition of the blood. About the physiological activities 
which go with feelings of time, belief, desire, choice and 
many other types of feelings, so little is known or even 
guessed that it is unwise to note the speculations about 
them. x ' 

Of Mental Connections. — The physiological basis of 
the connections between ideas, acts, and ideas and acts is 
much clearer than the physiological basis of the varieties 



The Nervous System and Mental States 1JJ 

of ideas. These connections are throughout based on the 
connections between neurone and neurone in the nervous 
system, the existence of paths of easy conduction for the 
nervous stimulus. 

Reflexes and instincts are the manifestations in con- 
duct of connections between neurones due to the natural 
organization of the human body. Acquired habits of 
thought and conduct represent the connections between 
neurones by which the nervous system has adapted itself 
to the individual's needs. When in Part III the growth' 
of mental life and the laws of its action are described, 
the dependence of the connections between the parts of 
a human life of thought and action upon the connections 
between parts of the nervous system will be seen every- 
where to be a natural, almost the inevitable, conclusion. 

Exercises 

Experience 13. The Influence of .the Absence of Neurone 
Endings in a Portion of a Sensitive Surface. The neurones com- 
posing the optic nerve form a compact bundle of fibres where they 
enter the retina. Where this bundle enters there are no rods or 
cones or bi-polar neurones, nothing in fact to be stimulated by- 
light. 

Close or cover the left eye. Look with the right eye steadily 
at the cross in Fig. 62. When the book is about seven inches from 




Fig. 62. 

the eye the circle will not be seen at all. It is essential that the 
eye be kept fixed steadily on the cross. The reason for the 
non-appearance of the circle is that at that distance the image of 
the circle on the retina falls on the spot where the optic nerve 
enters. Move the book slowly to a greater distance, fixating the 
cross as before. Soon the circle will reappear and the square dis- 



i 7 8 



Physiological Psychology 



+ 




fie. 63. 






• • • • 

• » • • ' 



• •••• ••« 



#*• » • • •*•*• • 



» ♦ * • * 

• • • • • 



+ 



m. 

'• • o * • 



• • • • % » • 

. - .\v.v 



Re. 64. 



+ 



After some time, I came thither dressed in 
my new habit, and now I was called governor 
again. Being all met, and the captain with 
me, I caused tho men to be brought before 
me, and I told them I had had a full account 
of their villainous behaviour to the captain, 
and how they had run away with the ship, 
and were preparing *• commit further rob- 
beries; but that ice had ensnared 
them in their ow d that they were 
fallen into the pi fey had digged for 
others. I let thei^ ,, that by my direc- 
tion the ship had been seized that she lay' 
now in the road and they might see by and 
bye that their new captain had received the 
reward of his villainy; for that they might 
see him hanging at the yard-arm. That as to 
them, I wanted to know what they had to . 
say, why I should not execute them as pirates 
taken in the fact, as by my commission they 
could not doubt I had authority to do. One- 



Etff 



The Nervous System and Mental States 179 

appear. Why? How may the figure be used to demonstrate the 
existence of the similar 'blind spot' in the left eye? 

From this experiment it would appear that every field of view 
seen by a single eye should have an unseen spot or patch. 



+ 



Fig. 66. 

Perform a similar experiment with Figs. 63, 64, 65, 66 and 67. 
When the circle falls on the blind spot, what takes its place in each 
case? State the rule which seems to hold concerning what hap- 
pens (in the case of vision) in the absence of neurone endings 
in a portion of a sensory surface. 



+ 




Fig. 67. 

Sensations from Bilaterally Symmetrical Sensitive Surfaces. 

Experiment 14. If you touch the desk simultaneously with 
the right and left forefingers, you feel two touches, but if you 



180 Physiological Psychology 

hear a bell with both ears or see a star with both eyes you ordi- 
narily feel but one sound or star. Recall and perform the experi- 
ment familiar to childhood by which the eyes are made to see 
double. 

In binocular vision each retina is separately stimulated, but 
the result in sensation may be (i) two corresponding sights, or 
only one sight due (2) to the joint action of the two stimuli 
or (3) to the failure of one of them to influence sensation, or (4) 
three sights, one due to joint action and two to the separate ac- 
tions. Experiment 14 shows a case of (1). Cases of (2) and 
(3) occur of course in ordinary life (cases of 2 occurring dur- 
ing every moment's vision), but they may be seen most clearly 
by simple experiments. These experiments involve the power 
to observe near objects while holding the eyes as one would to 
look at a distant object, and so may require a little practice. 

Experiment 15. Holding the book upright before the eyes 
at a distance of about 12 inches, look at the drawings of Fig. 68 
as you would to look through it at an object in the distance. 
That is, fixate for a point in the distance, so that the left eye 
looks at the left hand pair of circles and the right eye at the 
right hand pair. If this is done the two figures will appear to 
move toward each other and occupy the same space. If the eyes 
are kept as if fixed on a distant object, the single figure result- 
ing from the two drawings can be kept in place for examination. 
Neglect the two hazy figures seen one on each side of it. What 
does it appear to be? What new feature not present in either 
of the two figures appears ? Do likewise with Fig. 69. Fill out 
with appropriate words the blanks in the following statement : — 
In certain cases when one retina receives one impression and 

the other another impression, the resulting percept is of , 

and possesses the quality of 

Perform the same experiment with Fig. 70. What is the re- 
sulting single percept? Do the bars of the cage hide part of the 
bird or does it hide part of the cage? Does it seem inside or 
outside or' against the front of the cage? 

Experiment 16. Combine the two halves of Fig. 71 by fix- 
ating for a point in the distance as in Experiment 15. What is 
the resulting picture? Hold it steadily for some moments. 
What happens? 

Do likewise with the two drawings of Fig. 72. 

Do likewise with the two drawings of Fig. 73. 



The Nervous System and Mental States 181 





Fig. 68. 




Fig. 69. 



\~7 





Fig. 70. 



1 82 



Physiological Psychology 




^T7 



Fig. 71. 



rj 



Fig. 72. 






Fig 73- 




The Nervous System and Mental States 183 

What is the chief difference between the resulting percepts in 
Experiment 15 and those in Experiment 16? What are some 
other differences? What difference between the pairs of objects 
of Figs. 68-70 and the pairs of objects of Figs. 71-73 seems to ac- 
count for the difference in the resulting percepts? Fill out with 
appropriate words the blanks in the following statement : Two 
differing retinal impressions will result in a single and constant 
percept if they are the impressions which would ordinarily be 

caused by , or are such impressions. They will 

result in if they are impressions which could not be 

caused by 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, II. (9-12), III. (28-40), IV. (47- 

53), V. (60-67), XIII. (228-234), XIX. (310-311), 
XX. (329-330) XXIV. (375-384). 
Angell, Psychology, III. ; see also pp. 93-101, 137, 190-192, 
215I, 272L, 316-319. 

B. James, Principles, XL (434-447), XVI. (653-658), XVII. 

(68-75), XIX. (103-106), XX. (449-474-) 



PART III 

DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY 

§ 30. Introduction 

The previous chapters have described the different 
varieties of mental states, the service performed by each 
in the conduct of life, and the physiological facts with 
which they are connected. Equally important — for 
practical purposes more so — is knowledge of the mind 
in action, knowledge, that is, of the facts and laws which 
determine what any human being will think and feel and 
do, how he will learn, why he will misunderstand, when 
he will be interested, what habits he will form, to what 
sort of intellect and character he will attain. The science 
of the mind in action is called Dynamic Psychology. 1 

If we ask how the baby comes to feel pleasure at pull- 
ing and overturning a toy, why we shut our eyes when an 
object approaches them, or why we feci the sun to be 
brighter than the moon, common experience readily an- 
swers that we are by nature provided with these and 
other tendencies to think, feel and act in certain ways, — 
that apart from any training the mind of its own accord 
or, to use a more technical word, instinctively behaves in 
certain ways under certain conditions. 

For very many of the mind's connections we need no 
other immediate explanation than that human beings are 
by nature so organized as to manifest under certain cir- 

1 By some writers it is called functional psychology. 
184 



Introduction 185 

cumstances certain thoughts, feelings and acts. Just as 
human beings by nature possess arms and hands, so they 
possess nervous systems that lead them to reach for 
objects that lie within their view and to grasp the objects 
touched. Just as they are given by nature lips and 
tongues, so also they are given the feelings of sweetness 
and of pleasure thereat. Just as infants are given by 
nature muscles that turn the head and eyes, so they are 
given by nature a connection between seeing a light and 
turning the head and eyes toward it. 

The capacity for becoming a great musician or a 
great orator or a great mathematician is to a large extent 
born in a man as a part of his original make-up. For all 
of the powers of sense, intellect and character there are 
certainly foundations in human nature apart from the 
training which life gives. Such features of our original 
make-up are due to the same causes as unlearned re- 
actions. 

The basis of a mind's action, — the starting point of 
the life of intellect, feeling and conduct, — is thus its 
equipment of instincts and capacities, its native or un- 
learned tendencies. 

These correspond to qualities inherent in the nervous 
system, to characteristics of and connections between the 
neurones which are provided by nature. The brain is so 
constructed at birth and so grows by the inner impulse of 
development as to make stimulation of the neurones end- 
ing in the retina of the eye arouse sensations of light and 
color, to make the afferent nerve cells stimulated by the 
sight of a light connect with the motor cells that cause 
movements of the head and eyes toward the light. That 
we have, apart from training, a vast number of tendencies 
to feel and to act in certain ways in response to certain 
situations, corresponds to the fact that by the inner 

13 



1 86 Dynamic Psychology 

impulse of growth the brain is so made as to connect 
certain afferent neurones with certain associative and 
efferent neurones. That we have, apart from training, 
an equipment of capacities or possibilities of thought and 
action, corresponds to the fact that the brain is by nature 
fitted to do certain work. 

Although much of human life finds its explanation in 
unlearned tendencies, — in the mental constitution pro- 
vided by nature, — still more must be attributed to learn- 
ing, experience, training. What is born in us soon 
becomes outweighed by what happens to us. The brain, 
the basis of mental life, is primarily an organ to be modi- 
fied; the connections between its neurones are constantly 
being added to and substracted from; it is literally never 
the same at any two moments of life. The mind similarly 
is constantly adding and losing habits, increasing this and 
decreasing that capacity, changing with every influence 
that plays upon it. If we ask how the baby comes to feel 
pleasure at the sight of its mother, why we shut our eyes 
when told to do so or why we feel $30.00 to be more 
than 30 cents, the answer must be sought in the facts of 
the modification of connections by experience, — in the 
laws of mental acquisition. 

The two great divisions of dynamic psychology will 
thus treat of: (1) The power of nature, manifested in 
instincts and capacities. (2) The power of nurture, 
manifested in habits and acquired powers. 



CHAPTER XII 

Original Tendencies to Connections 
§ 31. Instincts 

The Law of Instinct. — Instincts have been defined 
as all connections or tendencies to connections which are 
unlearned, — are in us apart from training or experience. 
The inborn constitution of a human being provides con- 
nections between certain situations and the responses 
made to them. The line of least resistance in any case 
will then, apart from training, be toward that response 
connected by nature with the situation. This fact may 
be called the law of instinct or the law of original con- 
nections. It may be stated as follows : In any situation 
that mental state or act will, other things being equal, 
take place which is by original nature most closely con- 
nected with the situation; or, the likelihood that any 
mental state or act will occur is, other things being equal, 
proportional to the closeness of its instinctive connection 
with the situation in question. 

The Attributes of Instincts. — That an instinctive 
pendency is born in a human being as a result of the 
structure of his nervous system need not mean that it is 
present at birth. Creeping, standing erect and laughing 
are surely instinctive, but appear only after months of 
life. The new feelings and desires which characterize 
the change from childhood to adult life in the years from 
thirteen to sixteen are as truly instinctive as the infant's 

187 



1 88 Dynamic Psychology 

fears. The date of appearance of each instinct is a 
separate problem. 

It is also an error to suppose that instinctive acts or 
feelings always jump suddenly into being, that what we 
do not learn we get in a flash as an instantaneous inspira- 
tion from nature. On the contrary, the common fact is 
a gradual growth. So, for instance, with the fear of 
strangers in young infants or the tendency to personal 
display with boys from fourteen to eighteen. There are 
all degrees of gradualness in the maturing of instincts. 

Again, that a tendency is due to inborn nervous make- 
up need not mean that it will remain all through life. On 
the contrary, all instincts tend to die out if not given 
exercise, and may be killed off, — or, to use the technical 
term) inhibited, — when circumstances are so arranged 
that their manifestation leads to discomfort. Thus chicks 
brought up in isolation from the parent hen do not show, 
after ten or twelve days, the tendency to follow her; and 
children are taught by punishment to abandon their 
original tendency to grab every new and attractive 
object which they see. If an instinct does not accord 
with our notions of desirable behavior, we may and do get 
rid of it. If it is advantageous, we must take pains to 
provide the conditions to call it into use and to allow its 
action to result in pleasure. Instincts are a fund of capi- 
tal loaned to us by nature for a period, not given outright. 
Only on the condition that they are used and bring satis- 
faction do they become our permanent property. 

They become our permanent property by being hard- 
ened into habits. It is a general law of mind that any act 
or thought or feeling which in a given set of circum- 
stances results in satisfaction, comfort or at least 
indifferently, is, if those circumstances recur, more likely 
to appear than in the first instance ; and so on increasingly 



Original Connections 189 

with more repetitions. The transitory instinct thus may 
become a permanent habit. The child who instinctively 
says baba or mama in its mother's presence and is re- 
warded by parental attention and petting, forms the habit 
of calling her by that name. The chick, in the ordinary 
course of events, follows the hen for a few days because 
of instinct, but from the second time on the force of habit 
combines with that of inner nature ; so that by the eighth 
or tenth day, when the instinct, if left to itself, would 
have vanished, the chick continues the now habitual act. 

It is common in books of natural history to give, as 
illustrations of instincts, extreme cases, : — such as the 
building of the honeycomb by bees or the spinning of the 
web of the spider, — where the action is definite and uni- 
form and highly specialized. But the majority of in- 
stincts are vague, variable and rough-hewn. The chick 
instinctively feeds itself by pecking at, picking up and 
swallowing small objects; but so far as the instinct goes, 
all sorts of small objects fit and unfit, — tacks, yarn, and 
match heads as well as seeds and bugs, — are pecked at. 
Experience, not instinct, decides the particular feeding- 
habits into which the vague instinct shall eventually grow. 

This indefiniteness and lack of precise adaptation to 
any one particular situation is important because it allows 
the instinctive tendency to produce, not some one single 
habitual act, a replica of itself, but a number of different 
habits, each fitted to some special set of situations. 
Thus the vague, instinctive tendency of kittens when con- 
fined in boxes to squeeze, claw, bite and pull, gave rise to 
the habits of pulling a loop in one box, turning a button 
in another, pulling a lever in another, etc. Thus the 
general instinctive tendency of babies to take and pull 
and twist and turn and drop and poke all things grows 



190 Dynamic Psychology 

into the multitude of habits of using toys and common 
household objects. 

Akin to the naturalist's error of neglecting vague and 
variable instincts is the psychologist's error of neglecting 
general tendencies. The tendency of children to do all 
sorts of things to objects, — e. g., to pull, turn, drop, pick 
up, roll, put in the mouth, bite, pull out and rub a new toy, 
— is as truly due to inborn make-up as are their tendencies 
to sneeze, laugh or creep. The instincts of the most im- 
portance to mental growth and education are those 
general tendencies to react in certain ways to large classes 
of experiences which we call curiosity, emulation and 
physical play. 

Instincts, then, may be delayed, gradual in appearing, 
and transitory; they are modifiable, hardening into habits 
or becoming abolished by disuse or inhibition; they are 
often indefinite and general. 

Human Instincts. — Too little is known about the 
extent to which human behavior is based upon instincts 
to allow their enumeration. But even with our present 
lack of knowledge the list of demonstrated instincts is a 
long one. It takes Professor James thirty-seven pages 
to list and describe them. Probably the list will grow 
with further study, since many actions which common 
sense credits to acquisition are really the gift of nature. 
E. g., standing alone, walking and retrieving (getting an 
object and bringing it back) appear in babies who are 
given no incitement or assistance. The manifestations 
of grief, — puckering the lips, drawing down the face and 
a prolonged wail, — appear in babies at the stimulus of 
harsh speech or ugly looks, although such speech or looks 
have never been followed by any unpleasant consequence. 
The more carefully mental development is investigated, 



Original Connections 191 

the more we find human life everywhere rooted in in- 
stincts. 

Especially noteworthy in human instinctive equipment 
is the tendency which I shall call multiple reaction to a 
single stimulus. The reason for this name will appear 
from the following illustrations : The baby confronted 
by a small novel object, not only reaches and takes it; 
he also, as has already been noted, puts it in his mouth, 
takes it out, turns it over, drops it, picks it up, rolls it 
around, rubs it against his nose, looks at it in one way, 
then in another, holds it up, holds it down, and so on. 
Again the baby makes not a few distinct cries as does the 
dog or cat, but a rich variety of prattle, containing all 
sorts of combinations of sounds. By means of these 
multiple reactions to single stimulLthe field of experimen- 
tation with things is far greater in man than in any other 
animal. Man, who does so many things to so many 
things, has the opportunity to develop a far wider range 
of habits. Out of the fumbling and prattle of the baby 
grow the play and speech of the child, and later the work 
and invention and thought of the man. 

§ 32. Capacities 

The Attributes of Capacities. — All the character- 
istics of instincts summarized in § 31 belong to the 
subtler possibilities of mental life which are called 
capacities. For instance, the capacity for managing men 
is delayed in comparison with that for acting or literary 
production. Apparently the capacity for seeing blue 
develops later than that for seeing other colors. Capaci- 
ties of motor control and of sense perception have been 
proved to mature gradually. It is a common and likely 
belief that the capacity for rote-memorizing is transitory, 



192 Dynamic Psychology 

weakening somewhat in spite of the tremendous amount 
of training which it receives. The capacity to adopt new 
points of view seems to be very often lost by the age of 
twenty-five. When their exercise is attended by pleasant 
results, capacities harden into actual powers, just as 
instincts harden into habits. The child with musical 
capacity, wisely trained, thus becomes capable of actual 
achievement in music. But disuse will as surely destroy 
the capacity, and the fact of a capacity positively stamped 
out by unpleasant results is one of the commonest facts 
in human life. Many men would have been great generals 
had there been wars enough. Most men could have 
been first-rate bullies and vagabonds, most women could 
have been first-rate coquettes, had not the capacities been 
stifled from childhood 

It is fortunately true that useful capacities are not 
likely to be inhibited even when home and school offer 
them little encouragement. For the capacity itself begets 
interest, and mere achievement is often its sufficient 
reward. Sooner or later the boy or girl who has a 
capacity which the world needs will probably transform 
it into actual power and achievement. It is risky to 
console oneself for lack of success by the claim that one 
had as much capacity as anyone else but was not en- 
couraged. There are, however, some sad cases of noble 
capacities starved and beaten to death. 

The Specialization of Capacities. — Like instincts, 
capacities are often indefinite and generalized. Men are 
not born with the capacity to learn English or German, 
but to learn a language. Common belief, and many 
psychologists, however, make here an error just the 
reverse of that made concerning the same feature of 
instincts. In the latter case they overestimate the definite- 
ness and specialization of inborn nature; in the case of 



Original Connections 193 

capacities they overestimate the indefiniteness and gen- 
eralization. These instincts of possibility are much more 
specialized than we commonly think or than the older 
books on psychology acknowledge. One may have the 
capacity to appreciate music without the capacity to 
appreciate other forms of art ; one may be a most expert 
calculator with numerical problems and nearly an idiot 
in other fields of knowledge; a most gifted reasoner in 
mathematics was easily deceived by a spiritualist's tricks ; 
the hardest-headed men of business are often silly in their 
superstitions; a most gifted and inventive scholar may 
be hopelessly stupid about the simplest bit of machinery. 

§ 33. Further Attributes of Original Tendencies 

Individual Differences in Inborn Nature. — Nature 
does not provide each human being with the same capital 
of instincts and capacities. Men are no more created 
alike in their mental constitutions than they are treated 
alike by their surroundings. Any instinct is possessed 
by different individuals in different degrees of strength. 
One is gentle, one harsh, one cruel, one a Nero. One 
strikes back only when teased for an hour, another at the 
least offense. Indeed there is probably no instinct which 
is not entirely lacking in some individuals. Even that 
one which is the first necessity for living, the suckling 
instinct, does not always appear. So also any capacity 
is possessed by different individuals in different degrees 
of strength, the variation here being even greater than in 
the case of instincts. Some men are born to be intel- 
lectual giants, some to be idiots. This is universally 
recognized only in such obvious cases as the capacities 
for music and poetry, but it is equally true of the capacity 
to add or to multiply, to read or to spell, to succeed in 
science or in affairs. Wherever measurements have been 



194 Dynamic Psychology 

made of mental capacities, individual differences are the 
rule. In the keenness of the senses, in the quickness and 
accuracy of perception, in the vividness of imagery, in the 
permanence of memories, in the appreciation of relations, 
— everywhere men are by nature different. It is true that 
when thought of in comparison with other animals, men 
seem closely alike, — that amongst all men there is a gen- 
eral family resemblance. The differences amongst men 
seem small in comparison with the much greater differ- 
ence between men and animals. But they exist, and in 
sufficient amount to explain a great part of the differences 
in human achievements. 

The original mental equipment of any human in- 
dividual is thus to be regarded as the result of two fac- 
tors ; ( I ) a fund of instincts and capacities which he has 
in common with other members of the human species, 
and which belongs to him as one of that species, and 
(2) an additional fund which belongs to him alone as an 
individual. It is most convenient to regard as the com- 
mon fund, that which the ordinary, average, common 
man possesses and to regard any individual's special share 
as being either plus or minus. The common fund is then, 
not that possessed by all, but that possessed by the gen- 
eral type of the species. From this type an individual 
may deviate in either direction. 

The Source of Original Nature. — So far the inborn 
equipment of instincts and capacities has been attributed 
to the constitution of the nervous system as determined 
by nature. We have now to ask what laws of nature 
control its distribution. These are the lazv of heredity 
and its supplement, the lazv of variation. 

The mental constitution given by nature to any man is 
that of his ancestors plus many or few of the variations 
which occur in all living things. The special share 



Original Connections 195 

characteristic of any individual, — his deviation from the 
general type of the species, — is his inheritance from his 
immediate ancestry; the common fund is his inheritance 
from his remote ancestry, the human race as a whole. 

Much of this common fund dates its origin farther 
back than the human species. Just as the human back- 
bone can be traced back to the notochord of Amphioxus, 
or the human kidney to the pronephros of the fishes, so 
many instincts and capacities can be traced back to our 
animal forebears. ( Scratching the head in perplexity is 
as old as the monkeys ; creeping has a still more remote 
origin; the capacity to modify instincts into habits is an 
inheritance fully as old as the backbone. We are by 
nature a part of a species thousands of years old, — a part, 
too, of the animal kingdom as a whole. In mind as in 
body, man bears the marks of his long ascent. 

The special characteristics of an individual are partly 
due to normal variation and partly to the characteristics 
of his immediate ancestors. The second factor is by far 
the greater. Measurements of the resemblance of par- 
ents to offspring and of brother to brother prove that, in 
the same way and for the same reason that tall parents 
have tall children or dark-haired parents dark-haired 
children, so also stupid parents have stupid children, hot- 
tempered parents have hot-tempered children, and musical 
parents, musical children. 

Original mental make-up is thus determined by 
heredity, slightly supplemented by chance variation. 
To it prehuman species contribute ; the thousands of gen- 
erations of savage and prehistoric man add their shares; 
its special features in any individual are the bequests of 
his nearer ancestry. On this foundation of original 
make-up, nurture builds. The bequests of heredity are 
invested and made productive by the environment. In- 



196 Dynamic Psychology 

stincts and capacities are modified and transformed by 
experience. The study of the laws by which this modi- 
fication takes place will occupy us in the next six chapters. 
The Control of Original Tendencies. — Although 
instincts and capacities are, in and of themselves, removed 
from human control, their later modifications are not. 
They are a fund of capital given by nature which may be 
invested in all sorts of ways. We make the most of 
nature's gifts by (1) encouraging the useful instincts 
and capacities, (2) inhibiting the harmful ones, and (3) 
by so arranging life's work as to have natural tendencies 
assist rather than oppose it. 

(1) Useful instincts and capacities are encouraged: 

(a) by being given exercise as soon as they appear and 
frequently enough to result in the formation of habits 
before the instinct wanes, and (b) by making their con- 
sequences pleasurable. 

(2) Harmful instincts and capacities are weakened 
or inhibited : (a) by depriving them of exercise, by not 
allowing the situations which would evoke them to appear, 

(b) by forming, before the tendency is fixed, the habit 
of meeting the situation in some other way, and (c) by 
making their consequences intolerable. 

(3) No general answer can be given to the question 
suggested by (3), but one or two illustrations will show 
the gain to be everywhere expected from recognition of 
and allowance for natural tendencies. A man wanted a 
pile of rocks removed. He taught his boys to play that 
there was a fire in a hole some distance away and that the 
rocks were pails of water and they the firemen. In a few 
days not a rock was left. At a city playground the older 
boys bullied and teased the younger ones. The sagacious 
director picked out several leaders from among the older 
boys and appointed them policemen to enforce fairness 



Original Connections 197 

and to protect the "little kids." The instincts of activity 
and combativeness and emulation were now turned to 
useful ends. Bullying the small boys gave way to gov- 
erning the large ones. Judge Lindsey of Denver turns 
youthful offenders into arms of the law by directing the 
instinctive love of excitement into the channel of detective 
work against men selling liquor to minors. 

The individual differences in inborn original nature 
may be prevented from waste and made to do service by 
specialization in the home, in school, in business — in fact 
everywhere. Since men are different, they are adapted 
to different careers in life. By finding out their individual 
constitutions and directing their energies in appropriate 
channels, we may make them happier and more useful, 
may preserve them from unmeaning instruction and 
profitless tasks and incite them to service which they can 
do better than anyone else. 

Exercises 

1. Pugnacity, climbing, walking, emulation, jealousy, biting 
the finger nails, curiosity, and manipulation or constructiveness are 
commonly quoted cases of instinctive tendencies. What are the 
situations and the responses, the connections of which constitute 
these several instincts? E. g., pugnacity means the response, 
'blow/ to the situation, 'being injured or interfered with,' and the 
response, 'enjoyment/ to the situation, 'fighting.' 

2. Of the instincts named in question 1, name one that is de- 
layed, one that is transitory, one that is common to man and the 
lower animals, one that is specially characteristic of the male 
sex, one that is most useful, one that is often the origin of crimi- 
nal acts. 

3. Give two illustrations from history or from your own ac- 
quaintance of a high degree of capacity coupled with only mod- 
erate attainments in other directions. 

4. Just how would you get rid of the tendency in a child to 
torment animals? After writing your answer read again (2) of 






198 Dynamic Psychology 

page 196 and note which methods of those mentioned there your 
plan involves. 

5. Which is rarer, the capacity to form percepts or the 
capacity to form abstract ideas? 

6. Illustrate individual differences (a) in the case of sensa- 
tion, and (b) in the case of imagery. 

7. Illustrate race heredity, i. e., the inheritance of certain 
mental qualities by a race as a whole. 

Experiment 17. Instincts of the Reflex Type. — Have a friend 
hold about half or three quarters of an inch in front of his eyes, a 
piece of glass, at least an eighth of an inch thick. Throw directly 
at his eye a bit of cork or light wood, or a small wad of paper, 
so aimed that, but for the glass, it would hit the eye and at a fair 
rate of speed. Of course he winks. 

Then inform him that you will repeat the process, and that 
since it is impossible that anything can hit his eye he is to keep it 
wide open. Throw as before. Is the eye kept open? Repeat 
nine times more, noting and recording each time the action of the 
eyelids. 

Experiment 18. The Modiiiability of Instincts. — With suffi- 
cient time the instinctive closing of the eye can be modified and 
even inhibited. The experiment may take many trials. If it is 
made, a tube like a pea-shooter, but one half inch in diameter 
and not over eight inches long, and a sufficient number of bits of 
cork about a quarter of an inch in diameter, should be provided. 
Record the action of the eyelids at each trial, and continue 
the experiment until the person can hold the eyelids unmoved 
during ten successive trials. 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, XXV. 
Titchener, Outline, §§ 35, 66-67. 
Angell, Psychology, XV., XVI. 

B. James, Principles, XXIV. 



CHAPTER XIH 

The Law of Association 

§ 34. The Growth of Instincts into Habits 

Under the influence of the outside conditions that 
form human nature, instincts and capacities grow into an 
almost countless multitude of habits of thought, feeling 
and action. \ On the basis of our many unlearned ten- 
dencies, we learn still more numerous acts and ideas. To 
original equipment is added the store of knowledge and 
skill which we acquire. How this modification and de- 
velopment of instincts and capacities into the fullness of 
mental life is brought to pass is the subject of this chapter. 

Some Concrete Cases. — A simple case of the develop- 
ment of habits from instincts will introduce us best to the 
laws that govern this process. A child eight months old 
was kept an hour or so each day in a chair beside a win- 
dow. To a cord hung from above were attached some of 
his playthings. His instinctive tendency led him to pull 
at, poke and finger these. By a specially vigorous pull 
to one side the toy would be swung against the window 
glass. This sort of a pull occurred occasionally among the 
many acts which resulted from his instinctive play. It 
noticeably attracted the child's attention and aroused the 
expression of satisfaction. As time went on he did it 
oftener and oftener until swinging the toy against the 
glass became a regular feature of his play. The vague 
instinctive pulling had given birth to a special habit. 

199 



200 Dynamic Psychology 

The particular act of pulling in a certain way had been 
selected from the many acts performed and had been 
associated more and more closely with the situation 
'being in that chair in sight of that string of toys/ The 
force which strengthened the connection between that 
particular act and the situation was not only its repetition, 
but also the resultant satisfaction, for other acts done as 
frequently at the beginning faded out and did not result 
in any new habits. This will be still clearer from two 
illustrations drawn from animal life. 




Fig. 74. 

"If we make a pen, as shown in Fig. 74, and put but a 
chick, say six days old, in at A, it is confronted by a situa- 
tion which is, briefly, 'the sense-impression or feeling of 
the confining surfaces, an uncomfortable feeling due to 
the absence of other chicks and of food, and perhaps the 
sense-impressions of the chirping of the chicks outside.' 
It reacts in this situation by running around, making loud 
sounds, and jumping at the walls. When it jumps at 
the walls, it has uncomfortable feelings of effort; when 
it runs to B, or C, or D, it has a continuation of the feel- 
ings of the situation just described; when it runs to E, it 



The Law of Association 



20 1 



gets out, feels the pleasure of being with the other chicks, 
of the taste of food, of being in its usual habitat. If from 
time to time you put it in again, you find that it jumps and 
runs to B, C, and D less and less often, until finally its 
only act is to run to D, E, and out. It has, to use techni- 
cal psychological terms, formed an association between 
the sense-impression or situation due to its presence at 
A and the act of going to E. In common language it has 
learned to go to E when put at A — has learned the way 
out. The decrease in the useless runnings and jumping 
and standing still finds a representative in the decreasing 
amount of time taken by the chick to escape. The two 
chicks that formed this particular association, for exam- 
pier, averaged one about three and the other about four 
minutes for their first five trials, but came finally to 
escape invariably within five or six seconds. 

The following schemes represent the animal's behavior 
(1) during an early trial and (2) after the association 
has been fully formed — after it has learned perfectly the 
way out.. 







(I) 






Situation 


Impulses 




Acts 


Resulting Feelings 


As described 


To chirp, etc. 


Corresponding 


Continuation of situa- 


above. 


To jump at various to 


impulses. 


tion. 




places. 






Fatigue. 




To run to B. 










" " " c. 










" " " D. 




( 


Pleasure of company. 




« » " E. 




\ 


" food. 






1 


" surround- 








( 


ings. 






(2) 






Situation 


Impulses 




Acts 


Resulting Feelings 


Same as (i). 


To run to E. 


Corresponding 
to impulse. 


Pleasurable as above. 



If we take a box twenty by fifteen by twelve inches, 
replace its cover and front side by bars an inch apart, and 
14 



202 Dynamic Psychology 

make in this front side a door arranged so as to fall open 
when a wooden button inside is turned from a vertical 
to a horizontal position, we shall have means to observe 
another simple case of learning. A kitten, three to six 
months old, if put in this box when hungry, a bit of fish 
being left outside, reacts as follows: It tries to squeeze 
through between the bars, claws at the bars and at loose 
things in and out of the box, reaches its paws out between 
the bars, and bites at its confining walls. Some one of 
all these promiscuous clawings, squeezings, and bitings 
turns round the wooden button, and the kitten gains 
freedom and food. By repeating the experience again 
and again, the animal gradually comes to omit all the 
useless clawings, etc., and to manifest only the particular 
impulse ( e. g. } to claw hard at the top of the button with 
the paw, or to push against one side of it with the nose) 
which has resulted successfully. It turns the button 
round without delay whenever put in the box. It has 
formed an association between the situation, 'confinement 
in a box of a certain appearance,' and the impulse to the 
act of clawing at a certain part of that box in a certain 
definite way. Popularly speaking, it has learned to open 
a door by turning a button. To the uninitiated observer 
the behavior of the six kittens that thus freed themselves 
from such a box would seem wonderful and quite unlike 
their ordinary accomplishments of finding their way to 
their food, beds, etc., but the reader will realize that the 
activity is of just the same sort as that displayed by the 
chick in the pen. A certain situation arouses, by virtue 
of accident, or, more often, instinctive equipment certain 
impulses and corresponding acts. One of these happens 
to be an act appropriate to secure freedom. It is stamped in 
in connection with that situation. Here the act is 'claw- 



The Law of Association 203 

ing at a certain spot' instead of 'running to E/ and is 
selected from a far greater number of useless acts." 1 

The Law of Habit-Formation. — The characteristics 
of these cases of learning are that from the instinctive 
tendencies present the one which brings satisfaction is 
selected and is associated more and more closely with the 
situation until it alone is the reaction to that situation. 
The tendencies which bring discomfort are more and 
more dissociated from that situation until they may be 
totally eliminated and never appear in response to it. 
Selection and Association best describe the process. Sat- 
isfaction best describes the motive force in it. The result 
is that a set of special habits or connections between each 
particular situation and its fitting response takes the place 
of the original vague instinct. 

Instincts are thus modified into habits in accordance 
with the law that any act which in a given situation pro- 
duces satisfaction becomes associated with that situation, 
so that when the situation recurs the act is more likely 
than before to recur also. Conversely, any act which in 
a given situation produces discomfort becomes dissociated 
from that situation, so that when the situation recurs the 
act is less likely than before to recur. 

The case is the same when the response to the situation 
is a thought or feeling instead of an act. So the law 
may be stated, any mental state or act which, etc. 

§ 35. The Formation of Connections in General 

Habits Formed From Previous Habits. — The same 
process of learning occurs when the development is not 
from mere instinctive tendencies but from these as modi- 
fied by previous training. The baby who has formed the 

1 E. L. Thorndike in the Woods Holl Biological Lectures for 
1899, PP. 70-74. 



204 Dynamic Psychology 

habit of swinging a toy against the window-pane may 
later, as an outgrowth of that habit, form the new habit 
of swinging the toy rhythmically. The process is again 
simply the selection of the rhythmical movement from 
amongst the many sorts made because of its relatively 
greater amount of resulting satisfaction. We may there- 
fore widen the statement of our law and say : — In any 
situation the thoughts, feelings and acts manifested will 
be those to which instinctive tendencies or capacities and 
also previously formed habits impel one. Of all these 
the one which succeeds best, results in the most satisfac- 
tion, will be associated with that situation. 

Some Additions to the Law of Habit Formation. — 
In some cases the results of original tendencies and pre- 
vious learning will be to furnish, not a number of acts, — 
some more, some less, some not at all fitted to the situa- 
tion, — but to arouse directly the one suitable act. For 
instance, the chicken a few days old in the presence of 
a worm does not pick at it in many different ways, some 
quite useless ; he at once seizes it. The baby may suckle 
at once when the breast is offered to it. In such cases 
the selection is of one act from one only. The formation 
of the habit means as before the strengthening of one con- 
nection, though not the exclusion of other connections. 

Resulting satisfaction is not always a sine qua non in 
the formation of connections. Mere repetition strength- 
ens the connection between situation and response, pro- 
vided no positive discomfort results. The child who says 
dog at the sight of the letters dog often enough, will 
learn to do so even though he has never obtained any 
observable benefit from so doing. The law then may be 
stated, 'which in a given situation does not produce dis- 
comfort.' The greater the satisfaction produced, how- 
ever, the more firmly will the connection be made between 



The Law of Association 205 

the response and its situation, and vice versa. Thus 
amended the law becomes : — Any mental state or act 
which in a given situation does not produce discomfort 
becomes associated with that situation, so that when the 
situation recurs the mental state or act is more likely than 
before to recur also ; the greater the satisfaction produced 
by it, the stronger the association. Conversely, any mental 
state or act which in a given situation does produce dis- 
comfort becomes disconnected from that situation, so 
that when the situation recurs the mental state or act is 
less likely than before to recur also; the greater the dis- 
comfort produced by it, the weaker the association 
becomes. 

From another point of view the law may be stated as : 
In any situation the mental state or act will take place 
which has resulted from that situation oftenest and with 
the most satisfaction. 

The law of habit formation and the law of instinctive 
connection may be combined into one as follows : The 
likelihood that any mental state or act will occur in 
response to any situation is in proportion to the closeness 
of its inborn connection therewith, to the frequency of its 
connection therewith, and to the amount of satisfaction 
resulting. This may be called the Law of Least Resist- 
ance in Mental Life. 

The Real Situation May Be More or Less Than the 
Apparent Situation. — The word situation in the law 
of instinct and the law of association must be taken 
broadly. The connection made is not necessarily with 
one particular circumstance or thing, but often is with the 
total state of affairs felt. Thus the chicken in the pen 
whose behavior was described in § 34, did not make con- 
nection with the situation, 'sight of confining walls,' but 
rather with the situation, sight of confining walls plus 



206 



Dynamic Psychology 



feelings of hunger plus absence of sight of companions 
plus sound of companions at a distance plus absence of 
food.' The same particular circumstance may in one set 
of surrounding circumstances, — in one mental context, — 
connect with one act and in a different mental context, 
with another. Had the chick been put into a pen with 
other chicks and food, it would have played about and 
pecked at the food and only occasionally jumped at the 
confining walls. The sight of the figures below (Fig. 75) 
would call up in a school-boy's mind the thoughts of a 
cube and a sphere if felt in connection with the surround- 




Fig. 75. 

ings of his school room and geometry class, while if felt 
in connection with the ordinary sights of street or play- 
room they would call up the thought of a box and a ball. 

The situation may then be the whole state of mind, the 
circumstances or thing in its context, the entire 'attitude' 
or 'set' of mental life, as well as the particular^ fact in its 
focus. 

On the other hand the connection made may be with 
some very small element of the apparent situation. In 
learning to swim the connections are not made with the 
color, temperature, taste and smell of the water, but only 
with the feelings of non-solidity, of suspension and of 



The Law of Association 207 

sinking. In learning to play a piece on the piano the 
connections are not made with the color of the instrument, 
the quality of the room's atmosphere and the size of the 
music book, but with the position of the notes on the scale, 
the form of the notes, the feelings of one's arms and 
ringers and the sounds produced. 

The facts that the connection may be made not only 
with the apparent situation, but also with it plus the co- 
operating attitude of the mind as a whole or with it minus 
many or all but one of its elements may be stated as the 
laws (1) of the Mind's Set and (2) of Partial Activity. 
These are : — 

(1) The likelihood that any mental state or act will 
occur in response to any apparent situation is in propor- 
tion to the closeness of its connection with the total set of 
the mind at the time as well as zvith the apparent situation 
itself. 

(2) The likelihood that any mental state or act will 
occur in response to any apparent situation is in propor- 
tion to the closeness of its connection with the apparent 
situation or some element or part thereof. 

Recency and Intensity of Connections. — Other fac- 
tors besides the results of a connection and its frequency 
determine the likelihood of its operation, namely, recency 
and intensity. "For the sake of simplicity these factors 
may remain undescribed until later chapters. An ade- 
quate statement of the entire Law of Association would 
be : The likelihood that any mental state or act 

WILL OCCUR IN RESPONSE TO ANY SITUATION IS IN PRO- 
PORTION TO THE FREQUENCY, RECENCY, INTENSITY AND 
RESULTING SATISFACTION OF ITS CONNECTION WITH THAT 
SITUATION OR SOME PART OF IT AND WITH THE TOTAL 
FRAME OF MIND IN WHICH THE SITUATION IS FELT. 

The Varieties of Connections. — The law of associa- 



208 Dynamic Psychology 

tion applies not only to the growth of connections between 
sensory situations and responses to them, but also to the 
growth of all the forms of connections described in 
Chapter I. 

Connections between (i) physical stimuli and mental 
states, between (2) one mental state and another, between 
(3) ideas and acts — all are formed in accordance with 
the law of association. Illustrations of (1) need some 
preliminary explanation and will be reserved for another 
chapter (Chapter XV). Illustrations of (2) are found 
in almost every process of memory or thought. We 
think of 36 when we think of 9X4 because with the situa- 
tion, 'thinking of 9X4' the thought of 36 has gone 
oftenest and with most satisfaction. Illustrations of (3) 
are found in almost every hour of daily life. We start 
for the class-room when the clock strikes the hour be- 
cause we have done so ; when we feel a desire to read, we 
buy a magazine because we have done so and with 
pleasurable results. 

In -cases where the connection involves a bodily act, 
it will be found that the satisfaction or discomfort result- 
ing plays a large part in the formation or breaking of the 
connection. In cases where the connection involves only 
thoughts and feelings, the mere frequency of the response 
will be found to play the leading role. This is due to the 
fact that (1) the satisfaction resulting from responding 
to a situation by a successful idea so often comes much 
later. The boy in school who thinks of the correct answer 
to a question does .not feel much satisfaction at the 
time. Often he does not know that his idea is right and 
so feels none. It is later when he is asked to recite and 
wins approval, or when his examination paper is re- 
turned and he finds it marked high, that the satisfaction 
comes. Moreover (2) the results of many of our mental 



The Law of Association 209 

responses produce almost no satisfaction. It makes little 
difference whether the sight of a watch arouses the 
thought of a clock or the thought of time or the thought 
of wheels ; whether the thought of John arouses the 
thought of Smith or of Jones or of Anderson. 

§ 36. The Control of the Formation of Connections 

Three Essentials in Efficient Learning. — The appli- 
cations of the law of association to the control of mental 
life by school education and general training are clear. 
In briefest terms they are as follows : — 

The first necessity of mental progress is fertility in 
response. Unless the baby does something, it can learn 
nothing; there is nothing for selection to work upon. In- 
tellect and character cannot be created from a void. 
Other things being equal, the capacity for varied re- 
sponses, great activity, curiosity, and mental energy 
increase the probability of mental improvement. 

The second means of training is the arrangement of 
instructive situations, — of conditions the responses to 
which may form valuable associations. As civilization 
progresses, men try increasingly to provide in the home, 
in schools and in the world's affairs, situations fitted to 
induce profitable responses. The behavior and conver- 
sation of the people about us, the books, laboratories, 
museums and other school paraphernalia, sermons, news- 
papers, music, laws and the like — all aim to control the 
mind's acts by controlling the situations to which it 
responds. In the words of a sagacious trainer of ani- 
mals, we "Arrange all the circumstances of the experi- 
ment so that the animal is compelled by the laws of its 
own nature to do the trick." 

The third means is the arrangement of the results of 



210 Dynamic Psychology 

the different possible responses so that desirable ones give 
satisfaction and undesirable ones, discomfort. By re- 
wards and punishments, natural or designed, parents, 
teachers, employers and rulers preserve the responses 
which they approve and stamp out those which they 
disapprove. The history of a mind's training is in great 
measure the history of the elimination of its mistakes. 

These Three Factors Illustrated. — These three fac- 
tors may be illustrated by almost any mental achievement, 
for instance, by learning to read. The teacher arranges 
a chart with a picture of a cat, the word cat and the like. 
The more skillfully she can arrange to get the situation 
'attention to the picture, the cat and the sound as she or 
some pupil pronounces it,' the better the prospect that the 
associations between the cat and the picture and sound 
will be formed. If now there is an utterly stolid, idiotic 
boy who is aroused to no action by the situation, who does 
not look at the chart or listen to the teacher, or repeat 
the sound after her, or think of cats or dogs or anything 
else, the process of teaching him to read is blocked at the 
outset and cannot progress till he is somehow stimulated 
to respond. 

Usually, of course, responses will be made; the chil- 
dren will say cat when the picture is pointed out, will 
repeat cat after the teacher when she points at the word 
and says cat; and will say cat when she points at the word 
but says nothing; some may however say 'kitten,' or 
'What is that?' or the last word the teacher has herself 
said. If the teacher looked as pleased, and said yes as 
often, and in general rewarded these incorrect replies as 
she does the correct ones, the process would again be 
blocked. It is the satisfaction or discomfort which she 
causes that selects the sound cat to be the permanent fixed 
associate of the sight cat. 



The Lazv of Association 211 

§ 37. Response by Analogy 

Responses to Novel Situations. — The law of instinct 
and the law of association fail apparently to prophesy 
what will happen when a situation appears for which no 
instinctive connection exists and which has never before 
been experienced. What, for example, will a chicken do 
when it for the first time sees a piece of yarn? What 
will a student unlearned in zoology do who is asked to 
name the picture of an Amphioxus? 

There being no response provided for that particular 
situation by inborn constitution 1 or previous experience, 
the individual will respond as he would to some situation 
like it, to which instinct or training has provided a re- 
sponse. The chicken will respond to the yarn as he 
would instinctively to a worm, will seize it, run away and 
begin to swallow it. The student will call the picture of 
Amphioxus a worm, though it is not, because experience 
has connected the word worm with long, legless, finless 
things. 

Every stimulus tends to discharge in some response; 
and in default of any response specially connected with 
it by nature or nurture, a stimulus will discharge into that 
response which has gone with something like it. This 
fact, that any unprepared-for situation will be treated as 
some familiar one like it would be, may be called Assimi- 
lation or Response by Analogy. The fact may be stated 
more exactly as follows : — 

To any situation for which neither nature nor nurture 
provides a response the response will be that which they 
provide for the situation most like it; or, Any situation 

1 It must be remembered that for many new situations there Is 
provided an instinctive response just because of their novelty. 'To 
handle and look at' is the baby's instinctive reaction to small novel 
objects as a class. 



212 Dynamic Psychology 

which has by nature and nurture no connections zvill con- 
nect with that response which the situation most like it 
would connect with. 

Response by Analogy. — Learning to deal with new 
situations is a constant repetition of the following process : 
the new is treated as some situation like it would be 
treated; by the results of the responses the responses 
themselves are modified until in due time a response is 
selected that is well adapted to the situation. 

The probable physiological basis for assimilation is 
easy to conceive, though proof is absent. Let us call the 
stimulation set up in the neurones by the new situation 
A B C D E F G. For just this particular situation there 
is no response provided; with just this neurone-group 
action there is no connection formed. But suppose that 
for the brain action A K C D E F G, there is a connection 
formed, M N O. The line of least resistance, of strongest 
connection for A B C D E F G would be toward M N O 
rather than toward some other ; for the elements A C D 
E F and G would tend each to call up its own connection. 
The fact that the new situation resembles some other 
means that it has elements in common with some other. 
It can call up a response because these elements do have 
some formed connection though it as a whole has not. 
It calls up the response which would be made to the 
situation most like it, because being most like it means 
containing many of the elements which it contains. The 
elements in it call up the response which they are con- 
nected with, namely, the response made to the situation 
most like it. Assimilation, then, is one instance of the 
law of partial activity. The case may be likened roughly 
to that of the direction taken by a four horse team at a 
fork in the roads, when the team has never traveled either 
road as a team but some one horse or a pair has. Their 



The Law of Association 213 

previous habit of taking, say, the left turn, will cause the 
whole team to go that way. 

The law of response by analogy is of importance 
apart from its service as an account of the means of 
responses to new situations ; for even when instinct or 
habit does furnish a response, that response may be 
neglected in favor of the response which would be made 
to some situation resembling the one present. The baby 
who on seeing a bottle of small white medicine-tablets 
sang out 'shirt buttons' could have followed instinct and 
responded merely by fumbling and biting the new things. 
The school boy who, when asked to give the opposite of 
frequently, wrote 'a bad smell,' could have followed pre- 
vious habits and said, T don't know.' 

Exercises 

1. What addition should be made to the maxim, "Practice 
makes perfect?" 

2. Why is repetition more useful in acquiring knowledge 
than in acquiring skill? 

3. Show how the law of association applies (a) to learning 
to ride a bicycle, (b) to learning to be tactful in dealing with 
people, (c) to learning to read, (d) to learning to shoot straight. 

4. (a) Give two cases of learning in which resultant satis- 
faction is the main factor, (b) Give two cases in which result- 
ing discomfort is the main factor, (c) Give two cases in which 
frequency is the main factor. 

5. Give two illustrations of the law of the mind's set. Give 
two illustrations of the law of partial activity. 

6. Explain by the laws described in this chapter or the pre- 
ceding one the following facts : 

a. Tne existence of the so-called 'happy families'; e. g., of 
dogs, cats, mice, chickens, living together in peace. 

b. That a religion based on fear commonly produces only 
negative morality ; i. e., only the absence of evil, not the presence 
of good acts. 

c. Young children (five to eight years old) will commonly 



214 Dynamic Psychology 

define an object by its use. Thus a knife 'is a thing to cut with', 
a chair 'is what you sit on'. 

d. A child in the primary class of a school committed some 
misdemeanor and was called to the teacher's desk and punished. 
A day or so later when occasion offered he committed the same 
fault but when told to come to the teacher's desk sat stubbornly 
still. 

e. A child from the country who was being shown the ani- 
mals in the zoological gardens called the antelopes calves. 

7. In what way does attention play a part in acquisitions 
by the law of association? 

8. Criticise the following statement: 

"Our nervous system grows to the modes in which it has 
been exercised." 

9. The probable physical parallel in the nervous system for 
the law of association is the law of the formation of connections 
stated and described in Chapter X. Read again § 27 and for 
each feature of the law of association find the probable physiolog- 
ical parallel. 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, X. 
Stout, Manual, 76-96. 

B. James, Principles, IV. 



CHAPTER XIV 

The Law of Dissociation or Analysis 
§ 38. The Process of Analysis 

Important as is the action of the mind in connecting 
impressions with ideas and acts, ideas with ideas and acts 
and acts among themselves, it would be a gross mistake 
to restrict mental action to the single field of connections, 
habit formation, association. The mind works not only 
by association, by connecting this situation with that 
response, but also by association or analysis, by breaking 
up a total situation into its elements. The abstract and 
general notions which we found in Part I to be essential 
features in the higher types of human thinking and the 
operations of parts of impressions or ideas which will 
later be found to be essential features of reasoning, are 
mental products which come, not by putting things to- 
gether, but by separating them into parts. The bare 
facts of experience give only white paper, white balls, 
white liquids, never the thought of mere whiteness by 
itself ; the law of association, so far as hitherto described, 
would lead to an interminable repetition of selections 
from our experience and responses, never to the original 
insights of the mathematical or scientific thinker; the 
same law in conduct would provide only a better and 
better selection from amongst acts, a greater skill due to 
the elimination of failures, never with totally new moral 
insights or new combinations of bodily movements. But 

215 



2i6 Dynamic Psychology 

in fact we do separate out elements in thought which 
have never appeared before by themselves, but only as 
parts or elements of total experiences. We do come to 
make isolated movements which have previously been 
only parts of instinctive and habitual reactions. And 
this work of analysis of total impressions into ideas of 
parts and elements and qualities and of complex acts 
into minute separate movements is of the utmost use in 
giving command over the problems of thought and the 
activities of the body. By dividing we conquer. How 
this process of analysis occurs will be clear from a few 
simple cases. 

The child at school whom we wish to feel the abstract 
quality of sphericity is given marbles and balls to observe. 
His attention is called to the orange, the gas globe, and 
the like. The word round or sphere is associated with 
all these and other objects, alike in being spheres but 
different in size, color, use, etc. As a result he comes to 
feel in connection with the word the special quality of 
similarity of surface at all points which to him means 
sphericity. Again the child to whom we wish to teach 
the abstract thing, number, — for instance the abstract 
quality of fiveness, — is given five peas, five sticks, five 
leaves, is made to draw five lines, to move his arm five 
times, to hold up five fingers, each time in association 
with the word five. He comes, by having the five quality 
constantly present but in connection with all sorts of 
other accessory qualities, to feel the numerical aspect of 
any group, the five aspect, by itself as a separate ele- 
mentary thought in his mind. 

In movements the same procedure is followed. A 
backward child can say th in common words but cannot 
make by themselves the movements needed to produce it 
alone. He is led to repeat that, those, they, this, then, 



The Law of Analysis 217 

breathe and similar words in order to lift into separate 
existence the th movement, to develop direct control of it. 

In all these cases the method taken to develop into a 
separate idea or act some aspect of a total mental state or 
muscular performance, — to abstract, that is, some part 
or quality of an experience, — is to arouse many experi- 
ences in which that aspect or part or quality is constantly 
present but with in each case different surroundings or 
context. The element of idea or impulse which is thus 
felt with many different associates comes to be felt with 
none of them, to be felt by itself as an idea, to be inde- 
pendent of any of them. The movement which is thus 
made with many different associated movements comes to 
be made by itself alone. BACD, EAFG, H A I J, 
K A L M, etc., result in a new A. 

It thus seems to be the general law of mind that any 
element of mental life which is felt as a part of many 
total mental states, differing in all else save its presence, 
comes thereby to be felt as an idea by itself, and that any 
movement which has been made as a part of many com- 
plex movements differing in all else save its presence 
comes thereby to be made as a movement by itself. This 
law is called the law of Dissociation by Varying Con- 
comitants, or the Law of Analysis. 1 

§ 39. The Influence of the Law of Analysis 
In the arithmetic of the primary school where the 
meanings of the numbers from one to twenty and their 

1 The law of dissociation is really only one case of the law of 
association ; it is the multitude of connections which serves to dis- 
connect. The same general principle accounts for both association 
and dissociation, although the results of its workings are opposite 
in the two cases. When one thing has gone with another it tends 
to call it up and to fuse with it ; but when one thing has gone with 
many different others it will tend to call up each of them a little 
and so none of them fully, and, instead of fusing with any one of 
them, to win an independent existence. 
IS 



218 Dynamic Psychology 

combinations are taught ; in all inductive work in science 
where a general law or general notion is evolved from 
particular series of events or cases ; in learning the mean- 
ing of but, and, notwithstanding, in spite of, etc., from 
their use in conversation and books; in comparing one 
character in literature or history with others to bring 
out essential points of his make-up — in short in all cases 
where we try to progress from vague feelings of a total 
fact to exact, definite feelings of its elements and of it as 
the compound of those elements — we depend upon the 
law of analysis or dissociation.^ 

This law is the basis of the capacity to reason, i.e., to 
think out the solutions of novel problems. Indeed it is 
probable that to the workings of this law of dissociation 
in infancy is due the growth of thought itself and of all 
those mental states which we call ideas, — that but for it 
mental life would be entirely composed of feelings 
like dizziness, suffocation, nausea, weariness or faint- 
ness, feelings which we would be very conscious of and 
would react to violently, but which we could not turn 
into continued and useful thought. 

The infant's feelings of things, qualities, conditions 
and relationships are nothing more than vague total im- 
pressions of this person, that thing, this weather, that 
stomach-ache and the like. Only after many experiences, 
resulting in many associations and comparisons, have 
given the law of dissociation an opportunity to play its 
role, does he come to feel the sense qualities of objects 
as discriminated elements, to feel forms and colors and 
sizes and shapes distinct from each other. His bottle, for 
instance, is to him for months only a vaguely sizable thing 
to be taken and held in his mouth. Only after much 
experience does it become a thing so long, so heavy and so 
colored. Even in adults much of mental life never 



The Law of Analysis 219 

develops into definite ideas. How few, for example, are 
the smells which we feel as definitely in the general odor 
of a cook shop as we do red and green in the colors of a 
landscape. 

As the infant gradually dissociates the elements of 
color, form, size and the like from the complex things in 
which they inhere, so the school boy in long years disso- 
ciates the more abstract qualities, such as justice, law or 
liberty. And to the end of life a thinking man will be 
busy in analyzing his vague impressions and opinions into 
their elements. 

The elements acquired by the action of the law of 
dissociation furnish new materials for the law of associa- 
tion to work with. As soon as the child in school feels 
the meanings of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, he is ready to form the 
associations 1 and 2 are 3, 1 and 3 are four, 1 and 4 are 5, 
2 and 3 are 5. As soon as a new movement comes under 
control, i.e., can be made- by itself, it enters into associa- 
tions with other movements and with mental states. The 
first mental connections are between particular sensory 
situations and responses thereto, simple modifications 
of existing instincts. Starting with these the law of dis- 
sociation produces the feelings of common objects, 
qualities, acts and relations, such as children commonly 
manifest in the third year of life. These new feelings as 
fast as they appear become associated with words, acts 
and with each other, so that the child by the time of 
entrance to school has thousands of associations between 
ideas, mostly between concrete particulars. With these 
associations further action of the law of dissociation pro- 
duces general and abstract ideas. These in turn form 
new associations. Thus in mental growth connection 
and analysis, association and dissociation, putting things 



220 Dynamic Psychology 

together and breaking things up into parts, constantly 
work together. 

§ 40. The Control of the Process of Analysis 

The conditions favoring the analysis of a definite ele- 
ment out of a vague and complex total fact are :— 

1. The collection of a number of total facts in each of 
which (a) the element is as obtrusive as possible, as little 
encumbered by irrelevant detail as possible and in which 
(b) the element's concomitants or surroundings vary. 
Thus if the teacher wishes to develop in a pupil's mind 
the abstract idea of the passive voice, he uses such exam- 
ples as: he is struck, they were accepted, you will be 
applauded, Grant was elected, rather than the repetition 
four times of, / am satisfied. For in the last example the 
passive element is not at all prominent; the pupil may 
well think of satisfied as an adjective; and the element is 
not thrown into relief by variations in the other features 
of the examples. 

2. That these facts be compared with attention di- 
rected toward the parts or elements of each fact, espe- 
cially toward the element in question. In the illustration 
above, attention could readily be directed toward the 
passive voice aspect by comparing the four sentences each 
with its corresponding active (he is struck, he strikes; 
they were accepted, they accepted, etc.) 

3. That a symbol or name of some kind be ready to be 
associated with the element when felt. Unconnected 
feelings cannot maintain an existence in the mind ; a fact 
thought of without a name of some sort is just an uncon- 
nected feeling. Let me have never so clear an idea of the 
thing, I shall gain by having also associated with it a 
name. So in the illustration above good teachers are 



The Law of Analysis 221 

careful to give the name 'passive voice' as soon as the 
pupil has the feeling, 'subject does nothing, something is 
done to him/ 

To assure the permanence of the feeling, repeated 
practice in detecting the element in new complexes is 
necessary. So the teacher sets the pupil to pick out all 
the passives he can on a page, or to divide a mixed list 
into actives and passives, or to perform some other exer- 
cise to the same end. 

The conditions that favor analysis are thus those that 
would be met by a fertile and selective mind, one that 
would naturally summon together many facts' and attend 
to their parts. More is required here than for the simple 
association of ideas and acts. Hence the capacity to 
dissociate or analyze is of later and higher development. 
Animals possessing the former lack it. Babies form 
many associative habits before they show any signs of 
analysis. In feeble minded adults analysis develops only 
to a slight extent. The commonest sense elements, such 
as color, size, shape, few, many, and the like, are known, 
but to feel the meaning of 'twenty,' or of 'a promise' or of 
'opposite' is beyond their power. In individuals of high 
intellectual ability, on the other hand, the process of dis- 
sociation is very prominent. 

Exercises 

1. Which process, association or dissociation, is involved in 
each of the following? 

(a) in learning to ride a bicycle. 

(b) in learning a poem by heart>c 

(c) in learning to understand the difference between 

the present tense and the past tense. 

(d) in learning to understand the difference between 

by to express means and by to express agency. 

(e) in learning the meanings of the numbers. 



222 Dynamic Psychology 

(f) in learning the multiplication table. 

(g) in learning the meanings of velocity and of accel- 

eration. 
(h) in learning to spell. 

2. For which is dissociation more necessary, (a) learning 
the grammar of a language or learning its vocabulaory? (b) 
Learning algebra or learning geometry? (c) Learning physical 
geography or learning commercial geography? 

3. (a) What associations would be necessary before a child 
could by dissociation come to feel the meaning of iff (b) Of 
longer than? (c) Of positive, comparative and superlative? 

4. How would you develop in the mind of a school-boy a 
definite and independent idea of acceleration, or of wealth, or of 
reciprocity? 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, XV. 

B. James, Principles, XIII. (502-508). 

§ 41. Physiological Conditions of Human Nature 

The three laws presented in this and the two preceding 
chapters summarize the method of action of nature and 
nurture, inborn mental constitution and acquired modi- 
fications, in its most essential features. The intellect and 
character of any one of us is due largely to the operation 
of these three laws. Not entirely, however; for any 
human being's thought and conduct, depending as they 
do upon the action of his nervous system, will sometimes 
show mysterious alterations, — behavior unexplainable by 
the laws of instinct, association and dissociation. The 
nervous system is influenced not only by the factors 
accounted for in these three laws, but also by fatigue, 
drugs, sickness, the decay of old age, shock, the chance 
variations of blood-pressure, metabolism and the like. 

It is necessary in a brief treatment to omit the facts 
that are known concerning the action of these forces, as 



The Law of Analysis 223 

well as the many problems answers to which are yet to 
be discovered. I have used and shall in the future, fre- 
quently use the phrase 'other things being equal' to recall 
to the reader's mind the fact that there are always many 
complex possibilities for mental action at any moment. 
Even when no such provisional clause is in the text the 
reader should supply it mentally. He should not forget, 
for instance, that though the general law of mental life 
is the law of association or habit, a sufficient dose of 
hashish will keep in temporary abeyance the most fixed 
habits of perception ; that enough alcohol will weaken all 
inhibitory associations ; that the law of frequency will be 
apparently suspended in the delirium of fever or even in 
ordinary sleep; that the capacity for intellectual achieve- 
ment may be weakened by disease of the thyroid gland; 
that a child's temperament or disposition will suffer com- 
plete change during an attack of indigestion. This 
caution not to forget the real and frequent influence of 
direct physiological changes in the nervous system upon 
human intellect and character ought perhaps to be re- 
peated at the beginning of every chapter from now on. 
But I shall entrust to the reader the duty of remembering 
it for himself. 



CHAPTER XV 



The Connections Between Sense Stimuli and Men- 
tal States: Connections of Impression 

§ 42. Inborn and Acquired Connections of Impression 

Inborn Connections. — Every educated person 
knows that some sort of connection exists between events 
taking place in the physical world and his mental states ; 
that he hears sounds because there are sound-waves, and 
smells odors when certain gases are present in the atmos- 
phere. The immediate connection is between the action 
of neurones in the brain and the mental states ; but since 
these neurones are aroused to action by afferent neurones 
from the sense organs, and since these afferent neurones 
are aroused by the physical event either directly or 
through some physiological process, we commonly speak 
of the total series of connections between the physical 
event and the mental state as one connection. 

Such connections are due to inborn capacities. Sound 
waves of 50-100 vibrations per second arouse a feeling 
of a low tone and those of 10,000-20,000 vibrations per 
second arouse a feeling of *a high tone, simply because 
man's mind is so constituted by nature that they do. 
Ether vibrations make us feel reds and greens and blues 
while rapid molecular motion makes us feel warm, just 
because these forms of connection have been established 

224 • 



Connections of Impression . 225 

by natural evolution. 1 Given a certain physical stimulus 
and a certain feeling follows. 

Acquired Connections. — At first thought this seems 
to be the end of the matter ; but, as was briefly stated in 
Chapter II, § 8, the stimulus itself is not the sole cause 
of the mental state. To the question, "What determines 
what things anyone feels at any moment?" common sense 
gives the ready answer, "That which is there to be sensed, 
— to be seen, heard or touched." But common sense is 
only partly right. The physical stimulus affecting the 
sense organs is one, but only one, of the causes which 
determine what the percept shall be. For (1) we may 
feel different things, have different percepts, from the 
same stimulus; moreover (2) we may have the same per- 
cept from different stimuli; and in the third place (3) we 
may feel a thing when there is no physical stimulus cor- 
responding to it. 

Thus (1) the same cup of coffee tastes sweet after 
quinine and bitter after honey; the same light is bright 
by night and dim by day ; the same gray looks reddish on 
a green background and greenish on a red background. 
The same air waves which make me feel a vague tumult 
of sound, make the musician feel the tones of five distinct 
instruments combined in a harmony; the same mass of 
colors is a blur to me and a definite group of micro-organ- 
isms to the trained microscopist. 

Thus (2) patches of quite different shades may all be 

^here is no absolute necessity that the connections should be 
as they are. Man might conceivably have been such a creature 
that sound waves of 50-100 vibrations would make him feel cold 
and those of 20,000-40,000 vibrations make him feel warm. There 
might conceivably exist connections between the pressure of the X- 
rays and feelings of some sort unlike any we now possess. Or we 
might lack, as the fishes apparently and as some lower animals cer- 
tainly do, any connections between sound waves and mental states. 
The existing connections represent only one of many possible ar- 
rangements. 



226 Dynamic Psychology 

felt as the same green (e.g., grass in the sunshine and in 
the shade) ; the table top is felt to be a rectangle, though 
seen as a sharp rhombus; in a brief glance at the letters 
'bad oratory,' half an audience saw the same word as 
when the letters presented were 'laboratory ;' so also with 
'peneil' and 'pencil.' 

Thus (3) occasionally in waking hours, and custom- 
arily in dreams, we see and hear and smell and taste 
things though neither they nor anything like them is 
present. 

Not only the outside stimulus, but also the inner con- 
stitution of the individual's mental life, decides what thing 
shall be felt. There is more to perception than passive 
impressibility by external forces. Every act of perception 
is really an act of association. What is felt depends not 
only upon how the afferent neurones are stimulated, but 
also upon what neurones they in turn arouse; not only 
upon what the external object is, but also upon (A) the 
past experiences and (B) the present tendencies of the 
individual who perceives it. 

(A) The musician feels the sounds made by the 
string quintette differently from the untrained person, 
because he has in the past attended to musical sounds and 
learned to discriminate the parts of a harmony; the 
audience saw peneil as pencil because the pen il had so 
often connected with the thought pencil in their previous 
reading. (B) The coffee tastes now sweet, now bitter, 
the light is now bright, now dim, according to the back- 
grounds of taste and illumination accompanying them; 
the 'bad oratory' was felt as 'laboratory' because in the 
minds of the audience (a class seated in a laboratory 
where they had been doing laboratory work for the month 
past) the thought of laboratory was especially ready to 
be aroused, was in a line of little resistance. If 'labora- 



Connections of Impression 227 

tory' had been shown for a fraction of a second to an 
audience accustomed to listening to and thinking about 
speeches, many of them would have seen it as 'bad 
oratory.' 

§ 43. The Law of Association in the Case of Connections 
of Impression 

In General. — What one feels at any given sense 
stimulus depends then upon what one has felt and upon 
what one is feeling at the time. Not only the mere capaci- 
ties for responding to certain events in the physical world 
by feelings of certain qualities, but also the development 
of these capacities by training and their dependence upon 
the particular circumstances attending each case of re- 
sponse, must be taken into account in a study of the 
connections between sense stimuli and mental states. 
Nurture modifies nature even in the case of feelings from 
the senses. The connections between sense stimuli and 
mental states are partly instinctive and partly learned. 
Perception involves the influence of training and is 
explained by the law of association as surely as is the 
formation of habits; there are habits of perceiving as 
truly as there are habits of thought and conduct. The 
incoming stimulus from any set of afferent neurones may 
discharge into any one of several cell groups ; which one 
it will arouse depends upon the general laws of asso- 
ciation and assimilation deciding which connection is 
strongest. 

In Detail. — Other things being equal the strongest 
connection will be (1) that favored by inborn structure, 
(2) that most frequently made, (3) the most recently 
made, (4) that with the most easily excitable mental state 
and (5) that most in harmony with the general set of the 



228 Dynamic Psychology 

mind at the time. Illustrations of the influence of each 
of these factors may be found in anyone's daily experience, 
(i) is of course illustrated in every minute of perceptual 
experience. The trained nurse reading 'abominable' as 
'abdominal' illustrates (2) ; the householder who, after a 
burglary at his house, heard every noise as a fumbling at 
the door illustrates a combination of (3) and (4). The 
psychology class who saw 'psychogaly' as 'psychology' 
illustrates (5) combined with (2) and (3). The author's 
name was heard by various people to whom he was intro- 
duced at the time of the discovery of gold in x\laska, as 
Klondike ; and an old lady in a country town once greeted 
him as Mr. Corn-doctor. 

One consequence of the laws of association and assim- 
ilation in the case of connections of impression is that any 
sense stimulus tends to be felt as some definite 'thing.' 
The incoming nerve currents have by the law of diffusion 
to go somewhere and the connections which have been 
made in the past are largely with cell actions correspond- 
ing to feelings of 'things.' So ink blots made at random 
often strike the observer as pictures of real objects; the 
clouds take on animal forms ; there is a man in the moon ; 
the wind in the trees is heard as a 'sighing.' 

The Influence of the Law of the Mind's Set. — 
Three special forms of the influence of the general set of 
the mind, of the mental context in which the percept is 
felt, are so important as to deserve formulation as special 
laws. The first and most general is the Law of Relativity, 
that any stimulus will be felt, not as it would be if by 
itself alone, but in comparison with the sensations and 
percepts which accompany or precede it. Thus a gray 
on a black background will look whiter than when on a 
white background ; a one-pound weight added to a pound 
will be felt as an increase, but will not when added to a 



Connections of Impression 229 

hundred pounds. The second and third laws refer to 
special cases of the law of relativity. The Law of Dimin- 
ishing Returns from increases in the amount of a stimulus 
(Weber's law) is that the same stimulus will produce a 
more intense sensation when added to a weak stimulus 
than when added to a strong one. Under this law belongs 
the case of the pound weight. Similarly an inch more 
makes 2 inches perceptibly longer, but adds little feeling 
of length to ten feet; it is easy to distinguish a three 
candle power lamp from a two candle power lamp, but 
between a two hundred and three and a two hundred and 
two candle power lamp practically no difference can be 
felt. The Law of Contrast is that one sensation or per- 
cept felt with or after another tends to take on the quality 
opposite to or complementary to that other. When the 
other is felt with it, we have Simultaneous Contrast; 
when the other is felt before it, we have Successive Con- 
trast. Thus the gray on a black looks whiter and on a 
white blacker than it would by itself ; a candle light looks 
brighter in the dark than in daylight; a tone seems lower 
after a high than after a low one ; lemonade tastes sweeter 
after vinegar than after honey; a gray on red looks 
greenish ; on blue, yellowish ; and on green, reddish. 

Percepts, Illusions and Hallucinations. — It follows 
from the facts so far stated that the same general process 
causes percepts, illusions and hallucinations. When the 
word beautiful is spoken and heard, hearing it is called a 
percept ; when dutiful is spoken but beautiful heard, hear- 
ing it is called an illusion ; when nothing is spoken (as in 
a dream) but beautiful is heard, hearing it is called an 
hallucination. In all three cases the same final brain 
process was aroused, the difference being that in the first 
case one afferent process excited it, in the second a slightly 
different process, and in the third no afferent process at all 



230 Dynamic Psychology 

but some inner connection. In other words, when the 
sense stimulus present is the one that ordinarily arouses 
the mental fact, it is a case of perception ; when the sense 
stimulus present is one that ordinarily arouses some other 
mental fact, it is illusion ; and when the sense stimulus is 
nil, it is hallucination. 

What is commonly called perception is a mixture of 
perception, illusion and hallucination. Thus in reading, 
some of the words which we feel ourselves to see are not 
seen at all and others are seen as quite different from their 
actual printed forms. There are misspellings in almost 
every book, but they pass unnoticed, unseen by the mental 
eye. Parts of words, even whole words, are often not 
present as sensory stimuli at all, the mind making them 
up out of whole cloth. So also in listening to spoken 
language we hear words which the ear does not hear at 
all. If one says rapidly in the proper context 'What time 
tis it ?' or 'Please pass me ge butter,' the error will often 
be undetected. The letter t is often pronounced as d in 
such words as ability, certainty, falsity, 1 but only experts 
in phonetics notice the fact. Again and again in rapid 
speech words are totally omitted without anyone being 
the wiser. 

§ 44. The Control of Connections of Impression 
What is called the education of the senses and training 
in observation might better be called training in acquiring 
associations with sense stimuli. The difference between 
the untrained and the trained observer lies not in the 
action of the sense organs but in the previous experience 
which interprets their messages. The professional tester 
of tea has not a different tongue but a different set of 
experiences, a different stock of associations with various 

1 Where the t is far removed from the accented syllable. 



Connections of Impression 231 



1 
11 

2 
12 

3 
18 

4 
14 

5 
15 

6 
16 

7 
17 

8 
18 

9 

19 
10 

go 



Fig. 76- 



stimuli. The man of science sees more in the specimen 
because he knows more about it. One does not learn to 
see by perpetual staring, but by connecting each sight 
with knowledge about the thing seen. To educate the 
senses means ( 1 ) to form habits of systematic rather than 
hap-hazard examination, (2) to learn to recognize ele- 
ments in complexes by first getting used to them singly, 
and (3) to connect each sensory stimulus with a separate 
identifiable feeling and with knowledge of its properties. 



2$2 Dynamic Psychology 



IA- 
11» 

2 « 

12 " 

3 " 
j.3 «« 

4 h 

14" 

ISA 

16 « 
7" 

17 u 

8 n- 

18 w 
9" 

19 » 
10'^ 



20 i' 



Fig. 77. 

Exercises 



i. Read again § 8 and recall the results of the experiment 
there described. 

2. Illustrate individual differences in the capacities to feel 
things and qualities in response to sensory stimuli. 

3. Illustrate individual differences in perception due to dif- 
ferences in previous experience. 

4- Illustrate the law of diminishing returns in the case of 
the perception of movements. Of tastes. 

5- Classify the following illusions as (A) those caused by 



Connections of Impression 233 

the strength of previous habit and (B) those caused by the 
temporary set of the mind: — 

a. "An officer who superintended the exhuming of a coffin 
rendered necessary through a suspicion of crime, declared that he 
already experienced the odor of decomposition, though it was 
afterwards found that the coffin was empty." (Quoted from 
Carpenter's Mental Physiology by J. Sully in Illusions p. 
108.) 

b. "I never feel sure after wiping the blades of my skates, 
that they are perfectly dry, since they always seem more or less 
damp to my hand." (Sully.) 

c. "If we are seated in a railway train which is quite station- 
ary and watch through the window a train passing ours on a 
neighboring track, we feel our own train to be in motion in the 
opposite direction. 

d. "I remember one night in Boston, whilst waiting for a 
'Mount Auburn' car to bring me to Cambridge reading most 
distinctly that name upon the signboard of a car on which (as I 
afterward learned) North Avenue was painted." (James.) 

6. Hold one hand in hot and the other in cold water for a 
few seconds ; then put them both in the same dish of tepid water. 
Compare the feelings of the two hands^ 

Experiment 19. Color Contrast. — Take 5 pieces of the same 
gray paper. Lay them on sheets of white, black, red, green and 
blue paper. Cover with very thin tissue paper. Compare the 
five grays. 

Take two pieces of the same green paper. Lay one on a red 
background, the other on a background of its own color. Cover 
as before and compare the two greens. Do similarity with red 
on a green and on a red background. 

Experiment 20. The Law of Diminishing Returns. — (a) 
Look at line No. 1 of Fig. 76 then at line No. iA of Fig. yy. Is 
the latter shorter or longer than No. 1. (Do not measure, judge 
by the eye alone.) Compare similarly lines 11 and 11 A, 2 and 
2A, etc., recording each judgment. After the 20 judgments have 
been recorded measure the lines and compare the frequency of 
right judgments in the case of lines 1-10 with that in the case of 
lines 11-20. 

(b) On a sheet of paper 10 inches or more wide rule five lines 
20, 40, 60, 80 and 100 millimeters long respectively. Place beside 
it a similar sheet and draw lines as nearly equal to the models 

16 



234 



Physiological Psychology 



as you can without measuring or superposition. Do the same 
thing with another sheet, and continue until you have 10 sheets, 
each with five lines as nearly equal to the original models as you 
can draw them. Find, by measuring, the error made in each of 
the fifty lines. Compare the amount of the error for the 20 mm. 
line with that for the 40 mm. line and so on through the series. 

Experiment 21. The Law of Association in Perception. — 
Print in the Scttne style and size each of the following words upon 
a slip of paper and paste on a card about 3*^ by i l / 2 inches: (1) 
good, (2) boy, (3) house, (4) pasent, (5) scarf, (6) sdirt, (7) 
chipon, (8) feather, (9) tackle, (10) tooch drwn, (11) genuine, 




Fig. 78. 



Fig. 79' 



(12) meawing, (13) reaeoning, (14) initate, (15) stoie, (16) 
morning, (17) frequmtly, (18) constant, (19) embrarderg. 

Expose each (in the order given above) for one or two tenths 
of a second to some one unacquainted entirely with the cards or 
the object of the experiment, and have him write down what he 
sees in each case. Explain so far as you can the percepts felt. 
Compare the records of men and women in the case of words 
6, 7, 9, 10, 15, and 19. 

Experiment 22. Look at Fig. 78. Does it seem to be (1) a 
folded sheet with the folded edge toward you, or (2) a folded 
sheet with the folded edge away from you, or (3) a group of 
lines on a flat surface? Continue looking at it steadily. What 
happens? Make it seem like (1) (without altering the figure it- 



Connections of Impression 



235 



self at all). Make it seem like (2). What do you do to make it 
seem like (1) ? Shut your eyes ; imagine a sheet of cardboard with 
the folded edge away from % you, open your eyes and look at the 
figure. Which was it like, (1), (2) or (3)? Make it seem like 
(3). Which appearance is hardest to obtain: (1), (2) or (3)? 

Experiment 23. How many blocks are there in Fig. 79? 
Continue looking at it steadily. What happens? 

Experiment 24. How many different appearances can you 




Fig. 80. 



get from Fig. 80? Describe each of them. Why does it seem 
like an object of three dimensions rather than of two only, when 
it really is all in one plane? 

Experiment 25. How many different appearances can you 
get from Fig. 81 ? Describe each of them. Which is the easiest 
to get and retain? Why? 

7. In what other experiments have you found the alternation 



236 



Dynamic Psychology 



of one impression with another in somewhat the same way as 
happens in Experiment 22. 

8. Illustrate from your record of Experiment 22 the state- 
ment: "What thing is perceived will depend upon past experi- 
ence." 

9. Illustrate similarly ; "What thing is perceived will depend 
upon the state of mind at the time of perceiving." 




Fig. 81. 



10. Illustrate similarly ; "Perception is of definite and prob- 
able things." 

11. Illustrate similarly the influence of frequency of con- 
nection in determining what percept a given sense stimulus will 
arouse. 

12. From your records of Experiments 19 to 25 gather all the 
facts you can in support of any statements made in this chapter. 

Arrange these facts in lists, each under the statement which 
it supports. 



Connections of Impression 237 

References 

James, Briefer Course, II. (17-27), XX. (316-334). 

Stout, Manual, 125-140, 199-209. 

Titchener, Outline, §§ 27-30. 

Ebbinghaus, Grundziige, §§ 44-47. 

James, Principles, XVII. (9-31), XIX. (82-133). 

Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, IX., XII.-XV. 



CHAPTER XVI 

The Connections Between one Mental State and 
Another 

§ 45. Associations of Ideas 

The Problem Stated.— The problem of this section 
may be stated in several ways. Given any mental state 
not due to a sense stimulus, how came it to be present? 
Given any mental state, what other mental state will it call 
up? What in addition to sense stimuli determines the 
order of our thoughts ? What laws account for the ways 
in which mental states are connected among themselves? 
These four questions are substantially the same. 

The first member of the connection, i.e., the mental 
state that calls up, may be termed the antecedent, the 
stimulant or simply Thought 1 ; the second member of the 
connected pair, i.e., the mental state that is called up, may 
be termed the consequent, sequent, resultant or simply 
Thought 2. Thought 1 may be a mental state of any 
sort; but Thought 2 cannot be a sensation or percept or 
any feeling that results directly from a sense stimulus, for 
then the connection would necessarily be not mental- 
mental, but physical-mental. Thought 2 is generally, 
perhaps always, an image, a feeling of meaning or intel- 
lectual relationship, or a judgment. 

The complex states of mind which we ordinarily 
experience are the results of both the antecedent thought 
and of sense stimuli; a man does not often have a series 

238 



Purely Mental Connections 239 

of mental states due to purely mental connections. What 
he sees and hears, the feelings of his own body, and other 
sensory stimuli, color his thoughts and may redirect them. 
Still in day dreams, in serious thought on intellectual 
problems and in the flow of undisturbed memories, when 
little attention is paid to the physical world and to the 
warmth or cold or pain or movements of the body, the 
course of thought is almost exclusively explainable as the 
result of purely mental connections. And in any case we 
can study the influence of the present thought in determin- 
ing the future apart from that of the sense stimuli which 
are also acting. 

The General Law of Association in the Case of 
Purely Mental Connections. — Probably none of the 
purely mental connections are inborn, unlearned. Nature 
does not apparently provide any ready-made apparatus 
for such connections as thinking of six when one thinks 
of three and three. Our rich inheritance of connections 
between sense stimuli and mental states, sense stimuli and 
acts, and mental states and acts, is in sharp contrast to our 
utter poverty with respect to connections between one 
mental state and another. Nature gives only the general 
capacity to form such connections as soon as images, 
feelings of meaning and judgments have been acquired. 
One important result of the fact that all purely mental 
connections are due to nurture is that there is far less 
uniformity among human beings in the mental-mental 
than in the physical-mental connections. Light rays of a 
certain vibration-rate produce in seeing persons the feel- 
ing of red with comparatively small variations, but the 
sight of the color will arouse in one the thought of red, 
in another of roth, in another of rouge, in another of 
corado, according to the connections which have been 
acquired. 



240 Dynamic Psychology 

The mode of acquisition of the purely mental con- 
nections is by the action of the general law of association. 
The most frequent reason why one mental state calls up 
the thought of a certain object is that it has been its 
antecedent in our previous experience. Thinking of 6 
times 7 makes us think of 42, because in school the 6 times 
7 was deliberately connected with 42. The child thinks 
of the word dog as a sequent to the percept of the animal 
because he has heard and said the word in response to 
that percept before. All associations between percept 
of thing and name, percept of relation and name, percept 
of image of thing and class-name, between sensation and 
adjective, and the like, are clearly due to this law. Con- 
sider also the vast number of mental connections which 
owe their origin to arithmetical tables, paradigms and 
definitions learned, to books read, to sights seen and 
sounds heard in sequence. Throughout life we put one 
thing after another in order that the thought of the first 
may call up the thought of the second. The mental con- 
nections which attract our notice do so often by their very 
abnormality and rareness and so give a false notion of 
connections in general. For once that a thought calls up 
some unlikely sequent, there are a hundred times that it 
calls up the object which the law of association would lead 
us to expect. The law of association applied to the 
formation of purely mental connections may be roughly 
stated as follows : Any mental state will be followed by 
that mental state by which it has been followed in the past. 
A fuller statement of the law will be made later after 
certain apparent exceptions to it have been examined. 

The Law of Partial Activity. — It is impossible to 
explain the following connections, which represent a very 
common sort, by the fact of Thought 1 having been fol- 
lowed by Thought 2 in the past : — 



Purely Mental Connections 241 

Case A. Thought 1. Of a large piece of ice in a cup of 

iced tea. 
Thought 2. Of the ice trust. 
Case B. Thought 1. I have lots of curiosity. 
Thought 2. Of Eve. 
In these and similar cases the first thought as a whole 
has surely never before gone with the second thought. 
But they are nevertheless to be explained by the law of 
association, for although Thought 1 has never been fol- 
lowed by Thought 2 in either case, a part of it has. In 
Case A the image or word ice is the only element of the 
total thought that is active in making the connection; 
in Case B the thought of curiosity is the active element. 
Tee — Ice trust' and 'Curiosity — Eve' are readily explain- 
able by the law of association. In the total thought some 
one element frequently, indeed usually, will be thus active. 
The law should therefore be amended so as to read : Any 
mental state zvill be followed by that mental state by which 
it or some part of it has been folloived in the past. 

A Mental State Calls Up Its Previous Accompani- 
ments. — There remain still some apparently unex- 
plained cases such as the following: 
Case A. Thought 1. Percept of Mr. S. reciting. 

Thought 2. Image of Mr. S. at luncheon the 
day before. 
Case B. Thought 1. Percept of the moon. 

Thought 2. Image of a lamp with a round 
globe at home. 
Here, as before, only a part of Thought 1 is operative, 
but the part acts not by calling up something which has 
followed it, but something which has been simultaneous 
with it and of which it was a part. The feeling of Mr. S. 
in the total of 'Mr. S. reciting' calls up the feeling of 
Mr. S. in the total of 'Mr. S. at luncheon.' The feeling 



242 Dynamic Psychology 

of bright roundness in the total, 'bright roundness up in 
the sky there/ calls up the feeling of bright roundness in 
the total, 'bright roundness of globe with rest of lamp/ 
It is a fact that mental states connect not only with their 
previous sequents but also with their previous accompani- 
ments. Association is not only in a forward but also in 
a sideways direction. The law should read, 'by which 
it or some part of it has been followed or accompanied.' 

Purely Mental Connections in General. — The facts 
of mental connections so far presented may be represented 
by easy symbols as follows : — 
Let x be a total thought composed of the elements ABC 

it a a a a tt a a a "D "R T? 

ft tt <t it a a it it tt p tt y 

a a a a tt tt tt tt tt T T^* T 

" W " " " " " " " " A M N 

Let x have been followed by y 
tt A a a a a z 

" x " " accompanied by v 
Then x may call up y because y has followed x in the past. 
Or x " " z " z " " a part of x 

in the past. 
Or x may call up v because v has accompanied x in the 

past. 
Or x may call up w because the elements M N have ac- 
companied a part of x in the past. 
Cases where Thought i as a whole leads to Thought 2 
are called cases of Total Recall; cases where a part of 
Thought 1 leads to Thought 2 are called cases of Partial 
Recall; cases where some one element or feature of 
Thought 1 leads to Thought 2 are called cases of Focal 
Recall. These names are not well chosen ; for they would, 
according to the common use of language, mean that all 
or part or a little was recalled; they should mean of course 



Purely Mental Connections 243 

that all or a part or a little of a thought is active in recall- 
ing. Perhaps Total, Partial and Very Partial Activity 
would be more useful names. Focal Activity is only the 
extreme of partial activity. 

Cases of partial or focal activity in which the recalling 
elements are present not only in Thought 1 but also in 
Thought 2 2 cases, that is, of the xw type, used to be 
called cases of Association by Similarity. In such cases 
Thought 1 and Thought 2 will of course be more or less 
similar, because one or more elements are the same in 
both, but they are not connected by their similarity. Mere 
similarity in and of itself has no tendency to result in con- 
nection. The thought of a red brick does not make us 
keep on thinking of red bricks. 

The name Association by Contiguity has been used, 
first to denote connections between things which exist 
together in time or space, and later to denote all con- 
nections of the x y or x z or x v types. The name has 
outlived its usefulness. 

The names (1) Persistent and (2) Desistent associa- 
tions have been used 1 for ( 1 ) cases where the first thought 
or part of it remains and is an element in the sequent 
thought and (2) cases where it does not. 

I have spoken of connections between one mental state 
and another and of connections between the thought of 
one thing and the thought of another thing, as if the two 
phrases meant the same. They really do not; quite dif- 
ferent mental states may each be the thought of the same 
thing. Thus in the following connections the second 
members are in both cases the thought of George Eliot's 
novels, but they are different mental states : — 
A. Thought 1. Adam Bede. 

2. I like George Eliot's novels. 

1 By Professor M. W. Calkins. 



244 Dynamic Psychology 

B. Thought i. Adam Bede. 

2. I dislike George Eliot's novels. 

If the student will notice his own trains of thought he 
will soon conclude that one mental state rarely calls up 
exactly the mental state which has in the past followed it. 
Suppose mental state A to be followed by mental state B ; 
suppose that later A recurs. The emotional tone, the feel- 
ings of the accompanying circumstances, the general set- 
ting which composed in large measure mental state B, will 
in all probability not recur, but only the object or fact felt 
as the core of B. For instance, 'amo, amas, amat' is 
followed originally by the feeling, 'amamus ; I am sick 
of this ; how hot it is !' etc. ; but 'amo, amas, amat' in my 
mind to-day calls up only the word 'amamus ;' the setting 
it has, if any, is furnished by present circumstances. In 
short what is called up in Thought 2 is some object or 
fact. Just how the object is felt or the fact regarded is 
decided by present circumstances rather than by the way 
the object and fact were felt and regarded in the past 
when connected with Thought 1. The reason for this is 
that the settings of the object or fact in its original 
appearances were due largely to the sensory stimuli then 
active, and were different at different times. In recall 
(1) the sensory stimuli of the present far outweigh any 
images of the setting of earlier appearances, and (2) such 
images mutually interfere because of their unlikeness. 

The Causes in Partial Activity. — The next step in 
an account of mental connections is to explain which 
part of Thought 1 will in cases of partial activity be 
operative in calling up the coming thought. It will, 
other things being equal, be that part which is attended to, 
which is interesting, which is held in the mind's focus. 
Just as of what the eyes see at any time, only the part 
that is in the center of the visual field arouses a clear per- 



Purely Mental Connections 245 

cept ; so of what is thought at any time, only the focal part 
will arouse the next idea. The other things that must be 
equal are all those which make one brain process more 
likely to discharge than another, such as conditions of 
nutrition, blood supply, fatigue and the like. About 
these little is known, but they are so effective as to prevent 
a psychologist from prophesying with any approach to 
certainty what part of any total thought will count in 
determining the next thought. If a school boy thinks, 
'Christmas comes on December 25th,' he will in the long 
run be reminded of gifts, good things to eat and festivi- 
ties, rather than of 'square root,' 'what is the etymology 
of December,' or 'December has 31 days;' the element 
Christmas being active rather than the element 25th or 
December. But on any one occasion these or other 
features of the total thought may chance to be the de- 
termining factor of the next thought. 

The Causes that Determine Which One of Several 
Possible Facts Shall be Called Up. — The account of 
mental connections so far given is adequate to explain 
why any mental state or part of a mental state calls up the 
idea which has gone with it. But any antecedent may 
have been followed by several different ideas. In such 
cases which one will be called up ? Horse has gone with 
wagon, whip, harness, mane, car, barn, stall, etc. Which 
of these former associates will be the sequent in any given 
case when horse is thought of? The details of the gen- 
eral law of association contain the answer. The con- 
nection will be along the line of least resistance. The 
line of least resistance will be determined by the frequency, 
recency, vividness and resulting satisfaction, of the con- 
nection, and the excitability of the sequent ideas. 

Resulting satisfaction plays here a comparativelv 
unimportant part directly for the reason stated in § 35 



246 Dynamic Psychology 

that in itself one image, feeling of meaning or judgment 
is little less or more pleasant than another. Horse- 
wagon, horse-whip, horse-harness, are as feelings alike 
indifferent. Resultant satisfaction is probably a partial 
explanation of the frequency of rhyming associations and 
the connection of certain epithets with things. The 
pleasure in the rhyme or in the fitness of the epithet may 
fix the two members of the connection firmly together so 
that the one will later call the other up. Indirectly, in the 
guidance of the process of association, as in schools, 
resulting satisfaction and discomfort are prime causes. 

Frequency of connection in the past is the commonest 
cause of connection in the future. Thus the sight of a 
horse is almost sure to call up the word horse, no matter 
what else it may call up; 4X9 is, in an educated mind, 
almost sure to produce the thought of 36 if it has any 
sequent. In all cases where the feeling of a thing or 
quality calls up its name, where the sight of printed 
letters calls up the auditory or motor image of a word; 
where a word in one language calls up its translation in 
another ; where familiar signals, such as the striking of a 
clock, calls up their corresponding events, and in many 
more, — frequency is the cause. No further illustrations 
are needed; they may be found in the trains of thought 
appearing in connection with almost every example in 
arithmetic done, every page read, every hour of daily life. 

That the recency of a connection between one thought 
and another increases the probability that the first will 
call up the second also needs no proof and little comment. 
Anyone's mental life during any day-will substantiate and 
illustrate the fact. The following are actual cases : — 
A. Thought 1. The sight of some fruit. 

2. Mr. S. asked me this morning if I liked 
fruit. 



Purely Mental Connections 247 

B. Thought I. Of Spanish wars. 

2. Of the trouble [then arising] in China. 

C. Thought 1. Of cable cars, horse cars and of my feet 

on the pavement. 
2. Of cable cars just keeping up with a 
horse car yesterday — dreadfully 
slow. 

That one thought which has gone with another in 
some vivid, intense experience will be more likely to call 
it up than to call up some other to which it led in the 
course of commonplace, unattended-to life is also proved 
and illustrated by everyone's experience. In the mind 
of the man who has dined with the king, every future 
meal will be honored by his majesty's presence in imagina- 
tion. In 1 90 1 the mention of the word anarchist called 
up in every mind the lamented death of President McKin- 
ley. 

Every day life also sufficiently illustrates the fact that 
a half-awake, ready-to-be-excited idea, one due to some 
vivid and deep impression, is especially likely to be called 
up. We all know to our discomfort how easily the events 
of a trip to Europe are called up in our friends' minds; 
how everything will remind the doting mother of some 
saying or act of her child; how quickly conversation in 
the country store turns to the great event of the burning 
of Thomson's cow-barn. 

Finally, to understand which of its former associates 
any mental state will call up we need to bear constantly 
in mind the caution of page 167. It was there stated that 
the action of the brain at any time must not be con- 
sidered as a definite action of a limited number of neurones 
and nothing more, but as such definite, special, emphatic 
action plus more or less action in a whole system of 
neurones, even throughout the entire nervous system. 



248 Dynamic Psychology 

The nature of this more general action or 'set' of entire 
systems might be, we then saw, an important factor in 
determining into what neurones the specially active 
neurone group would discharge. 

This fact implies concerning the connections between 
one mental state and another that which thought any 
given thought will call up of the many that it might call 
up, will be determined in part by the general trend of 
thought at the time, the general frame or set of mind one 
is in, the general system of ideas which is as a whole more 
or less aroused and ready to appear. For example, if it 
is vacation time and I am digging in my garden and a 
neighbor leans over the fence and says, "What do you 
think of James?" I shall probably think, "What James?" 
If I were in a class room in the university and a student 
asked the same question, I should think of the gifts and 
work of the eminent psychologist. 

The same thought may arouse different associates 
according to whether it is felt in one's work system or play 
system, one's week day or Sunday system ; at home or at 
school ; by oneself or among others ; in one's scientific 
or one's sentimental system ; in the mood of elation or of 
depression. Besides these great systems there are multi- 
tudes of lesser systems, each exerting its influence on the 
direction of thoughts that occur within it. Notice how 
every new thought in the following reverie is due, not to 
the previous thought alone, but also to the general system 
of 'African war affairs :' — 

"Sensation of getting warm under sUn while walking fast. 
Soldiers in Africa compared with me. 
My bag not like soldier's gun but officer's sword. 
Officers do not wear swords, but I saw a picture of one 

with a scabbard recently. 
British have learned a lot this war, 



Purely Mental Connections 249 

Boers taught officers to quit wearing swords by shooting 
at officers. 

Old chivalric notions dying out of warfare; thought of 
Fontenoy and the silly exchange of courtesies. 

Newspaper tale that Roberts has society men on his staff 
as well as real men. 

Does he have to? 

That's why he keeps ahead of Kitchener, by not appear- 
ing harsh. 

What's Kitchener doing as chief of staff? 

Roberts sending him to relieve Rushenburg, something 
like sending him to the Victoria West District. 

I guess they work separately better than together. 

I would better think of something useful. 

I'll work up this train of thought." 

The action of the general law^of association in the 
case of connections between one mental state and another 
may be summarized as follows : Any fact thought of will 
call up that fact, the thought of which has accompanied 
or followed it or a part of it most frequently, most re- 
cently, in the most vivid experience and with the most 
resultant satisfaction, and which is most closely con- 
nected with the general set of mind at the time. 

The physiological basis of this law is simply that of 
the general law of association, the neural connections 
being in this case between associative neurones. The 
connections between the thought of one object and that 
of another illustrate the general law of the transmission of 
the nervous impulse along the line of least resistance or 
closest connection. 

Individual Differences in Purely Mental Connec- 
tions. — Individuals differ tremendously in the number 
of purely mental connections which they possess and in 
the time required to make the connection. What is com- 
monly called knowledge is, in psychological terms, mental 
connections, error equalling incorrect connections and 

17 



250 Dynamic Psychology 

ignorance the absence of connections. As people differ 
in the amount of information possessed, so roughly they 
differ in the number of purely mental connections. The 
differences are then obviously tremendous. Individual 
differences in the case of the time it takes for one idea to 
call up another have been proved to exist by actual meas- 
urement. Even among so-called 'normal' children the 
range is such that some children require more than twice 
as long for the same process. If so-called deficient chil- 
dren are included the differences are much more pro- 
nounced. 

Before leaving this general discussion of the laws of 
the connections between the thought of one object and 
the thought of another, I may refer the reader to the 
warning given in § 41. Ideas occasionally, even often, 
come up which are highly improbable so far as frequency, 
recency, vividness, and so on are concerned, and which 
can be attributed only to some at present unaccountable 
disturbance of the nervous system, — some process of in- 
ner change that is beyond our ken. In sleep, fevers and 
mania this is perhaps the rule. 

Exercises 

1. How does the following anecdote illustrate the general 
fact that any idea will call up that idea which has gone with it 
or a part of it? 

Six gentlemen, all unacquainted each with the others, had 
been conversing in a railway carriage. One offered to tell the 
profession of each of the others, provided they answer one ap- 
parently irrelevant question. They agreed. "He drew five leaves 
from his note-book, wrote a question on' each, and gave one to 
each of his companions with the request that he write the answer 
below. When the leaves were returned to aim, he turned, after 
reading them, without hesitation to the others, and said to the 
first, 'You are a man of science' ; to the second, 'You are a soldier' ; 
to the third, 'You are a philologer'; to the fourth, 'You are a 



Purely Mental Connections 251 

journalist'; to the fifth, 'You are a farmer'. All admitted that 
he was right, whereupon he got out and left the five behind. 
Each wished to know what question the others had received; 
and behold, he had given the same question to each. It ran thus : 
'What being destroys what it has itself brought forth?' 
To this the naturalist had answered, 'vital force' ; the soldier, 
'war'; the philologist, 'Kronos'; the publicist, 'revolution'; the 
farmer, 'a boar'." (H. Steinthal, Einleitimg in die Psychologie 
und S prachwissenschaft, pp. 166-167; quoted in James', Principles 
of Psychology, vol. II., p. 108.) 

2. Arrange the connections given below in three groups ac- 
cording to the amount of Thought 1 that is active in calling up 
Thought 2. 

A. Thought 1. Seeing a wrought-iron letter-rack on the 

breakfast table. 
Thought 2. I thought, 'That has been made by a student 
in the manual training class.' 

B. Thought 1. 2 of A. 

2. What is the value of manual training? 

C. " 1. 2 of B. 

2. Men engaged in education are now looking 
to the practical in life. 

D. Thought 1. Thought of my physician. 

2. " his asking me to study medicine. 

E. " 1. 2 of D. 

2. Thought of my replying that I was afraid of 
contagious diseases. 

F. " 1. 3X9- 

2. 27. 

G. 1. A noun is the name 

" 2 of a thing. 

3. What per cent, of the connections in each of the following 
passages exemplify total or nearly total activity of the antecedent 
thought? Can you recall other quotations showing the same dif- 
ference? In what sort of intellects are mental connections made 
by the total or nearly total activity of the antecedent? 

I. " 'But where could you hear it?' cried Miss Bates. 'Where 
could you possibly hear it, Mr. Knightley? For it is not five min- 
utes since I received Mrs. Cole's note — no, it cannot be more than 
five — or at least ten — for I had got my bonnet and spencer on, 



252 Dynamic Psychology 

just ready to come out — I was only gone down to speak to Patty 
again about the pork — Jane was standing in the passage — were 
you not, Jane? — for my mother was so afraid that we had not 
any salting-pan large enough. So I said I would go down and 
see, and Jane said: "Shall I go down instead? for I think you 
have a little cold, and Patty has been washing the kitchen." "Oh, 
my dear," said I — well, and just then came the note. A Miss Haw- 
kins — that's all I know — a Miss Hawkins, of Bath. But, Mr. 
Knightley, how could you possibly have heard it? for the very 
moment Mr. Cole told Mrs. Cole of it, she sat down and wrote 
to me. A Miss Hawkins — ' " (Jane Austen, "Emma" quoted 
by James, Principles of Psychology, vol. I, p. 571.) 

II. "She always was clever," said poor Mrs. Nickleby, bright- 
ening up, "always from a baby. I recollect when she was only 
two years and a half old, that a gentleman who used to visit very 
much at our house — Mr. Watkins, you know, Kate, my dear, that 
your poor papa went bail for, who afterwards ran away to the 
United States, and sent us a pair of snow shoes, with such an af- 
fectionate letter that it made your poor dear father cry for a week. 
You remember the letter? In which he said that he was very- 
sorry h? couldn't repay the fifty pounds just then, because his 
capital was all out at interest, and he was very busy making his 
fortune, but that he didn't forget you were his god-daughter, and 
he should take it very unkind if we didn't buy you a silver coral 
and put it down to his old account? Dear me, yes, my dear, how 
stupid you are! and spoke so affectionately about the old port 
wine that- he used to drink a bottle and a half of every time he 
came. You must remember, Kate." 

"Yes, yes, mamma; what of him?" 

"Why, that Mr. Watkins, my dear," said Mrs. Nickleby, 
slowly, as if she were making a tremendous effort to recollect 
something of paramount importance; "that Mr. Watkins — he 
wasn't any relation, Miss Knag will understand, to the Watkins 
who kept the Old Boar in the village ; by the by, I don't remember 
whether it was the Old Boar or the George the Third, but it was 
one of the two, I know, and it's much the same — that Mr. Watkins 
said, when you were only two years and a half old, that you were 
one of the most astonishing children he ever saw. He did indeed, 
Miss Knag, and he wasn't at all fond of children, and couldn't 
have had the slightest motive for doing it. I know it was he who 
said so, because I recollect as well as if it was only yesterday, his 



Purely Mental Connections 253 

borrowing twenty pounds of her poor dear papa the very moment 
afterwards." (Nicholas Nickleby.) 

III. "To be, or not to be: that is the question: 
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer 

The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, 

Or to take arms against a sea of troubles, 

And by opposing end them ? To die : to sleep ; 

No more ; and by a sleep to say we end 

The heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks 

That flesh is heir to, 'tis a consummation 

Devoutly to be wish'd. To die, to sleep; 

To sleep : perchance to dream ; ay, there's the rub ; 

For in that sleep of death what dreams may come 

When we have shuffled off this mortal coil, 

Must give us pause : there's the respect 

That makes calamity of so long life; 

For who would bear the whips and scorns of time, 

The oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely, 

The pangs of despised love, the law's delay, 

The insolence of office and the spurns 

That patient merit of the unworthy takes, 

When he himself might his quietus make 

With a bare bodkin? who would fardels bear, 

To grunt and sweat under a weary life, 

But that the dread of something after death, 

The undiscover'd country from whose bourn 

No traveller returns, puzzles the will 

And makes us rather bear those ills we have 

Than fly to others that we know not of?" 

IV. "Two beggars told me 

I could not miss my way: will poor folks lie, 
That have afflictions on them knowing 'tis 

A punishment or trial? Yes; no wonder, 

When rich ones scarce tell true. To lapse in fulness 

Is sorer than to lie for need, and falsehood 

Is worse in kings than beggars. My dear lord ! 

Thou art one o' the false ones. Now I think on thee, 

My hunger's gone ; but even before, I was 

At point to sink for food. But what is this? 

Here is a path to 't : 'tis some savage hold: 



254 Dynamic Psychology 

I were best not call ; I dare not call : yet famine, 
Ere clean it o'erthrow nature, makes it valiant. 
Plenty and peace breeds cowards: hardness ever 
Of hardiness is mother." 

(Cymbeline, Act III., Scene VI.) 

4. (a) Give two illustrations of connections of the X Y type 

(see page 242). 

(b) Give two illustrations of connections of the X Z type 

(see page 242). 

(c) Give two illustrations of connections of the X V type 

(see -page 242). 

(d) Give two illustrations of connections of the X W type 

(see page 242). 

5. (a) Which element of the total thought, Tuesday, elec- 
tion day, being a holiday, the stores will be closed,' would be most 
likely to be operative in calling up the next thought in the mind 
of a candidate for office? In the mind of a school boy? In the 
mind of a housekeeper? 

(b) Compose a similar illustration. 

6. (a) Give three illustrations of one idea calling up a cer- 
tain one of its previous associates because of the frequency of the 
connection, (b) Give three illustrations of the power of recency 
of connection, (c) Three of the power of vividness. Three of 
the power of membership in the same mental system. 

7. Give the most probable causes for the connections which 
are shown by. the following trains of thought. That is, state in 
the case of each connection whether the sequent was called up be- 
cause it was the only connection or because it was the most fre- 
quent connection or because it was the most recent or because it 
was the most vivid, etc. 

"I saw a paper which I had written for the course in phil- 
osophy. 

I wondered whether the paper would be accepted. 

Then I wondered what criticism I would get. 

That reminded me that I must study my philosophy lesson. 

Then I thought that the lesson was about Aristotle. 

This reminded me that he was called the father of the sciences. 

Then I thought about his logic. 



Purely Mental Connections 255 

This reminded me of Harris' treatment of logic in his 'Psy- 
chologic Foundations.' 

By thinking of the word psychologic I thought of psychology. 

Then I thought of the psychology class. 

That reminded me that I had not yet written out any train 
of thought." 

"Yesterday we received a letter from my sister who is off on a 
yachting trip. One of the men on board is a young fellow who is 
to be an assistant pastor in the fall. This brought up the church, 
and then came the school where I teach, which is just beside the 
church. This brought up one of my old pupils who is now in Ger- 
many. Then came an experience that my brother, who has just 
returned from India, told yesterday of being cheated in a bi- 
cycle tire by some German. The thought of my brother suggested 
India and I thought of some snake stories that he had told about 
that country. The snakes suggested something I had seen in the 
morning paper about some albino snakes at Bronx Park." 

8. Looking in turn at each of the words printed below 
(keep all the later words covered by a card until the first, sec- 
ond and so on have been allowed to call up their associations) 
note and record the fact which it calls up. State the apparent 
cause for each of the connections made. 

seven dress 

name potato 



dinner 




game 


friend 




psychology 


election 




religion 


instinct 




river 


house 




fast 


picture 




Japan 


association 
home 




easy 
walking 




§46. 


Memory 



Memory and the Law of Association.— The terms 
memory and remember are used to refer to ( 1 ) the revival 
of a mental fact in imagination, (2) the revival of a fact 
plus the feeling of its having been in one's experience at 



256 Dynamic Psychology 

some time in the past, (3) the revival of the appropriate 
mental fact in response to a situation, and (4) the revival 
of a movement or set of movements. The causes of the 
revival of movements will be stated in Chapter XVIII. 
The causes of the revival of mental facts are found in 
the general laws describing the formation and operation 
of connections between one mental state and another, the 
revival of mental facts being simply the result of the laws 
of the association of ideas. 

The answer that has been given to the question, 'Given 
any mental state, what idea will be called up ?', will answer 
also the question, 'What decides whether any mental fact 
shall reappear in memory?' The only need for a sep- 
arate section on memory is that some new questions arise 
when the process of mental connection is studied from the 
point of view of the 'to be recalled fact' rather than from 
the point of view of the 'mental fact present.' 

The probability of revival of any mental fact depends 
upon the strength of the original impression and the num- 
ber of situations which lead to it. If fact A is impressed 
deeply, it will by the laws of intensity tend to be called up. 
If there are a hundred mental states which have led to fact 
A, it has by the law of association a hundred times the 
chance of being called up that it would have if there were 
only one mental state which had led to it. 

To make sure that a mental fact will reappear, e.g., 
that you do not forget to write a letter to Mr. A, you may 
either fix firmly the fact by attending to it, repeating it, 
etc. ; or you may arrange so that many of the day's situa- 
tions will call up the fact 'Write a letter to Mr. A,' e.g., 
by saying to yourself: 'After dinner I must write to A. 
When I get home I must write to A. Before I go to bed 
I must write to A. Do nothing until A is written to.' 

To recall a fact we try one after another those facts 



Purely Mental Connections 257 

which have gone with the desired fact in the hope that 
some one of them will call it up. Thus in trying to think 
of a certain man's name we think of the different occa- 
sions when we have seen and spoken to him, of the things 
he did, of the persons who also know and may have 
spoken of him, of his appearance and ways and the like, 
of names that we feel are like his name. 

Appropriate Revival. — For practical purposes it is 
not the mere revival of a mental fact that counts but its 
revival at the proper situation. To recall this man's 
name is useless unless it is recalled at the sight of his face. 
To recall 1763 is useless unless it is recalled in connection 
with the Treaty of Paris or some other relevant fact. To 
recall 8:42 is useless unless it is recalled in connection 
with 'the train goes at.' Thus the problem of memory 
becomes still more similar to that of the association of 
ideas in general. In arranging for the revival of a mental 
fact, we commonly arrange for its connection with a 
particular situation. We try to make sure that 8 will be 
thought of and thought of after 4+4; that Shakspere will 
be thought of and thought of with Hamlet, Lear and 
Othello. 

Goodness of memory depends upon the permanence of 
impressions, the permanence of connections, their number 
and their nature or arrangement. To have a first class 
memory one must retain for long the effects of an impres- 
sion, must retain for long the effects of a connection, 
must have a goodly number of connections and must have 
things connected in logical, useful ways. It is better, for 
instance, to remember amat for a year than for a day and 
to keep the connection 'he loves is amat' for a year than 
for a day ; to have a hundred such connections rather than 
one; to have fifty connections like he loves — amat, they 
love — amant, I love — amo, amabat — he was loving, 



258 Dynamic Psychology 

amaverant — they had loved, rather than fifty like amo- 
amas, amas-amat, amat-amamus, amamus-amatis, amatis- 
amant, amant-amabam. 

These facts are well illustrated in the stock methods of 
memorizing; Repetition, Concentration and Recall. Repe- 
tition strengthens both the impressions and the connection 
between them and is easy and natural, but is somewhat 
wasteful of time. Concentration, or prolonged attention 
to the fact to be remembered, strengthens the impressions 
and the connection- between them and saves time, but at 
the expense of effort. Recall (i.e., the expression from 
within of the fact to be remembered, after one or more 
impressions of it from without) gains the extra advantage 
of forming the connection in the way in which it will be 
required to act later 1 and is conceded to be the best method 
of the three. 

The general permanence of impressions and con- 
nections, the mere retentiveness of the mind, is decided 
largely by original capacity and the general conditions of 
bodily health. The permanence of any particular im- 
pression or connection depends also upon the degree of 
attention given to it, its vividness, and the frequency of its 
repetition. The number of connections depends upon 
experience or training. The choice of logical and useful 
connections depends upon experience as directed by the 
capacity to see the essential elements in situations. 

Individual Differences in Memory. — Individual dif- 
ferences in the power to remember are among the most 
striking found in mental life. For some it is a heavy 
burden to keep in mind the names of a hundred friends, 
the necessary detail of a single business or profession, 

1 The connection required is to think of B on seeing A ; it is 
therefore more useful to practice 'see A think B' rather than 'see A 
see B.' 



Purely Mental Connections 259 

and perhaps a hundreth part of what is learned. For 
others there seems no need of more than a casual impres- 
sion to fix a thing in memory. Of such a one James 
writes, 

"He never keeps a written note of anything*, yet is 
never at a loss for a fact which he has once heard. He 
remembers the old addresses of all his New York 
friends living in numbered streets, addresses which 
they themselves have long since moved away from and 
forgotten. He says that he should probably recognize 
an individual fly, if he had seen him thirty years pre- 
vious — he is, by the way, an entomologist. As an in- 
stance of his desultory memory, he was introduced to 
a certain colonel at a club. The conversation fell upon 
the signs of age in man. The colonel challenged him 
to estimate his age. He looked at him, and gave the 
exact day of his birth, to the wonder of all. But the 
secret of this accuracy w r as that, having picked up 
some days previously an army-register, he had idly 
turned over its list of names, with dates of birth, 
graduation, promotions, etc., attached, and when the 
colonel's name was mentioned to him at the club, these 
figures, on which he had not bestowed a moment's 
thought, involuntarily surged up in his mind." 1 

These differences are due to (1) differences in the 
original capacity to retain impressions and connections, 
(2) differences in interest and (3) differences in the 
training of the capacity. The excellent memory for 
names as connected with faces so often found amongst 
clergymen and politicians is probably a case of interest. 
Names are attended to and thought over because of the 
professional interest in them. Many a woman of gen- 
erally feeble memory can remember every dress she has 
owned since she was ten years old. The reason that men 
of poor general capacity to retain do as well as they do 
in the memory work of science, business and other walks 
1 Principles of Psychology, I, p. 661. 



2(5o Dynamic Psychology 

of life is apparently that they train themselves to learn 
facts in the most logical and useful ways and so get on 
with a little material well ordered. 

Exercises 

i. What means do you yourself take to make sure of re- 
membering a fact? Explain why each is useful. 

2. What fact probably explains both of the following cases ? — 
A young man knew by heart a large percentage of the products 

of every number up to a thousand by every number up to a thou- 
sand; he could give .the population of hundreds of cities and 
counties. He did not remember names or poetry or miscellaneous 
facts much, if any, better than" a person of moderately good 
memory. 

An ignorant waiter, whose duty it was to care for hats and 
coats left at the door of a hotel dining room, is reported to have 
never made a mistake in years in recalling which hat belonged to 
which man of the hundreds who came to the hotel each day. 

3. Which would be the better way to commit to memory a 
speech, to sit in one's chair and read it to oneself or to stand up, 
and say it out loud? 

4. Find what evidence you can from your knowledge of 
yourself and of your acquaintances to support the following state- 
ments : — 

(a) A good memory over a short interval does not imply a 
good memory over a long interval, (b) A good logical memory 
may go with a very poor verbal memory, (c) Very stupid 
people may have excellent memories. 

§ 47. The Control of Purely Mental Connections 

Habit Rules Thought. — If one desires to have one 
fact call up another, the two should be put together. 
The certainty of the recall will depend upon the frequency 
and vigor with which the two are put together. Thought 
like conduct is a matter of habit, and habits result only 
from painstaking connections. The intellect does not 
work logically or usefully of its own accord, but only by 
being practiced in or habituated to logical and useful 



Purely Mental Connections 261 

associations of mental facts. For instance, the person 
cannot help becoming intellectually commonplace who 
habitually listens to and participates in such talk as: 
"I saw Mrs. Jones yesterday. She was going down 
town." ''She told me she was going to buy a hat." 
"Yes, she showed it to me this morning. She said it 
cost twenty dollars." "I don't believe she paid cash. The 
Jones live away beyond their income." "Mr. Jones' health 
is not very good, I'm told; it would be very hard for them 
if he broke down." "It has been a terrible winter for 
sickness," etc., etc., etc. 

Adult students who are by nature of a superior intel- 
lectual calibre and by training supplied with many useful 
systems of connections between facts, are prone to forget 
the bondage to purely habitual associations which masters 
less gifted and less mature minds. The following exam- 
ples will help to make real the true state of affairs, and to 
emphasize the obvious but neglected practical rule : Put 
together facts which you wish to go together, and keep 
apart facts which you wish to be separate : — 

Children are found to learn long division far more 
easily if in short division they are taught to put the line 
above or at the right of, instead of below, the dividend 
and the quotient above the line or to the right of it, thus : 
4| 0% or 4I1688I422. The reason is of course that they 
are saved the trouble of forming a new and contradictory 
set of associations when they begin long division. 

Children taught the numbers from 1 to 20 and then 
from 20 to 40 or higher are found to have difficulty, after 
learning to write those from 20 to 40, in writing those 
from 13 to 19, although in their first learning they had had 
no trouble. The errors made are writing 61 for sixteen, 
81 for eighteen and the like. The reason is that they form 
with the numbers above twenty the association of putting 
the digit denoted by the first part of the word first in order 
and the digit denoted by the second part of the word sec- 



262 Dynamic Psychology 

ond in order. Thus thirty-eight is 38, twenty-six is 26. 
When now they hear sixteen or eighteen, they tend to 
follow the recent habit of making the order of digits the 
order of the syllables of the word. 

Three quarters of a page of a magazine contained an 
advertisement of the Oneita Clothing. One quarter of it 
contained an advertisement of the Munsing Clothing. 
Many people sent to the Munsing Company orders for the 
Oneita Clothing. 



Systems of Associations. — The arrangement of 
mental connections in useful systems adds greatly to their 
efficiency. Just as science orders the incoherent mass of 
experiences of the world at large, so any individual may, 
by having facts presented to him in coherent systems and 
by being encouraged to recall facts in a logical order, 
become a more efficient thinker. 

The capacity to make connections with some element 
of the antecedent thought, — i.e., the capacity for partial 
activity, — is on the whole more valuable than that for 
total activity. We should train ourselves to survey each 
fact and to select its essential element or feature to be the 
antecedent to the next thought. To learn the gist of a 
passage is thus often a more profitable task than to learn 
it verbatim. 

Apart from inborn capacity the efficiency of a man's 
memory depends on his general health, the degree of 
attention he bestows on facts, the care with which he 
arranges them into systems, and the zeal with which he 
works over these facts, recalling them, comparing them 
and thinking about them. Any training which teaches 
us (1) to consider facts fully and thoughtfully, (2) to 
compare them, to put those together which belong to- 
gether and to study their relationships, and (3) to recall 
them on all suitable occasions, so as to connect them with 



Purely Mental Connections 265 

relevant facts of daily life, will improve memories so far 
as they are improvable. 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, XVI. (253-271), XVIII. 
Stout, Manual, 418-446. 

Titchener, Outline, §§ 52-55. 

B. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, §§ 60-64. 
James, Principles, XIV., XVI. (653-689). 

Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, XIX. (§§ 1-4). 



CHAPTER XVII 

The Connections Between One Mental State and 
Another (Continued) 

§ 48. Purposive Thinking 

Purposive Thinking Equals Spontaneous Thinking 
Plus Selection. — We distinguish spontaneous or aim- 
less thinking from controlled or purposive thinking. In 
the former ideas flow on at random, unchecked by any 
interference on the part of our general intentions and 
aiming at no desired goal. The prattle of babies, the 
reveries and haphazard trains of thought which come as 
we sit idly thinking of nothing in particular, and the 
majority of dreams are of this sort. In the latter some 
end is in view; our thoughts are kept so far as may be 
under control and make an intelligible sequence. 

The connections in controlled thinking follow the same 
law as those in spontaneous thinking. The difference is 
that in controlled thinking each thought as it comes is 
attended to; its usefulness is judged in the light of our 
general system of ideas and purposes concerning the topic 
in hand; it is allowed to remain and influence the future 
course of thought only when it seems fit. So also of any 
total thought, that element which seems most useful to our 
purpose is definitely selected, attended to and encouraged 
to call up its connections. In spontaneous thinking we 
take whatever comes. In controlled thinking we select 
and reject in view of the goal we wish to attain. 

264 



Purely Mental Connections 265 

This process of attentive consideration and selection or 
rejection is clearly shown in the search for a proper word 
to express a meaning, in attempts to solve problems of all 
sorts, from the simplest riddle or puzzle to the most 
abstruse question in mathematics or science, and in sum- 
moning evidence to support an argument. E.g., you wish 
an adjective to describe a person who habitually enjoys 
what you do to entertain him, puts himself at your point 
of view and disagrees with nobody. You think : "Affa- 
ble — no! that means more active effort at being pleasant 
— agreeable — no! agreeing would do better — apprecia- 
tive — yes ! but that doesn't include his readiness to accept 
almost any statement — compliant would mean that, but 
misses the appreciative, easily suited nature — complaisant 
— no ! that isn't it at all — suitable — we ought to be free to 
use suitable to mean one who can be suited, can be 
pleased — pleasable is just it and isn't ambiguous. That's 
the word. He is a pleasable man." 

The Process of Selection. — Selection and survival 
of the fit thoughts ; inhibition and elimination of the unfit 
— these are the essentials of purposive thinking. The 
forces that select and inhibit are the feeling of approval 
or satisfaction and its opposite. The inhibition of the 
unfit thought is often accompanied by feelings of effort; 
often the unfit thought is banished only by voluntary at- 
tention to something else. Thoughts of play will intrude 
while the pupil is working out a problem in geometry, 
and their expulsion, or, — what is the same thing, — the 
persistence of attention to the geometry, becomes a matter 
of effort. It would be wrong, however, to make volun- 
tary attention or the feeling of effort, the sine qua non 
of purposive thinking. Efficient, controlled thought may 
go on with little or no feeling of effort. Connection after 
connection may be made, all leading steadily toward the 

18 



266 Dynamic Psychology 

desired end; irrelevant ideas may occur but seldom and, 
when they do occur, be pushed aside without any strug- 
gle. The following account by Galton of his own thinking 
illustrates this and also the general characteristics of the 
process of connection in purposive thinking. 

"When I am engaged in trying to think anything out, 
the process of doing so appears to me to be this : The 
ideas that lie at any moment within my full consciousness 
seem to attract of their own accord the most appropriate 
out of a number of other ideas that are lying close at 
hand, but imperfectly within the range of my conscious- 
ness. There seems to be a presence-chamber in my mind 
where full consciousness holds court, and where two or 
three ideas are at the same time an audience, and an ante- 
chamber full of more or less allied ideas, which is situated 
just beyond the full ken of consciousness. Out of this 
antechamber the ideas most nearly allied to those in the 
presence-chamber appear to be summoned in a mechani- 
cally logical way, and to have their turn of audience. 

"The successful progress of thought appears to depend 
— first, on a large attendance in the antechamber; sec- 
ondly, on the presence there of no ideas except such as 
are strictly germane to the topic under consideration ; 
thirdly, on the justness of the logical mechanism that 
issues the summons. The thronging of the antechamber 
is, I am convinced, altogether beyond my control; if the 
ideas do not appear, I cannot create them, nor compel 
them to come. The exclusion of alien ideas is accom- 
panied by a sense of mental effort and volition whenever 
the topic under consideration is unattractive, otherwise it 
proceeds automatically, for if an intruding idea finds 
nothing to cling to, it is unable to hold its place in the 
antechamber, and slides back again. An animal absorbed 
in a favorite occupation shows no sign of painful effort of 
attention ; on the contrary, he resents interruption that 
solicits his attention elsewhere. 

"The consequence of all this it that the mind frequently 
does good work without the slightest exertion." 1 

1 Inquiries into Human Faculty, p. 203. 



Purely Mental Connections 267 

§ 49. Reasoning 

The word reasoning has no exact accepted meaning. 
Its most general meaning, which will be adopted here, is 
purposive thinking which solves, or tries to solve, new 
problems. The man who thinks of whipping his horse 
to make him go out from his barn, does not reason. But 
the man who, when the horse refuses to go out, procures 
a bucket of oats, lets the horse begin to eat them and 
while his attention is thus distracted, gently leads it out 
through the door, reasons; for he solves a problem for 
which ordinary habits of thought or action do not suffice. 
In reasoning, then, we deal with new data or with old 
data in new ways ; we break away from the field of con- 
crete habits and particular associations. 

Inductions and Deductions. — The logic books divide 
reasonings into inductions, in which the examination 
of many particular facts leads to a general conclusion, 
and deductions, in which some general conclusion already 
found leads to another general conclusion or to a judg- 
ment about some particular fact. When a student finds 
that hydrochloric acid and zinc produce hydrogen and 
zinc chloride, that nitric acid and silver produce hydrogen 
and silver nitrate and so on, and therefore concludes 
that any acid will combine with any metal to form a salt, 
he reasons by induction. When he argues that since the 
sum of the three angles of a triangle equals two right 
angles, the sum of the two acute angles of a right triangle 
will equal one right angle, or that the three angles of 
such and such a particular figure will equal two right 
angles, he reasons by deduction. 

In both cases the process involves the analysis of facts 
into their elements and the selection of the element that 
is, or is thought to be, instructive. In the case of the 



268 Dynamic Psychology 

inductive reasoning, the student must have thought, not 
of the total appearances of the chemicals with which he 
experimented, but of the elements; acid-quality, metal- 
quality and salt-quality. In the first case of deductive 
reasoning, he must have thought, not of the form or di- 
rection of the two angles of a right triangle, but of their 
equality to 'three angles of a triangle minus one right 
angle/ In the second he discards from attention all 
the features of the figure (size, shape, etc.) except the 
'being a surface inclosed by three straight lines in the 
same plane.' 

The important factors in inductive reasoning are fer- 
tility of association, to call up a sufficient number of 
particular facts; the capacity to select their common ele- 




S 



Fig. 82. 

ments by the working of the law of dissociation ; and the 
capacity to judge which of the elements is the essential 
one for the end in view. Fertility of knowledge, power of 
abstraction and sagacity in selection make the efficient 
inductive reasoner. One may fail by not having the facts 
to begin with, by not being able to analyze them or by 
neglecting their vital feature. Thus one could not reason 
well about the cause of malaria who had never studied 
cases of it, or who could not separate the phenomenon as 
a whole into its conditions, cause, symptoms, effects, and 
the like ; and one could never get the right answer who 
studied the high body-temperature, or the mental lassitude, 
or the occurrence in swampy places, neglecting the 'hav- 
ing the malarial parasite in the blood' feature. 



Purely Mental Connections 269 

The important factors in deductive reasoning are the 
power of abstraction, enabling one to break up a given 
fact into its elements, fertility of knowledge of the proper- 
ties of these elements and sagacity in the choice of the 
essential one. To take a very simple case, to prove that 'if 
one straight line cuts another straight line, the vertical 
angles are equal/ a school-boy must be able to think of the 
angle AOB (see Fig. 82) as B O D— D O A or as 
A O C— B O C, and of D O C as A O C—D O A or as 
B O D— B O C, and of B O D or O A C as a straight line. 
He must have the sagacity to see that for the end in view 
he must think ofAOBasBO D — D O A in combina- 
tion with the thought of D O C as A O C—D O A or of 
A O B as A O C — B O C in combination with the thought 
of D O C as B O D— B O C. 

To take another case, one must, to draw the right 
conclusion about the treatment of a diseased condition 
of the throat, be able to distinguish its different symptoms, 
must attend to the presence of the Klebs-Loeffler bacillus 
as the vital feature, and know the property of that bacillus 
as the cause of diphtheria and the property of diphtheria 
as curable by antitoxin. 

We may expect to find efficient reasoning only where 
the capacities to dissociate and to make associations by 
partial activity are well developed. Its rarity in com- 
parison with the ability to learn by mere association and 
to remember, is due to the comparative rarity of these two 
capacities. When they are present in a high degree and 
are supported by a wide range of knowledge about the 
topic in question, the results in reasoning seem to ordinary 
mortals miraculous. We can hardly keep from believing 
that the flights of great genius are the result of an inscrut- 
able capacity for being right where others are wrong. 

It is, however, possible to understand the miracle, 



270 Dynamic Psychology 

The purposive thinking of the genius is wonderful, but 
not because it is of a mysteriously different kind from that 
of ordinary men. The marvel is in the superior activity 
of the processes of dissociation or abstraction by which 
a fact reveals to the genius elements or aspects never 
before seen in it, and in the superior fertility by which 
one after another of the consequences of this new insight 
are passed in review and so used to test its value. 

Training in Reasoning. — (1) Facts to reason with 
are the first essential to progress in reasoning. It is by 
other facts that the pertinence of any fact is judged; it 
is by calling up some decisive fact that the selected 
element brings the thinker nearer to the desired con- 
clusion. 

(2) Practice in attending to the parts or elements of 
facts, in examining each detail, in thinking of things not 
in their gross total appearance but in their different 
aspects and with respect to their different features, is the 
second essential. The student must learn to conquer 
facts by dividing them. 

(3) The greatest aid in this process is comparison. 
Elements appear in a fact when it is in juxtaposition with 
others which would never be noticed in it by itself. 
Thinking things together, putting them in groups, looking 
for similars and opposites, supplanting the random order 
of the world's facts by an arrangement into classes, — into 
likes and unlikes, causes and effects, conditions and 
dependents and the like, — is the preliminary to insight 
into the world's nature. It furnishes the opportunity for 
the law of dissociation to operate. 

(4) Practice in criticising one's ideas, — in asking 
'Does this fit the problem?' 'Is this a relevant, useful 
idea?' 'Where will this fact lead?' 'Am I on the right 
track?' — will improve the power to select wisely and to 



Purely Mental Connections 271 

resist the attractions of unessential ideas. This process 
of criticism, of learning to judge whether the idea present 
is the one essential to the end in view, will be improved 
(5) by knowledge of the common fallacies or mistakes 
to which thinking is subject, and of the useful methods 
of verification of thought by appeal to observation and 
experiment. Practice in detecting fallacies and verifying 
conclusions is the business of logic and scientific method, 
not of psychology. 

Exercises 

1. Which of the trains of thought of question 3 of the ex- 
ercises following § 45 seem most purposive or controlled? 

2. In which case is it harder to tell whether frequency, re- 
cency or intensity is the cause of the connection, in the connec- 
tions of passage I., of page 251 or in those of passage IV., of 
page 253? 

3. Why? 

4. Notice what happens as you try to think of a word mean- 
ing 'not capable of being taken away from or given away by the 
possessor.' 

5. Note what happens in your mental life when you think 
out the answer to the question, 'What are the opposites of be- 
cause, if, and, adroit, loquacious, to degrade?' 

6. Prove the following proposition : The diagonals of a 
rectangle are equal. Write down every idea you have in the 
course of thinking out the proof. After you have finished, ex- 
amine the series of ideas recorded and note instances of selection 
and of rejection. 

7. Compare a passage involving reasoning with a simple 
descriptive passage of equal length : — * 

(a) In the number of general notions. 

(b) " " " " abstract notions. 

(c) " " " " intellectual relationships. 

(d) " " " associations by focal activity. 
Experiment 26. Spontaneous and Controlled Association. — 

Cover the lists of words printed below and look at them only as 
necessary for the experiment. 

1 Selections of the one sort will be readily found in text books 
on mathematics, physics, economics and the like ; and of the other 
sort in novels or biographies. 



2J2 



Dynamic Psychology 



Get a friend to measure, with a stop watch if one is obtain- 
able, the time taken in calling up the things or words suggested 
by the words in list A. That is, uncover the words at a given 
signal, looking at the first word. As soon as any thing or word 
comes to your mind, look at the second ; as soon as it arouses an 
idea look at the third and so on. When the tenth word has 
called up its associated idea record the time that has elapsed in 
seeing the ten words and thinking of ten things. 

Do the same with lists B, C and D except that the idea called 
up must mean in every case the opposite of the thing or quality 
meant by the printed word (e. g., for work you must think play, 
or be idle or the like, for friend you must think enemy or foe or 
the like). 

Compare the times taken in the four cases. Record, so far 
as you can remember them, any instances of the inhibition of 
irrelevant or misleading ideas that came to mind in the course 
of thinking of the opposites of list D. 



A. 


B. 


C. 


D. 


house 


day 


permanent 


proud 


tree 


long 


to spend 


weary 


child 


boy 


to reveal 


permit 


time 


white 


motion 


genuine 


art 


outside 


separate 


to respect 


London 


good 


rude 


precise 


Napoleon 


poor 


simple 


obnoxious 


think 


to hate 


grand 


unitary 


red 


yes 


frequently 


scatter 


enough 


above 


broken 


particular 



Experiment 27. Spontaneous and Controlled Association. — 
(a) With pencil in hand read the passage that follows, writing 
in each of the blank spaces the very iirst word that comes to mind 
as you read. Have some one note the number of seconds which 
the experiment takes. Read the same passage as before, writ- 
ing in each of the blank spaces the word which seems to you the 
right one. Have some one note the time taken as before. Des- 
cribe the differences between the two mental processes. 

The world is too much with us; late and soon, 

Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers: 

Little we see in Nature that is ; 

We have given our hearts away, a boon ! 



Purely Mental Connections 273 

The Sea that bares her bosom to the moon ; 

The winds that will be at all ; 

And are up-gathered now like flowers ; 

For this, for , we are out of tune; 

It moves us not. Great God ! I'd rather be 

A suckled in a creed ; 

So might I, standing on this lea, 

Have that would make me less ; 



Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea; 
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn, 
(b) Do likewise with the following passage : — 

Transportation. — The transporting of running 

water as the sixth-power of the velocity. Even at this 

enormous of increase, blocks of stone of many hundreds of 

tons weight, such as are often found in the of glaciers, 

would require, if carried by , an almost incredible . 

But glaciers carry resting on their surfaces, and therefore 

of all sizes, with ease. Rock-fragments of thousands of 

tons are by them and left in path by retreat. 

Again: fragments carried by water are always more or less 
bruised, worn, and rounded, while fragments carried on the sur- 
face of are . Again, water-currents set down blocks 

of stone in positions ; while glaciers, in their slow melting, 

often leave them perched in positions, and even some- 
times as rocking-stones. 

References 

A. James Briefer Course, XVI. (271-279), XXII. 
Stout, Manual, 447-458. 

Titchener, Outline, §§ 84-85. 

B. James, Principles, XXII. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

The Connections Between Mental States and Acts : 
Connections of Expression 

§ 50. The General Laws of Human Action 

The same laws which describe the connections between 
sense stimuli and mental states and between one mental 
state and another, apply to the connections between mental 
states and movements. 

The Law of Instinct. — Given any mental state, that 
movement will be made which the inborn constitution of 
the nervous system has connected with the mental state 
or part of it. The baby reaches for a bright object seen 
because by inner organization that sense-presentation con- 
nects with that act. For the same reason he puts the 
object into his mouth when he feels it within his grasp. 
The boy puts up his arm and wards off a blow, and 
strikes back at the giver of the blow, because his brain 
is so organized by nature as to connect those responses 
with those situations. 

The Law of Association. — Given any mental state, 
that movement will be made which has been connected 
with it or part of it most frequently, most recently, in the 
most vivid experience and with the most resulting satis- 
faction, and which has been so connected with the general 
system of thought and conduct present. We say five 
when we think five ; we take off our clothes when we 
decide to go to bed ; we shake hands with a caller ; we pat 
a dog ; we stroke a kitten ; we put a hat on our head and a 

274 



Connections of Expression 275 

coat over our shoulders — because in the past we have done 
so and without discomfort. Each of the factors noted 
finds illustrations in any day's experiences. 

We put cheese in our mouths and keep soap out of our 
mouths, put our hands in water and not in fire, because 
the opposite connections have brought discomfort. We 
say man and not mensch or homme when we mean a man, 
or sit on chairs rather than on the floor, chiefly because 
we have made those connections so often. We say, 'How 
do you do/ to a friend if we see him on the street but do 
not if we see him in church, because the connection made 
in the case of the general system has been avoided in the 
case of the 'in church' system. For the same reason the 
girl in her 'teens may be of a delicate and ethereal appetite 
in her 'party system' and in the presence of strangers, 
but seizes and devours 'pork and beans, and beef and 
greens' in the 'at home in the pantry' system. Recency 
is not so common an influence in the case of connections 
of expression as it is in the case of purely mental con- 
nections. Its influence is clearly seen, however, in the 
experience, common in pronunciation, typewriting and 
games of skill, of repeating two or three times within a 
few minutes an error or blunder once made. So also, if 
you have been signing ten or twelve letters with someone 
else's name and then turn to a letter of your own, you will 
often perform the recent act instead of the right and far 
more frequent one. The influence of vividness or in- 
tensity is often hard to separate from that of satisfaction 
and discomfort, but is witnessed by such facts as the 
following: In walking up a flight of, say, eight steps 
which we traverse often in the day time, we always then 
step out forward instead of up after the eighth step is 
reached. Yet in walking up them in the dark the situa- 
tion 'eighth step reached' does not securely produce the 



2j6 Dynamic Psychology 

movement of stepping out forward, for, though so fre- 
quently made, the situation and act have lacked vividness, 
have been only in the margin of thought and little 
attended to, since in day-light the vivid and attended-to 
facts have been the sight of the steps and their sur- 
roundings. 

The Law of Assimilation in the Case of Connec- 
tions of Expression. — If the mental state is a new one, 
that movement will follow it which would follow a famil- 
iar state like it. Thus the person unused to the para- 
phernalia of the breakfast table responds to the sight of a 
finger bowl by drinking from it ; the baby runs to pick up 
a bird; Sir Walter Raleigh's servant threw a bucket of 
water on him when he saw him smoking a pipe. 

The fact of instinct, the general law of association and 
its supplement, the law of assimilation, thus are operative 
in the case of the facts of conduct as well as in the case of 
those of sense perception and thought. 

The Law of Analysis. — The application of the law 
of dissociation or analysis to movements was made in 
Chapter XIV. Suffice it to say that elements of complex 
movements come to appear in isolation when the same 
movement has been made in many different combinations 
and that after they acquire thus an independent existence, 
they enter into new combinations resulting in what are 
apparently totally new acts. Thus from the complex 
movements involved in its cries and prattling the infant 
develops by dissociation the elementary movements in- 
volved in articulate speech and gradually combines these 
elements by association into new words and phrases. 

§ 51. The Will: Spontaneous and Purposive Action. 

Exceptions to the General Law. — No one will deny 
that nine out of ten or even nine hundred and ninety-nine 



Connections of Expression 277 

out of a thousand of human acts occur in accord with 
these general laws. But do these laws not break down 
in the case of the few, but real and tremendously sig- 
nificant connections when by an effort of will we 
supplant the pleasurable by a painful, the frequent by a 
new, connection? Can man not act against instinct, 
habit and desire by force of pure will? Such possible 
exceptions to the common laws of human behavior may 
best be examined after a distinction between spontaneous 
and controlled action, similar to the distinction made in 
the case of thought, has been explained. 

Spontaneous and Controlled Action. — Spontaneous, 
unintentional and involuntary are three synonymous 
names applied to behavior where the act follows the men- 
tal state without any consciousness of purpose, is done 
without foresight. Controlled, purposive or voluntary 
action means, on the contrary, behavior in which a pur- 
pose is felt, in which we think what we are about and act 
with foresight. To think, 'I must read that book now,' 
and to take and open the volume, is a case of voluntary 
action. When, after I begin to read, my eyes continue 
to move back and forth across the page, the action is 
involuntary. 

Spontaneous actions may be with or without con- 
sciousness. For instance, when one's eyes move in 
ordinary reading, he may not know whether they move or 
not, and almost never knows the frequent stops which 
they make in the course of a line. The name, Automatic 
Action, is used for spontaneous action without conscious- 
ness. Purposive action as defined is never unconscious. 
Spontaneous action is never accompanied by the feeling 
of effort. Purposive action may or may not be accom- 
panied by the feeling of effort. 

Purposive action may occur with or without delibera- 



278 Dynamic Psychology 

tion. Seeing a pin, picking it up and putting it in the 
pincushion ; taking a sheet of paper on thinking of a letter 
to be written ; going to the door on hearing the sound of 
the door-bell — are cases of action without deliberation. 
Seeking a snake and picking it up, if done by one who 
abhors their slimy writhing but wishes to secure a speci- 
men for a scientific friend ; taking a sheet of paper, if done 
after an argument as to whether one can or cannot afford 
to order a certain book; walking toward the door as the 
result of choosing to play rather than work — are cases of 
action after deliberation. 

The feeling of effort is present only in the case of 
deliberative action, and not always then. In deliberative 
action alternatives are present, from which we select. 
Whenever the selected alternative is unattractive, is a 
course of action contrary to natural personal cravings, 
its acceptance is accompanied by a feeling of effort. Or, 
conversely, when a rejected alternative is attractive, is a 
course of action agreeable to natural personal cravings, 
its inhibition is accompanied by a feeling of effort. 

The Nature of the Control. — The control of actions 
means the control of the mental states leading to them. 
In no case do we control acts directly, but only by arous- 
ing or repressing the feelings which would lead to the acts. 
In trying to produce an act we try to put ourselves in the 
frame of mind which will be followed by that act. The 
struggle to keep from doing a certain thing is the struggle 
to keep in check or to banish utterly the feelings that will 
issue in the undesired movements. Of course, of these 
two processes the former involves also putting out of 
mind ideas which will prevent the desired act, and the 
latter keeping in mind ideas which will prevent the un- 
desired act. Thus to produce the act of mailing a letter 
we try simply to remember 'mail letter, mail letter.' To 



Connections of Expression 279 

keep from going to sleep we wash our eyes in cold water 
to stop their heavy, drooping feeling; we stand up and 
shake ourselves to banish the relaxation of the muscles; 
we say to ourselves, 'Go to sleep at this hour with all these 
tasks undone, — nonsense !', to drive out the willingness to 
lie back and snooze. 

The proper frame of mind necessary to produce an 
act often implies the feeling of consent, the feeling of 
'Yes ! Let connections be made. There is no need of 
further postponement. Go ahead !' Just as in purposive 
thought, after the contemplation of an idea which has 
satisfied us with its usefulness as a step in the argument, 
we may feel a peculiar, 'All right, that will do,' which 
means that no further deliberation is necessary; so in 
purposive action, the contemplation of an impulse to 
action often ends in an 'All right, that will do.' Similarly 
the proper frame of mind necessary to prevent an act 
often contains as an important element the feeling of 
denial, the feeling of, 'No ! No ! Halt connections ! 
Wait !' This also has its counterpart in the control of 
thought. 

In every respect, then, the control of purposive action 
is the same process as the control of thought. The same, 
selective agency, attention, chooses what thought shall 
determine action. As in reasoning the sequent thought 
is not created but only chosen ("if the ideas do not 
appear, I cannot create them, nor compel them to come"), 
so in conduct the act is created or 'willed' not directly, but 
only indirectly through such manipulation of the mental 
state as will make it the necessary sequent. What is 
directly selected or rejected in action, as in thought, is a 
mental state. The only difference is that the associate, 
the sequent, is in the one case an idea, in the other a 
movement. 



280 Dynamic Psychology 

The Real Meaning of Acts of Pure Will.— The 
facts stated in the preceding paragraphs provide the real 
meaning and the explanation of those cases where man 
appears to act contrary to the laws of association, in spite 
of instinctive tendencies, pleasurable consequences and 
frequency of connection, by an exertion of pure will. 
They show first of all that the exertion of pure will 
influences acts only indirectly by influencing mental 
states. The will to do a thing is the will to keep a frame 
of mind that will result in the doing of that thing. "The 
will is a relation between the mind and its ideas." "The 
point to which the will is directly applied is always an 
idea." We do not choose movements, but the ideas lead- 
ing to movements. In the second place, the contradic- 
tion of the laws of association is not real, only apparent. 
The ascetic who scourges himself really illustrates those 
very laws, in particular the law of partial activity; for his 
act is the sequent, not of the mere total mental state 'whip 
in hand,' but of the thought, 'Strike, bruise, crucify your 
flesh, feel pain for the glory of God ! Yes ! Yes !', to 
which his act is the natural sequent. The connection 
would be unexpected if the instinctive tendencies felt were 
those of self-preservation, but they are not : they are those 
of self-sacrifice. It would be unexpected if the painful 
consequences were attended to, but they are not : the 
satisfaction of repentance, restitution and peace is the 
main resultant. It would be unexpected if the ante- 
cedent state of mind were that which an ordinary mortal 
would face when thinking of giving himself a beating, 
but it is not : the 'Yes ! Yes', the feeling of acceptance, 
means that the ideas that would lead to opposing acts are 
all banished and that the way is open and unimpeded to 
the movements of scourging oneself, which are, in view 
of the circumstances, the most frequent connection. In 



Connections of Expression 281 

the third place, since the exertion of pure will works al- 
ways upon mental states, it is a feature of thought as well 
as of conduct. Man contributes to the world by knowl- 
edge and belief in the same way as by choice and action. 
The real fact to which experiences of the choice of the 
hard instead of the easy and the rare instead of the usual, 
refer, — the real meaning of the exertion of pure will, — 
is the law of partial activity, — the power of man to 
attend to and cherish whatever frame of mind appeals 
to his general purpose in life or to the ideal of the moment. 
In rational thinking he may discard the customary and 
obvious in favor of some abstract element which appeals 
perhaps to none but him. In controlled action he may 
banish ordinary likes and dislikes, usual habits and im- 
pulses, and elevate to the leadership of his mind some 
ideal purpose, — some motive which defies the claims of 
the majority of men and even those of his own past. His 
will is free in the sense that at any moment what he will 
attend to and cherish depends upon him, upon his attitude 
toward the situation he confronts. Whether it is free in 
the further sense that this attitude would be unpredictable 
even by a perfect intelligence that knew his inborn nature 
and entire previous experience, is a question unanswered 
by science and disputed by philosophers. 

§ 52. The Nature of the Mental States Which Precede 
Movements 

The Problem. — Psychologists have argued much 
about what kinds of mental states are the antecedents 
of movements in purposive action. The arguments con- 
cern chiefly (1) the so-called feelings of innervation, (2) 
the feeling of decision, of consent, of 'let this act be/ the 
Hat, and (3) the memory images of the feelings produced 
by the movement. 

19 



2%2 Dynamic Psychology 

By feelings of innervation are meant feelings directly 
due to the passage of the nervous impulse to efferent 
neurones and through them to the muscles. It is very 
doubtful whether any feelings are so caused. They cer- 
tainly are not essential to the execution of a purposely 
made movement. The feeling of decision has been 
already described. Though of frequent occurrence, 
notably in action after deliberation, it cannot be regarded 
as a sine qua non of purposive action, as defined in this 
book ; for of the thousand intentional acts of a day, only 
a small number are preceded by it. The memory images 
of the feelings produced by the movement are of two 
sorts, Resident and Remote. By resident feelings are 
meant the feelings of tension, movement and the like of 
the moving part, due to the movement itself. By remote 
feelings are meant the feelings of any sort secondarily 
caused by the movement, e<g., the sound due to the move- 
ments of saying a word, the pressure due to grasping a 
stick, or the sight of the clinching and clinched fist due 
to the same movements. 

Any Variety of Mental State May Precede a Volun- 
tary Act. — Nearly all writers on psychology seem sure 
that some special sort of feelings must be present in 
purposive action. Some think the feeling of decision 
must always be there ; some think that feelings of innerva- 
tion must be there ; nearly all think that at least memory 
images of the feelings produced by the movement must 
be there. Only recently has it been argued that after all 
there is no justification for the assumption that any 
peculiar sort of feeling is a necessary element of pur- 
posive action ; that really any mental state whatever may 
be the antecedent of an intentional act. Yet this seems 
easily demonstrable. For instance, I just now completed 
the purposive action of writing, 'Yet this seems easily 



Connections of Expression 283 

demonstrable/ The act was certain ringer and arm 
movements and certain eye movements involved in guid- 
ing them. But my antecedent state of mind contained 
no images whatever of feelings in my fingers, arms or 
eyes, nor even of the sight of the words. It was simply 
the judgment, 'Yet this seems easily demonstrable,' felt 
with the auditory images of the words. A few hours ago 
I signed a lease, and I can confidently affirm that the 
thought antecedent to the act contained no images of any 
sensations in any way connected with the act of writing 
my name, but only the auditory images, 'He came to my 
terms after all.' Professor James, who maintains that 
"whether or no there be anthing else in the mind at the 
moment when we consciously will a certain act, a mental 
conception made up of these sensations (of the movement's 
results) * * * must be there," {Principles, Vol. II, p. 
492) gives illustrations which prove precisely that the 
antecedent to a movement need never have been its 
result. "We say, 'I must go downstairs,' and ere we 
know it we have risen, walked and turned the handle of a 
door." (Idem. p. 519) "Hallo! I must lie here no 
longer," is the antecedent to getting out of bed. (Idem. 

P- 524). 

The Feelings Produced by a Movement Rarely 
Cause It. — In fact, the doctrine that the image of 
some one of the previous results or effects of a movement 
is its necessary antecedent in purposive action makes the 
perversest of mistakes. The antecedent is some one of its 
previous preliminaries or causes. Occasionally what was 
first a result or effect of a movement may later be thought 
of as a preliminary, and so become its antecedent in still 
later connections, but in general what has led to a move- 
ment, not what has come after it, will lead to it on future 
occasions. It is not the image of a mouth full of liquid 



284 Dynamic Psychology 

but the sight of the bottle, that makes the baby reach out 
its hands. It is not the feeling of a brush on one's 
head, but the thought 'I must comb my hair/ that assists 
our toilet. It is not the thought of feeling warm but of 
feeling cold, that commonly makes one build a fire. It is 
the thought of a bill as due, not as having been paid, 
which makes us draw a check. We do not move our eyes 
so as to focus them on an object because we see it clearly, 
but because we don't. We do not eat because we feel full 
in imagination, but because we feel empty in reality. 

Motives. — So also there is no need of restricting the 
word motive to any particular class of feelings. Any 
mental state may serve as a motive. For a motive to 
an act is simply any fact which assists to be present 
and to be approved, a mental state which will have the act 
as its sequent. A motive against the act is simply any 
fact which hinders the presence and approval of a mental 
state which will have the act as its sequent. One of the 
most artificial doctrines about human nature which has 
ever acquired prominence is the doctrine that pleasure 
and pain, felt or imagined, are the only motives to action, 
that a human being is constantly making a conscious or 
unconscious calculation of the amount of each which the 
contemplated act will produce, and that his entire behavior 
is the result of such a lifelong series of complicated sums 
in addition and substraction. Pleasure and pain do play 
a leading role in determining action, but the cast of 
characters includes also percepts, ideas and emotions of 
all sorts. 

Exercises 

1. State in the case of each of the following whether it is an 
instinctive or an acquired connection: — 

Situation Response 

a. A bright light. Blinking 



Connections of Expression 285 



b. 


A bright light. 


Pulling down a curtain. 


c. 


Feeling cold. 


Shivering. 


d. 


Feeling cold. 


Opening a radiator. 


e. 


The sight of a cup of tea. 


Drinking it. 


f. 


The sight of an approaching 






missile. 


Dodging it. 


& 


Feeling sleepy. 


Closing the eyes. 


h. 


The thought, Tt is breakfast 






time'. 


Getting up from bed. 


i. 


The sight of a book. 


Opening it at the first page. 


J. 


Falling. 


Clutching at objects. 


k. 


A blow received. 


A blow given. 



2. Which three tf the following involve many movements 
acquired through dissociation from more complex movements? — 
Running, wrestling, singing, playing the piano, climbing, writing. 

3. (a) Give two cases of connections of expression acquired 
chiefly by reason of resulting satisfaction, (b) Two acquired 
chiefly by reason of resulting discomfort, (c) Two acquired 
chiefly by reason of mere frequency. 

4. Give five instances of connections all ending in the act of 
shaking hands, the act being in one case spontaneous and uncon- 
scious, in the second case spontaneous but conscious, in the third 
case purposive but without deliberation or effort, in the fourth 
case purposive and with deliberation but without effort, and in 
the fifth case with both deliberation and effort. 

5. Give five similar instances of connections all ending in 
the act of saying, 'Yes'. 

6. Which part of the following train of thought would prob- 
ably be operative in arousing action (a) in a gourmand, (b) in a 
philanthropist, (c) in a proud and honest business man, (d) in a 
dandy? — "I have only ten dollars. I owe Jones eight. How 
hungry I am. That woman opposite looks half-starved. Her 
clothes are as shabby as mine." 

7. In a railroad accident a lady was mortally injured. Hav- 
ing but a few hours to live she begged her husband not to leave 
her. The surgeon called him to help rescue the passengers still 
confined in the wreck. What will decide which thing the man 
will do? 

8. What statements in § 51 support the following? — "Every 
act of will requires attention and every concentration of atten- 
tion is an act of will." (Preyer.) 



286 Dynamic Psychology 

§ 53- Suggestion and Imitation 

In General. — To produce a given act in any person 
implies the arousal in him of the mental state which has 
that act as its sequent. If the act is the inevitable sequent 
of the mental state, this is sufficient. To make a baby 
cry, it is sufficient to make it feel severe pain. To make 
a man eat, it is sufficient in almost all cases to make him 
feel very hungry. But usually the act will only follow 
the mental state on condition that the latter is without 
opposition, is attended to exclusively, is freed from the 
influence of conflicting ideas. To produce a given act in 
any person thus commonly implies the arousal of the 
mental state which has that act as its sequent and also the 
suppression of conflicting or competing mental states. 

Conflicting ideas may be (i) prevented from appear- 
ing at all or (2) inhibited in the course of deliberation. 
They may be inhibited by motives in the shape of prom- 
ises, arguments, entreaties, threats and the like which 
weaken them or which strengthen contrary ideas. 

Suggestion. — There will therefore be two methods 
of arousing an act: (1) by Suggestion and (2) by Per- 
suasion. In cases of suggestion, the idea which tends 
to result in the act is so aroused in the mind that few or 
no conflicting ideas will appear; the person is prevented 
so far as possible from deliberating, in the hope that the 
mere tendency of the idea itself to work out into the act 
will suffice. In cases of persuasion, the idea which tends 
to result in the act is so aroused in the mind that it will 
possess motives to support it even at the cost of the 
arousal of conflicting ideas as well ; the person is encour- 
aged to deliberate and to consider the motives in the hope 
that those favoring the act will prevail. 

The power of suggestion depends upon the fact that 
any idea does tend to result in its appropriate act if no 



Connections of Expression 287 

competing idea or physical impediment prevents it. 
Suggestion as a method of control is especially useful 
(1) in cases where the individual could not rightly value 
the motives, and (2) in cases where it is important that 
the individual should do the right thing, but is relatively 
unimportant that he should learn to rightly value the 
motives. Thus to argue with a homicidal maniac would 
be folly, and to attempt to teach a three-year-old child 
why he should not cry, would be a waste of time. It is 
much better to say to the maniac who approaches with 
drawn knife, 'You have forgotten your spectacles/ and to 
the crying baby, 'Now you are really one of the bravest 
boys, I know. Just a minute and you won't cry any 
more. I know you didn't mean to. You are all right 
now.' Suggestion as a method of control is risky in 
cases where training in judgment and choice is one chief 
benefit of the act. It is bad for any rational being to be 
forever hoodwinked into doing this, that and the other. 

Differences in the degree of suggestibility, — in the 
tendency to accept ideas and neglect conflicting ideas, — 
are important amongst individual differences. Some 
people live continually in a state approaching that of a 
hypnotized person. They do and believe whatever they 
are told ; they never make a logical decision ; they are the 
prey of the last person who sees them. At the other 
extreme is the stolid but hard-headed type that figures 
everything out, that greets the most adroit suggestion 
with a, 'Huh ! So you want me to do something. Well ! 
I'll think it over.' When only half awake, when asleep, 
and above all in the hypnotic and certain other trance 
states we all lapse into a more and more suggestible 
condition. 

Imitation. — The word imitation is now used in 
psychology to mean two different facts. The first is the 



288 Dynamic Psychology 

general fact of the repetition of one man's thoughts and 
acts by other men. In this sense imitation means the 
opposite of invention, and includes perhaps ninety-nine 
per cent, of life ; for a really new thing in thought or con- 
duct is extremely rare. The second meaning is the fact 
of the influence of the concrete behavior of one individual 
upon other individuals, as opposed to the influence of 
explanations, commands, lessons and the like. In this 
narrower sense imitation means the influence of personal 
example. It is imitation in this second sense that will be 
discussed here. 

Among the most numerous and the most important 
causes of the ideas producing action in a human being 
are the acts of other human beings. Manners, accent, 
the usages of language, style in dress and appearance, — 
in a word, the minor phases of human behavior, — are 
guided almost exclusively by them. They also control the 
morals, business habits and political action of many men 
on many occasions. As the physical environment decides 
in large measure what things a man shall see and hear, 
so the social environment decides in large measure what 
he shall do and feel. 

The acts of other people exert a twofold influence: 
(i) that of stimuli to action and (2) that of models by 
which the satisfactoriness of an act is judged. Thus (1) 
A's going to school may arouse in B the idea and act of 
going to school, or (2) A's style of speech may be B's 
model, to speak as A does giving him satisfaction and so 
being the goal of his trials. As stimuli to action other 
people's acts are as a rule more potent than explanations, 
precepts and advice because they are clear and concrete. 
It is, for instance, easy to show a servant how to turn on 
and off the electric light in a room, but very hard to tell 
him how. They also have strong suggestive force, since 



Connections of Expression 289 

to see other people doing a thing inhibits any ideas of the 
act's impossibility or undesirability. If everyone else is 
rushing down the street, the idea of so doing tends to be 
deprived of opposition. 

As models by which to judge one's own acts, the acts 
of other people have the advantage over abstract prin- 
ciples or verbal descriptions, of being far more clear and 
vivid. No explanation of the essentials of a graceful 
gesture can in these respects equal the actual sight of it as 
made by the teacher. The student of music can compare 
the tone he produces with that actually produced by his 
master far better than with an ideal constructed from 
general statements. 

Exercises 

1. What statements in § 53 support the following? — 
"What we do, when we want to pursue, any line of conduct, 

is to hold that action clearly in mind and dismiss all impeding 
or inhibiting thoughts. When we want to influence any one to 
do a particular thing, we try so to present it to him that it com- 
pletely fills his mind. We try to get him to think of the action 
without thinking of any contradictory action. If we want him to 
go West, we can accomplish the result if we can get him to 
think of going West without having the ideas of going East or 
of standing still arise in his mind and check action. If you 
can get him to think of going to Kansas City over the Chi- 
cago & Alton, he will go to Kansas City over the Chicago & 
Alton, and nothing but a competing idea or physical impediment 
can stop him. If Tie is so taken up with the idea of Chicago 
& Alton that the name of no other means of transportation 
enters his mind, and if he is so situated that no physical impedi- 
ment (sickness, lack of money, etc.) hinders him, he will start 
at once to go to the. destination thought of and over the route 
thought of. All we can do is to get the thought into the mind 
and in an automatic manner the thought will suggest the action." 
(Scott, Theory of Advertising, pp. 51-52.) 

2. Read Mark Antony's speech over Caesar's body (Julius 
Caesan, Act III., Scene II., passim). Note three or four parts 



290 Dynamic Psychology 

which make prominent use of suggestion and three or four parts 
which make prominent use of persuasion. 

3. Why do political parties spend money in printing such 
apparently unconvincing stuff as, 'Vote Under the Eagle', or 
'Vote the Straight Democratic Ticket?' 

4. Collect from magazines four advertisements that depend 
for success chiefly upon suggestion. Four that depend chiefly en 
persuasion. 

5. What risk is run by the parent or teacher who in educat- 
ing children relies upon suggestion and imitation rather than 
argument and principles? 



§ 54. Individual Differences in the Life of Action 

Their Amount. — Individuals differ by inborn con- 
stitution with respect to the intensity of certain desires 
and interests, the capacities for connecting acts with men- 
tal states speedily, surely and permanently, the capacities 
for attending to abstract considerations, the capacities for 
resisting the strain of effort, and the other factors which 
influence human action. They differ by training in the 
kinds of mental states which they feel, in the elements of 
these to which they attend, in the acts which are con- 
nected therewith and in the ways in which the inborn 
instincts and capacities just mentioned are modified. 
There is perhaps no desire so universal as not to be absent 
in some human being and no connection between mental 
state and act so absurd and unlikely as not to have some- 
where existed. I dare say that the thought of four times 
seven may have made some maniac jump with glee, and 
impelled some other to cut his throat. The differences 
in inborn desires and interests and tendencies to action 
will, in general, be less than the differences in inborn 
capacities to connect and attend, and these will, in gen- 
eral, be less than the differences in acquired ideas and 
habits. 



Connections of Expression 291 

Little is known of the amounts of difference in these 
various respects or of the types or species of character 
into which human beings may perhaps be divided. Any- 
one may at least be sure that it is unsafe to prophesy the 
behavior of anyone else on the basis of what he himself 
would do and that it is unjust to judge the behavior of 
anyone else on the basis of the motives which he himself 
would have felt. The following differences and types, 
by no means exactly duplicated in reality, are worthy of 
study as samples of present incomplete knowledge" of 
individual differences in controlled action : — 

Differences in the Antecedents of Action. — Individ- 
uals may be ranked in a series according to the extent to 
which abstract ideas serve as the antecedents of action. 
At one extreme are those men and women who, like the 
lower animals, react only to some concrete particular 
situation. They live by special habits, not by general 
rules. They can work for a man, but not for a cause. 
They can fight a fire or a seen enemy, but not a principle 
like falsity or injustice. They can worship an idol or a 
saint, but not truth or righteousness. At the other 
extreme are those who can break up a total fact into its 
elements and react to one quality whenever found, to 
injustice whether experienced from friend or enemy, to 
truth whether found in their creed or another's. Such 
men and women progress from special habits to general 
principles of behavior, originate customs and modify 
social codes. They include the geniuses of action, and 
also its fanatics. Most men and women occupy stations 
near the middle of such a scale. They act in the main in 
response to concrete facts, but possess a few general prac- 
tices, avoiding 'crime,' refusing to be 'unladylike,' and 
doing 'their duty,' when an act possesses sufficiently 
obviously the abstract quality in question. 



292 Dynamic Psychology 

The Impulsive Type. — Individuals may also 7 be 
ranked in a series according to the strength of the ten- 
dency of a mental state to call up action compared with 
its tendency to call up another mental state. At one 
extreme is the man or woman who can hardly have any 
idea without following it by its connected act. 'John is in 
town; let's go and see John,' and he seizes his hat. 
'Where is my hat?', and she runs about in search for it. 
At the other extreme is the one who can rarely get so far 
as to do anything about anything. 'J°h n is in town. I 
wonder where he lives. Would he be at home now if we 
should call? Perhaps he won't want visitors yet. It's 
a disagreeable day anyway. He rather likes company, 
though. It would take all the evening. I'm not sure 
what I'd best do,' and so on. 'Where is my hat? I 
probably may not find it if I look for it. It will do no 
harm to go out bare-headed. Still it would look queer. 
I wonder if it is in that closet. Perhaps I'd better look. 
Still I feel sure I had it in this room. Where shall I look 
for it?', and so on for twice the time it would take to 
ransack the house. The first extreme we may call the 
Impulsive, the latter the reflective, or, still better, since 
reflective is commonly used of necessary thoughtfulness, 
the Pondering, individual. As before, most of us occupy 
a station midway between the extremes. The terms 
(A) Explosive Will and (B) Obstructed Will, have been 
used by Professor James, and others following him, to 
refer to these extreme types and also in general to (A) 
individuals who act too much, too quickly and in the 
wrong direction because impulses are too strong and 
inhibition too weak, and to (B) individuals who act too 
little, too late and in the wrong direction because impulses 
are too weak and inhibitions too strong. 



Connections of Expression 293 

§ 55. The Control of the Life of Action 

The good and efficient character implies the subjuga- 
tion of those instinctive tendencies to action which injure 
oneself or others, the energetic action of desirable ones, 
the presence of worthy ideals and the connection of these 
with appropriate acts, a multiplicity of useful habits, the 
power to see and react to the element of a situation which 
will issue in an act producing the best results, the power 
to react to barren abstractions such as ought, right and 
true, the power to delay decision until enough evidence 
is in to warrant one in deciding, the power to refrain from 
delaying it too long, and the power to stand the strain of 
effort implied in choosing a relatively unattractive course 
of behavior. 

The Elements of Moral Training. — The training of 
character is correspondingly complex. Useful instincts 
must be given a chance to exercise themselves and become 
habits. Harmful instinctive responses must be inhibited 
through lack of stimulus, through the substitution of de- 
sirable ones or through actual resultant discomfort, as 
best fits each special case. The mind must be supplied 
with noble ideas through the right examples at home, in 
school, in the world at large and in books. These ideas 
must be made to issue in appropriate action or they may 
be worse than useless. The capacity to examine any 
situation and see what the essential fact in it which should 
decide action is, must be constantly exercised and guided. 
The habits of letting Tt is right' or Tt is best' or Tt will 
be for the real welfare of the world' or the like, be an 
absolutely final warrant for action must be firmly fixed. 
The will must be prevented alike from precipitate re- 
sponses and from dawdling indecision. The power to 
banish from mind attractive but unworthv ideas, and to 



294 Dynamic Psychology 

go on one's way regardless of the effort involved in so 
doing, must be gradually built up. Especially important 
is the actual formation of definite habits. If a man does 
what is useful and right he will soon gain proper ideas 
of social efficiency and of morals. If he learns to do the 
right thing in a thousand particular situations, he will, so 
far as he has the capacity, gain the power to see what act 
a new situation demands. If he is made to obey a thou- 
sand particular, This is right's and 'That is right's, he 
will, so far as he has the capacity, come to connect respect 
and obedience with the abstractly right and true. If he 
does what he has to do well and treats his fellow beings 
as he should in the thousands of situations of the ordinary 
course of life, he will gain the power to conquer attractive 
counter-impulses. 

Common Mistakes in Moral Training. — The com- 
monest error is to expect people to become efficient and 
decent by some mysterious influences from lessons or 
sermons or good resolutions or what not. We forget 
that character means the connections between mental 
states and acts, and that the only way to have connections 
is to make them. Men become efficient and decent only 
by behaving efficiently and decently. To work is the 
only cure for laziness ; to give is the only cure for stingi- 
ness ; to tell the truth is the only cure for lying. 

There are many more blunders in our dealings with 
ourselves and other men from which knowledge of the 
psychology of human action should rescue us. Of these, 
two or three are so common as to deserve special men- 
tion : — 

(i) To fail to foster the desirable instincts. Babies 
are rarely given much attention except when their parents 
are annoyed by them or wish to pet and display them. 
They get nothing but neglect for playing quietly, but are 



Connections of Expression 295 

fondled and bribed when they become sufficiently obnox- 
ious. When by chance they behave modestly and 
obediently, they are unnoticed; but their early efforts at 
impertinence, self-will and vanity arouse amusement and 
comment. By the time the two-year-old baby has be- 
come a ten-year-old boy the result is often intolerable, 
and the father who laughed at the infantile self-will is 
amazed to find an ill-mannered, selfish, petulant son. He 
then makes an equal error, expecting (2) to inhibit 
directly by resulting discomfort a fully formed habit. 
He scolds and punishes the boy for the acts he encouraged 
in the baby. He may mend the boy's manners, but he 
loses his confidence. He may prevent certain acts for the 
time being, but they will probably recur when the boy 
becomes old enough to fear punishment no longer, or 
when circumstances are such that the act will not be 
discovered. 

(3) To value the feeling of effort for its own sake. 
The feeling of effort is found in efficient and good men ; 
it is a frequent accompaniment of great and noble deeds. 
As a result we tend to think of it as itself a desirable 
thing, and to use its presence as a test of the value of any 
act. This is hard; therefore it is right. Ido not wish 
to do this; therefore I ought,' was a common enough 
reasoning of our Puritan ancestors. 'You do not wish 
to do this; therefore you ought,' was still commoner. 
And to-day many a one does, and makes others do, useless 
acts because they are hard and because their doing will 
test and increase the power to stand the strain of effort. 
This is doubly a mistake. The chance to improve char- 
acter by the performance of concretely useful acts, 
productive of concretely useful habits, is wasted ; and the 
one who makes the effort, stands the strain, is being 
taught the lesson that, though he does stand the strain, 



296 Dynamic Psychology 

nothing comes of it, unless perhaps this power of con- 
centration about which his master disclaims. There are 
enough useful acts to be done to give all the training in 
self-control that anyone could ask, and these will increase 
self-control far more surely, for they will demonstrate 
that it is worth while. 

(4) To regard quantity of action as a sign of energy. 
It is an American fashion to regard repose as indolence 
and 'hustle' as accomplishment. But in reality a vast 
amount of action may come from a small amount of 
energy, when none is expended for inhibition and control. 
In well-directed action far more energy is consumed in 
restraining and guiding conduct than in merely arousing 
it. Indeed, over-action is a recognized symptom of 
nervous weakness. Men learn efficiency in action by 
learning to omit erroneous acts and to keep all acts under 
rigid control. Not quantity, but balance, — the preserva- 
tion of the golden mean in action, — is the best symptom 
of energy or strength. 

Exercises 

1. Illustrate from your own acquaintance or from fiction, 
extreme inability to act on abstract and general ideas. 

2. Illustrate similarly a predominant tendency for ideas to 
call up other ideas rather than acts. 

3. Illustrate similarly an explosive will due to excessive im- 
pulsion. 

4. Illustrate similarly an explosive will due to a lack of inhi- 
bition. 

5. Illustrate similarly an obstructed will due to excessive in- 
hibition. 

6. Illustrate similarly an obstructed will due to a lack of 
impulsion. 

7. What did Dr. Clouston probably mean by this state- 
ment : "You Americans wear too much expression on your faces 
The duller countenances of the British population be- 



Connections of Expression 297 

token a better scheme of life." (Quoted by James in his Talks 
to Teachers on Psychology, p. 208.) 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, XXVI. 
Stout, Manual, 581-616. 
Titchener, Outline, §§ 62-69. 
Angeil, Psychology, XX., XXL, XXII. 

B. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, §§ 68-60. 
James, Principles, XXVI. 

Wundt, Physiologische Pyschologie, XVII. 

References on Imitation and Suggestion 

Stout, Manual, 269-275. 

James, Principles, .XXVII. 

Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, XX (§ 3). 



20 



CHAPTER XIX 

Movements 

§ 56. Acts of Skill 

So far the connections of mental states with bodily 
movements have been treated broadly and from the point 
of view of the general conduct of life. From this point 
of view the exact nature of the movement is of little con- 
sequence, the main issue being whether or not a movement 
of a certain general character shall or shall not be made. 
In the case of what are called acts of skill the same gen- 
eral problem appears, but the main issue is now : Just 
what movement shall be made; just how extensive or 
energetic or long in duration shall it be ? Life as a whole 
is made up of both such movements as are made in play- 
ing chess, where zvhat you do counts, and of such move- 
ments as are made in billiards or lawn tennis, where the 
thing of importance is how you do it. The question 
before was : 'Given any mental state, what thing shall be 
done ?' The question now is : 'What causes a certain 
definite, precise movement or series of movements?' 

The Acquisition of Skill. — The same law of asso- 
ciation operates here as elsewhere. A single illustration 
will suffice. In drawing a straight line, the situation is 
the sight of the paper, the feeling of the pencil and of 
one's arm and fingers in position, and the command or 
idea that is connected with the act of drawing a straight 
line. As the movement is made new sensations arise 

298 



Movements 



299 



from the sight of so much of the line as has been already- 
drawn, from the movements already made and from the 
new position taken; the continuation of the movement is 
the sequent of these as well as of the original mental 
state; and so on until the movement is complete, each 
successive part of the movement furnishing new sensa- 
tions which, arousing their appropriate connections, 
modify the further course of the movement. Let the 
reader draw rapidly a line between the two lines of Fig. 83 






Fig. 83. 



without touching either and he will realize, this process of 
continual arousal of alterations in the movement by new 
sensations produced by it. When you see the pencil going 
too far down toward one line, you alter its direction; 
when you have made one or two touches, you decrease the 
speed. Just how you initiate, guide and alter your move- 
ment will depend upon what inborn capacity for steadiness 
and precision of movement you possess and what previous 
practice you have had; i.e., upon what connections have 



300 Dynamic Psychology 

been made between this and that guiding sensation and 
this or that alteration of the movement. 

Motor Skill means the existence of certain connections 
whereby the guiding sensations arouse appropriate move- 
ments. Practice means the formation of such connec- 
tions. A skilled movement may commonly be divided 
into the coarser adjustments with which it starts and the 
■finer adjustments which come into play in response to the 
guiding sensations. Thus, in driving a nail, lifting the 
hammer and letting it start downwards are the coarser 
adjustments; the finer adjustments enter as it approaches 
the nail and we regulate its direction and force. In play- 
ing the violin, the first movements in drawing the bow are 
comparatively coarse adjustments, the exact degree of 
tension, pressure and the like being determined by finer 
adjustments made during the movement. In planing a 
board the movement is begun with a coarse adjustment, 
followed by finer adjustments made in response to the 
feelings of pressure, the sight of the board to be planed 
and so on. 

The Mental Factors in Motor Skill.— Motor skill is 
thus by no means a matter of delicacy of movement alone. 
It implies also the capacity to receive and attend to the 
fine differences in sensations which are the guides to the 
finer adjustments, and, most important of all, the capacity 
to make connections between sensations and movements, 
to eliminate the unnecessary and undesirable movements. 
These capacities improve with maturity, and with train- 
ing, provided the successful connections are rewarded by 
resultant satisfaction. As a general rule the capacities 
for the coarser adjustments mature earlier in life than 
those for the finer adjustments. 

Skill in movements is by no means primarily a matter 
of the arms and hands. The movements of the vocal 



Movements 301 

chords in speech and singing and of the eyes in bringing 
objects into clearest vision are among the most delicately 
adjusted movements made by man. In most handicrafts 
the eyes co-operate in the movements as well as furnish 
guiding sensations. The movements of the facial muscles 
by which interest, amusement, enthusiasm and the like 
are expressed, are often extremely delicate and in the case 
of actors may be the result of long continued practice. 

Skill is improved by ( 1 ) deliberately following certain 
rules which can be learned by mere thought, and (2) by 
unconsciously dropping inefficient and emphasizing 
efficient connections in the course of practice. The first 
factor, the learning by explanations, may be called the 
acquisition of Form; the second factor, the learning by 
trial and error, or better by the selection of chance suc- 
cesses, may be called the acquisition of Execution. The 
golf player may learn outright what is the right way to 
hit the ball, how and where to stand, how to hold the club, 
and the like. This is learning form. But the actual 
associations between the sight of the ball and the exact 
movements necessary to drive it a hundred and sixty 
yards, must be patiently built up by the 'try, try again* 
method. 

Exercises 

Experiment 28. The Acquisition of Skill. — Make some new 
combination of movements ; e. g. } that of drawing a circle with 
one hand while drawing a straight line with the other. Repeat 
the process until a fair degree of skill is secured. Notice the 
tendency for the two hands to move in accord and the difficulty at 
the start of inhibiting undesirable movements. Note any in- 
stances of movements hard to avoid because of their frequent 
connection with similar situations in the past. 

Experiment 29. The Influence of Practice on Motor Skill. — 
Procure some book or magazine which you are free to mark or 
destroy. Select 50 pages, in each of which the space between lines 



302 Dynamic Psychology 

of print is the same. Cut them so as to leave 21 lines on each 
page. Have ready a sharp pencil, and a watch with a second 
hand. At a fixed time, say when the minute hand is at 14 and the 
second hand at 60, begin to draw a line between every two lines 
of print as fast as you can without touching the print in any place. 
Draw first between the first and second lines from left to right, 
then around the right end of the second line and back between 
the second and third lines from right to left and so on until 20 
lines have been drawn. Note and record the time of completion 
and so obtain the number of seconds taken to make the movements. 

Make in all 30 or more 20-line tests. Do not make more than 
5 or 6 at a time. Try to keep the number of touches at zero and 
to reduce the time to as low a figure as possible. Compare the 
first 4 with the last 4 records with respect to time (and touches, 
if any were made). Compare the first, second, third and last 
quarters of the total series. Make as clear and complete a state- 
ment as you can of the effect of the practice. 

If this experiment were to be used as a means of measuring 
the influence of practice with certainty and precision, what pre- 
cautions should be taken with respect to avoiding the influence of 
unfair physical conditions (e. g., light), fatigue, variations in 
interest and attention and other disturbing factors? 

§ 57. The Connections between Sense Stimuli and 

Movements 

Automatic Connections. — If the order of our chap- 
ters were the order of the development of mental life, the 
connections between physical stimulations of the sense 
organs and bodily movements would have been the first 
group of connections described. Physical stimuli con- 
nect with movements earlier in life than they connect 
with sense impressions and long before sense impressions 
connect with other mental states. 

The order is in fact : — 

(1) Connections of physical stimuli with movements. 

(2) Connections of physical stimuli with sense im- 

pressions, emotions and other feelings of the 
first intention. 



Movements 303 

(3) Connections of sense impressions with move- 

ments. 

(4) Connections of one mental state with another and 

of mental states of the second and third inten- 
tions with movement. 

The early connections between stimulus and move- 
ment are all unlearned or instinctive. The increased 
heart-beat in response to physical activity, the primitive 
embryonic movements, the reaction of the pupil to light 
and the like are samples of the provision by nature 
of responses to stimuli which are not even felt. Many 
such connections persist. Processes go on in the body in 
response to external and internal stimuli which are not 
dreamt of in the philosophy of conscious life. 

There is a second group of such connections which 
come much later in life and represent the relics of pro- 
cesses which originally involved physical stimulus, feel- 
ings of the first intention and bodily movement. By 
continued use such connections come to drop the middle 
term. For instance, walking involves, at first, sensations 
of sight, pressure, position and motion, which connect 
with the appropriate movements of the legs and balancing 
muscles ; but in adult life we walk along absorbed in con- 
versation or thought with apparently no such sensations. 
I say 'apparently' because it is conceivable that the feel- 
ings are there but so little attended to as to pass un- 
noticed. At all events they are so little in evidence that 
for practical purposes they may be considered absent. 

When the physical stimulus arouses a movement 
directly instead of via some feeling, the response is called 
an Automatic Movement or an Automatic Act, and a se- 
ries of such connections is called automatic conduct or au- 
tomatic behavior or automatic action. Instinctive auto- 
matic behavior is probably common in the very low forms 



304 Dynamic Psychology 

of animal life, such as the protozoa, and in human life 
before, and perhaps for some weeks after, birth. It 
persists in many of the fundamental physiological ac- 
tivities. Acquired automatic behavior represents nature's 
economy in leaving unattended to, and even unfelt, those 
stimuli to which we have gained a perfect habit of 
response. Just as the thought of 2 times 8 produces the 
thought of 16 without the reappearance of the long 
process of learning which was originally necessary, so the 
touch of the pavement produces the act of walking with- 
out perhaps any feeling whatever. 

There are all degrees of weakening of the mental 
state in habitual connections, from the connection so 
firmly fixed that no sensation can be discerned, up to the 
connection in which attention is just beginning to be 
somewhat freed from thinking one i>y one of the sensa- 
tions which guide the movement. In learning to play a 
piece on the piano, to ride a bicycle or to knit, one grad- 
ually passes from full consciousness of what one sees and 
hears and does to such an almost complete absence of 
feelings concerned with the act that one can think of 
something else at the time with no effort whatever. 

The Function of Automatic Connections. — The 
saving of time due to this release of attention, and, per- 
haps, of all feeling, from fully formed habits, is enormous. 
In so far as the movements of the eyes in reading become 
automatic, attention can be devoted to the meaning of the 
words read ; in so far as the movements necessary to feed 
oneself become automatic, the newspaper can be devoured 
with the breakfast. If the operations of dressing, eating, 
walking, reading, sewing and the like were all accom- 
panied by the attentive consciousness which went with 
them in their early appearances, half our days would be 
spent in getting them done. It is necessary for the 



Movements 305 

efficiency of mental life that many habits should be made 
thus self-controlling, should be practiced until they make 
no demands upon mental life proper. Indeed in general 
we think about things so as eventually to do them without 
thought. It should be the fate of every connection to 
progress toward automatic behavior. It is extravagant 
to waste attention on minor connections which do not 
deserve it. A student who was forced by circumstances 
to spend much time in the society of some stupid people, 
found that by making automatic the habit of responding 
to a certain general tone by 'Exactly' or 'Certainly/ to 
another tone by 'Indeed!' or 'Well! Well!' and to still 
another by, 'Your own judgment on that question would 
be better than rnine,' she could carry on her own medita- 
tions almost as well as if by herself. One reason perhaps 
for the absent-mindedness of gifted men is that they have 
learned to leave all the small matters of life to take care 
of themselves and so occasionally blunder by making an 
automatic response at an improper time. It is better to 
occasionally enter a neighbor's house, or try to light the 
gas with a pencil or greet your wife on the street with 
a pleasant 'And -how is your husband's health ?', than to 
think all day long about trifles. 

Exercises 

1. Name six instinctive automatic connections. 

2. What name is given in § 4 to the instinctive automatic 
connections ? 

3. Observe by looking in a glass what happens to the pupils 
of your eyes when you come into a bright room after eight or ten 
minutes in a very dark room. Would you know what happened 
to them from direct feeling alone? 

4. Name six acquired connections which you make auto- 
matically or nearly so. 

5. The conjurer Houdin is. reported to have been able to 
keep four balls in the air quite automatically, in fact to do so 



306 Dynamic Psychology 

while steadily reading a book. Give similar instances showing 
the degree of complexity possible in automatic connections. 

6. Which would be harder, to learn to walk and sew at 
the same time or to read and sew at the same time? 

7. Why is to learn to talk and sew at the same time easier 
than either? 

§ 58. Movements as Antecedents 

Movements, though they do not directly arouse, do 
indirectly react on mental states, Any movement serves 
as a stimulus to the sense organs, — of the eye, if it is seen ; 
of the skin, if it causes tension or folding; of the joints, if 
a bone is moved ; of the muscle itself in any case. Every 
turn of the eyes, every change of facial expression, every 
contraction of the vocal chords, every posture of the body, 
every extension of flexion of a finger, thus plays a part in 
determining the course of the stream of thought. Just 
as a multitude of sights and sounds sets at work the forces 
of sensation and produces new mental states, so the mul- 
tiplicity of bodily movements produces a crop of second- 
arily caused sensations, which feature in later thought. 

Just what and how great a part movements play as 
stimuli to sensations, is not known. But it is surely not 
unimportant. The images of words in which thought is 
carried on are often motor images of the movements 
made in speech. The feelings of strain, irritation and 
perplexity, are very probably due to conditions of general 
muscle tension. One theory of the fusion of sensations 
into percepts is that we feel as one thing whatever com- 
bination of sensations is responded to by a single move- 
ment or a connected series of movements. Some thinkers 
assert that without bodily movement, controlled thought 
cannot even take place. The feeling of self or person- 
ality, which is one element of almost all mental states, is 
in large measure due to the ever present stimuli from the 



Movements 



3°7 



muscular tension of the body, the unnoticed movements of 
breathing, and the like. The feelings of the distances of 
objects arise in part from feelings of the movements of 
the eyes made in converging for near and diverging for 
far objects. General satisfaction and dissatisfaction are, 
by one theory, explained as the feelings caused by move- 
ments of extension or approach and of flexion or with- 
drawal respectively. 

From these and similar facts and theories, it is certain 
that the indirect contribution of movements to thoughts 
and feelings is a large one, and one upon which man relies 
for the material for some of his most important judg- 
ments. 

Exercises 

I. Which looks longer in Fig. 84, the vertical or the hori- 
zontal line? Measure the lines. What fact, in addition to the 
fact that it is harder to move the eyes in a vertical than a horizon- 
tal direction, is needed to explain the appearance? 



Fig. 84. 



2. Can you discover in yourself feelings due to movements 
of the sort described in the following passages? — 



308 Dynamic Psychology 

"In consenting and negating, and in making a mental effort, 
the movements seem more complex, and I find them harder to 
describe. The opening and closing of the glottis play a great 
part in these operations, and, less distinctly, the movements of 
the soft palate, etc., shutting off the posterior nares from the 
mouth. My glottis is like a sensitive valve, intercepting my 
breath instantaneously at every mental hesitation or felt aversion 
to the objects of my thought, and as quickly opening, to let the 
air pass through my throat and nose, the moment the repugnance 
is overcome. The feeling of the movement of this air is, in me, 
one strong ingredient of the feeling of assent. The movements 
of the muscles of the brow and eyelids also respond very sensi- 
tively to every fluctuation in the agreeableness or disagreeable- 
ness of what comes before my mind. 

In effort of any sort, contractions of the jaw-muscles and of 
those of respiration are added to those of the brow and glottis, 
and thus the feeling passes out of the head properly so called." 
James, Principles, I., 301. 

Experiment 30. Movements as Stimuli to Mental States. — 
Lie down and let all your muscles relax until you are perfectly 
limp and easy and without any tension anywhere. Let the mus- 
cles of the face relax as well as those of the rest of the body. 
Rest thus for ten minutes or more. Then jump up, frown, set 
your teeth, clinch your fists and stalk back and forth with quick, 
vigorous and jerky movements. How did you feel in the two 
cases ? 

References 

A. James, Briefer Course, XXIII., X. 
Stout, Manual, 99-102. 

B. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, § 65. 
James, Principles, XXIII., IV. 

Wundt, Physiologische Psychologic XIV., § 3. 



CHAPTER XX 

Selective Processes 

§ 59. Attention and Neglect 

Attention. — In the last seven chapters are frequent 
references to the facts of attention, the fact (1) that of 
any mental state some one portion is predominant, — is 
more likely than others to be operative in causing the 
sequent mental state or act; and the fact (2) that of many 
feelings felt, only a few are noticed, dwelt upon, allowed 
to play leading parts in influencing the future course of 
thought and action. Chapter VII contained a brief 
description of the facts of attention. It is now necessary 
to study their causation ; to answer the questions : 'What 
determines which part of a mental state will be focal? 
Which mental states will be selected, dwelt upon, allowed 
to weigh heavily in mental life and conduct?' 

Here as elsewhere (1) original nature, (2) the in- 
fluence of experience and (3) accidental causes share in 
producing the result. What will be felt as clear, em- 
phatic and focal, what will be selected and dwelt upon, 
what in short will be attended to, by any individual, will 
be that mental state or that feature of a mental state 
which is attractive because of (1) the original tendencies 
to attend with which nature endows us, because of (2) 
the habits of attention which have been found by the 
individual in question to be desirable or because of (3) 
some accidental cause. The original tendencies to attend 

309 



310 Dynamic Psychology 

may be called instinctive interests; the acquired tenden- 
cies to attend may be called acquired interests. 

Instinctive Attention. — Some of the more important 
instinctive tendencies are to attend, other things being 
equal to: — 
(i) Moving objects rather than still objects. 

(2) Other human beings and living animals rather than 

plants or inanimate objects. 

(3) Clear rather than obscure or indefinite objects. 

(4) Intense rather than weak stimuli. 

(5) Novel rather than familiar objects (unless the latter 

have special advantages). 

(6) Pleasurable rather than painful stimuli. 

(7) Expected rather than unexpected stimuli. 

These tendencies are fairly common to all human beings, 
though individual differences exist with respect to the 
amount of strength of each. 

Like instincts in general, these instinctive interests 
may be delayed. Obvious illustrations are the interest 
in living animals and the interest in the opposite sex. 
Little is known of the exact time of maturing of in- 
stinctive tendencies to attend, because in actual life the 
influence of original nature is often inextricably con- 
joined with that of experience. No one can yet say, for 
instance, how far the tendency to attend to the number 
aspect of any stimulus, — to count objects, — is a delayed 
instinct and how far it is an acquired habit. 

Acquired Attention — In habits of attention there is 
amongst individuals a tremendous diversity due to the 
moderate differences in the instinctive tendencies from 
which the habits develop, the greater differences in 
capacities, and the still greater differences in the exper- 
iences which life affords to different individuals. We all 
come to attend in general to spoken words more than to 



Selective Processes 311 

coughs, laughs, sneezes and the like ; to facial expression 
more than to movements of the chest; to the weather 
more than to the character of the soil. In these cases 
experience teaches all much the same lessons. But on 
the whole each individual acquires interests in a special 
circle of friends, special divisions of knowledge, a special 
profession or trade, a special locality, and so with the 
many objects of modern civilized life. 

The forces in forming habits of attention, and in 
deciding what thing or feature out of several will in any 
given situation be attended to, are the frequency, recency 
and intensity of attention to the thing on previous occa- 
sions, resultant pleasure, and harmony with the general 
set of the mind. Of these, resultant pleasure is by far 
the most important. Mere frequency and recency of 
attention will in fact produce inattention or disregard if 
the consequences are unsatisfactory or even indifferent; 
for frequency breeds familiarity and monotony and by 
original nature the familiar and monotonous is disre- 
garded in favor of the novel. In the long run attention 
is more and more given to those things attention to which 
produces felt satisfaction. 

Voluntary Attention. — So-called voluntary atten- 
tion, — i.e., attending with effort and deliberately neglect- 
ing the thing which appeals to instinctive interests or 
pleasurable habits of attention, — seems unexplainable by 
the laws of instinct and association. Why, for instance, 
does a boy attend with effort to the words of his spelling 
lesson when the sound of a band and the vision through 
the window of a circus parade invite him? As a matter 
of fact he usually does not. When he does, it is because 
some idea or feeling in connection with the situation 
makes the attending to the spelling words more satis- 
factory to him than attending to the parade. In and of 



312 Dynamic Psychology 

themselves the spelling words would speedily give way 
to the parade. But the situation is: 'spelling words to 
look at and think of — please father — show my grit — I'm 
weak if I don't do it — of course they must be learned first, 
and the like/ and if these ideals of duty and achievement 
are highly enough esteemed, the spelling words are 
clothed with an attractiveness derived from remote aims 
and enjoyments which is stronger and wins. It is not 
that the unsatisfying conquers the desirable; but that 
what is undesirable in itself may be so suffused by the 
desirability of its connections as to seem the more desira- 
ble to the total frame of mind. It is not that men attend, 
some only to the attractive and others, of a firmer fibre, to 
the repugnant. The real difference is that some feel 
satisfaction only in the directly pleasurable, the selfish 
rewards, the narrow and immediate outcome; whereas 
others feel satisfaction in the prospects of far off benefits, 
in the welfare of others, and in the general and eventual 
outcome which their entire system of ideas and purposes 
holds in view. The thing to be accounted for is not a 
difference in the laws of attention but a difference in 
taste or preference. Whether the proverbial, 'There is 
no accounting for tastes' be true or not will be seen in a 
later section. The fact of moment here is the fortunate 
one that men may have a preference for the eventually 
useful, the abstractly good and the eternally right as well 
as for beer and skittles. 

The case of voluntary attention, attention against 
resistance, is one case of the general fact of derived 
attention. Any thing may gain attention not only from 
its intrinsic qualities (immediate attention), but also 
from its associations. Derived attention may or may not 
imply effort, may minister to higher or lower impulses. 
Attention to a dollar bill is derived but commonly implies 



Selective Processes 313 

no feeling of effort. Fagin's attention to Oliver Twist, 
derived from the idea of making him a thief, was of 
course in the service of a distinctly low motive. 

One more fact of the development of tendencies to 
attend deserves notice, — namely, that an object which 
originally is attended to with effort so often comes after 
a time to be attended to without effort. To look at the 
printed words in a story book and to think of '4 and 7 
are 11' and the like in doing sums in addition, imply 
effort in the 7 year old child in school, but none in the 
practiced reader and accountant. 

Getting rid of the feeling of effort is due to getting 
rid of irrelevant impulses or ideas which need checking 
or inhibition, and to the strengthening of the relevant im- 
pulses or ideas by their repetition and resulting satis- 
faction. Just as a person could free life as a whole from 
the feeling of effort, if the tendencies to do every thing 
that he had to do were made a hundred times as strong 
and the tendencies to do everything that he must not do 
were reduced ninety-nine per cent, in strength; so in a 
single process of life like reading, effort vanishes in pro- 
portion as the tendencies to do what must be done in 
reading {e.g., to move the eyes to a point on the line) are 
strengthened and the tendencies to do what must not be 
done (e.g., to move the eyes away from the point before 
the words are perceived) are weakened. There is no 
mysterious law that effort decreases with repetition. It 
does not except in so far as the need for inhibition 
decreases. 

Neglect. — Selecting one thing implies the disregard 
of other things. For one feature of a mental state to be 
focal, others must be kept in the margin. Attention has, 
as its corollary or negative aspect, neglect. 1 The same 

1 The term inhibition is the one commonly used for this process 
21 



314 Dynamic Psychology 

process is, from the point of view of the thing selected, 
attention, and, from that of the thing disregarded, neglect. 
The account just given is then as applicable to the latter 
as to the former. Tendencies to neglect, like tendencies 
to attend, are partly inborn and partly acquired. The 
laws of their acquisition are the same; discomfort being 
the rejecting and dissociating force as satisfaction is the 
emphasizing and associating force. 

Neglect may be intrinsic or derived, according as the 
object is in itself unattractive or repellent, or has grafted 
upon it the unattractiveness or repulsiveness of its mental 
associates. Neglect may be with or without a feeling of 
strain or effort. 

§ 60. Satisfaction and Discomfort 

Two facts, resulting satisfaction and resulting dis- 
comfort, have been constantly invoked as causes of 
changes in the life of thought and action. The reader 
is acquainted with these facts in his own experience but 
certain knowledge about their presence and causation 
needs statement here. To explain fully why any human 
being thinks and feels and acts as he does, it is necessary 
to know what circumstances will give him the feelings of 
satisfaction and of discomfort. Having learned that 
connections productive of satisfaction are selected for 
survival and that connections productive of discomfort 
are eliminated, the final step is to learn what sort of result 
is satisfying. 

of disregard or neglect. The word inhibition is however used also 
to mean the prevention of any tendency, of tendencies to move, to 
perceive, to associate ideas and the like as well as the prevention 
of tendencies to attend to an object. It is best to avoid ambiguity 
by using rejection or neglect to refer to the negative aspect of at- 
tention and keeping inhibition for the more general fact of preven- 
tion. 



Selective Processes 315 

Original nature decides this in part. Man is so con- 
stituted by nature that certain stimuli produce feelings of 
satisfaction and others discomfort. Sweet tastes, rhyth- 
mical sounds, movements after rest, relaxation of the 
muscles after fatigue, the moderate action of the senses 
of vision, hearing and smell, are thus satisfying to well 
nigh everyone. The free exercise of instinctive tenden- 
cies to take, hold, play, sleep, run, fondle and the like, is 
an almost equally important source of satisfaction. Sen- 
sory pains from blows, cuts, burns, diseases and the like ; 
certain sensations and emotions such as hunger, thirst, 
fatigue, fear, anxiety; restraint from the exercise of 
instinctive tendencies, as by capture, confinement or the 
obstruction of movement, are for the same reason uncom- 
fortable. Let us call these two classes of feelings, 
Original Satisiiers and Original Troublers. 

Original nature alone is obviously insufficient to 
account for all likes and dislikes ; for they differ much 
with different individuals, change much with age and alter 
quickly with training. Whether any given result shall 
be satisfying or uncomfortable depends in part upon what 
it has been associated with. The rule is that, other things 
being equal, any feeling will be satisfying which has been 
associated with original satisiiers, and that any feeling 
will be uncomfortable which has been associated with 
original troublers. Thus 'to have the bottle' becomes a 
satisfactory result to the baby, being suffused with the 
feeling originally felt only with the result 'food in mouth/ 
After the satisfyingness has been acquired from connec- 
tion with an original satisfier, it can spread further. 
Later 'to see the bottle being brought' and later still 'to 
be told "You shall have your milk," ' acquire in turn this 
aura of satisfyingness. The discomfort of the blow 
spreads to the sight of the uplifted hand, and from there 



316 Dynamic Psychology 

to the sound of the spoken threat. No matter how barren 
of instinctive pleasurableness a condition may be, it may- 
become the most cherished and satisfying of feelings. 'I 
am doing God's will/ T am serving the state/ and 'I am 
hunting the truth/ have ruled men's lives in spite of their 
lack of intrinsic satisfaction. 

The general laws of instinct and of association thus 
account for the satisfying and uncomfortable qualities of 
different feelings as well as for the connections amongst 
stimuli, mental states and movements. How the satis- 
faction following upon a connection strengthens it, and 
how the discomfort following upon a connection weakens 
it, must be left unanswered questions. Neither psy- 
chology nor physiology has yet anything much better than 
a guess to offer to this, the most fundamental question of 
the mental life of man and of the animal kingdom as a 
whole. All that can be said is that the original satisfiers 
are as a rule events useful for the survival of the species 
and the original troublers are as a rule events disadvan- 
tageous to the survival of the species; consequently any 
means by which the former could reinforce the connec- 
tions causing them and the latter weaken the connections 
causing them would, when evolved, be maintained by 
natural selection. Perhaps their respective influences on 
the blood supply constitute such a means. 

§ 61. Conclusion of Part III 

Complex as is a human life, it is at bottom explainable 
by a few principles. The presence of original tendencies 
to connections and of satisfaction and discomfort as quali- 
ties of certain feelings, the power of satisfaction to 
strengthen the connections producing it and of dis- 
comfort to weaken those producing it, the natural 
influence of frequency, recency and intensity on con- 



Conclusion of Part III 317 

nections : — these are the ultimate laws of dynamic psy- 
chology. Of these the only one unexplained by the 
general laws of living beings is the power of satisfaction 
and discomfort. 

The development of a human mental life may be 
likened to that of the animal kingdom as a whole. The 
present animal kingdom is the result of the existence in 
the past of many variations, the elimination of those 
which did not lit the environment so as to survive, and the 
persistence of the others through heredity. The eliminat- 
ing agent in this case is death. Any man's intellect and 
character are the results of the existence in his past of 
many connections, the elimination of those which did not 
fit their environment so as to bring satisfaction, and the 
persistence of the others through the law of association. 
The eliminating agent in this case is dissatisfaction and 
the environment is not the physical world alone but also 
the greater universe of passions and ideals, of wrong and 
right, of falsehood and truth. 

It is often said that there is and can be no science of- 
human nature, that it is impossible to do more than make 
shrewd guesses as the poets, story-writers and proverb- 
makers do. The progress of psychology is, however, 
gradually proving the assertion false. Even in the ele- 
mentary and untechnical account of psychology presented 
in these few pages, there is given enough evidence to 
justify the faith that human life can be the object of 
systematic and verified knowledge. Nor are the facts of 
psychology so chaotic and fragmentary as is generally 
supposed. Although yet far from the perfection of full 
explanation by a few general laws which is being reached 
in the case of physical facts, they are nevertheless being 
more and more reduced to order and summarized under 
simple laws. In Part I the rich variety of human thought 



318 Dynamic Psychology 

and feeling was shown to be after all divisible into three 
natural groups; first, feelings of direct experience; sec- 
ond, reproductions of direct experience; and third, feel- 
ings meaning or referring to direct experience. In 
Part II the tremendously complex physical basis of mental 
life, the nervous system, was shown to be essentially the 
sum of the connections between sensitive areas of the 
body and motor organs, the same bodily organ, the 
neurone, being always the connecting agent. In Part III 
it has been shown that in great measure the intellects and 
characters of men are explainable by a single law, and that 
in the case of certain facts psychology possesses the final 
warrant of a science, the power to predict the future. 



CHAPTER XXI 

Conclusion : The Relations of Psychology 
§ 62. The Science of Psychology as a Whole 

In this book only the more elementary and funda- 
mental facts and laws of mental life have been presented. 
A complete account of the science of psychology would 
require many volumes. We have studied only the more 
general facts of ordinary human mental life, but psy- 
chology deals also with the details of sensations, the 
associations of ideas and the like, with the facts of 
abnormal and diseased minds and with the mental 
processes of animals. I have, as a rule, described only 
those facts which may be appreciated by simple observa- 
tions and reflection, but psychology uses also intricate 
analysis, elaborate experiments, exact measurements and 
wide comparisons. The subject matter of psychology 
covers a wide range of facts, and these are studied by 
many different methods. 

Such a book as this can, of course, be but the slightest 
beginning of a study of psychology, — of the thoughts and 
feelings of men, their relation to the nervous system and 
the human actions which they arouse and guide. The 
field of the science is so wide, and the methods of studying 
it so various that any one small book can present only the 
most general principles and offer only the simplest kind of 
an introduction to psychology as a whole. During the 
year 1903 alone there were published over two thousand 

3i9 



320 Conclusion 

books and articles on psychology or allied topics, written 
by recognized scientific workers. These included studies 
of the psychology of children as well as of adults; studies 
of the insane, of the feeble-minded and of animals as well 
as of ordinary human beings ; studies of the growth and 
decay of mind as well as analysis of its normal conditions ; 
studies of the deeper realities behind human lives as well 
as of mental facts taken at their face value. The psy- 
chologists who wrote them used in some cases observation 
and reflection, in other cases comparison, experiment and 
measurements. In many cases all these methods were 
employed. The subject ranged from The Psychology 
of Advertising to The Psychology of Religion, from 
Habit Formation in the CrazvUsh to the Aesthetics of 
Unequal Division. 

The Subject Matter of Psychology.— The chief 
divisions of psychology and the subject matter dealt with 
by each are: 

General Psychology : The ordinary mental life of 

human beings. 
Individual Psychology : The nature and amount of the 

mental differences which are 

found"among human beings. 
Abnormal Psychology : Exceptional and unhealthy 

mental traits. 
Child Psychology : The mental life of children. 

The grozvth of mental life in the individual and in the 
race is often regarded as a special division of psychology 
and called Genetic Psychology. 

Animal Psychology : The mental life and ways of 

learning of the lower ani- 
mals. 



The Relations of Psychology 



321 



Physiological Psychology 



Social Psychology : 



Educational Psychology 



: The relations between mental 
life and conditions of the 
body, especially of the nerv- 
ous system. The division 
of psychology dealing with 
the relation of stimulus to 
sensation is called Psycho- 
physics. 

Those aspects of mental life 
which are connected with 
the influence of human be- 
ings on one another and the 
action of human beings in 
groups. 

Those aspects of mental life 
which are connected with 
the production of changes 
in human beings, especially 
by consciously directed hu- 
man influences. 

Philosophical Psychology : The fundamental realities be- 
hind the facts of mental life. 
The place of mental life in 
the universe as a whole. 

The Methods of Psychology. — The chief methods of 
studying mental facts and the names commonly given to 
them are : 

Observation: Mental facts are noticed (1) directly in 
oneself by introspection, or (2) indi- 
rectly in others by studying their be- 
havior and their statements about their 
mental lives. 



322 



Conclusion 



Analysis : Complex mental facts are broken up into 

their elements. The composition of 
mental states is studied. 
Experiment: Mental facts are noticed under special 

conditions arranged for the purpose. 
Measurement : Quantitative estimates of mental facts 

and their relationships are made. 
Comparison : Any one group of mental facts is studied 
in the light of others. Human mental 
life is studied in connection with animal 
mental life. Adult minds are com- 
pared with the minds of children ; nor- 
mal mental conditions with abnormal, 
etc. 
Reflection : All methods imply the thoughtful, logical 

consideration of facts. 
Any one of the kinds of subject matter may be studied 
by several methods. For instance, Child Psychology may 
be studied by all the methods except by direct introspec- 
tive observation. It could be so studied if there were 
children who were also psychological students. Each 
method is, however, in the present state of the science, 
more appropriate to some kinds of subject matter than to 
others. Thus animal psychology is very often compara- 
tive; philosophical psychology is rarely aided by experi- 
ments or measurements; individual pschology is much 
more frequently quantitative than is social psychology. 
The tendency of the present time is to rely less on mere 
observation and analysis and more upon carefully planned 
experiments conducted with quantitative precision. 

§ 63. The Relations of Psychology to Other Sciences 

Psychology is related to other sciences both as a 
dependent and as a contributor. It needs the results of 



The Relations of Psychology 323 

physiology to explain the action of the nervous system 
which is the basis of mental life as we know it. It sup- 
plies or should supply the fundamental principles upon 
which sociology, economics, history, anthropology, lin- 
guistics and the other sciences dealing with human 
thought and action should be based. 

The connection between psychology and physiology 
has been illustrated so often in this book as to need no 
further comment. Everywhere we have to seek for the 
physiological basis of mental facts and connections. 
Through physiology, psychology makes connection with 
anatomy, physics and chemistry. The structure of the 
body must be known if we are to understand the action 
of the sense organs, central nervous system and muscles. 
The nature of the physical forces must be known if we are 
to understand the ways in which the sense organs are 
stimulated by outside events. With some of the physical 
sciences, such as geology, astronomy, physical geography, 
paleontology, botany and mineralogy, psychology has only 
the most remote relations. 

With the non-physical sciences, the connections should 
naturally be closer. The story of human life as told by 
anthropology and history; the picture of man's dealings 
with man given by sociology ; the analysis which econom- 
ics makes of human action in the production, distribution 
and consumption of wealth ; the record of the processes of 
human thought which is stored up in languages, — all 
these should furnish material for the student of human 
thought, feeling and action. On the other hand, the 
facts and laws of psychology, — its account of why 
human beings think and feel and act as they do, — should 
provide the general basis for the interpretation and 
explanation of the great events studied by history, the 
complex activities of civilized society, the motives that 



324 Conclusion 

control the action of labor and capital, and the causes to 
which linguistic inventions and modifications are due. 
Theoretically, history, sociology, economics, linguistics 
and the other 'humanities' or sciences of human affairs 
are all varieties of psychology. But in fact the connec- 
tions have not been close. These sciences have not 
attained sufficient insight into general principles or suffi- 
cient precision in the knowledge of details to offer psy- 
chology very many valuable contributions. And psy- 
chology, for the same reasons and also because the greater 
part of its endeavors so far have been confined to the one 
problem of the way we come to feel the world of things, — 
to perceive space, color, form, movement, weight and the 
like, — has not been a necessity to students of these 
sciences. On the whole, psychology has at present more 
to gain than give. But in the future psychology will 
undoubtedly assume the relation to the other sciences of 
human affairs which physics now holds to geology, 
meteorology, astronomy and the like; it will become the 
fundamental science in the mental world. 

§ 64. The Relations of Psychology to the Arts 

The sciences state facts and laws; the arts give rules 
for practical procedure. Science seeks to know the 
world; the arts, to control it. Each art is or should be 
dependent upon some science or sciences for its general 
principles. Thus the rules of the art of architecture 
should be derived from the laws of mechanics, aesthetics, 
etc. ; the practice of medicine and surgery should be 
founded in the sciences of physiology, pathology, bac- 
teriology, anatomy, etc. ; the art of steel-making depends 
upon the facts of chemistry and metallurgy. 

If there were a complete science of psychology,— if 
the laws of human nature were fully known, — all the arts 



The Relations of Psychology 325 

concerned with human thought, feeling- and action would 
be based upon it. The orator and actor would seek from 
psychology knowledge of the laws governing the feelings 
of an audience ; the man of business would ask from psy- 
chology an account of the motives which influence men 
in buying and selling; the teacher would derive his 
methods from a consideration of the psychological laws 
of learning; the statesman would study psychology to 
find the probable effect on a population of a certain law 
or policy; the manufacturer would obtain the advice of a 
psychological expert concerning the conditions under 
which his employees would work most intelligently and 
efficiently. 

Psychology is not sufficiently advanced as yet to give 
the man engaged in the control of human forces much 
more useful knowledge than he can obtain by direct 
observation of his own special problems and common 
sense inferences from what he sees in daily life. And 
the only practical sphere in which there has yet been any 
important relation between the science of psychology and 
the arts of control over mental life is that of education. 
In this case the value of the science has been perhaps 
exaggerated. The art of teaching has been improved by 
being based upon the science of psychology, but not so 
much as one might hope. 

As the science progresses, it will more and more pro- 
vide with useful rules all the arts that aim to influence 
men, and will more and more be recognized as a part of 
the equipment of the teacher, business man, clergyman, 
employer, statesman or writer. Even now there are signs 
of a rapidly growing recognition of its importance by 
practical men. 

Psychology and Education. — Education was men- 
tioned as the one art which has been commonly supposed 



326 Conclusion 

to rest upon a foundation of psychology. The supposi- 
tion has a far better warrant now than it had fifty or even 
ten years ago. 

Besides the general recommendations concerning the 
best ways to get boys and girls to study, to notice, attend 
to, understand, remember and apply knowledge, to form 
habits and develop capacities, which spring out of the 
facts of general psychology, there are three lines of special 
psychological knowledge which are influencing the prac- 
tical work of education. (1) The psychology of child- 
hood has acquired facts concerning instinctive tendencies, 
the gradual maturing of capacities, the tendencies useful 
and harmful in children's habits of observing, associating 
and reasoning, the actual kinds and amounts of knowledge 
which they may be expected to possess at different ages 
and under different conditions, their likes and dislikes, the 
relation of their mental to their physical well being and 
the like. You will hardly find a book or address on the 
art of teaching before 1890, which pays any attention to 
the fact of instinctive tendencies and you will hardly find 
one after 1900 which does not. The knowledge of these 
facts is altering the treatment of children in homes as 
well as in schools. (2) The results of researches in 
dynamic psychology, mostly quantitative, into the nature 
and amount of individual differences, the relative shares 
of original nature and experience in the formation of 
human intellect and character, the relationships between 
various factors in education and certain traits of mind, 
and other allied topics, are being studied by the men and 
women who plan educational systems, construct the pro- 
grams of studies for the schools and select the methods 
of teaching to be followed, — who, that is, administer the 
affairs of education. For instance, the old practice of 
trying to get everyone in a class to the same level of 



The Relations of Psychology 327 

achievement is fast vanishing as a result of increasing 
knowledge of individual differences. (3) The detailed 
studies of special topics, such as the time taken to per- 
ceive objects, or the nature of eye-movements, or the 
course of fatigue, or the relation of motor skill to intel- 
lectual capacity, frequently provide some fact or theory 
upon which those who have charge of school systems or 
classes of scholars base changes in their practice. For 
instance, manual training, though introduced into the 
schools largely because of the belief that in some subtle 
way the acquisition of bodily skill improved the intellec- 
tual powers, is coming year by year, as later studies show 
this relationship between bodily skill and intellect to be 
not at all close, to base its claims rather upon the value 
of the knowledge of physical things, the appreciation of 
industry and art, the actual skill and the interest in con- 
structive activity which it produces. 

§ 65. The Relations of Psychology to the Personal Con- 
duct of Life 

Knowledge of psychology should make one better 
able to control his own mental life. Man is more nearly 
master of his own intellect and character than of anything 
else in nature. The mind is readily influenced, the nerv- 
ous system being the most modifiable of all the bodily 
organs, and one has a power over himself that he has over 
no other mind. 'Psychologist, improve thyself is an even 
more just command than 'Physician, heal thyself/ 

The application of psychological knowledge to the 
work of self-improvement has important limitations, how- 
ever. The first is due to the same fact that limits its 
application to the arts of controlling others, — the incom- 
pleteness of the science : we do not know enough about 
psychology to give us self-knowledge and self-control. 



328 Conclusion 

In the second place, making the most of one's own intellect 
and character depends largely upon the knowledge of 
one's own individual psychology, of the mental character- 
istics peculiar to oneself, of one's special variations from 
the common human type. But this knowledge the study 
of general psychology does not supply ; it must be gained 
by direct observation. In the third place, the habit of 
taking an impartial, purely scientific view of oneself is 
rare. To see ourselves as others see us, or as a scientific 
observer would see us — who of us even tries to do that ? 

Even with the limitations of the inadequacy of psy- 
chology, the indispensability of direct observation of 
individual make-up, and the rarity of a scientific attitude 
toward oneself, psychology can minister to the art of self- 
improvement. Although this book presents but the out- 
lines of the science, it should teach a number of lessons 
in the conduct of life. A brief mention of some of these 
may indicate what the student could expect from further 
knowledge of psychology. 

It is a natural tendency, when disturbed by any un- 
pleasant fact, to do one thing after another blindly in the 
hope of getting rid of or altering the fact. This holds 
of mental as well as bodily life. If we find that we are 
not very well liked by some companion, we do this or that 
to please him in a hit or miss fashion ; if we grow irritable 
during the day, we try to work it off in a fit of scolding or 
we go out doors for a tramp or we do nothing; if we 
become discouraged and pessimistic, we resort to prayer 
or to drink or to a change of air as our habits may be, 
from no rational idea of what is the matter with us or 
what is its best remedy. Now every step in psychological 
study teaches us that for everything in mental life there 
is a reason, that what anyone thinks or feels or does at 
any time is the result of causes, and that these are to at 



The Relations of Psychology 329 

least some extent knowable. When in mental difficulty, 
do not worry or aimlessly try this or that, but seek the 
reason, is the plain teaching of psychology. The advice 
is worth following. The cause will not always be found ; 
when it is found, to avoid it or to find a remedy for its 
action will in some cases be impossible. But there will 
be very many cases where an intelligent search for the 
reason of a mental fact will soon disclose both it and the 
means of preventing it. 

Too often the energy of life is wasted in sickly thought 
or unproductive emotion. Life is wrecked morally for 
anyone who is content with fine thoughts and fine feelings. 
Psychology, in teaching us that the function of mental 
life is to arouse and guide action, warns us against the 
errors of the sentimentalist and emotional enthusiast. 
The lessons of church and of school are unfortunately 
often insufficient, and even misleading, here. To feel love 
toward God and righteousness, to thrill with admiration 
for the heroes of history and fiction, to say fine things 
about truth and duty— these are too often accepted as 
virtues in and of themselves. Psychology teaches us that 
they are worthy only in so far as they are expressed in 
worthy conduct, — that, as mere feelings, they may even 
be vices because they may encourage the habit of feeling 
satisfied with being a wolf in action with a sheep's cloth- 
ing of sentiment. This is a sound lesson. Not only the 
hateful Pecksniffs and the charming Sentimental Tommys, 
but every one of us, needs it. You think and feel so as 
to do, and what you do — that and that alone you will 
really be. 

It is a common fallacy in human conduct to try to do a 
thing merely because someone else has done it with suc- 
cess. Jones made a fortune by speculating in stocks. 
Why not I? Miss Smith went on the stage and is a 

22 



330 Conclusion 

great actress. Why not I ? The reason why is that you 
are not Jones or Miss Smith. The fallacy is the neglect 
of differences in capacity. To know our powers and our 
limitations is the first step in using them wisely. Many 
of our failures are due to forgetfulness of our limita- 
tions; many of our missed opportunities are due to for- 
getfulness of our powers. We spoil a first rate artisan 
to make an inferior lawyer. She who might be happy 
and useful as a wife and mother becomes a dissatisfied 
and inefficient teacher. Psychology teaches us to take 
stock of our mental equipment and to wisely dispose our 
forces in the attack on life's problems, to seek carefully 
for the lines of least resistance. 

Perhaps the most important of all the practical lessons 
of psychology is furnished by the general law of the 
modification of the mind by every thought and feeling 
and act of a man's life. Common experience teaches us 
in a vague and partial way that what we are at any time 
depends upon what we have been "and done in the past; 
but life is so complex and the causes of the growth of 
intellect and character are so hidden that unless we have 
studied mental life scientifically we are almost sure to 
make two errors, — to suppose ( I ) that much in our lives 
is due to chance and (2) that by an act of will we can at 
any time blot out the past and begin again. Psychology 
proves and reinforces the practical conclusion of the wise 
men of all ages that every thought and act of life counts, 
that we build the ladder by which we climb, that nothing 
happens by chance. Though we seem to forget what we 
learn, each mental acquisition really leaves its mark and 
makes future judgments more sagacious; a few indul- 
gences in some useless or bad habit are of small conse- 
quence but they are of some consequence; nothing of 
good or evil is ever lost; we may forget and forgive, but 



The Relations of Psychology 331 

the neurones never forget or forgive. Balzac somewhere 
says that if a young man is upright and honorable till he is 
twenty-five he can never become thoroughly vicious. It 
is certain that every worthy deed represents a modification 
of the neurones of which nothing can ever rob us. 
Every event of a man's mental life is written indelibly in 
the brain's archives, to be counted for or against him, not 
at some far off judgment day, but in every future step of 
his mental career. We must learn then that no intellec- 
tual or moral response is without importance and dignity. 
The influence of each one lasts as long as life; the little 
things prepare for the great ; no effort for truth and right 
is ever a waste; no error should ever be without regret. 
We must learn to have full confidence that we shall think 
wisely and act nobly in face of the great problems and 
decisions, if we do the measure of our duty by the common 
day's work of thought and action. Our only responsi- 
bility toward the unknown is to do our best by the known. 
He who is faithful in a very little is given authority over 
ten cities. 

Man not only creates his own future by the responses 
he makes from moment to moment ; he also creates in 
some measure his own present by his power to select what 
features of his surroundings shall influence him. The 
psychology of attention should teach us that in some 
degree we can literally make the world. We can avoid 
the pain and distress and cherish the joy and hope. It is 
our choice whether the world shall be sordid and mean 
or inspiring and noble, — shall be ugly or beautiful, en- 
couraging or disheartening. There is no place in nature 
so repellent as to possess no feature which attention might 
select to enjoy; nor is there any place so lovely as not to 
make dissatisfied one who should focus a fault-finding 
mind on some one of its details. We are as truly and 



33 2 Conclusion 

perhaps as much rulers as victims of circumstances. As 
saints burning at the stake have felt only the joy of 
worship, so we may refine away the dross from life simply 
by not attending to it. To banish great physical pain or 
impressive misfortune is perhaps too much to expect of 
ordinary mortals, but surely there is no excuse for any 
student of psychology who does not keep his stream of 
attentive thought turned away from minor discomforts 
and mishaps, petty irrelevancies and idle regrets. 

One of our chief practical problems is to conduct life 
so that we may think and act rightly with as little effort 
or strain as possible. Effort or strain is what makes work 
unpleasant in the doing and destructive of mental health, 
and the worker a trial to all his friends and associates. 
It is our duty to them and to ourselves to work easily, 
without fatigue and irritation. Psychology teaches us 
that mental activity is in itself pleasant, that to think is 
more enjoyable than to be empty-minded, that the effort 
and strain of thought and action are not concerned with 
the actual thinking and doing, but with not thinking and 
not doing, — with inhibiting irrelevant ideas and undesir- 
able impulses. The effort involved in reasoning we found, 
in Chapter XVII, to be due to the irruption into our 
stream of thought of ideas which did not fit our purposes 
and so needed to be promptly ruled out of the mind's 
court; the effort involved in voluntary action we found, 
in Chapter XVIII, to be due to the rise of impulses which 
conscience or wisdom could not approve and which the 
will must promptly squelch. The effort of being indus- 
trious is the effort not to heed the calls of idle pleasures. 
We become weary, worn and peevish because of what we 
do not do. 

Psychology offers us help in two ways. In the first 
place tension and effort may be lessened by so arranging 



The Relations of Psychology 333 

circumstances that undesirable ideas and impulses requir- 
ing inhibition will seldom appear. The school-boy who 
cannot do his lessons in the midst of the family circle 
often works successfully if given a study room for him- 
self. Men for whom the moral life was a bitter and 
wearying struggle have found peace and rest in the 
monastery. Every intelligent worker soon learns that 
discretion is often the better part of valor, that to avoid 
temptation is often wiser than to resist it. Psychology 
also teaches us to distinguish between those impulses 
which should be overcome by never letting them come to 
the front, and those which should be faced and conquered 
outright. The rule is simple. Any undesirable impulses 
which must be often met sooner or later need to be abso- 
lutely inhibited : any which are transitory, infrequent and 
unnecessary in life may best be avoided. It is the error 
of the weak individual to always either yield or avoid; it 
is the error of the strong mind to make needless victories, 
expensive in their tax on the power of inhibition ; it is the 
error of all of us to fight useless battles, — useless either 
because, being weak, we are sure to be beaten or because, 
though strong, we gain victory at too great a cost. 

In the second place much of the need for voluntary 
inhibition is due to a misleading notion taught to many of 
us in school that the harder work we make of any mental 
task, the better we shall do it. T must now make a tre- 
mendous effort at concentration, bend all my energies to 
the work, gird up my loins for an intense fight,' we say, 
with the expectation that the amount of effort that we 
expend will decide the amount of work that we get done. 
Nothing could be more perverse. Other things being 
equal, the more easily we work, the more we shall accom- 
plish. The success of mental work is measured by the 
amount done and its quality, not by the feelings we have 



334 - Conclusion 

when doing it. The most efficient workers make the least 
display of effort; and the best men and women morally 
are those who do what is right with the least moral strug- 
gle. The mental attitude toward intellectual work should 
be to think, not of our efforts, but of the problem in hand. 
We should do right with as little trouble to ourselves or 
anyone else as may be. 

As a last illustration of the applications of psychology 
to the practical control of life, we may take the outcome 
of the general fact that our feelings of things and of 
personal conditions are due to conditions of the body. 
Common sense has by the present day come to agree that 
a headache is more likely to come from overeating or 
eye strain than from anxiety or disappointed love, and 
that the temper and peevishness of children are caused by 
improper food rather than by the sin of Adam. Psy- 
chology extends the lesson through the entire realm of 
sensation and the sensory emotions. Of course, improv- 
ing one's health is not the only way to improve one's 
temper, but it is the easiest. Correcting eye defects is not 
the only way to increase the quantity of one's mental 
work, but it is one of the most profitable. A sagacious 
school principal who realized the effect of the physical 
functions on intellect and disposition remarked that he 
looked especially for teachers who had strong 'insides.' 
Certainly one of the best means of preserving intellectual 
vigor and emotional balance is to maintain healthy 
'insides/ 

These samples may serve to show that psychology has 
a real bearing upon mental hygiene. At the present time 
its recommendations are necessarily somewhat vague, but 
with every advance in the science of mental facts we may 
rightly expect a corresponding advance in the art of con- 
trolling them. 



The Relations of Psychology 335 

Concerning the general position of psychology 
amongst other sciences and in relation to the arts, the 
facts given in this chapter emphasize the incorrectness 
of the common notion of psychology as a study apart from 
the recognized sciences and devoid of meaning for the 
practical affairs of life. On the contrary psychology is 
intimately connected with the biological and social 
sciences and is likely in the future to become one of the 
most useful of them to the practical man. 

References 

A. Stout, Manual, 14-32. 
Titchener, Outline, §§ 5-6. 
Angell, Psychology, pp. 3-10. 

B. Ebbinghaus, Grundzilge, § 6. 
James, Principles, VII. 



336 Topics for Special Study 

Topics for Special Study 

The topics and references given below are chosen to 
meet the needs of students in their first year of psycho- 
logical work, who wish or need to make an intensive 
study of several topics. Those marked (A) may conven- 
iently be studied by all students and even before any text- 
book is completed. Those marked (B) should in most 
cases be studied only by interested and capable students 
and after the text-book is nearly or quite completed. 

The aim in the selection of references has been not 
only to name books and articles by thoroughly qualified 
experts, but also to name only those which are not too 
advanced for college students, which can be readily ob- 
tained by the ordinary college or normal school class, and 
which exist in an English text. Books known to be out 
of print, such as Galton's 'Inquiries into Human Faculty,' 
are for this reason rejected; and articles in periodicals 
which the student would be unable to buy and of which 
a single copy or none would be found in his institution's 
library, are used very sparingly. It is unfortunately true 
that not one in fifty amongst college and normal school 
students of psychology can read a technical book in a for- 
eign language. All the books referred to may well be 
bought for the library of any institution which offers in- 
struction in psychology. 

In some cases the reference is not to pages to be read 
but to sets of experiments to be done. Such cases are 
marked Experimental. 

(A) 1. The Nervous System. The Growth of the Brain, by 
H. H. Donaldson, or The Anatomy of the Central 
Nervous System, etc., by L. Edinger (translation). 

(A) 2. Sensations. Chapters I-VII of An Introduction to 
Physiological Psychology, by T. Ziehen (translation), 
or The Analysis of Sensations, by E. Mach (transla- 
tion) . 



Topics for Special Study 337 

(A) 3. The Sense Organs. The Physiology of the Senses, by 
J. G. M'Kendrick and W. Snodgrass. 

(A) 4. The Experimental Study of Connections of Impression. 
Chapters V and VI of Analytical Psychology, by L. 
Witmer. Experimental. 

(A) 5. Vision. Sight, by J. Le Conte. 

(A) 6. Color Vision. The Colour Sense, by Grant Allen, or 

Colour Blindness and Colour Perception, by F. W. 
Edridge-Green. 

(B) 7. Hearing. L' Audition, by P. Bonnier. 

(A) 8. The Experimental Study of Perception. Chapters I 

and IV of Analytical Psychology, by L. Witmer. 
Experimental. 

(B) 9. The Perception of Space. Chapter XX of The Princi- 

ples of Psychology, by W. James, or Studies in Audi- 
tory and Visual Space-Perception, by A. H. Pierce. 

Illusions. Illusions, by J. Sully. 

Hallucinations. Hallucinations and Illusions, by E. 
Parish (translation). 

Apperception. Apperception, by K. Lange (transla- 
tion). 

Apperception. The Reading of Words; A Study in 
Apperception (in the American Journal of Psychol- 
ogy, 1897, VIII, 315-393), by W. B. Pillsbury and 
The Apperception of the Spoken Sentence (in the 
American Journal of Psychology, 1900, XII, 80-130), 
by W. C. Bagley. ^ 

(A) 14. Attention. The Psychology of Attention, by T. Ribot. 

(B) 15. Imagery. Mental Imagery (Monograph Supplement 

No. 7 of the Psychological Review), by W. Lay, 
or An Essay on the Creative Imagination, by T. Ribot 
(translation). 

(A) 16. Memory. Memory, by F. W. Colgrove, or La memoir e, 

by J. J. Van Biervliet. 

(B) 17. The Association of Ideas. Association (Monograph 

Supplement No. 2 of the Psychological Review), by 
M. W. Calkins, or ^association des idees, by E. 
Claparede. 
(B) 18. Reasoning. The Psychology of Reasoning, by A. Binet 
(translation). 



(A) 


10. 


(A) 


n. 


(A) 


12 


(B) 


13- 



338 Topics for Special Study 

(A) 19. The Physiological Basis of the Emotions. Chapter 
XXV of The Principles of Psychology, by W. James 
and Les emotions or Ueber Gemiithsbewegungen, by 
C. Lange (translations from the Danish). 

(A) 20. The Expression of the Emotions. The Expression of 

the Emotions, by C. Darwin. 

(B) 21. Fear. Fear, by A. Mosso (translation) and A Study of 

Fears (in the American Journal of Psychology, 1897. 

VIII, 147-249), by G. S. Hall. 
(B) 22. Anger. A Study of Anger (in the American Journal 

of Psychology, 1899, X, 516-591), by G. S. Hall. 
(B) 23. Joy. The Emotion of Joy (Monograph Supplement 

No. 9, of the Psychological Review), by G. V. N. 

Dearborn. 
(A) 24. The Instincts of Animals. Habit and Instinct, by C. 

L. Morgan. 

(A) 25. The Instincts of Man. Chapter XXIV of The Princi- 

ples of Psychology, by W. James and Chapters III- 
XIII of The Fundamentals of Child Study, by E. A. 
Kirkpatrick. 

(B) 26. Movement. Le mouvement, by R. S. Woodworth. 

(A) 27. Suggestion and Hypnotism. Chapter XXVI of The 

Principles of Psychology, by W. James and one of 
the following: Hypnotism, by A. Moll (translation) ; 
Hypnotism, by J. M. Bramwell; The Psychology of 
Suggestion, by B. Sidis. 

(B) 28. Diseases of the Will. Diseases of the Will, by T. A. 

Ribot (translation) and Les obsessions et les impul- 
sions, by E. Regis and A. Pitres. 

(B) 29. The Self. Chapter X of The Principles of Psychology, 
by W. James and Chapter VII of Book IV of A 
Manual of Psychology, by G. F. Stout. 

(B) 30. Physical and Mental Fatigue. Fatigue, by A. Mosso 
(translation), or La fatigue intellectuelle, by A. 
Binet and V. Henri. 

(A) 31. Dreams. Chapter IV of Sleep, by M. de Manaceine 

(translation) and Les rives, by P. Tissie. 

(B) 32. The Acquisition of Skill. Studies in the Psychology of 

the Telegraphic Language (in the Psychological Re- 
view, 1897, IV, 27-53 and 1899, VI, 346-375), by W. 
L. Bryan and N. Harter, or The Practice Curve 



Topics for Special Study 339 

(Monograph Supplement No. 19 of the Psycholog- 
ical Review), by J. H. Bair, or Studies in the 
Psychology and Physiology of Learning (in the 
American Journal of Psychology, 1903, XIV, 201- 
251), by E. J. Swift. 

(A) 33. The Inheritance of Mental Capacities. Hereditary 

Genius, by F. Galton, or Mental and floral Heredity 
in Royalty, by F. A. Woods. 

(B) 34. Sex Differences in Mental Traits. Chapters VI-VIII, 

XII-XVI and XVIII of Man and Woman, by H. 
Ellis, and Mental Traits of Sex, by H. B. Thompson. 

(A) 35. Experimental Psychology. Experimental Psychology 
and Culture, by G. M. Stratton, or The New Psy- 
chology, by E. W. Scripture, or Analytical Psychol- 
ogy, by L. Witmer. 

(A) 36. The Psychology of Infancy. The Mind of the Child, 
by T. W. Preyer (translation), or First Steps in 
Mental Growth, by D. R. Major. 

(A) 37. The Psychology of Childhood. Studies of Childhood, 
by J. Sully, or The Fundamentals of Child Study, 
by E. A. Kirkpatrick, or Notes on Child Study, by 
E. L. Thorndike. 

(A) 38. The Mental Life of Animals. Animal Behavior, by C. 

L. Morgan, or Animal Intelligence (Monograph Sup- 
plement No. 8 of the Psychological Review), by 
E. L. Thorndike. 

(B) 39. The Psychology of Primitive Man. The Basis of Social 

Relations, by D. G. Brinton, or Primitive Culture, by 
E. B. Tylor. 

(A) 40. The Psychology of Races. The Psychology of Peo- 
ples, by G. Le Bon (translation), or La psychologie 
du peuple franqais, by A. Fouillee, or The Russian 
People (in The Expansion of Russia, by A. N. 
Rambard), by Novikov Yakov. 

(A) 41. The Psychology of Insanity. The Pathology of Mind, 
by H. Maudsley, or Sanity and Insanity, by C. Mer- 
cier. 

(A) 42. The Psychology of Intellectual Superiority. English 
Men of Science, by F. Galton and A Study of British 
Genius, by H. Ellis. 



34-0 Topics for Special Study 

(B) 43. The Psychology of the Feeble-minded. The Mental 
Affections of Children, by W. W. Ireland, or The 
Psychology of Mentally Deficient Children, by N. 
Norsworthy or Mental Defectives, by M. W. Barr. 

(A) 44. The Psychology of the Mob. The Croivd, by G. Le 
Bon (translation), or U opinion et la foule, by G. 
Tarde. 

(A) 45. The Psychology of the Criminal. The Criminal, by 
H. Ellis. 

(A) 46. The Psychology of the Deaf-Blind. The Story of My 

Life, by Helen Keller, or Laura Bridgman, by M. H. 
Elliott and F. H. Hall and the article on Laura 
Bridgman "in Aspects of German Culture, by G. S. 
Hall. 

(B) 47. The Psychology of the Weather. The Weather, by 

E. G. Dexter. 

(A) 48. The Psychology of Play. The Play of Animals and 
The Play of Man, both by K. Groos (translations). 

(A) 49. The Psychology of Religion. The Varieties of Re- 
ligious Experience, by W. James, or The Psychology 
of Religion, by E. D. Starbuck, or The Spiritual Life 
and The Religion of a Mature Mind, both by G. A. 
Coe. 

(A) 50. The Psychology of the Occult. Fact and Fable in Psy- 

chology, by J. Jastrow. 

(B) 51. The Psychology of Speech. The Faculty of Speech, 

by J. Collins, or Aphasia, by F. Bateman. 

(B) 52. The Development of Speech. Chapter V of The Psy- 
chology of Childhood, by F. Tracy, and Die Entwick- 
lung von Sprachen und Denken beim Kinde, by W. 
Ament. 

(B) 53. The Psychology of Reading. On the Psychology and 
Physiology of Reading (in the American Journal of 
Psychology 1900, XI, 283-302 and 1901, XII, 292- 
312), by E. B. Huey, or Psychologische Unter- 
suchungen iiber das Lesen, by B. Erdmann and R. 
Dodge, or The Psychology of Reading, by W. F. 
Dearborn. 

(B) 54. The Psychology of Spelling. Spelling in the Elemen- 
tary School, by O. P. Cornman. 

(B) 55. The Psychology of Arithmetic. The Psychology of 
Number, by J. A. McLellan and J. Dewey. 



Topics for Special Study 341 

(B) 56. The Psychology of Writing. Zur Psychologic des 
Schreibens, by W. Preyer. 

(A) 57. The Psychology of Advertising. The Theory of Ad- 
vertising, by W. D. Scott, and On the Psychology of 
Advertising, by Harlow Gale (pp. 39-69 of his Psy- 
chological Studies). 

(A) 58. Psychology and Philosophy. An Introduction to Phil- 

osophy, by F. Paulsen (translation) and Chapters V 
and VI of The Principles of Psychology, by W. 
James. 

(B) 59. Psychology and Philosophy. Why the Mind Has a 

Body, by C. A. Strong, or The Philosophy of Mind, 
by G. T. Ladd. 

(B) 60. Psychology and Ethics. The Psychology of Ethics, by 
D. Irons. 

(B) 61. Psychology and Aesthetics. Aesthetic Principles, by 
H. R. Marshall. 

(B) 62. Psychology and Sociology. The Psychic Factors of 
Civilization, by L. F. Ward, or The Principles of So- 
ciology, by F. H. Giddings, or The Laws of Imita- 
tion, by G. Tarde (translation), or Etudes de psy- 
chologic sociale, by G. Tarde. 

(B) 63. Psychology and Economics. La psychologic econo- 
mique, by G. Tarde. 

(A) 64. Psychology and Education. Talks to Teachers on Psy- 
chology, by W. James, or Genetic Psychology for 
Teachers, by C. H. Judd, or Herbartian Psychology 
Applied to Education, by J. Adams, or The Principles 
of Teaching, by E. L. Thorndike, or The Psychologi- 
cal Principles of Education, by H. H. Home. 

Bibliographies of Psychology 

The books and articles on psychology which have been 
written since the beginning of 1894 are carefully indexed 
in the annual 'Psychological Index' of the Psychological 
Review. A selected bibliography containing the titles 
of all important books on psychology is being published 
as a volume of the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychol- 
ogy, edited by J. M. Baldwin. 



342 Bibliographies 

Guidance in the selection of reading may be best ob- 
tained from the reviews of psychological books found in 
the leading psychological journals. Those in English 
are: Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Phil- 
osophy; The American Journal of Psychology; The Psy- 
chological Review; The British Journal of Psychology; 
and The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific 
Methods. Nature and Science also furnish trustworthy 
guidance. 



INDEX 

Illustrations 

Page 

1. Ambiguous and hidden pictures 41 

2. The brain and spinal cord 122 

3. The cerebrum 123 

4. A section of the brain as it appears to the naked eye. . . . 124 

5. Sketches of neurones 125 

6-1 1. Drawings of the finer structure of the brain 128-131 

12-16. Micro-photographs of the finer structure of the brain. 132 
17. A section of the brain as it appears to the naked eye. . 132 
18-23. Drawings of neurones and parts of neurones. .. .133-136 

24. Scheme showing sheaths of a neurone 137 

25. Drawings showing sheaths of neurones 137 

26-29. Micro-photographs of neurones and parts of neurones. 136 

30-37. Drawings of different varieties of neurones 138-141 

38-40. Micro-photographs of different varieties of neurones 140 

41. Scheme showing connections of neurones 142 

42-43. Drawings showing connections of neurones 143 

44.-47. Schematic representations of the arrangement of 

neurones 150-153 

48-55. Drawings of sensory neurone-endings 154-156 

48. Neurone endings in the epidermis 154 

49 
50 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 



Corpuscle of Rufhni 155 

Tendon with nerve-plaque 155 

Taste buds 156 

Neurone endings in the ear 156 

Neurone endings in the nose 156 

Nervous elements of the retina 156 

Ending of a motor neurone 157 

57 and 58. Sensory areas in the cortex 159 

59 and 60. Motor areas in the cortex 160 

61. The neural correlate of perception 171 

62-67. Diagrams for experiments on the blind spot 177-179 

343 



344 Index 

Page 

68-73. Diagrams for experiments in binocular vision... 181-182 

74. Apparatus for experiments on animal learning. 200 

75. A diagram to illustrate the influence of the law of the 

mind's set 206 

76 and 77. Diagrams to test the law of relativity 231-232 

78-81. Diagrams to illustrate the law of association in per- 
ception 234-236 

82. A diagram for an experiment in purposive thinking 268 

83. A diagram for an experiment in the accuracy of movement 299 

84. A diagram for an experiment in the influence of move- 

ments as antecedents , , . . 307 



Experiments 

Page 

1. Pressure spots 32 

2. Cold spots 33 

3. The threshold for pressure 33 

4. The mixture of taste and smell 34 

5. Sensations and percepts 41 

6. Percept and stimulus 42 

7. After-images and recalled images 57 

8. The duration of mental processes 96 

9. The fluctuations of attention 106 

10. The relative time of focal and marginal thinking 106 

11. The influence of attention on memory 107 

H 12. The aid of attention in analysis 107 

13. The influence of the absence of neurone endings in a por- 

tion of a sensitive surface 177 

14, 15 and 16. Sensations from bilaterally symmetrical sensi- 

tive surfaces 179 

17. Instincts of the reflex type 198 

18. The modifiability of instincts 198 

19. Color contrast 233 

20. The law of diminishing returns! 233 

21. The law of association in perception 234 

22. 23, 24 and 25. Apperception .234-235 

26 and 27. Spontaneous and controlled association 271-273 

28. The acquisition of skill 301 

29. The influence of practice on motor skill 301 

30. Movements as stimuli to mental states 308 



Index 



345 



Names and Subjects 



Abstract ideas, 6, 68. 

Abstraction (See Analysis). 

Acquired Tendencies, described, 
14 f. ; in general, 184 ff. ; 199 
ff.; in perception, 225 ff. ; in 
the connections of ideas, 239 
ff. ; in connections of expres- 
sion, 274 ff. ; to attend, 101 f. ; 
to feel satisfaction and dis- 
comfort, 315 f. 

Action, 10 ff. (See also Expres- 
sion, connections of) . 

Adaptation, 113 f. 

Adjustments, in motor skill, 300. 

Aesthetic feelings, 80 ff. 

Affection (See Emotions, Sat- 
isfaction and Discomfort). 

Afferent (See Sensory). 

After-images, 57. 

Aikins, H. A., 72. 

Analogy, response by, 211 ff. 

Analysis, and attention, 105; 
the law of, 215 ff. 

Animals, mental states of, no, 
221, 320. 

Apperception (See Impression, 
connections of and Associa- 
tions of ideas). 

Applications of psychology, in 
the case of instincts, 196 f., of 
the law of association, 209 f. ; 
of connections of impression, 
230!; of memory, 260 ff. ; of 
reasoning, 270 f. ; of action, 
293 ff. ; to the arts, 325 f . ; to 
the personal conduct of life, 
327 ff- 

Assimilation, fill, 213, 276. 

Association, connections of, 14; 
23 



of ideas, 17, 238 ff.; the law 
of, 199 ff. ; 227 f., 234, 239 f., 
274 ff., 298 f., 309 ff., 315 f. 

Associations of ideas, 238 ff. ; 
and the general law of asso- 
ciation, 239 f.; the law of 
partial activity in, 240 f. ; 
simultaneous and successive, 
241 f. ; laws of, 242; by 
similarity, 243; by contiguity, 
243; selection among sequent 
ideas, 244 ff.; individual dif- 
ferences in, 249 f. ; control of, 
260 ff. ; and memory, 255 f. ; 
and purposive thinking, 264. 

Associative neurones, 148 f. 

Attention, the nature of, 94 ff., 
98; varieties of, 99 f. ; volun- 
tary and involuntary, 100 f. ; 
native and acquired, 101 f.; 
immediate and derived, 102 
f. ; sensorial and intellectual, 
103; and analysis, 105; func- 
tion of, 118; law of associa- 
tion in habits of, 309 ff. ; and 
neglect, 313 *• 

Auditory images, 43, 47, 49. 

Auditory sensations, 25, 29. 

Automatism, 302 ff. 

Axis-cylinder process (See 
Axone). 

Axone, 132, 137. 



Bain, A., 44. 

Baldwin, J. M., j6. 

Barker, L. F., 121, 154, 155, 156, 

160. 
Blind spot, 177 ff. 



346 



Index 



Blood supply, the influence of 
on mental life, 222. 

Bodily expression, of emotions, 
81 f. ; of mental states in gen- 
eral, in f. 

Brain {See Nervous system). 

Bunge, 154. 



Cajal, Ramon y., 131. 

Calkins, M. W., 91. 

Capacities, defined, 17; attri- 
butes of, 191 f. ; specialization 
of, 192 f. ; control of, 196 f. 

Cells, of nervous system {See 
Neurones). 

Cerebrum {See Nervous sys- 
tem). 

Choice, 87 f. 

Ciaccio, 155. 

Classification, of mental states 
in general, 3ff., 108 ff.; of 
movements, 11 f. ; of con- 
nections, 12 ff. ; of sensations, 
24 ff. ; of percepts, 39 f. ; of 
images, 43 f. ; of feelings of 
relationships, 61 f. ; of feelings 
of meaning, 67 f. ; of judg- 
ments, 72; of emotions, 75 
ff. ; of attention 99 f. ; of 
neurones, 147 ff. ; of the sub- 
ject matter of psychology 
320 f. ; of the methods of 
psychology, 321 f. 

Clouston, 297. 

Collaterals, 132 ff. 

Color, sensations of, 24, 26; 
contrast, 229 232. 

Complex mental states, 8, 92. 

Concepts, described, 6, 68 ; func- 
tion of, 116; physiological 



basis of, 175. '(See also 
Meaning, feelings of). 

Conduct {See Expression, con- 
nections of). 

Conductivity of neurones, 145 f. 

Connections, in general, 12 ff. ; 
functions of, 117 f . ; original 
and acquired, 165 ff . ; phys- 
iological basis of, 222 f. ; the 
formation of, Chapter XIII; 
of impression, Chapter XV; 
between one mental state and 
another, Chapters XVI and 
XVII; of expression, Chap- 
ters XVIII and XIX. 

Consciousness {See Mental 
states). 

Contiguity, association by, 243. 

Continuity of mental life, 94. 

Contrast, 229, 232. 

Coordination of movements, 
298 ff. 

Cortex of cerebrum, 121, 124, 
128, 129 and Figs. 13-16. 

Curiosity, 190. 



Decision, 87 f. 

Deduction, 267 ff. 

Deliberation, 87. 

Dendrites, 132, 137. 

Desire, 87. 

Discomfort, influence of on 
connections, 166, 188, 200, 203, 
204ff., 245 f., 265, 275; in- 
stinctive sources of, 315; the 
acquisition of feelings of, 
315 ff. 

Dissociation, 215 ff. 

Duration, of sensations, 22; 
of mental states in general, 96. 



Index 



347 



Eberth, 154. 

Edinger, L., 121, 124, 128, 130, 
132, 141, 154. 

Education {See Applications of 
psychology). 

Efferent neurones {See Motor 
neurones). 

Effort, 89, 100 f. ; 295 f. ; phys- 
iological basis of, 174. 

Emotions, denned, 7, 74; and 
sensations, 75 ; classification 
of, 75 ff. ; aesthetic, 80 . f. ; 
bodily expression of, 81 f. ; 
and action, 82; development 
of, 82 f. ; function of, 117; 
physiological basis of, 172 ff. ; 
James-Lange theory of, 172 
f., 174. 

End organs {See Sense organs 
and Motor organs). 

Expression, movements of, 11; 
of the emotions, 81 f. ; the law 
of, 162 f. ; connections of, 
274 ff. ; connections of ex- 
pression and the law of in- 
stinct, 274; and the law of 
association, 274 ff. ; and the 
law of assimilation, 276; and 
the law of analysis, 276 ; spon- 
taneous and purposive, 2j6 
ff. ; individual differences in, 
290 ff. ; the control of, 293 ff. 

Extensity of sensations, 23. 



Facts, feelings of, 58 ff. 

Fatigue of neurones, 167. 

Flechsig, P., 159. 

Frequency of connections as a 
cause of their permanence, 
204, 206, 227 f., 245 ff., 274 ff. 



Functions of mental states, 111 
ff. ; of sensations, 114; of per- 
cepts, 114 f. ; of images, 115; 
of memories, 115; of feelings 
of relationships, 115 f. ; of 
feelings 'of meaning. 116; of 
emotions, 117; of the connec- 
tions of mental states, 117 f. ; 
of selective processes, 118; of 
automatism, 304 f. 

Galton, F., 53 ff., 266. 

General notions {See Con- 
cepts). 

Gustatory sensations {See 
Tastes). 

Habits, 16, 199, 302. {See also 

Association, the law of, and 

Connections). 
Hallucinations, described, 35 ; 

physiological basis of, 171 ; 

causes of, 229 f. 
Heredity, 194 ff. 
Horsley, V., 160. 
Huxley, T. H., 45. 

Ideas, association of {See As- 
sociation). 

Illusions, defined, 35 ; physi- 
ological basis of, 171 ; causes 
of, 229. 

Imagery, {See Images). 

Images, defined, 5, 43 ; classifi- 
cation of, 43 f. ; variation in, 
45 ff. ; types of individuals 
with respect to, 49; and per- 
cepts, 49 f. ; productive and 
reproductive, 50 f. ; and feel- 
ings of meaning, 68 f . ; of 
emotions, 83; function of, 115. 



348 



Index 



Imitation, 287 ff. 

Impression, connections of 224 
ff.; inborn, 224 f . ; acquired, 
225 ff. ; law of association in 
the case of, 227 ff. ; control of, 
230 f. 

Impulses, 85 ff. 

Inattention, 104 f. 

Individual differences, in im- 
agery, 45 ff. ; in original ten- 
dencies, 193 f. ; in purely men- 
tal connections, 249 ff. ; in 
connections of expression, 
290 ff. 

Individual notions, described, 6, 
68; function of, 116; physio- 
logical basis of, 175 f. 

Induction, 267 ff. 

Inferences, 17. ' 

Inhibition, as a feature of at- 
tention, 101, 313 ff. ; as a func- 
tion of the nervous system, 
163 f. ; of instincts, 188 f. ; in 
purposive thinking, 265 ff . ; 
in motor skill, 299 ff. ; and 
effort wasted, 332. 

Instincts, defined, 15 f. ; 187; de- 
layed, 187 f. ; transitory, 188; 
and habits, 188 f . ; 199 ff. ; 
indefiniteness of, 189 f . ; hu- 
man, 190 f. ; individual differ- 
ences in, 193 ff. ; the control 
of, 196 f. 

Intensity, of sensations, 23; of 
mental states in general, 96; 
as a cause of the formation 
of connections, 166, 207, 247, 
275- 

Interest, 309 ff. (See also un- 



der Attention and Satisfac- 
tion). 

James, W., 3, 22, 42, 44, 46, 47, 
Si, 57, 60, 80, 93, 95, 172, 252, 
259, 283, 297. 

Judgments, defined, 7, 71 ; 
classification of, 72; and 
reasoning, 71 f. 

Kinaesthetic sensations (See 
Movement, sensations of) . 

V. KOELLIKER, A., 121, 129, 130, 

135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140. 

Ladd, G. T., 3. 

Lange, C, 172. 

Lay, W., 48, 49. 

v. Lenhossek, M., 121, 135, 

136, 140, 156. 
Localization, of brain functions, 

158 ff. 

McCosh, J., 3. 

Meaning, feelings of, described, 
6, 65 ff.; classification of, 67 
f. ; and images, 68 f. ; and 
reasoning, 69 f. ; functions of, 
116. (See also under Indi- 
vidual notions, Concepts and 
Abstract ideas.) 

Medullary sheath, 134 ff. 

Memories, described, 5 f., 50 ff. ; 
function of, 115. 

Memory, and the law of asso- 
ciation, 255 ff. ; appropriate 
revival in, 257 f. ; individual 
differences in, 258 f. ; the con- 
trol of, 260 ff. 

Mental states, in general, 1 ff., 
92 ff. ; function of, 111 ff. ; 



Index 



349 



physiological basis of, 169 ff. 
(See also under Sensations, 
percepts, etc.). 

Modifiability of the nervous sys- 
tem, 146 f. 

Moral training, 298 ff. 

Motor images, 43 ff. 

Motor neurones, 147 f. 

Motor organs, 157 f. 

Movements, in general, 10 ff. ; 
classification of, 11 f. ; sensa- 
tions due to, 306 ff. ; connec- 
tions involving, 298 ff. 

Native tendencies (See Original 
tendencies). 

Nervous system, gross struc- 
ture, 120 ff. ; finer structure, 
125 ff. ; action of the, 144 ff. ; 
arrangement of the elements 
of, 147 ff. ; and mental states, 
169 ff. 

Neurones, in relation to the 
nervous system, 125 ff. ; 
structure of, 132 ff. ; varieties 
of, 138 ff. ; connections of, 
139, 141 ff. ; functions of, 144 
ff. ; arrangement of, 147 ff- 

Original tendencies, defined, 14; 
attributes of, 184 ff. ; in per- 
ception, 224 f. ; and purely 
mental connections, 239; in 
action, 274; to automatic re- 
sponses, 303; in attention, 
310; to feel satisfaction and 
discomfort, 315. (See also 
Instincts and Capacities). 

Partial activity, the general law 



of, 206 f. ; in connections be- 
tween one mental state and 
another, 240 f. ; in connec- 
tions of expression, 280 f. 

Perception (See Impression, 
connections of). 

Percepts, described, 5, 35 ff. ; 
and stimuli, 36 ff . ; and sen- 
sations, 39; classification of, 
39 ff. ; function of, 114 f.; 
physiological basis of, 171. 

Personal feeling as a quality of 
mental states in general, 93. 

Persuasion, 286. 

Powers, 16. 

Pre-perception, 235 f. 

Psychology, the subject matter 
of, 1 ff. ; 319 ff. ; abnormal, 
320; individual, 320; of chil- 
dren, 320 ; animal, 320 ; physi- 
ological, 120 ff., 321 ; sociolog- 
ical, 321 ; educational, 321 ; 
methods of, 321 f. ; the rela- 
tions of, to other sciences, 322 
ff. ; to the arts, 324 ff. ; to 
education, 325 ; to the personal 
conduct of life, 327 ff. 

Purposive action (See under 
Expression, connections of). 

Purposive thinking, 264 ff. ; and 
spontaneous thinking, 264 f . ; 
selection in, 265 f. ; and reas- 
oning, 267 ff. 

Qualities, feelings of, 19 ff. 
Quality, of sensations, 23 f. 

Range, of sensations, 28. 

Reactions, 17. 

Reasoning, described, 17, 267; 



350 



Index 



and feelings of relationship, 
62 f.; and feelings of mean- 
ing, 69 f.; and judgments, 
71 f. ; inductive and deductive, 
267 ff. ; factors in, 269 f.; 
training in, 270 f. 

Recency of connections, 166, 
207, 245 ff., 275. 

Reflexes, 15, 198. 

Relationships, feelings of, de- 
scribed, 7, 58 *•; attributes of, 
59 ff. ; classification of, 61 f.; 
and logical thought, 62; de- 
velopment of, 63 f . ; function 
of, 115 f.; psychological basis 
of, 174 ^ 

Relativity, law of, 228. 

Resistance, law of least, 164 f. 

Response, 17. 

Retzius, G., 154- 

Royce, J., 78. 

RUFFINI, ISS. 



Satisfaction, influence of on 
connections, 166, 200 ff., 245 
f., 265, 274 f.; the source of, 
315 ff- 

SCHAEFER, l60. • 

Scope of psychology, 3*9 ff- 

Scott, W. D., 289. 

Selection, 309 ff. (See also At- 
tention). 

Sensations, defined, 5, 19 ff. ; 
pure sensations, 21 ; elemen- 
tary sensations, 22 ; attributes, 
22 ff. ; classification of, 24 ff. ; 
and stimuli, 28 ff. ; and per- 
cepts, 39; and emotions, 75; 
functions of, 114 f. ; physio- 



logical basis of, 170 f. ; caused 
by movements, 306 ff. 

Sense organs, 154 ff.; and sen- 
sations, 24 ff. 

Sense stimuli, connections of 
with mental states (See Im- 
pression) ; connections of 
with movements, 302 f. 

Sensitivity of neurones, 144 f. 

Sensory neurones, 147 f. 

Sheath of Schwann, 134, 137. 

Similarity, association by, 243. 

Skill in movement, 298 ff. 

Social implications of mental 
life, 94. 

Spontaneous action (See Ex- 
pression, connections of). 

Spontaneous thinking (See As- 
sociations of Ideas). 

Starr, M. A., 121, 132, 136, 140. 

Steinthal, H., 251. 

Stimulus, 17 (See also under 
Sensations). 

Stricker, S., 47 f. 

Stout, G. R, 3, 31. 

Suggestion, 286 ff. 

Synapsis, 141. 

Tastes, 26, 29, 34. 
Things, feelings of, 35 ff. 
Threshold of sensations, 28. 
Titchener, E. B., 3, 41, 78. 

Van Gehuchten, A., 121, 122, 

123, 131, 133 138, 143, 152, 

153, 156, 157, 159- 
Variations in individuals (See 

Individual differences). 
Vision, binocular, 179 ff. (See 

also Sensations). 



Index 



351 



Volition {See Expression, con- 
nections of) . 

Voluntary {See Purposive : See 
also under Attention and Ex- 
pression, connections of). 



Weber's Law, 229, 233. 
Will, 7, 85 ff. {See also Ex- 
pression, connections of). 
Wish, 87. 

WUNDT, W., 77. 



